AND now I'll get back to October,1907.I bought a yacht and made all preparations to leave New York for a cruise in Southern waters.I am really daffy about fishing and this was the time when I was going to fish to my heart's content from my own yacht,going wherever I wished whenever I felt like it.Everything was ready.I had made a killing in stocks,but at the last moment corn held me back.
I must explain that before the money panic which gave me my first million I had been trading in grain at Chicago.I was short ten million bushels of wheat and ten million bushels of corn.I had studied the grain markets for a long time and was as bearish on corn and wheat as I had been on stocks.
Well,they both started down,but while wheat kept on declining the biggest of all the Chicago operators—I'll call him Stratton—took it into his head to run a corner in corn.After I cleaned up in stocks and was ready to go South on my yacht I found that wheat showed me a handsome profit,but in corn Stratton had run up the price and I had quite a loss.
I knew there was much more corn in the country than the price indicated.The law of demand and supply worked as always.But the demand came chiefly from Stratton and the supply was not coming at all,because there was an acute congestion in the movement of corn.I remember that I used to pray for a cold spell that would freeze the impassable roads and enable the farmers to bring their corn into the market.But no such luck.
There I was,waiting to go on my joyously planned fishing trip and that loss in corn holding me back.I couldn't go away with the market as it was.Of course Stratton kept pretty close tabs on the short interest.He knew he had me,and I knew it quite as well as he did.But,as I said,I was hoping I might convince the weather that it ought to get busy and help me.Perceiving that neither the weather nor any other kindly wonder-worker was paying any attention to my needs I studied how I might work out of my difficulty by my own efforts.
I closed out my line of wheat at a good profit.But the problem in corn was infinitely more difficult.If I could have covered my ten million bushels at the prevailing prices I instantly and gladly would have done so,large though the loss would have been.But,of course,the moment I started to buy in my corn Stratton would be on the job as squeezer in chief,and I no more relished running up the price on myself by reason of my own purchases than cutting my own throat with my own knife.
Strong though corn was,my desire to go fishing was even stronger,so it was up to me to find a way out at once.I must conduct a strategic retreat.I must buy back the ten million bushels I was short of and in so doing keep down my loss as much as I possibly could.
It so happened that Stratton at that time was also running a deal in oats and had the market pretty well sewed up.I had kept track of all the grain markets in the way of crop news and pit gossip,and I heard that the powerful Armour interests were not friendly,marketwise,to Stratton.Of course I knew that Stratton would not let me have the corn I needed except at his own price,but the moment I heard the rumors about Armour being against Stratton it occurred to me that I might look to the Chicago traders for aid.The only way in which they could possibly help me was for them to sell me the corn that Stratton wouldn't.The rest was easy.
First,I put in orders to buy five hundred thousand bushels of corn every eighth of a cent down.After these orders were in I gave to each of four houses an order to sell simultaneously fifty thousand bushels of oats at the market.That,I figured,ought to make a quick break in oats.Knowing how the traders' minds worked,it was a cinch that they would instantly think that Armour was gunning for Stratton.Seeing the attack opened in oats they would logically conclude that the next break would be in corn and they would start to sell it.If that corner in corn was busted,the pickings would be fabulous.
My dope on the psychology of the Chicago traders was absolutely correct.When they saw oats breaking on the scattered selling they promptly jumped on corn and sold it with great enthusiasm.I was able to buy six million bushels of corn in the next ten minutes.The moment I found that their selling of corn ceased I simply bought in the other four million bushels at the market.Of course that made the price go up again,but the net result of my manoeuvre was that I covered the entire line of ten million bushels within one-half cent of the price prevailing at the time I started to cover on the traders' selling.The two hundred thousand bushels of oats that I sold short to start the traders' selling of corn I covered at a loss of only three thousand dollars.That was pretty cheap bear bait.The profits I had made in wheat offset so much of my deficit in corn that my total loss on all my grain trades that time was only twenty-five thousand dollars.Afterwards corn went up twenty-five cents a bushed.Stratton undoubtedly had me at his mercy.If I had set about buying my ten million bushels of corn without bothering to think of the price there is no telling what I would have had to pay.
A man can't spend years at one thing and not acquire a habitual attitude towards it quite unlike that of the average beginner.The difference distinguishes the professional from the amateur.It is the way a man looks at things that makes or loses money for him in the speculative markets.The public has the dilettante's point of view toward his own effort.The ego obtrudes itself unduly and the thinking therefore is not deep or exhaustive.The professional concerns himself with doing the right thing rather than with making money,knowing that the profit takes care of itself if the other things are attended to.A trader gets to play the game as the professional billiard player does—that is,he looks far ahead instead of considering the particular shot before him.It gets to be an instinct to play for position.
I remember hearing a story about Addison Cammack that illustrates very nicely what I wish to point out.From all I have heard,I am inclined to think that Cammack was one of the ablest stock traders the Street ever saw.He was not a chronic bear as many believe,but he felt the greater appeal of trading on the bear side,of utilising in his behalf the two great human factors of hope and fear.He is credited with coining the warning:“Don't sell stocks when the sap is running up the trees!”and the old-timers tell me that his biggest winnings were made on the bull side,so that it is plain he did not play prejudices but conditions.At all events,he was a consummate trader.It seems that once—this was way back at the tag end of a bull market—Cammack was bearish,and J.Arthur Joseph,the financial writer and raconteur,knew it.The market,however,was not only strong but still rising,in response to prodding by the bull leaders and optimistic reports by the newspapers.Knowing what use a trader like Cammack could make of bearish information,Joseph rushed to Cammack's office one day with glad tidings.
“Mr.Cammack,I have a very good friend who is a transfer clerk in the St.Paul office and he has just told me something which I think you ought to know.”
“What is it?”asked Cammack listlessly.
“You've turned,haven't you?You are bearish now?”asked Joseph,to make sure.If Cammack wasn't interested he wasn't going to waste precious ammunition.
“Yes.What's the wonderful information?”
“I went around to the St.Paul office today,as I do in my news-gathering rounds two or three times a week,and my friend there said to me:‘The Old Man is selling stock.’He meant William Rockefeller.‘Is he really,Jimmy?’I said to him,and he answered,‘Yes;he is selling fifteen hundred shares every three-eighths of a point up.I've been transferring the stock for two or three days now.’I didn't lose any time,but came right over to tell you.”
Cammack was not easily excited,and,moreover,was so accustomed to having all manner of people rush madly into his office with all manner of news,gossip,rumors,tips and lies that he had grown distrustful of them all.He merely said now,“Are you sure you heard right,Joseph?”
“Am I sure?Certainly I am sure!Do you think I am deaf?”said Joseph.
“Are you sure of your man?”
“Absolutely!”declared Joseph.“I've known him for years.He has never lied to me.He wouldn't!No object!I know he is absolutely reliable and I'd stake my life on what he tells me.I know him as well as I know anybody in this world—a great deal better than you seem to know me,after all these years.”
“Sure of him,eh?”And Cammack again looked at Joseph.Then he said,“Well,you ought to know.”He called his broker,W.B.Wheeler.Joseph expected to hear him give an order to sell at least fifty thousand shares of St.Paul.William Rockefeller was disposing of his holdings in St.Paul,taking advantage of the strength of the market.Whether it was investment stock or speculative holdings was irrelevant.The one important fact was that the best stock trader of the Standard Oil crowd was getting out of St.Paul.What would the average man have done if he had received the news from a trustworthy source?No need to ask.
But Cammack,the ablest bear operator of his day,who was bearish on the market just then,said to his broker,“Billy,go over to the board and buy fifteen hundred St.Paul every three-eighths up.”The stock was then in the nineties.
“Don't you mean sell?”interjected Joseph hastily.He was no novice in Wall Street,but he was thinking of the market from the point of view of the newspaper man and,incidentally,of the general public.The price certainly ought to go down on the news of inside selling.And there was no better inside selling than Mr.William Rockefeller's.The Standard Oil getting out and Cammack buying!It couldn't be!
“No,”said Cammack;“I mean buy!”
“Don't you believe me?”
“Yes !”
“Don't you believe my information?”
“Yes.”
“Aren't you bearish?”
“Yes.”
“Well,then?”
“That's why I'm buying.Listen to me now:You keep in touch with that reliable friend of yours and the moment the scaled selling stops,let me know.Instantly!Do you understand?”
“Yes,”said Joseph,and went away,not quite sure he could fathom Cammack's motives in buying William Rockefeller's stock.It was the knowledge that Cammack was bearish on the entire market that made his manoeuvre so difficult to explain.However,Joseph saw his friend the transfer clerk and told him he wanted to be tipped off when the Old Man got through selling.Regularly twice a day Joseph called on his friend to inquire.
One day the transfer clerk told him,“There isn't any more stock coming from the Old Man.”Joseph thanked him and ran to Cammack's office with the information.
Cammack listened attentively,turned to Wheeler and asked,“Billy,how much St.Paul have we got in the office?”Wheeler looked it up and reported that they had accumulated about sixty thousand shares.
Cammack,being bearish,had been putting out short lines in the other Grangers as well as in various other stocks,even before he began to buy St.Paul.He was now heavily short of the market.He promptly ordered Wheeler to sell the sixty thousand shares of St.Paul that they were long of,and more besides.He used his long holdings of St.Paul as a lever to depress the general list and greatly benefit his operations for a decline.
St.Paul didn't stop on that move until it reached forty-four and Cammack made a killing in it.He played his cards with consummate skill and profited accordingly.The point I would make is his habitual attitude toward trading.He didn't have to reflect.He saw instantly what was far more important to him than his profit on that one stock.He saw that he had providentially been offered an opportunity to begin his big bear operations not only at the proper time but with a proper initial push.The St.Paul tip made him buy instead of sell because he saw at once that it gave him a vast supply of the best ammunition for his bear campaign.
To get back to myself.After I closed my trade in wheat and corn I went South in my yacht.I cruised about in Florida waters,having a grand old time.The fishing was great.Everything was lovely.I didn't have a care in the world and I wasn't looking for any.
One day I went ashore at Palm Beach.I met a lot of Wall Street friends and others.They were all talking about the most picturesque cotton speculator of the day.A report from New York had it that Percy Thomas had lost every cent.It wasn't a commercial bankruptcy;merely the rumor of the world-famous operator's second Waterloo in the cotton market.
I had always felt a great admiration for him.The first I ever heard of him was through the newspapers at the time of the failure of the Stock Exchange house of Sheldon & Thomas,when Thomas tried to corner cotton.Sheldon,who did not have the vision or the courage of his partner,got cold feet on the very verge of success.At least,so the Street said at the time.At all events,instead of making a killing they made one of the most sensational failures in years.I forget how many millions.The firm was wound up and Thomas went to work alone.He devoted himself exclusively to cotton and it was not long before he was on his feet again.He paid off his creditors in full with interest—debts he was not legally obliged to discharge—and withal had a million dollars left for himself.His comeback in the cotton market was in its way as remarkable as Deacon S.V.White's famous stock-market exploit of paying off one million dollars in one year.Thomas' pluck and brains made me admire him immensely.
Everybody in Palm Beach was talking about the collapse of Thomas' deal in March cotton.You know how the talk goes—and grows;the amount of misinformation and exaggeration and improvements that you hear.Why,I've seen a rumor about myself grow so that the fellow who started it did not recognise it when it came back to him in less than twenty-four hours,swollen with new and picturesque details.
The news of Percy Thomas' latest misadventure turned my mind from the fishing to the cotton market.I got files of the trade papers and read them to get a line on conditions.When I got back to New York I gave myself up to studying the market.Everybody was bearish and everybody was selling July cotton.You know how people are.I suppose it is the contagion of example that makes a man do something because everybody around him is doing the same thing.Perhaps it is some phase or variety of the herd instinct.In any case it was,in the opinion of hundreds of traders,the wise and proper thing to sell July cotton—and so safe too!You couldn't call that general selling reckless;the word is too conservative.The traders simply saw one side to the market and a great big profit.They certainly expected a collapse in prices.
I saw all this,of course,and it struck me that the chaps who were short didn't have a terrible lot of time to cover in.The more I studied the situation the clearer I saw this,until I finally decided to buy July cotton.I went to work and quickly bought one hundred thousand bales.I experienced no trouble in getting it because it came from so many sellers.It seemed to me that I could have offered a reward of one million dollars for the capture,dead or alive,of a single trader who was not selling July cotton and nobody would have claimed it.
I should say this was in the latter part of May.I kept buying more and they kept on selling it to me until I had picked up all the floating contracts and I had one hundred and twenty thousand bales.A couple of days after I had bought the last of it it began to go up.Once it started the market was kind enough to keep on doing very well indeed—that is,it went up from forty to fifty points a day.
One Saturday—this was about ten days after I began operations—the price began to creep up.I did not know whether there was any more July cotton for sale.It was up to me to find out,so I waited until the last ten minutes.At that time,I knew,it was usual for those fellows to be short and if the market closed up for the day they would be safely hooked.So I sent in four different orders to buy five thousand bales each,at the market,at the same time.That ran the price up thirty points and the shorts were doing their best to wriggle away.The market closed at the top.All I did,remember,was to buy that last twenty thousand bales.
The next day was Sunday.But on Monday,Liverpool was due to open up twenty points to be on a parity with the advance in New York.Instead,it came fifty points higher.That meant that Liverpool had exceeded our advance by 100 per cent.I had nothing to do with the rise in that market.This showed me that my deductions had been sound and that I was trading along the line of least resistance.At the same time I was not losing sight of the fact that I had a whopping big line to dispose of.A market may advance sharply or rise gradually and yet not possess the power to absorb more than a certain amount of selling.
Of course the Liverpool cables made our own market wild.But I noticed the higher it went the scarcer July cotton seemed to be.I wasn't letting go any of mine.Altogether that Monday was an exciting and not very cheerful day for the bears;but for all that,I could detect no signs of an impending bear panic;no beginnings of a blind stampede to cover.And I had one hundred and forty thousand bales for which I must find a market.
On Tuesday morning as I was walking to my office I met a friend at the entrance of the building.
“That was quite a story in the World this morning,”he said with a smile.
“What story?”I asked.
“What?Do you mean to tell me you haven't seen it?”
“I never see the World,”I said.“What is the story?”
“Why,it's all about you.It says you've got July cotton cornered.”
“I haven't seen it,”I told him and left him.I don't know whether he believed me or not.He probably thought it was highly inconsiderate of me not to tell him whether it was true or not.
When I got to the office I sent out for a copy of the paper.Sure enough,there it was,on the front page,in big headlines:
JULY COTTON CORNERED BY LARRY LIVINGSTON
Of course I knew at once that the article would play the dickens with the market.If I had deliberately studied ways and means of disposing of my one hundred and forty thousand bales to the best advantage I couldn't have hit upon a better plan.It would not have been possible to find one.That article at that very moment was being read all over the country either in the World or in other papers quoting it.It had been cabled to Europe.That was plain from the Liverpool prices.That market was simply wild.No wonder,with such news.
Of course I knew what New York would do,and what I ought to do.The market here opened at ten o'clock.At ten minutes after ten I did not own any cotton.I let them have every one of my one hundred and forty thousand bales.For most of my line I received what proved to be the top prices of the day.The traders made the market for me.All I really did was to see a heaven-sent opportunity to get rid of my cotton.I grasped it because I couldn't help it.What else could I do?
The problem that I knew would take a great deal of hard thinking to solve was thus solved for me by an accident.If the World had not published that article I never would have been able to dispose of my line without sacrificing the greater portion of my paper profits.Selling one hundred and forty thousand bales of July cotton without sending the price down was a trick beyond my powers.But the World story turned it for me very nicely.
Why the World published it I cannot tell you.I never knew.I suppose the writer was tipped off by some friend in the cotton market and he thought he was printing a scoop.I didn't see him or anybody from the World.I didn't know it was printed that morning until after nine o'clock;and if it had not been for my friend calling my attention to it I would not have known it then.
Without it I wouldn't have had a market big enough to unload in.That is one trouble about trading on a large scale.You cannot sneak out as you can when you pike along.You cannot always sell out when you wish or when you think it wise.You have to get out when you can;when you have a market that will absorb your entire line.Failure to grasp the opportunity to get out may cost you millions.You cannot hesitate.If you do you are lost.Neither can you try stunts like running up the price on the bears by means of competitive buying,for you may thereby reduce the absorbing capacity.And I want to tell you that perceiving your opportunity is not as easy as it sounds.A man must be on the lookout so alertly that when his chance sticks in its head at his door he must grab it.
Of course not everybody knew about my fortunate accident.In Wall Street,and,for that matter,everywhere else,any accident that makes big money for a man is regarded with suspicion.When the accident is unprofitable it is never considered an accident but the logical outcome of your hoggishness or of the swelled head.But when there is a profit they call it loot and talk about how well unscrupulousness fares,and how ill conservatism and decency.
It was not only the evil-minded shorts smarting under punishment brought about by their own recklessness who accused me of having deliberately planned the coup.Other people thought the same thing.
One of the biggest men in cotton in the entire world met me a day or two later and said,“That was certainly the slickest deal you ever put over,Livingston.I was wondering how much you were going to lose when you came to market that line of yours.You knew this market was not big enough to take more than fifty or sixty thousand bales without selling off,and how you were going to work off the rest and not lose all your paper profits was beginning to interest me.I didn't think of your scheme.It certainly was slick.”
“I had nothing to do with it,”I assured him as earnestly as I could.
But all he did was to repeat:“Mighty slick,my boy.Mighty slick!Don't be so modest!”
It was after that deal that some of the papers referred to me as the Cotton King.But,as I said,I really was not entitled to that crown.It is not necessary to tell you that there is not enough money in the United States to buy the columns of the New York World or enough personal pull to secure the publication of a story like that.It gave me an utterly unearned reputation that time.
But I have not told this story to moralize on the crowns that are sometimes pressed down upon the brows of undeserving traders or to emphasize the need of seizing the opportunity,no matter when or how it comes.My object merely was to account for the vast amount of newspaper notoriety that came to me as the result of my deal in July cotton.If it hadn't been for the newspapers I never would have met that remarkable man,Percy Thomas.
現(xiàn)在讓我回過頭來繼續(xù)講1907年10月的事情。我買了一艘游艇,做好所有準(zhǔn)備,離開紐約去南邊游玩。我太喜歡釣魚了,現(xiàn)在有了游艇,我想去哪里都行,什么時(shí)候去都可以,只要我愿意的話。一切準(zhǔn)備都做好了,我在股票上賺了很多錢??墒?,臨到最后時(shí),玉米期貨市場把我留了下來。
我必須解釋一下,在那次我遇到的第一個(gè)100萬的資金恐慌前,我就在芝加哥做過谷物期貨。我各做了1000萬蒲式耳的小麥和玉米的空頭,我對(duì)這個(gè)市場研究了很久,就像看淡股市一樣,我也看淡谷物市場。
谷物一直在下跌。當(dāng)小麥下跌嚴(yán)重時(shí),芝加哥的一個(gè)大玩家——我們把他稱作斯特雷登吧——想壟斷玉米市場。我把股票全部清盤后,準(zhǔn)備乘游艇去游玩,卻發(fā)現(xiàn)自己在小麥?zhǔn)袌錾嫌泻艽蟮母?dòng)利潤。因?yàn)樗固乩椎前延衩變r(jià)格抬得很高,我承受著很大的浮動(dòng)虧損。
我知道玉米存貨量不少,供需法則總是會(huì)發(fā)揮作用。可是需求主要來自斯特雷登,供應(yīng)卻比較匱乏,因?yàn)榻煌ú缓脤?dǎo)致玉米沒法運(yùn)送。我曾祈愿要是有魔法相助多好,讓農(nóng)民們能把玉米送到市場中來,可惜這是不可能的。
事情就是這樣,當(dāng)我即將開始計(jì)劃已久的釣魚之旅時(shí),玉米的虧損把我拉住了。市場這個(gè)樣子,我沒法走脫。當(dāng)然了,斯特雷登很注意空頭,我完全被他抓在股掌之間,而我也清楚這一點(diǎn)??墒?,就像我說的那樣,我把希望寄托在天氣上。但當(dāng)我覺得天氣和其他好心人都沒辦法幫我時(shí),我就將精力放在了研究如何靠自己來擺脫這種困境上。
我把小麥頭寸平了,得到了比較高的利潤。玉米的事情卻非常艱難,我若用當(dāng)時(shí)的價(jià)格回補(bǔ)我的1000萬蒲式耳玉米的話,我會(huì)很高興地立刻這樣做,雖然這樣損失會(huì)特別大??僧?dāng)我一開始買進(jìn)玉米,斯特雷登就會(huì)全心全力成為主要軋空我的人,我可不愿意因?yàn)槲易约嘿I進(jìn),而抬高我要付出的價(jià)格,就像我不喜歡拿刀子割自己的喉嚨一樣。
玉米雖然很強(qiáng)勁,可我想去釣魚的愿望更加強(qiáng)烈。因此我要立即想方設(shè)法行動(dòng)起來,進(jìn)行一次戰(zhàn)略性撤退。我需要把我做空頭的那1000萬蒲式耳買進(jìn)來,而且要盡力把損失降到最低。
事有湊巧,當(dāng)時(shí)斯特雷登也玩著一大把燕麥,牢牢地壟斷了市場。我搜集了有關(guān)谷物市場的很多新聞與消息,研究它們的市場走向。據(jù)說很有實(shí)力的阿莫爾與斯特雷登關(guān)系不好,我也知道除非我按照他的價(jià)格買進(jìn),不然他不會(huì)讓我買到我需要的玉米。所以我立刻想到要去阿莫爾那里找辦法,尋求幫助。他們要幫助我,只有一個(gè)辦法,就是把斯特雷登不肯賣給我的玉米賣給我,那接下來的事情就好辦了。
我先是發(fā)了一些單子出去,每當(dāng)降低1/8美分的時(shí)候,就買50萬蒲式耳的玉米。等這些單子生效了,我就讓四個(gè)經(jīng)紀(jì)人以市價(jià)賣出50萬蒲式耳的燕麥。我清楚那些交易商的想法,他們肯定會(huì)覺得是阿莫爾要跟斯特雷登開戰(zhàn)了。他們看到有人損壓燕麥之后,一定會(huì)很合理地?cái)喽ㄏ乱粋€(gè)就會(huì)是玉米了,因此他們會(huì)賣掉玉米,從而打破壟斷局面。那可賺的就多了。
我對(duì)芝加哥投機(jī)商這種心理的判斷絕對(duì)正確。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)各地來的賣單敲開燕麥的價(jià)格壟斷后,立刻開始打壓玉米,迫不及待地開始往外賣。十分鐘時(shí)間,我就買了600萬蒲式耳的玉米。等我發(fā)現(xiàn)他們停止往外拋售玉米的時(shí)候,我干脆用市價(jià)買了另外400萬蒲式耳,這就讓價(jià)格又上漲了。我這樣做的結(jié)果是,在拋售浪潮中,我用很好的價(jià)格回補(bǔ)了整整1000萬蒲式耳的玉米頭寸,價(jià)格跟我趁交易者賣出開始回補(bǔ)時(shí)的行情,差距在0.5美分之內(nèi)。而且,我拿出來誘出投機(jī)商的那20萬蒲式耳燕麥,只帶來了3000美元的損失,這是特別廉價(jià)的投入。同時(shí),我在小麥上賺到的錢,又把玉米的虧損補(bǔ)回來了。如此一來,我在谷物市場只損失了2.5萬美元。這個(gè)事情之后,玉米每蒲式耳上漲了25美分。如果不管價(jià)格買進(jìn)1000萬蒲式耳玉米的話,損失可就無法估量了。
同一件事情,不能花了幾年時(shí)間,還沒有形成正確的做事態(tài)度,這是專業(yè)人士與業(yè)余人員的區(qū)別。如何對(duì)待事物,決定了人們在市場中是賺還是賠。一般人對(duì)自己的付出持有的觀點(diǎn)很不專業(yè),容易自高自大,思考也深入不下去。專業(yè)人士則重視做事的正確性,不只是賺錢,因?yàn)樗麄兦宄M力把事情做好,錢自然就能賺到。交易者在玩這種游戲時(shí)要像撞球?qū)<乙粯?,看到前面很多步,而不要僅僅盯著眼前這一桿。為了爭取優(yōu)越而操作,必須變成一種直覺。
我記得好像聽過一個(gè)有關(guān)艾迪生·科馬克的故事,這是個(gè)特別恰當(dāng)?shù)膶?shí)例。以我所聞,科馬克是華爾街最有能力的股票作手之一,他不像很多人認(rèn)為的那樣總是在做空頭。他覺得利用希望和恐懼兩大人性因素,來幫助他做空是很有用的。他編造了這樣一句警語:“在元?dú)膺€在上升的時(shí)候,不要放空股票!”老前輩告訴我說,他賺得最多的錢都是做多賺來的,所以顯然他炒股不片面,只根據(jù)實(shí)況來,確實(shí)是個(gè)很有水平的商人。有一次,離牛市結(jié)束還有一段時(shí)間,科馬克就很不看好后市。不過當(dāng)時(shí)市場還很強(qiáng)勁,股價(jià)一直在上漲——這都是多頭集團(tuán)和報(bào)紙報(bào)道造成的現(xiàn)況。一個(gè)叫喬瑟夫的喜歡傳播消息的金融記者知道后找到科馬克。他明白像科馬克這樣的人,非常需要利空的消息。
“科馬克先生,我有個(gè)好朋友在圣保羅公司工作過,他剛才對(duì)我說了些事情,我認(rèn)為你應(yīng)該知道才對(duì)?!?/p>
“什么事?”科馬克顯得愛理不理。
“你改變方向了嗎?你現(xiàn)在對(duì)后市不太看好吧?”喬瑟夫?yàn)榱烁闱鍫顩r,想知道科馬克有沒有興趣,要是沒有的話,他也用不著浪費(fèi)寶貴的子彈。
“是啊。到底什么好消息?”
“今天,我去圣保羅公司了,每周我都會(huì)去采訪兩三次,我朋友對(duì)我說,老頭子在賣股票,他說的是威廉·洛克菲勒。股價(jià)每每上漲3/8個(gè)點(diǎn),洛克菲勒就賣出1500股。這兩天他一直忙著賣。我可沒耽誤時(shí)間,立馬就來對(duì)你說了?!?/p>
科馬克可不是個(gè)沉不住氣的人,而且他已經(jīng)對(duì)各色人等沖進(jìn)辦公室這樣的事習(xí)以為常了,這些人通常都會(huì)帶來些亂七八糟的東西,他根本不信任他們了,所以他說道:“你肯定沒聽錯(cuò)吧,喬瑟夫?”
“我肯定,必須肯定。你覺得我是聾子嗎?”喬瑟夫說。
“那你相信你的朋友嗎?”
“絕對(duì)相信!”喬瑟夫說,“我們認(rèn)識(shí)好多年了,他從來沒對(duì)我說過謊,他絕對(duì)不會(huì)說謊。他非??煽?,我可以拿性命來為他的話擔(dān)保,在這個(gè)世界上我最了解他——遠(yuǎn)比你我認(rèn)識(shí)這么多年之后,你對(duì)我的了解還要深很多啊?!?/p>
“確定,沒錯(cuò)吧?”科馬克又看著喬瑟夫說,“好吧,你應(yīng)該沒錯(cuò)?!彼皝砹艘粋€(gè)營業(yè)員惠勒爾。喬瑟夫以為他會(huì)下單賣掉5萬股圣保羅股票。威廉·洛克菲勒正在拋售圣保羅公司的股票,不管是投機(jī)股還是投資股,都沒關(guān)系,最重要的事實(shí)是最高明的股票作手洛克菲勒想從圣保羅公司退出來。一個(gè)正常人聽到這個(gè)可靠的消息會(huì)怎么辦呢?根本不用問。
可是,科馬克——這一時(shí)期最優(yōu)秀的空頭股票操控者,當(dāng)時(shí)已經(jīng)看淡了后市——卻對(duì)營業(yè)員說:“比利,去交易所,每每上漲3/8美分就買進(jìn)圣保羅的1500股?!蹦菚r(shí)候這只股票的價(jià)格是90美元左右。
“你說的是賣吧?”喬瑟夫插嘴說,他并不是華爾街的新人,可他對(duì)待市場的方式還是新聞人士,也就是普通大眾的樣子。因?yàn)閮?nèi)幕人士在拋售,價(jià)格自然會(huì)下跌,可哪個(gè)賣家還能比洛克菲勒更牛呢。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)石油公司正在拋售,科馬克卻在買進(jìn),怎么可能呢!
“不,”科馬克說,“我說的是買入?!?/p>
“你不信任我?”
“不是,我信任?!?/p>
“你不相信我的情報(bào)?”
“我相信?!?/p>
“你現(xiàn)在不看好后市吧?”
“對(duì)?!?/p>
“那你這是要做什么呀?”
“這就是我為什么要買入。你聽我說,你去跟你朋友繼續(xù)聯(lián)系,要是洛克菲勒停止了賣股票,就趕緊告訴我,快去吧,聽明白沒?”
“好的。”喬瑟夫說完就走了。他不知道是不是真明白了科馬克的意思??岂R克看淡市場,使他的操作更沒法讓人理解。不過,喬瑟夫還是去找他那個(gè)朋友了,告訴了他科馬克的意思,而且每天打兩次電話詢問情況。
有一天,喬瑟夫的朋友對(duì)他說:“老頭子不賣股票了?!眴躺蚋兄x了他,然后來找科馬克。
科馬克專心聽他說完,轉(zhuǎn)身問惠勒爾:“我們現(xiàn)在大概有多少圣保羅公司的股票?”惠勒爾查看后說,大概是6萬股。
科馬克一直做空,早在買入圣保羅股票之前,他就賣掉了很多其他公司的股票,是整個(gè)市場的大空頭。他馬上讓惠勒爾賣掉那6萬股圣保羅股票,當(dāng)作是打壓市場的武器,使他的空頭操作大大獲利。
圣保羅跌到了44美元,科馬克大賺了一把。他用絕佳的技巧來操作,我認(rèn)為最重要的是他對(duì)市場交易的習(xí)慣感知,他很敏感地看到了比單獨(dú)靠這個(gè)股票來賺錢還要重要很多的東西,他發(fā)現(xiàn)了一個(gè)全面施展做空的絕佳機(jī)會(huì)。他靠著圣保羅股票的消息買入而不是賣出,原因是他明白這是一個(gè)積累籌碼的最好時(shí)機(jī)。
要回過頭來說說我自己了。我結(jié)束小麥和玉米的交易后,坐游艇去了南邊海域。我在佛羅里達(dá)州玩得特別痛快,釣魚也很順利。一切都看上去很美。我不用去想這個(gè)世界上的任何事情,更不想去獲得什么東西。
有一天,我到了棕櫚灘,看到很多來自華爾街的朋友,他們在聊棉花期貨市場的事情。從紐約傳來消息說,珀西·托馬斯賠掉了血本,這是這位厲害角色在棉花市場上第二次遭受巨大失敗。
我很佩服托馬斯這個(gè)人。初次聽說他是通過報(bào)紙,當(dāng)時(shí)證券交易所會(huì)員公司謝爾頓·托馬斯公司倒閉,那個(gè)時(shí)候,托馬斯想到壟斷棉花市場,可是謝爾頓卻沒那么大的魄力和眼界,在快成功時(shí)害怕了。反正整個(gè)華爾街都是這么傳的。他們不但沒賺到錢,還遭遇了多年的大賠本。我記不清他們賠了多少錢,總之公司破產(chǎn)了,托馬斯和謝爾頓也分道揚(yáng)鑣了。后來托馬斯轉(zhuǎn)過來把所有精力都用在了棉花交易上,沒多久就東山再起,不但還清了所有的債,包括那些法律規(guī)定的并不需要還清的部分,還剩下了100萬。他在棉花市場的東山再起的事跡,和“老手白”在股市的著名杰作一樣讓人驚嘆,老手白在一年里靠股市操作,還清了100萬美元的債務(wù)。托馬斯的勇氣和頭腦使我非常景仰他。
棕櫚灘的所有人都在說3月托馬斯在棉花市場遭遇滑鐵盧的事情,你明白他們會(huì)怎樣以訛傳訛的。我曾經(jīng)遇到過一個(gè)關(guān)于我的謠言,也是這樣被夸大其詞、添油加醋地傳播的,以至于在不到一天時(shí)間內(nèi),當(dāng)這個(gè)謠言重新傳回最初編造這個(gè)謠言的那個(gè)人耳朵里時(shí),他都不知道是怎么回事了。謠言已經(jīng)被增添得枝繁葉茂了。
托馬斯事件也改變了我的想法,我不想再繼續(xù)度假了,我要回到棉花市場中去。我找了很多交易文件認(rèn)真研讀,想了解清楚事實(shí)。回到紐約,我看到所有人都在做空頭,大賣7月棉花期貨。我覺得人們就像得了傳染病,誰去做什么,是因?yàn)樗車娜硕荚谶@么做,或許這是群眾心理的某種階段或變化。不管怎樣,很多人都覺得賣掉是最聰明最安全的做法。交易的人們只看到了市場的一面和有可能出現(xiàn)的暴利。他們的的確確覺得價(jià)格會(huì)崩潰。
我肯定也看到了這些情況,但是我想到放空的那些人是沒多少時(shí)間回補(bǔ)的。我分析得越深入,就搞得越清楚,最后做出了買進(jìn)7月棉花的決定。我開始著手實(shí)施,買了10萬包,這很容易辦到,大量的人都在賣出。在我看來,我甚至可以懸賞100萬美元,不論死活,抓一個(gè)沒有賣7月棉花的人,肯定沒有人來領(lǐng)賞。
那時(shí)候是5月下旬,我不停地買進(jìn),他們不停地賣出。我把所有賣出的全部買了以后,一共是12萬包棉花。我停手后沒兩天,棉花開始漲價(jià),市場狀態(tài)特別好,一天內(nèi)就漲了四五十點(diǎn)。
我開始買入棉花十多天后,一個(gè)周六,價(jià)格上漲的速度放慢了。我不清楚是不是有人還想賣,所以一直等著,到了閉市前的最后十分鐘。我知道這個(gè)時(shí)間經(jīng)常是空頭入市的時(shí)候,如果高位收盤,他們肯定會(huì)被我套住。所以,我發(fā)出了四張不同的單子,同時(shí)以市價(jià)各買進(jìn)5000包,把價(jià)格拉高了30個(gè)點(diǎn),那些做空的人慌不擇路了。市場在最高價(jià)收盤了,請(qǐng)知悉,我只是買了2萬包棉花。
第二天是周日,等到周一時(shí),利物浦本來高開20點(diǎn)就能配合紐約的市場行情,沒想到它高開了50個(gè)點(diǎn),這就是說利物浦的漲勢超過我們的漲勢百分之百。利物浦市場走高與我是沒關(guān)系的,這個(gè)情況說明了我的推斷是正確的,我是按照最小阻力線完成的交易。當(dāng)然我也不會(huì)忘記,我手上有大批的棉花要脫手。市場能夠暴漲,也能夠緩緩上漲,可它的容量也有限度。
利物浦的消息引發(fā)我們的市場狂漲,可是我卻發(fā)現(xiàn)漲得越高,7月棉花的成交量卻越少。我準(zhǔn)備一點(diǎn)兒都不賣??偟膩碚f,周一對(duì)空頭來說,就是很崩潰的日子。不過,我也沒發(fā)現(xiàn)任何空頭驚恐,也沒有空頭爭相回補(bǔ)的跡象,我必須要為我手里的14萬包棉花找到去處。
周二一大早,我去辦公室的時(shí)候在門口遇到了一個(gè)朋友,他笑呵呵地說:“《世界報(bào)》今早發(fā)了一則大消息啊?!?/p>
“什么消息?”我問。
“嗯?你難道還沒看報(bào)紙嗎?”
“呃,報(bào)道的是你呀,你把7月棉花壟斷到手中了?!?/p>
“我沒看報(bào)呢?!蔽一卮鸬?。我不知道他是否相信,說不定他覺得我沒說真話,不是好哥們兒。
到辦公室后,我拿了一份《世界報(bào)》,看到頭版頭條寫著:“拉里·利文斯頓壟斷7月棉花期貨?!?/p>
我馬上感覺市場要受這個(gè)報(bào)道影響了。我如果仔細(xì)研究該怎樣刻意尋找什么方法賣掉我的14萬包棉花的話,再也沒有比這個(gè)更好的計(jì)劃了。這時(shí)候,全國各地的人都從《世界報(bào)》或其他轉(zhuǎn)載了這個(gè)消息的報(bào)紙上看到了這個(gè)消息,而且它也已被歐洲市場知曉了,利物浦的市場價(jià)格說得一清二楚,瘋狂的市場因?yàn)檫@條消息而失控,也沒什么驚奇的了。
我知道紐約市場會(huì)面臨什么變化,也清楚該怎么去應(yīng)對(duì)市場。上午十點(diǎn)開盤,十點(diǎn)十分的時(shí)候,我就已經(jīng)賣完了棉花。我把那14萬包棉花轉(zhuǎn)給了別人,我的大部分頭寸都是在當(dāng)天價(jià)位最高的時(shí)候交易的。那些人替我塑造了很好的市場,其實(shí)我要做的就是抓住這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì),賣掉我的棉花。我確實(shí)利用了這次機(jī)會(huì),我可不能讓機(jī)會(huì)隨風(fēng)而逝,我不這么做還能怎樣?
本來要花費(fèi)很大精力才能解決的問題,就因?yàn)檫@么一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)而輕易解決了。要是沒有《世界報(bào)》的這篇新聞,我一旦賣出就會(huì)賠掉大量的浮動(dòng)利潤。我可沒能力賣掉14萬包7月棉花期貨,還不拉低市場價(jià)格。無論如何,《世界報(bào)》的這條新聞就是恰逢其時(shí)地幫了我,我不知道它為什么會(huì)報(bào)道這個(gè)新聞,我確實(shí)想知道。我覺得,那位記者可能從清楚棉花市場的朋友處聽到了消息,就認(rèn)為是個(gè)獨(dú)家好新聞。我不認(rèn)識(shí)這個(gè)記者,更沒見過《世界報(bào)》的其他職員。那天上午九點(diǎn)我才知道了這個(gè)消息,而且要不是那個(gè)朋友跟我說,我還不清楚。
如果沒這個(gè)新聞,也就沒有大到可以讓我賣掉棉花的市場。交易量大是很惱人的,平倉的時(shí)候就不能安全地退出來。你不能像在做小買賣一般自如,不能在想賣或者能賣的時(shí)候退出,而必須在市場有足夠空間接納你的賣出時(shí)再賣。只要錯(cuò)過時(shí)機(jī),就要賠掉很多。要快刀斬亂麻,不可猶豫,否則就賠大了。你也不能把出貨價(jià)拉高,這不是好辦法,因?yàn)橛锌赡軙?huì)把買盤的力量減弱。另外,我還要說,想抓住機(jī)會(huì)并不容易,必須要行動(dòng)迅速,在機(jī)會(huì)到你門口探頭的時(shí)候,一定要抓住。
當(dāng)然并不是每個(gè)人都知道我的運(yùn)氣來了。在包括華爾街在內(nèi)的很多地方,任何讓一個(gè)人賺大錢的意外事故都會(huì)令人起疑,可誰要是偶然賠光,人們就不會(huì)覺得是偶然,而會(huì)看作是欲望和自以為是的結(jié)果。一旦你突然賺了很多錢,人們就把你賺的錢看作是掠壓來的財(cái)富,會(huì)說“厚顏無恥有好報(bào),保守和正直沒有好報(bào)”。
那些做空的人因?yàn)榇中亩r錢后陷入痛苦,罵我是在有計(jì)劃地破壞市場,而其他的人也會(huì)這樣想。
過了一兩天,一個(gè)棉花交易市場上的世界級(jí)大佬遇到我,他說:“利文斯頓,這可是你玩得最聰明的一把。我那時(shí)候還想呢,你要是賣掉的話會(huì)賠多少。要知道當(dāng)時(shí)市場沒多少需求,市場是沒有五六萬包的容納量的。你能夠賣掉比這個(gè)數(shù)目多很多的棉花,而且沒有賠掉一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)浮動(dòng)利潤,這其中的手法真讓人拍案叫絕,真是沒想到你有這么一手,厲害啊?!?/p>
“這與我無關(guān)。”我很誠懇。
可他卻不斷重復(fù)說:“兄弟,聰明啊,太厲害了,你不要謙虛?!?/p>
這件事情之后,很多報(bào)紙都把我稱作“棉花之王”。但是就像我說過的,我根本配不上這個(gè)殊榮。不說你也能明白,美國人不可能富有到能買下《世界報(bào)》的欄目,也沒有誰能牛到讓報(bào)紙刊登那樣的新聞。可是,《世界報(bào)》當(dāng)時(shí)確實(shí)給我塑造了一個(gè)虛名。
但是,我告訴你這個(gè)故事,并不是想讓偶爾強(qiáng)加在某些名不符實(shí)的交易者身上的頭銜合理化,也不是為了說抓住機(jī)會(huì)有多么重要,不管這種機(jī)會(huì)在什么地方、以什么形式出現(xiàn),而只是想說明,我做了7月棉花交易之后,數(shù)量大得驚人的報(bào)紙報(bào)道替我揚(yáng)了名。如果沒有那些報(bào)道,我是不可能有機(jī)會(huì)和著名的棉花奇才珀西·托馬斯見面的。
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