中國債務問題未必釀成災難

　　The case for the prosecution: George Soros, who isconsiderably richer than you, says China’s debtsremind him eerily of the US pre-2008. The defence:people often say this sort of thing, and China alwaysshrugs it off.

　　控方的理由是：比你富有得多的喬治•索羅斯(GeorgeSoros)說，中國的債務詭異地讓他聯(lián)想起美國在2008年前的情形。辯方的理由是：人們經(jīng)常這么說，而中國總能安然無恙。

　　Sure, its borrowing generates remarkably scarynumbers. With every flavour included — households, local and central government, corporate— HSBC puts debt at 249 per cent of GDP. Annual credit growth is 15 per cent, twice that ofnominal GDP. Central government is obscurely entwined in much of it, backing state-ownedenterprises and local municipalities.

　　沒錯，中國的借貸數(shù)據(jù)極為可怕。匯豐(HSBC)表示，若計入各類債務(家庭、地方和中央政府、企業(yè))，中國的債務與國內生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)之比達到249%。年度信貸增速達到15%，是名義GDP增速的兩倍。為國有企業(yè)和地方政府提供擔保的中央政府，隱晦地與很大一部分債務扯在一起。

　　But the defence has some strong points. Being much poorer, China has much more potentialto grow than pre-crisis America. It finances its own debts, more or less: households lend tobanks, who lend to corporates — the reverse of the subprime wheeze.

　　但辯方的理由也很有力。由于比危機前的美國窮得多，中國的增長潛力也要大得多。中國或多或少為本國的債務提供資金：家庭向銀行放貸，銀行向企業(yè)放貸——這與美國次貸危機的模式相反。

　　In contrast to the US, years of trade surpluses have left China with ample foreign reserves. Itscapital markets are volatile, but nothing like the Wild West of runaway securitisation seen inthe US circa 2008. Debt is still largely held on banks’ balance sheets. And those banks look safeenough. At 12.9 per cent, Industrial and Commercial Bank has a common equity tier onecapital ratio in the same ballpark as JPMorgan.

　　與美國形成反差的是，多年的貿(mào)易順差讓中國擁有充足的外匯儲備。中國的資本市場并不平穩(wěn)，但不像2008年前后美國失控的資產(chǎn)證券化那么瘋狂。債務基本上仍在銀行的資產(chǎn)負債表上。而那些銀行看起來足夠安全。中國工商銀行(ICBC)的普通股一級資本充足率為12.9%，與摩根大通(JPMorgan)差不多。

　　The defence wins. China is not pre-crisis America. Those who hear history rhyme too well areusually not listening closely. Although a country cannot indefinitely increase its debts twice asfast as GDP, predicting the nature and timing of the end is a mug’s game.

　　辯方贏了。中國不是危機前的美國。那些對歷史回聲聽力太好的人通常聽得不夠仔細。盡管一個國家的債務不可能無止境地以兩倍于GDP增速的速度增長，但預測其終點的性質和時機是毫無把握的。

　　A more pertinent worry is that China’s debt spigot sends credit flowing to unproductiveplaces: inefficient SOEs, sectors struggling with overcapacity, property. This slows downreform, and the more debt, the harder the eventual move towards freer capital markets.

　　更值得擔憂的是，中國的債務閥門讓信貸流向徒勞無益的領域：效率低下的國有企業(yè)，艱難應對產(chǎn)能過剩的行業(yè)，以及房地產(chǎn)。這減緩了改革步伐，債務越多，就越難最終轉向更自由的資本市場。

　　Don’t worry, HSBC says. The latest credit upsurge has gone into infrastructure, and propertyin areas where people want houses. Since 2014, Beijing has chivvied local authorities intoswapping opaque shadow finance for more transparent municipal bonds. A hereticalthought: China’s debt binge does not have to end in catastrophe.

　　匯豐說，別擔心。最近激增的信貸流入了基礎設施，以及那些仍有住房需求的地區(qū)的房地產(chǎn)。自2014年以來，北京方面敦促地方政府將不透明的影子金融轉化為更為透明的市政債券。一種異端思想是，中國的債務盛宴不一定以災難告終。