歐洲認(rèn)為,它的麻煩是烏克蘭,實(shí)際上,這個(gè)麻煩是俄羅斯,或者更準(zhǔn)確地說(shuō),是俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(VladimirPutin)。莫斯科對(duì)基輔的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是冰山一角。普京的復(fù)仇主義目標(biāo)遠(yuǎn)不止烏克蘭。他的更大目標(biāo)是撕毀歐洲大陸共產(chǎn)主義時(shí)代結(jié)束后的安排。
European hesitation about confronting Russia is readily explained. Economic self-interest,history, cultural affinity, and latent anti-Americanism have persuaded many Europeans to lookat Mr Putin as the leader they hoped for rather than the one who saw the fall of the SovietUnion as the geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.
歐洲不愿與俄羅斯正面對(duì)抗的原因很好解釋。經(jīng)濟(jì)上的利己主義、歷史、文化上的親緣性以及潛在的反美主義都讓許多歐洲人認(rèn)為,普京是他們所希望的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人,而不是那個(gè)將蘇聯(lián)解體視為20世紀(jì)地緣政治災(zāi)難的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。
There is a seductive narrative for a west chastened by bungled interventions in the MiddleEast. If Mr Putin’s demands are sometimes provocative — and, as in Georgia as well asUkraine, can turn into outright aggression — the west should be mindful of the circumstances.Perhaps Nato had indeed broken promises about admitting former Soviet satellites? Maybe ithad bent the rules when it bombed Serbia? As for the Iraq war, well, enough said.
一個(gè)有誘惑性的說(shuō)法是,西方由于搞砸了對(duì)中東地區(qū)的干預(yù)已經(jīng)學(xué)乖了。如果說(shuō)普京的要求有時(shí)是挑釁性的——而且正如格魯吉亞和烏克蘭的情形那樣,可能演變?yōu)閺氐椎那致?mdash;—西方應(yīng)該時(shí)刻牢記當(dāng)前形勢(shì)。或許北約(Nato)真的放棄了接納前蘇聯(lián)衛(wèi)星國(guó)的承諾?或許當(dāng)北約轟炸塞爾維亞的時(shí)候,它就已經(jīng)有所松動(dòng)了?至于伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng),嗯,就不用多說(shuō)了。
The annexation of Crimea and the march into Ukraine’s Donbass region should have dispelledthe doubts. In the case of Angela Merkel this is what seems to have happened. Not a politicianto prefer confrontation over negotiation, the German chancellor has been offered too manylies and broken promises.
俄羅斯吞并克里米亞以及進(jìn)入烏克蘭頓巴斯地區(qū)后,人們應(yīng)該不再懷疑了。就德國(guó)總理安格拉•默克爾(AngelaMerkel)而言,這些懷疑似乎已成現(xiàn)實(shí)。默克爾不是一位喜歡對(duì)抗勝過(guò)談判的政客,她遭遇了太多的謊言和失信。
The argument within Europe, though, has not ended. Much has been made of the sympathytowards Moscowshown by the Syriza government in Greece. It is not alone. Italy’s primeminister Matteo Renzi has been outdoing Silvio Berlusconi in his fealty to Mr Putin. Hungary’sViktor Orbán publicly disdains liberal democracy. Cyprus always speaks up for Russia, whileFrench consent to the sanctions regime is halfhearted. So no one should be surprised by thelatest Russian offensive: there is no more powerful a provocation to the Kremlin thanappeasement.
然而,歐洲內(nèi)部的爭(zhēng)論沒(méi)有結(jié)束。眾所周知,希臘激進(jìn)左翼聯(lián)盟黨(Syriza)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的政府對(duì)莫斯科深表同情。這并非個(gè)例。在對(duì)普京忠誠(chéng)方面,意大利總理馬泰奧•倫齊(Matteo Renzi)一直勝過(guò)西爾維奧•貝盧斯科尼(SilvioBerlusconi)。匈牙利總理歐爾班•維克托(Viktor Orbán)公開(kāi)鄙視自由民主。塞浦路斯總是維護(hù)俄羅斯,而法國(guó)對(duì)制裁俄羅斯只是半心半意地贊同。因此,應(yīng)該沒(méi)有人對(duì)俄羅斯最新的進(jìn)攻感到意外:對(duì)克里姆林宮來(lái)說(shuō),沒(méi)有比綏靖政策更大的挑釁了。
Mr Putin’s litany of grievances — Nato’s “encirclement” of Russia, a plan to humiliate Moscow,broken international rules — have been heard over and over. Occasionally there is a small truthhidden in the big lie, but the essential storyline never deviates. The west wants to destroy thepower and dignity of Russia. So familiar are the charges that the implications are oftendiscounted. Everyone has heard Mr Putin pledge to roll back the frontiers, but few have reallybeen listening.
人們不斷地聽(tīng)到普京的一連串抱怨:北約“包圍”俄羅斯、計(jì)劃羞辱莫斯科、違反國(guó)際規(guī)則。彌天大謊中偶爾也會(huì)隱藏著些許真相,但基本的故事情節(jié)永遠(yuǎn)差不了多少。西方希望破壞俄羅斯的實(shí)力和尊嚴(yán)。這些指控已是家常便飯,其影響往往大打折扣。所有人都聽(tīng)到普京承諾收縮疆界,但很少有人真的把他的話(huà)當(dāng)回事。
The annexation of Crimea and the push into eastern Ukraine were in one dimensionopportunistic. Mr Putin had misread the Maidan protests and failed to anticipate the fall offormer president Viktor Yanukovich. So he grabbed what he could. Expedient as the war mayhave been, it fitted the game plan to restore suzerainty over much of the former Soviet empire.
從某個(gè)方面來(lái)說(shuō),俄羅斯吞并克里米亞和進(jìn)入烏克蘭東部有些機(jī)會(huì)主義。普京誤讀了獨(dú)立廣場(chǎng)的抗議活動(dòng),未能預(yù)見(jiàn)到烏克蘭前總統(tǒng)維克多•亞努科維奇(Viktor Yanukovich)的垮臺(tái)。因此他抓住了他能抓住的機(jī)會(huì)。雖然戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)可能是權(quán)宜之計(jì),但它符合俄羅斯對(duì)前蘇聯(lián)帝國(guó)的許多加盟共和國(guó)恢復(fù)宗主國(guó)地位的通盤(pán)計(jì)劃。
General Yury Baluyevsky, the former chief of staff of the Russian armed forces, says theconfrontation with the west is a continuation of the cold war. The methods, though, are nowmore sophisticated. Military force, he says, is “the final stage of the process”. Moscow hasmastered the art of hybrid warfare, including “information and psychological pressure”. Toparaphrase the general, Mr Putin will divide and weaken his enemies before deploying force.
俄軍前總參謀長(zhǎng)尤里•巴盧耶夫斯基將軍(General Yuri Baluyevsky)表示,與西方對(duì)峙是冷戰(zhàn)的延續(xù)。然而,現(xiàn)在的對(duì)峙方式更加復(fù)雜。巴盧耶夫斯基將軍說(shuō),軍事力量是“這一過(guò)程的最后階段”。莫斯科掌握了混合戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的藝術(shù),包括運(yùn)用“信息和心理壓力”。用巴盧耶夫斯基將軍的話(huà)來(lái)說(shuō),普京將會(huì)在動(dòng)用武力之前分化削弱其敵人。
In its softest form, this means presenting rolling propaganda as rolling news with the rapidexpansion of the Kremlin-controlled Russia Today news network. Then there is the fundingof populist parties of left and right in western European capitals. Marine Le Pen’s National Frontin France has taken a Russian loan. Nigel Farage, the leader of the anti-immigrant UKIndependence party, counts himself an admirer of the Russian leader.
其最溫和的斗爭(zhēng)方式,就是借助俄羅斯政府控制的“今日俄羅斯”(Russia Today)新聞網(wǎng)絡(luò)的快速擴(kuò)張,不斷地以滾動(dòng)新聞的形式滾動(dòng)宣傳。然后是向西歐國(guó)家的左右翼民粹主義政黨提供資金。法國(guó)馬琳•勒龐(Marine LePen)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的國(guó)民陣線(National Front)已經(jīng)接受了俄羅斯的貸款。反對(duì)移民的英國(guó)獨(dú)立黨(UK Independenceparty)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人奈杰爾•法拉奇(Nigel Farage)自稱(chēng)是普京的仰慕者。
Further along the spectrum there are the bribes paid to politicians and business leaders andthe stakes taken in vulnerable financial institutions in south eastern Europe and the Balkans.There is a none-too-subtle campaign to destabilise pro-western governments in the formerSoviet space — Bulgaria is a recent victim — by exploiting their dependence on Russianenergy. Add in the testing of Nato defences by Russian fighter planes, cyber attacks andkidnappings in the Baltics, and the incursions of nuclear bombers, and you can see what thegeneral was talking about.
再接下來(lái)是賄賂政客和商界領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人,以及收購(gòu)東南歐國(guó)家和巴爾干地區(qū)的脆弱金融機(jī)構(gòu)的權(quán)益。俄羅斯利用前蘇聯(lián)勢(shì)力范圍內(nèi)親西方國(guó)家對(duì)其能源的依賴(lài),毫不掩飾地發(fā)動(dòng)破壞這些國(guó)家政府穩(wěn)定的攻勢(shì)——保加利亞就是最近的一個(gè)受害者。再加上俄羅斯戰(zhàn)機(jī)、網(wǎng)絡(luò)襲擊和巴爾干地區(qū)綁架事件對(duì)北約防務(wù)的考驗(yàn),以及攜帶核彈頭的轟炸機(jī)的入侵,你就可以明白巴盧耶夫斯基將軍在說(shuō)什么。
Ms Merkel has recognised the danger, publicly warning about subversion in Moldova andattempts to pull Serbia back into the Russian orbit. The US has been working with the EuropeanCommission to ease some of the vulnerabilities of energy-dependent governments insoutheastern Europe. But in western Europe there is widespread reluctance still to recognisethe big picture — to set the Ukraine crisis in the context of Mr Putin’s broader aims.
默克爾意識(shí)到了這種威脅,對(duì)摩爾多瓦境內(nèi)的顛覆活動(dòng)和俄羅斯將塞爾維亞拉回自身軌道的企圖進(jìn)行了公開(kāi)警告。美國(guó)一直在與歐盟委員會(huì)(European Commission)合作,以減輕有能源依賴(lài)性的東南歐國(guó)家的部分脆弱性。但在西歐,人們?nèi)云毡椴辉赋姓J(rèn)這種大局,不愿從普京更大范圍企圖的角度看待烏克蘭危機(jī)。
Mr Putin is not the creation of western perfidy. Throughout his career, from the office of themayor of St Petersburg to the top job in the Kremlin, he has been remarkably constant in hisambitions and in the ruthlessness he will deploy to achieve them.
普京并非是西方背信棄義的產(chǎn)物。在從擔(dān)任圣彼得堡市副市長(zhǎng)、到入主克里姆林宮的整個(gè)政治生涯中,普京的抱負(fù)及實(shí)現(xiàn)抱負(fù)過(guò)程中的冷酷無(wú)情沒(méi)有變過(guò)。
A collapsing oil price and the impact of sanctions have made him more dangerous: without oiland gas revenues, his domestic support now rests on his capacity to mobilise nationalistanger against the alleged attempt by Nato and the EU to subjugate “mother Russia”. Thewest’s options are limited, but the beginning of wisdom is to understand that this is not justabout Ukraine.
油價(jià)暴跌和制裁的影響讓普京變得更加危險(xiǎn):沒(méi)有了石油和天然氣收入,現(xiàn)在普京在國(guó)內(nèi)能否獲得支持,取決于他能否挑起民族主義者的怒火,對(duì)抗所謂的北約和歐盟要征服“俄羅斯母親”的企圖。西方的選擇是有限的,但要想明智行事,最起碼要明白這不僅僅與烏克蘭有關(guān)。