美國醫(yī)藥行業(yè)的偽難題

In all industries, monopolies and oligopolies limit choice and extract economic rent. In medicine, they do so when consumers are most vulnerable: often frightened, unable to forgo the product altogether, and dependent on experts in making decisions.

在所有的行業(yè)，壟斷和寡頭壟斷都會讓市場上的選擇變得有限并榨取經(jīng)濟租金。在醫(yī)藥領(lǐng)域，消費者是在自己最脆弱的時候面對這種狀況的：這時的他們往往很害怕、無法徹底棄用這種產(chǎn)品，事事依賴專家作決定。

This month the London-based drugmaker Hikma increased the US price of one drug — a liquid form of a diarrhoea treatment — by 430 per cent. The drug is decades old and has no patent protection.

本月，總部位于倫敦的制藥商Hikma將一種液劑止瀉藥在美國的價格上調(diào)430%。這種藥物已問世幾十年，沒有專利保護。

Yet barriers to competition remain. A new manufacturer would need to win regulatory approval and secure production facilities. This is harder for liquid, inhalable, or injectable drugs than for pills. And the new entrant would receive only a fraction of the monopoly price. It is likely a lossmaking proposition.

然而競爭壁壘仍然存在。一家新的制藥商需要獲得監(jiān)管批準并取得生產(chǎn)設(shè)施。相對于片劑藥，這對于液劑藥品、吸入式藥品或注射用藥品而言更難。市場新入者的藥品價格將僅為壟斷價格的一小部分。這項計劃很可能會賠錢。

Hikma is not alone. In recent years several companies with effective monopolies on non-patented products have jacked up prices. Turing raised the price of a drug for cancer patients by 55-fold. Mylan pumped up the price of EpiPen, for bee-sting allergies, by 500 per cent over six years. Valeant, a one-time stock market darling, made price gouging a core strategy. The list goes on.

Hikma并非唯一這么做的企業(yè)。最近幾年，幾家對非專利產(chǎn)品擁有實際壟斷權(quán)的公司紛紛上調(diào)價格。圖靈制藥(Turing)把一種救命藥的價格上調(diào)至原來的55倍。邁蘭(Mylan)在6年里將蜂蜇過敏用藥EpiPen的價格上調(diào)了500%。一度為股市寵兒的Valeant將抬高價格作為核心戰(zhàn)略。這樣的例子還有很多。

In general, competition in non-patented drugs works very well. It is in products with high entry costs and relatively small target markets that gouging flourishes. Regulations make the problem worse: if distributors could import drugs from abroad when domestic prices spike, the monopolies could be broken. But they cannot.

總體而言，競爭在非專利藥品領(lǐng)域很好地發(fā)揮著作用。出現(xiàn)大量提價行為的是那些前期成本高且目標市場相對較小的藥品。監(jiān)管加劇了這個問題：如果分銷商在國內(nèi)價格飆升時可以從國外進口藥品，壟斷可能會被打破。但它們不能。

Patented drug prices in the US are also inflated by regulations and perverse incentives. Consider Medicare, the government programme that pays for pensioners’ medications. It is required to pay for virtually every approved form of treatment for cancer and other life-threatening diseases, even when cheaper and therapeutically equivalent or near-equivalent treatments are available. This makes it impossible for the government to negotiate effectively on price. Many states have similar laws for private insurers, too. At the same time, Medicare pays doctors a percentage of the price of drugs they administer, giving them reason to prefer more expensive ones.

此外，監(jiān)管規(guī)定和不合理的激勵也提高了美國的專利藥品價格。舉個例子，為退休人員的用藥買單的“聯(lián)邦醫(yī)療保險”(Medicare)，需要為幾乎所有癌癥和其他致命疾病的獲批治療方法買單——即便有時存在更廉價、同時效果相同或近乎相同的治療方法。這讓政府無法有效地進行價格談判。很多州對私人保險公司也有類似法規(guī)。同時，“聯(lián)邦醫(yī)療保險”向開出其覆蓋范圍內(nèi)藥品的醫(yī)生提供藥價提成，這讓他們有理由青睞更昂貴的藥品。

Middlemen get in on the action. Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), which work on behalf of companies and insurance companies, negotiate discounts on drugs’ list prices. They then pass most of the savings on to their clients, keeping a portion for themselves.

中間人也“雁過拔毛”。代表制藥商和保險公司的藥品福利管理機構(gòu)(PBM)就藥品上市價格的折扣進行談判。它們隨后將大部分折扣讓渡給客戶，自己保留一部分。

They therefore have reason to secure bigger discounts — but because the discount is a percentage of the list price, they also have an interest in high list prices. If there was robust competition among PBMs this would be less of a problem. But after two decades of consolidation, with antitrust regulators sitting idle, three PBMs control nearly 80 per cent of the market.

它們因此有理由爭取更大折扣，但由于折扣是按藥品上市價格的比例計算的，上市價格高也符合它們的利益。如果PBM競爭激烈，那就問題不大。但經(jīng)過20年的行業(yè)整合，再加上反壟斷監(jiān)管機構(gòu)不作為，3家PBM控制了近80%的市場份額。

The drug industry argues that if action were taken to lower US drug prices, the incentive to innovate would be diluted. This is a false dilemma. Outright price controls — or making the government the sole drug buyer — would hurt innovation. But much could be done to stiffen competition while maintaining rich rewards for real innovation.

制藥業(yè)辯稱，如果采取行動降低美國藥價，創(chuàng)新動力就會下降。這是一個偽難題。完全的價格控制——或者讓政府成為唯一藥品買家——將會損害創(chuàng)新。但在為切實創(chuàng)新維持豐厚回報的前提下，還可以采取許多措施來加劇競爭。

Regulations that stifle competition are not only the result of regulatory capture. Americans demand paid access to whatever treatment they or their doctor prefer. Competition can only thrive when those who ultimately pay can decide which products are interchangeable and negotiate with manufacturers on that basis. The law should allow that to happen.

遏制競爭的監(jiān)管法規(guī)不只是“監(jiān)管被俘”(regulatory capture)的結(jié)果。美國人要求保險覆蓋他們或者他們的醫(yī)生青睞的任何治療方案。當那些最終支付的人可以決定哪些產(chǎn)品可以互換并在此基礎(chǔ)上與制藥商談判的時候，競爭才會如火如荼地展開。法律應該為出現(xiàn)這種局面創(chuàng)造條件。