金融時(shí)報(bào):“了不起的蓋茨比陷阱”

“了不起的蓋茨比陷阱”

了不起的蓋茨比曲線 (The Great Gatsby Curve)指出，社會(huì)代際流動(dòng)性較大的國(guó)家，居民收入差距較小，拼爹程度越高的國(guó)家，收入差距越大。那么，哪些發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家貧富差距較大？近些年來，這些國(guó)家的“1%與99%”的差距加大的原因是什么？這有哪些危害？

測(cè)試中可能遇到的詞匯和知識(shí)：

symposium [s?m'p??z??m] n.討論會(huì)，專題論文集

Journal of Economic Perspectives JEP，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)的《經(jīng)濟(jì)展望雜志》，是世界上頂尖的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)期刊

old-boy network 校友會(huì)，校友關(guān)系網(wǎng)

largesse [lɑ?'(d)?es] n.慷慨的贈(zèng)與

file one's boots （吃的喝的）請(qǐng)隨意

governance arrangement 制度安排

plutocrat ['plu?t?kræts] n.富豪，財(cái)閥政治

also-ran 落選者，失敗者，備胎

let the matter drop 聽任事務(wù)發(fā)展

How the wealthy keep themselves on top (893 words)

By Tim Harford, FT "undercover economist"

When the world’s richest countries were booming, few people worried overmuch that the top 1 per cent were enjoying an ever-growing share of that prosperity. In the wake of a depression in the US, a fiscal chasm in the UK and an existential crisis in the eurozone – and the shaming of the world’s bankers – worrying about inequality is no longer the preserve of the far left.

There should be no doubt about the facts: the income share of the top 1 per cent has roughly doubled in the US since the early 1970s, and is now about 20 per cent. Much the same trend can be seen in Australia, Canada and the UK – although in each case the income share of the top 1 per cent is smaller. In France, Germany and Japan there seems to be no such trend. (The source is the World Top Incomes Database, summarised in the opening paper of a superb symposium in this summer’s Journal of Economic Perspectives.)

But should we care? There are two reasons we might: process and outcome. We might worry that the gains of the rich are ill-gotten: the result of the old-boy network, or fraud, or exploiting the largesse of the taxpayer. Or we might worry that the results are noxious: misery and envy, or ill-health, or dysfunctional democracy, or slow growth as the rich sit on their cash, or excessive debt and thus financial instability.

Following the crisis, it might be unfashionable to suggest that the rich actually earned their money. But knee-jerk banker-bashers should take a look at research by Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh, again in the JEP symposium. They simply compare the fate of the top earners across different lines of business. Worried that chief executives are filling their boots thanks to the weak governance of publicly listed companies? So am I, but partners in law firms are also doing very nicely, as are the bosses of privately owned companies, as are the managers of hedge funds, as are top sports stars. Governance arrangements in each case are different.

Perhaps, then, some broad social norm has shifted, allowing higher pay across the board? If so, we would expect publicly scrutinised salaries to be catching up with those who have more privacy – for instance, managers of privately held corporations. The reverse is the case.

The uncomfortable truth is that market forces – that is, the result of freely agreed contracts – are probably behind much of the rise in inequality. Globalisation and technological change favour the highly skilled. In the middle of the income distribution, a strong pair of arms, a willingness to work hard and a bit of common sense used to provide a comfortable income. No longer. Meanwhile at the very top, winner-take-all markets are emerging, where the best or luckiest entrepreneurs, fund managers, authors or athletes hoover up most of the gains. The idea that the fat cats simply stole everyone else’s cream is emotionally powerful; it is not entirely convincing.

In a well-functioning market, people only earn high incomes if they create enough economic value to justify those incomes. But even if we could be convinced that this was true, we do not have to let the matter drop.

This is partly because the sums involved are immense. Between 1993 and 2011, in the US, average incomes grew a modest 13.1 per cent in total. But the average income of the poorest 99 per cent – that is everyone up to families making about $370,000 a year – grew just 5.8 per cent. That gap is a measure of just how much the top 1 per cent are making. The stakes are high.

I set out two reasons why we might care about inequality: an unfair process or a harmful outcome. But what really should concern us is that the two reasons are not actually distinct after all. The harmful outcome and the unfair process feed each other. The more unequal a society becomes, the greater the incentive for the rich to pull up the ladder behind them.

At the very top of the scale, plutocrats can shape the conversation by buying up newspapers and television channels or funding political campaigns. The merely prosperous scramble desperately to get their children into the right neighbourhood, nursery, school, university and internship – we know how big the gap has grown between winners and also-rans.

Miles Corak, another contributor to the JEP debate, is an expert on intergenerational income mobility, the question of whether rich parents have rich children. The painful truth is that in the most unequal developed nations – the UK and the US – the intergenerational transmission of income is stronger. In more equal societies such as Denmark, the tendency of privilege to breed privilege is much lower.

This is what sticks in the throat about the rise in inequality: the knowledge that the more unequal our societies become, the more we all become prisoners of that inequality. The well-off feel that they must strain to prevent their children from slipping down the income ladder. The poor see the best schools, colleges, even art clubs and ballet classes, disappearing behind a wall of fees or unaffordable housing.

The idea of a free, market-based society is that everyone can reach his or her potential. Somewhere, we lost our way.

請(qǐng)根據(jù)你所讀到的文章內(nèi)容，完成以下自測(cè)題目：

1.In which developed country we cannot observe a widening income gap?

A. UK.

B. Canada.

C. Australia.

D. Germany.

答案(1)

2.Why should we care about the widening income gap, according to the writer?

A. It implies that the gains of the rich are ill-gotten.

B. It means the old-boy network is too strong a vested interest.

C. It might result in envy or dysfunctional democracy.

D. It is a result of slow growth as the rich sit on their cash.

答案(2)

3.What is not a cause for the widening income gap?

A. Chief executives of large companies are being paid too much.

B. Technological changes favor the highly skilled.

C. Winner-take-all markets are emerging.

D. Globalisation.

答案(3)

4.What is the "painful" conclusion drawn by the JEP resaerch by Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh?

A. Income gap is small in France, Germany and Japan.

B. Intergenerational income mobility has something to do with income equality.

C. Intergenerational transmission of income is higher in developed countries.

D. A free, market-based society is the best system to reduce the gap.

答案(4)

* * *

(1) 答案：D.Germany.

解釋：文中第二段說美國(guó)、澳大利亞、加拿大和英國(guó)都有“1%”的收入增速快于其他人的現(xiàn)象，而法國(guó)德國(guó)和日本則沒有了不起的蓋茨比曲線。

(2) 答案：C.It might result in envy or dysfunctional democracy.

解釋：為什么我們要擔(dān)憂呢？There are two reasons we might: process and outcome. 也就是說貧富差距加大的過程和結(jié)果讓人憂慮。AB如此確信是不嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)?，原文?zhǔn)確說法是We might worry that the gains of the rich are ill-gotten:；D是顛倒了因果，貧富差距加大可能導(dǎo)致增長(zhǎng)緩慢，因?yàn)楦蝗说恼w邊際消費(fèi)傾向低于窮人。

(3) 答案：A.Chief executives of large companies are being paid too much.

解釋： 作者用了不少筆墨來講自己也懷疑大公司首席執(zhí)行官總是千方百計(jì)給自己提高收入，但他們比小公司、未上市公司經(jīng)理人的收入增幅要?。ūO(jiān)督大公司的經(jīng)理人更困難）。這說明前面的假設(shè)是不成立的。 BCD是正確的，全球化和技術(shù)進(jìn)步讓高技能者收入大漲，而低技能者就沒這么好運(yùn)了：發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家大量把勞動(dòng)密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移到發(fā)展中國(guó)家。“贏者通吃市場(chǎng)”不難理解，facebook和微信都是一家公司統(tǒng)治一個(gè)行業(yè)的。

(4) 答案：B.Intergenerational income mobility has something to do with income equality.

解釋： C是偷換概念，原文意思是說，在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家中，代際流動(dòng)性較小的國(guó)家，收入差距較大。事實(shí)上發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的整體收入差距遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)小于發(fā)展中國(guó)家。B說法是準(zhǔn)確的。D也是錯(cuò)誤的，如之前的解釋，全球化和技術(shù)變革傾向于增大收入差距。A為什么會(huì)痛苦呢？