紐約時(shí)報(bào)：為何富人比窮人更愛(ài)結(jié)婚？

為何富人比窮人更愛(ài)結(jié)婚？

By now it is common knowledge that professionals are more likely to marry and less likely to divorce than are less educated workers. Among 20- to 49-year-old men in 2013, 56 percent of professional, managerial and technical workers were married, compared with 31 percent of service workers, according to the American Community Survey of the Census Bureau. Some people argue that the gap is largely a result of a decline in traditional values among working-class men, particularly whites who constitute the majority of them. Supposedly they are not as industrious in seeking employment as were their fathers and grandfathers and so fail to secure the steady jobs needed for marriage.

現(xiàn)在眾所周知，與受教育程度較低的就業(yè)人群相比，專業(yè)人士結(jié)婚的可能性更大，離婚的可能性更小。美國(guó)人口普查局(Census Bureau)的美國(guó)社區(qū)調(diào)查(American Community Survey)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2013年20至49歲的男性中，56%的專業(yè)型、管理型和技術(shù)型職業(yè)人士已婚，而服務(wù)業(yè)從業(yè)人員的已婚者比例僅為31%。有人稱，兩者之間產(chǎn)生差距的原因主要是，工薪階層男性，特別是在這個(gè)階層中占多數(shù)的白人，對(duì)傳統(tǒng)價(jià)值觀的認(rèn)同降低?？赡芩麄?cè)谇舐殨r(shí)不像父輩和祖父輩那么勤奮，所以未能找到婚姻所需要的穩(wěn)定工作。

But some digging into historical census records shows that social class differences in marriage have been tied to the extent of income inequality among white Americans for at least 130 years. They also suggest that commentators who insist that the marriage gap is wholly a matter of values are almost surely wrong.

但對(duì)歷史人口普查數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行一些挖掘就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，在至少130年的時(shí)間里，婚姻方面的階層差異和美國(guó)白人當(dāng)中的收入不平等程度相關(guān)。歷史數(shù)據(jù)還表明，堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為結(jié)婚率差距完全是價(jià)值觀問(wèn)題的那些評(píng)論人士，幾乎可以肯定是搞錯(cuò)了。

Census records, which have been compiled into the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series by demographers at the University of Minnesota, tell us that the current era is not the first time that the nation has experienced a large marriage gap; it is at least the second. Another instance occurred in the late 19th century. What these two eras have in common, according to the economists Claudia Goldin, Lawrence F. Katz and Robert A. Margo, is that economic inequality was high and rising during both of them.

明尼蘇達(dá)大學(xué)(University of Minnesota)的人口統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)家已將人口統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)匯編進(jìn)了“綜合公共利用微數(shù)據(jù)系列”(Integrated Public Use Microdata Series)。這些數(shù)據(jù)告訴我們，當(dāng)今時(shí)代并非美國(guó)首次出現(xiàn)巨大的結(jié)婚率差距，至少是第二次。另一次出現(xiàn)在19世紀(jì)末?？藙诘蟻?middot;戈?duì)柖?(Claudia Goldin)、勞倫斯·F·卡茨(Lawrence F. Katz)和羅伯特·A·馬戈(Robert A. Margo)這三位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，這兩個(gè)時(shí)代的相同之處在于，經(jīng)濟(jì)不平等居高不下且日益加劇。

The first marriage gap occurred between 1880 and 1910, during a period that Mark Twain labeled the Gilded Age. The growing industrial economy increased the number of managers and executives. The extension of schooling increased the demand for teachers. And the quadrupling of newspaper circulation between 1880 and 1900 increased the demand for editors and reporters. A white-collar professional class solidified its gains in the labor market and married in large numbers.

首次出現(xiàn)結(jié)婚率差距是在1880年至1910年期間。那個(gè)時(shí)期被馬克·吐溫(Mark Twain)形容為“鍍金時(shí)代”(Gilded Age)。不斷發(fā)展的工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)提高了中高層管理人員的總?cè)藬?shù)。學(xué)校教育的延長(zhǎng)提升了對(duì)教師的需求。同時(shí)，1880年至1900年期間，報(bào)紙發(fā)行量翻了兩番，擴(kuò)大了對(duì)編輯和記者的需求。白領(lǐng)專業(yè)人士在就業(yè)市場(chǎng)上的收益得到了鞏固，并且他們還大量走進(jìn)婚姻。

At the same time, the fortunes of independent craftsmen and artisans declined as their small shops were replaced by large factories. Younger men who would have found positions as skilled apprentices and journeymen instead became low-paid industrial or service workers, and their marriage rates were modest.

與此同時(shí)，獨(dú)立工匠和手藝人的財(cái)富縮水，因?yàn)樗麄兊男〉赇伇淮笮凸S取代了。本可以找到熟練學(xué)徒和雇傭工崗位的年輕人，卻變成了低收入的工廠工人或服務(wù)業(yè)從業(yè)者。他們的結(jié)婚率較低。

In the past few decades, a period that some are calling the New Gilded Age, inequality has been high and rising again. Workers with bachelor’s degrees have seen their earnings far outpace those with less education. The middle of the labor market has hollowed out because of technological change. The offshoring of production has closed factory after factory. At the bottom, low-skilled service work has expanded, while at the top, an elite has captured an increasing share of income gains.

在被部分人稱作“新鍍金時(shí)代”的過(guò)去幾十年里，不平等再次居高不下并日漸加劇。有本科學(xué)歷的就業(yè)人群發(fā)現(xiàn)，自己的收入遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)了受教育程度較低的人。因?yàn)榧夹g(shù)變革，勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的中間部分被掏空了。生產(chǎn)流程外包導(dǎo)致一家又一家工廠倒閉。底層的低技能服務(wù)業(yè)從業(yè)者規(guī)模擴(kuò)大，而頂層的精英人士在新增收入中所占的份額日漸增大。

Not coincidentally, we see high levels of marriage among young professionals today, although they may delay weddings until they have started a career.

并非巧合的是，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，年輕的專業(yè)人士當(dāng)中，結(jié)婚比例也較高，盡管他們可能會(huì)將婚禮推遲到事業(yè)開(kāi)啟之后。

College-educated men and women are the privileged players in our transformed economy: They can pool two incomes and provide a solid financial foundation for a marriage. In contrast, we have seen declines in marriage among high school graduates who are stuck in the middle of the labor market, where they can no longer find the kind of steady, decently paying employment that supported their grandparents’ marriages.

在我們已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)型的經(jīng)濟(jì)中，接受過(guò)大學(xué)教育的人是處于優(yōu)勢(shì)地位的參與者：男女雙方可以獲得兩份收入，為婚姻提供堅(jiān)實(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)。相比之下，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在僅有高中學(xué)歷的人群中，已婚人士的比例出現(xiàn)了下降。他們卡在了勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的夾層中，如今已經(jīng)找不到祖輩那種穩(wěn)定而薪水體面、可以支撐婚姻的工作了。

What the census data demonstrate, then, is a strong association between the level of economic inequality and the level of marriage inequality. Since 1880, the marriage gap and the earnings gap have been correlated. In periods when wages were more unequal, so were marriage rates.

因此，人口普查數(shù)據(jù)所證明的，是經(jīng)濟(jì)不平等與結(jié)婚率不平等之間的有力聯(lián)系。自1880年以來(lái)，結(jié)婚率差距和收入差距一直存在關(guān)聯(lián)。在工資水平差距更大的時(shí)代，結(jié)婚率的差距也會(huì)更顯著。

When inequality was low and stable during the prosperous post-World War II years, marriage rates were more similar and the proportions of married people reached historic high points for all groups.

在二戰(zhàn)后繁榮的年份中，貧富差距水平低而穩(wěn)定，結(jié)婚率也相差不大，所有群體中的已婚者比例都創(chuàng)下了歷史新高。

To be sure, the parallel movements of economic inequality and marriage inequality do not prove that the former causes the latter. But it is hard to look at the census figures and conclude that the state of the labor market has had nothing to do with the marriage gap among the middle class, the working class and the poor. Certainly, no one would argue that the large marriage gap during the first Gilded Age was caused by the reluctance of men to work hard. On the contrary, they labored long hours for wages so low that families were often able to subsist only by sending sons out to sell newspapers or having their daughters work as servants in other families’ homes.

當(dāng)然，經(jīng)濟(jì)差距和結(jié)婚率差距的變動(dòng)趨于一致，并不能證明前者是后者的原因。不過(guò)，在看到人口普查的數(shù)據(jù)之后，很難相信就業(yè)市場(chǎng)的狀況與中產(chǎn)階級(jí)、工薪階層和窮人之間的結(jié)婚率差距無(wú)關(guān)。毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)的是，沒(méi)人會(huì)認(rèn)為，在第一次鍍金時(shí)代，結(jié)婚率的巨大差異是男性不愿意努力工作造成的。恰恰相反，他們工作的時(shí)間很長(zhǎng)，工資水平卻非常低，常常要讓家中的男孩去賣報(bào)紙、女孩去別人家里當(dāng)傭人，才能維持生計(jì)。

Moreover, the government social welfare programs that are often blamed for creating dependency among the poor, such as cash assistance for single parents, unemployment benefits and food stamps, did not start until the 1930s and therefore cannot be blamed for a marriage gap that existed a half-century earlier.

此外，人們常常把窮人中產(chǎn)生的差距歸咎于政府的社會(huì)福利項(xiàng)目，比如單親家庭的現(xiàn)金補(bǔ)貼、失業(yè)救濟(jì)和食品券。但這些福利項(xiàng)目是從上世紀(jì)30年代才開(kāi)始的，因此在那之前半個(gè)世紀(jì)的結(jié)婚率差距，并不是由此造成的。

Yet, even if it has not been the major determinant of class differences in who marries, cultural change has been a factor in what unmarried people are doing.

不過(guò)，盡管文化變革并不是決定階級(jí)之間結(jié)婚率差距的主要因素，但它卻影響著未婚人士的生活狀態(tài)。

Single men and women in the late 19th and early 20th centuries rarely lived together without marrying, and very few had children. The social norms against cohabitation and childbearing outside of marriage were strong.

19世紀(jì)末和20世紀(jì)初，單身男女很少同居，幾乎沒(méi)人未婚生子。反對(duì)婚前同居和生子的社會(huì)規(guī)范十分強(qiáng)大。

During the past few generations, these norms have weakened. It is now commonplace for unmarried young adults to cohabit and broadly acceptable for them to have children. Unlike their ancestors in the late 1800s, many of today’s working-class young adults have responded to the difficulty of marrying by living with a partner and having children outside of marriage. We would not be seeing these trends if social norms about family formation had remained unchanged — even given the recent rise in income inequality.

而過(guò)去幾代人的時(shí)間里，這些規(guī)范已經(jīng)弱化。如今，未婚男女同居的現(xiàn)象十分普遍，人們也廣泛認(rèn)為未婚生子是可以接受的。與19世紀(jì)末的人不同，今天工薪階層的年輕人當(dāng)中，許多人應(yīng)對(duì)結(jié)婚難的辦法是，找個(gè)伴侶同居，不結(jié)婚就生育。如果關(guān)于家庭的社會(huì)規(guī)范一成不變，就不會(huì)出現(xiàn)這種趨勢(shì)，即使近年來(lái)收入不平等出現(xiàn)加劇。