中國(guó)1945 毛的革命與美國(guó)命中注定的選擇

“To err is human. To blame someone else ispolitics.” Hubert H. Humphrey’s aphorism came tomind as I was reading “China 1945,” RichardBernstein’s excellent history of United States policytoward China at the end of World War II. Thecomment is particularly apt when intractableproblems provide myriad paths to failure but no clearright answer — and the civil war in China afterJapan’s surrender was just such a problem. (Today,think of Syria.) The debates over China policy wereacrimonious and personal, and this was severalyears before Joseph McCarthy lent his name to sneering political assassination.

“犯錯(cuò)是人性，歸罪于他人則是政治，”閱讀理查德·伯恩斯坦(Richard Bernstein)的《中國(guó)1945》(China1945)時(shí)，休伯特·H·漢弗萊(Hubert H. Humphrey)的格言不禁涌上心頭。這是一本關(guān)于“二戰(zhàn)”后美國(guó)對(duì)華政策歷史的精彩著作。漢弗萊的話尤其適用于那種棘手的難題，它們可以導(dǎo)致無(wú)數(shù)條通往失敗的道路，卻沒(méi)有任何清晰的正確答案——日本投降后中國(guó)的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)正是這樣的問(wèn)題(試想如今的敘利亞)。關(guān)于中國(guó)政策的爭(zhēng)論激烈而又充滿人身攻擊，幾年后，約瑟夫·麥卡錫(Joseph McCarthy)的名字就成了政治迫害的代稱。

 

 

Bernstein, a student of Harvard’s John King Fairbank and a formerNew York Times reporter,covers China’s political context in 1945 like a scholar, but maintains his journalist’s eye forhuman drama. In 1945 American officials in China were trying to achieve three impossiblyconflicting aims: prevent a civil war between ­Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang regime and MaoZedong’s Communist Party; keep the United States out of any civil war that might occur; andstop the Communists and their Soviet backers from seizing control of northern China fromChiang’s government, a World War II ally. The third aim could not be accomplished withoutviolating the second. But the second could not be seriously violated because America was,understandably, tired of war.

伯恩斯坦是哈佛大學(xué)費(fèi)正清教授的學(xué)生，曾在《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》擔(dān)任記者，他在本書中如學(xué)者一般記述1945年中國(guó)的政治環(huán)境，但又以記者的視角關(guān)注人性的戲劇。1945年，駐華美國(guó)官員試圖達(dá)成三個(gè)自相矛盾、不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)的目標(biāo)：其一，阻止蔣介石領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的國(guó)民黨政府與毛澤東領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的共產(chǎn)黨之間爆發(fā)內(nèi)戰(zhàn);其二，保證美國(guó)政府不卷入可能發(fā)生的內(nèi)戰(zhàn);其三，阻止共產(chǎn)黨及其蘇聯(lián)支持者從美國(guó)“二戰(zhàn)”期間的盟友蔣介石政府手中奪去對(duì)中國(guó)北方的控制權(quán)。除非違背第二個(gè)目標(biāo)，就不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)第三個(gè)目標(biāo)，但第二個(gè)目標(biāo)又不能被嚴(yán)重違背，因?yàn)椋梢岳斫?，美?guó)已經(jīng)厭倦了戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

So that left preventing civil war. Even before Japan surrendered, United States officials weretrying to persuade Chiang and Mao to cease hostilities and establish a coalition government.Bernstein convincingly deems this mission doomed, though it was headed in 1946 by GeorgeMarshall, the greatest American statesman of his generation. Chiang was politically beholden tofactions that could never allow sustained compromise with Mao’s Communists; and Chianghimself was bullheaded. Mao was a radical ideologue and manipulator who viewedcooperation with rivals in the same way as his role model, Joseph Stalin.

所以就只剩下阻止內(nèi)戰(zhàn)了。早在日本投降之前，美國(guó)官員就已經(jīng)開(kāi)始試圖說(shuō)服蔣介石和毛澤東放下敵意，成立聯(lián)合政府。貝恩斯坦令人信服地認(rèn)定，盡管這項(xiàng)任務(wù)在1946年是由同代美國(guó)政治家中最優(yōu)秀的喬治·馬歇爾(George Marshall)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)，但注定兇多吉少。蔣介石在政治上要對(duì)若干小集團(tuán)負(fù)責(zé)，這些集團(tuán)不可能長(zhǎng)期對(duì)毛澤東的共產(chǎn)黨妥協(xié);而蔣介石本人也很頑固。毛澤東則信奉激進(jìn)的意識(shí)形態(tài)，而且對(duì)于“與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手合作”這種事，和他的榜樣約瑟夫·斯大林(Joseph Stalin)持有同樣看法。

Marshall’s eccentric predecessor, Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, was deluded in believing thatwith his Oklahoma horse sense and lawyerly acumen he could broker a lasting coalitiongovernment. But in late November 1945, he abruptly resigned in frustration, publicly blamingForeign Service Asia experts like John Paton Davies and John Stewart Service for undercuttinghis efforts. Hurley complained that they had unfairly criticized Chiang’s government whilecoddling the Communists, and scandalously accused them of disloyalty to him and their nation(apparently in that order of importance).

馬歇爾的前任帕特里克·J·赫爾利(Patrick J. Hurley)大使是個(gè)性情古怪的人，有著俄克拉荷馬人的判斷力和律師式的聰明，他被哄騙著相信自己可以在雙方之間斡旋，協(xié)助建立一個(gè)持久的聯(lián)合政府。但在1945年11月底，他卻帶著挫敗感突然辭職，還公開(kāi)譴責(zé)戴維斯(John Paton Davies)和謝偉思(John Stewart Service)等美國(guó)駐外事務(wù)處的亞洲專家損害了他的努力。赫爾利抱怨，他們對(duì)蔣介石政府的指控有欠公正，同時(shí)過(guò)分縱容共產(chǎn)黨，他還嚴(yán)厲地指責(zé)這些專家背叛了他，也背叛了國(guó)家(顯然他認(rèn)為背叛他比背叛國(guó)家更不能忍)。

There are no unalloyed heroes in Bernstein’s story. While hardly traitors, Davies and Servicewere guilty of serious analytic misdemeanors. They naïvely advocated accommodation of theCommunists because they believed that Mao’s revolutionary movement was moredemocratic and nationalist than it actually was.

伯恩斯坦的故事中沒(méi)有真正的英雄。但也沒(méi)有什么叛徒。戴維斯和謝偉思在判斷上嚴(yán)重失誤。他們天真地宣揚(yáng)與共產(chǎn)黨和解，因?yàn)樗麄兿嘈琶珴蓶|的革命運(yùn)動(dòng)更民主、更民族主義，事實(shí)卻非如此。

Even if Mao had entertained a temporary deal with Chiang in the late 1940s, however, he wasnot one to keep promises or share power. After all, he purged and tortured many of his loyalfollowers once he “liberated” China. No pragmatist, Mao pursued a radical agenda that leftmore Chinese dead than even the Japanese imperialists did. And Bernstein could have taken hiscritique of these American officials’ analysis one step further. When Mao finally broke with theSoviets in the late 1950s and ’60s, as some American officials predicted in 1945 that he would,he did so not because he was forsaking the Stalinist model. Quite the opposite. Mao accusedStalin’s successors — Khrushchev and Brezhnev — of insufficient support for internationalrevolution and excessive compromise with the United States.

40年代末期，就算毛有興趣同蔣介石締結(jié)臨時(shí)合約，他也并不是那種會(huì)信守承諾或分享權(quán)力的人。畢竟，一俟他“解放”中國(guó)之后，便開(kāi)始清洗和迫害許多自己的忠實(shí)追隨者。毛并不是實(shí)用主義者，他追求激進(jìn)的政治進(jìn)程，害死的中國(guó)人甚至比日本帝國(guó)主義還多。伯恩斯坦本可以更進(jìn)一步地去批評(píng)美國(guó)官員們的分析。20世紀(jì)50到60年代，毛澤東最終同蘇聯(lián)決裂，美國(guó)官員們?cè)?945年便已經(jīng)預(yù)見(jiàn)了這一幕，但他這樣做并不是因?yàn)檗饤壦勾罅帜Ｊ健Ｇ∏∠喾?，毛澤東譴責(zé)斯大林的繼任者赫魯曉夫(Khrushchev)和勃列日涅夫(Brezhnev)不夠支持國(guó)際革命事業(yè)，過(guò)分向美國(guó)妥協(xié)。

My main objection to Bernstein’s book is a quibble concerning part of its subtitle: “America’sFateful Choice.” Right-wing critics blamed Truman for “losing China” to the Communists bybeing insufficiently supportive of Chiang. After Vietnam, left-wing academics lamented that therehad been a “lost chance” for friendship with Mao, if onlyWashington had seized it. Bernstein’ssubtitle suggests he will take a position in this tired debate. But he correctly rejects bothpositions. If any foreigners lost China to Communism, it was the rabidly anti-CommunistJapanese imperialists who undercut Chiang’s legitimacy and created space for revolution.And no amount of accommodation could have turned Mao into a trusted American ally in the1950s.

我對(duì)伯恩斯坦這本書最大的意見(jiàn)是對(duì)副標(biāo)題的吹毛求疵——“美國(guó)命中注定的選擇”。右翼評(píng)論家批評(píng)杜魯門(Truman)沒(méi)有給蔣介石足夠支持，因此從共產(chǎn)黨手中“失去了中國(guó)”。越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)后，左派學(xué)者又哀嘆失去了與毛建立友誼的“機(jī)會(huì)”，好像華盛頓真有這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)似的。伯恩斯坦的副標(biāo)題仿佛暗示自己將在這場(chǎng)令人厭倦的爭(zhēng)論中選擇立場(chǎng)。但他實(shí)事求是地對(duì)兩邊的立場(chǎng)都做了否定。如果有任何外國(guó)人把中國(guó)讓給了共產(chǎn)主義，那也應(yīng)該是瘋狂反共的日本帝國(guó)主義者，他們損害了蔣介石政府的合法性，為共產(chǎn)黨的革命創(chuàng)造了空間。而在50年代，沒(méi)有任何和解方式可以令毛澤東投向可信的美國(guó)聯(lián)盟。

Truman chose an ineffective middle road: side with Chiang, but not too much. Bernsteinblames American domestic politics for this diluted policy, and there is some truth to that. ButTruman had no better option. He gave Chiang a fighting chance to secure his own countrywithout dragging a war-weary America into a huge civil conflict on the Soviets’ doorstep, andChiang failed. Direct American intervention would have been the wrong war in the wrong placeat the wrong time. Yet simply abandoning wartime allies to insurrection would have harmedWashington’s reputation for resolve.

杜魯門選擇了無(wú)效的中間道路：和蔣介石站在統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線，但是不提供太多支持。伯恩斯坦認(rèn)為是美國(guó)的內(nèi)政導(dǎo)致了這種無(wú)力的政策，這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)有幾分正確性。但杜魯門并沒(méi)有更好的選擇。他給了蔣介石一個(gè)保衛(wèi)國(guó)家的戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)會(huì)，同時(shí)又沒(méi)有把已經(jīng)厭倦戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的美國(guó)拖入一場(chǎng)在蘇聯(lián)門口發(fā)生的大內(nèi)戰(zhàn)中去，而蔣介石失敗了。當(dāng)時(shí)如果美國(guó)進(jìn)行干預(yù)，將會(huì)是一場(chǎng)在錯(cuò)誤的時(shí)間、錯(cuò)誤的地點(diǎn)發(fā)生的錯(cuò)誤的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。但是如果放任戰(zhàn)時(shí)盟國(guó)陷入內(nèi)亂，又會(huì)損害華盛頓的信譽(yù)。

More important, indifference to Communism’s spread in China would have undercut theadministration’s domestic effort to mobilize support for Cold War strategies ingeostrategically more important places like Europe, Japan and the Middle East. Truman’s optionswere “bad,” “worse” and “terrible.” Truman wisely chose “bad.” Not all global problems haveAmerican solutions, and often the best policy choice is to manage and minimize costs.Moderation in the defense of liberty is no vice.

更重要的是，當(dāng)時(shí)政府正在國(guó)內(nèi)歐洲、日本和中東等從地緣政治而言更重要的地帶為鞏固“冷戰(zhàn)”戰(zhàn)略而進(jìn)行努力，如果放任共產(chǎn)主義在中國(guó)蔓延，政府的這些工作就將受到損害。杜魯門面臨的選擇有“糟糕”、“更糟”和“糟糕極了”。杜魯門明智地選了“糟糕”。美國(guó)并不能解決所有全球問(wèn)題，而最好的政治選擇通常是能夠控制成本、把代價(jià)減少到最低程度的選擇。在自由的保護(hù)之下深思熟慮并不是什么壞事。