金融時報:孟德斯鳩大戰(zhàn)凱恩斯

孟德斯鳩大戰(zhàn)凱恩斯

法國思想家孟德斯鳩在《論法的精神》中有句名言：“商業(yè)的自然結果是帶來和平”，而英國經(jīng)濟學家凱恩斯則認為，自由貿(mào)易與資本流動反而可能燃起戰(zhàn)爭。從歷史和現(xiàn)實來看，誰說的對？

測試中可能遇到的詞匯和知識：

Enlightenment [?n'la?t(?)nm(?)nt; en-] 啟蒙運動

precept ['pri?sept] 格言，說教

Richard Cobden 科布登是英國商人和國會議員，英國自由貿(mào)易運動的領袖

Robert Schuman 法國外長，歐洲一體化的倡導者

plunder ['pl?nd?] 搶奪，劫掠

mercantilist ['m?:k?ntailist] 重商主義的，即鼓勵出口抑制進口以“創(chuàng)匯”的做法

tilt [t?lt] 傾斜

warmonger['w??m??g?] 戰(zhàn)爭販子，好戰(zhàn)分子

China and the fallacy that trade will always lead to peace （710 words）

By John Plender

Wars are often born of tribalism and nationalism reinforced by insecurities and arms races

Any reassurance the world may have derived from Beijing's repeated emphasis on China's “peaceful rise” has long since been swept away by increasingly threatening rhetoric, most notably towards Japan over the disputed Senkaku-Diaoyu islands. Indeed, the Pacific region looks set to become the testing ground for an old theory that has enjoyed a striking comeback thanks to globalisation: the notion that economic interdependence is conducive to peace.

Historically, the idea is associated with Montesquieu, the French Enlightenment thinker who believed moralistic philosophy and religious precept had failed to restrain man's destructive passions, but that these passions could be harnessed by the pursuit of material self-interest. In De l'esprit des lois, he declared that “the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace”.

In the 19th century, the economic liberal Richard Cobden extended the argument, saying that the principle of free trade would not only remove the desire to build empires, armies and navies but lead to benign global government. Such thinking was dealt a devastating blow by the outbreak of the first world war.

The blow was not quite fatal. After 1945, the proposal by Robert Schuman for a Franco-German coal and steel community, which later morphed into the EU, specifically aimed to bind France and Germany so close as, in the statesman's words, to make war “not only unthinkable but materially impossible”.

Perhaps the most powerful recent statement of this liberal internationalism comes from the Yale economist, Robert Shiller, who argues in his book, Finance and the Good Society, that financial interconnectedness may help prevent war because it provides “a civilised stage for the playing out of aggressive impulses … Thus financial development may lead to a kinder and gentler – if not altogether kind and gentle – society.”

If this argument has proved resilient, it might be because there is something in it. Developed countries no longer engage in wars of plunder against each other, although the developing world is another matter. It seems inconceivable, too, that German tanks will once again sweep into France, the Netherlands or Belgium. Yet whether that is down to economic interdependence or to the complex EU political ecosystem is moot. Moreover, the cold war provided France and Germany with a common enemy and a nuclear context that were conducive to a psychological shift away from militarism and nationalism.

China presents an overwhelming difficulty. It is highly interdependent. Between 2009 and 2011, trade accounted for 53 per cent of gross domestic product, compared with just 28 per cent for the US. Its pursuit of a mercantilist exchange rate policy has boosted official reserves to more than $3tn, which are substantially invested in the IOUs of its strategic rival. It is a big recipient of direct investment from the US, Japan and Europe.

In a phrase used by Prof Shiller, its “conflictual tendencies have space to roam”. Yet it is far from clear that this has led to a kinder, gentler society in China. To the modest extent that the country has become more liberal since 1978, interconnectedness has played a part. But this has stemmed more from the internet, which has proved hard for Beijing to control, than from trade.

More important, interdependence has done little to damp the nationalist instincts that have driven China's new assertiveness and prompted nationalistic responses in Japan and elsewhere. And that is the most powerful counter-argument to Montesquieu et al. Modern wars are more often a product of tribalism and nationalism reinforced by deep insecurities and arms races. There is also the risk that the ruling elite will, quite rationally, put its own interests before those of the nation. Since its legitimacy derives primarily from high economic growth, its survival in an economic crisis may depend on whipping up nationalist sentiment to the point of using force against its neighbours. In that event, Japan's US security guarantee will matter far more than economic links.

John Maynard Keynes, against Montesquieu and Cobden, argued in 1933 that free trade combined with capital mobility was likely to “set up strains and enmities” that were more likely to provoke war than inhibit warmongers. In the course of this century, China may yet tilt the argument in Keynes's direction.

請根據(jù)你所讀到的文章內容，完成以下自測題目：

1.What is correct about the old theory of “commerce leads to peace”?

A.It was first brought up by Montesquieu.

B.It suffered a serious blow during Richard Cobden's times.

C.It is questioned by Nobel laureate Robert Shiller.

D.It was one of the cornerstone ideas of EU.

答案(1)

2.What is “the most powerful counter-argument” to Montesquieu?

A.That moralistic philosophy and religious precept can prevent war.

B.That trade enhances war capacity of the nations.

C.That interdependence has done little to damp the nationalist instincts.

D.That trade may set up strains and enmities.

答案(2)

3.What is a fact about China?

A.China's exchange rate policy is mercantilist.

B.China has become freer thanks to international trade.

C.China is becoming more assertive and nationalistic.

D.China's trade/GDP ratio is about twice higher than US.

答案(3)

4.Was Keynes right, according to the writer?

A.Yes, because it was international trade that set up WWII.

B.Yes, because trade failed to stop WWII.

C.No, because the WWII was the last world war.

D.No, because commerce had guaranteed centuries of European peace.

答案(4)

* * *

(1)答案：D.It was one of the cornerstone ideas of EU.

解釋：A在文中并未提到。Historically, the idea is associated with…并不意味著這是他提出的。 B是錯誤的，事實上19世紀廢除《谷物法》后直到一戰(zhàn)，是自由貿(mào)易的黃金時代。C也與事實相反。

(2)答案：C.That interdependence has done little to damp the nationalist instincts.

解釋：這是倒數(shù)第二段第一句的原話。孟德斯鳩認為A與事實相反，而人們對物質的追求反而利于避免戰(zhàn)爭。 D是凱恩斯對孟德斯鳩的反駁。但不是作者眼中“最有力的”。

(3)答案：D.China's trade/GDP ratio is about twice higher than US.

解釋：ABC都是觀點，D才是事實。

(4)答案：B.Yes, because trade failed to stop WWII.

解釋：作者顯然是站在凱恩斯這邊的（從標題就能看出來），因此答案是B。 C是不對的，作者認為歐洲戰(zhàn)后的和平 whether that is down to economic interdependence or to the complex EU political ecosystem is moot. D與事實不符。

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