中國經(jīng)濟(jì)唱衰論有些言過其實(shí)

It has not been a great week for China bulls.

對于看好中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的人而言，這一周過的并不開心。

First, data out at the end of last week pointed to a slowing mainland economy as the pace of growth in industrial production and investment fell in the second quarter. Then, in its annual review of the Chinese economy, the International Monetary Fund warned darkly of the risk of defaults on $6tn of shadow banking products. That gave more ammunition to those who warn that no country has increased its debt to GDP at the rate that China has without having a crisis.

首先，上周五公布的數(shù)據(jù)顯示中國內(nèi)地經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩，7月份工業(yè)生產(chǎn)增速和1-7月份投資增速雙雙下滑。接著，在對中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的年度評估中，國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)對6萬億美元影子銀行產(chǎn)品的違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提出嚴(yán)重警告。這給一些人提供了更多彈藥，他們警告稱，沒有哪個(gè)國家能以中國的速度提高債務(wù)與國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)之比而不發(fā)生危機(jī)。

It is possible, though, that the gloom is overdone. “Our analysis of 765 banks in China indicates that recapitalisation and bailouts have started and made unexpected (and under-appreciated) progress,” notes Jason Bedford, an analyst at UBS in Hong Kong in a detailed analysis in mid-August. “Write-offs and bad asset disposal have risen threefold since 2013.”

然而，這種悲觀情緒或許過頭了。“我們對中國765家銀行的分析顯示，資本重組以及紓困已經(jīng)啟動(dòng)并且取得了出乎意料(且被低估)的進(jìn)展，”瑞銀(UBS)駐香港分析師賈森•貝德福德(Jason Bedford)在8月中旬一份詳細(xì)分析報(bào)告中指出，“自2013年以來，資產(chǎn)減記和不良資產(chǎn)處置增加了2倍。”

Mr Bedford’s study is one of several indicators that suggest things are not as dire as conventional wisdom — and the many hedge funds with short positions on the banks as a proxy for the Chinese economy — suggest.

貝德福德的研究以及其他跡象表明，情況并不像普遍看法——以及通過做空銀行來做空中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的許多對沖基金——所認(rèn)為的那樣嚴(yán)重。

One of the banks that Mr Bedford mentions as having made aggressive write-offs of the sort of shadowy products the IMF warns about is Bank of Dalian. It reduced its exposure to what the lender itself refers to as high-risk credit assets and other credit assets by 86 per cent — and took a 95 per cent drop in profits before tax.

貝德福德提到一些銀行對IMF提出警告的影子銀行產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行了大規(guī)模減記，其中一家銀行是大連銀行(Bank of Dalian)。該銀行將其自稱的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)信貸資產(chǎn)和其他信貸資產(chǎn)的敞口減少了86%，稅前利潤縮水95%。

Dalian has the distinction of being based in Liaoning province, in China’s depressed north-east — the only province that actually shrank in recent quarters. In other words, the local economy is so bad that the bank’s executives could not hope to grow out of their problem assets over time in the way counterparts in more healthy parts of the country predict they will.

大連銀行的不同之處在于，它位于經(jīng)濟(jì)境況不佳的中國東北部的遼寧省，而遼寧是最近幾個(gè)季度經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)際上出現(xiàn)收縮的唯一省份。換句話說，當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟(jì)非常糟糕，銀行高管不可能指望慢慢靠業(yè)務(wù)增長擺脫不良資產(chǎn)，像處于經(jīng)濟(jì)較健康地區(qū)的銀行預(yù)測能夠做到的那樣。

City commercial banks such as Dalian are at the bottom of the financial food chain. Their larger rivals lend to big state-owned enterprises and are more diversified both by sector and geography. Borrowers from the city commercial banks, by contrast, tend to be small and medium enterprises that often lack valuable collateral and reliable numbers on cash flow.

大連銀行等城市商業(yè)銀行處于金融食物鏈的最底端。規(guī)模較大的競爭對手會(huì)貸款給國有企業(yè)，而且它們在貸款行業(yè)和地區(qū)分布方面較為多樣化。相比之下，城市商業(yè)銀行的貸款對象往往是中小企業(yè)，后者常常缺乏有價(jià)值的抵押物和可靠的現(xiàn)金流數(shù)據(jù)。

Last year, Dalian sold Rmb15bn of non-performing loans to Orient AMC, one of the four big asset management companies authorised by the central government to buy such problem obligations.

去年，大連銀行接受東方資產(chǎn)管理公司(Orient AMC)注資150億元人民幣，其中62億元人民幣用于收購其不良貸款。東方資產(chǎn)是中國中央政府批準(zhǔn)成立的收購不良貸款的四大資產(chǎn)管理公司之一，最初成立的目的是購買中國銀行(Bank of China)的不良貸款。

Orient, originally established to buy Bank of China’s NPLs, then went on to take a 51 per cent stake in the newly cleaned up bank. With its deep pockets, Orient could afford to install more experienced executives in Dalian, and, eventually, attract better customers. “With a strong parent, they can lift their brand,” one person involved with the bank says.

東方資產(chǎn)后來獲得清理干凈的大連銀行的50.29%股權(quán)。東方資產(chǎn)的雄厚財(cái)力令其有能力向大連銀行派駐更有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的高管并最終吸引更好的客戶。一位熟悉大連銀行的人士表示：“有了這家強(qiáng)大的母公司，他們就能提升他們的品牌。”

In many cases, management changes can make a big difference to a bank’s results. The founder of one lender in Shenzhen notes that he was able to improve the quality of the bank’s loan book by changing the incentive structure for employees. When the company began compensating loan officers based on interest-paying loans rather than on the rate of growth of the loan book, results improved dramatically. “We have learnt a lot,” he says.

在很多情況下，管理層變動(dòng)可能會(huì)對銀行業(yè)績產(chǎn)生巨大影響。深圳一家銀行的創(chuàng)始人指出，通過改變員工激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)，他得以改善了該銀行的貸款質(zhì)量。當(dāng)該銀行開始根據(jù)付息貸款而非貸款增速為信貸員發(fā)放薪酬時(shí)，該銀行的業(yè)績獲得巨大改善。他表示：“我們學(xué)到了很多。”

To be fair, his bottom line was also helped because much of the collateral for the loan book was in the form of local real estate and Shenzhen has had the hottest property market on the mainland for the past two years.

公平的來講，該銀行的利潤也得到改善，因?yàn)楹芏噘J款的抵押物是當(dāng)?shù)胤康禺a(chǎn)，而過去兩年深圳房地產(chǎn)市場是中國內(nèi)地最火熱的。

Still there are other hopeful indications for China’s economy. For example producer prices are expected to stop falling by the end of the year after four years of declines, says Haibin Zhu, chief China economist at JPMorgan Chase. As a result the real burden of debt will become lighter, providing relief to China’s many indebted corporates — and their bankers.

對于中國經(jīng)濟(jì)而言，還有其他一些頗有希望的跡象。例如，摩根大通(JPMorgan)中國首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家朱海斌表示，預(yù)計(jì)生產(chǎn)者價(jià)格將在連續(xù)4年下跌后在今年年內(nèi)止住跌勢。因此，實(shí)際的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)將減輕，這將讓很多負(fù)債企業(yè)以及負(fù)責(zé)它們貸款的信貸員松一口氣。

A benign outcome for China’s slowing economy of course is still not a given. After all, “bad debt accumulation is still rising,” Mr Bedford notes. “The growth of the problem could outpace the solution.”

當(dāng)然，對于中國日益放緩的經(jīng)濟(jì)而言，良好的結(jié)果不是必然的。畢竟，“壞賬累積仍在增加，”貝德福德指出，“問題的解決可能趕不上問題的增加。”

In many cases, related party lending and under the table kickbacks remain an issue; in other cases, it is hard to know whether political interference or lack of simple risk management is responsible for the mess. But at least the worst possible outcome is no longer a given.

在很多情況下，關(guān)聯(lián)方貸款以及暗中回扣仍是一個(gè)問題;在另外一些情況下，很難確定是政治干預(yù)還是缺乏簡單的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理導(dǎo)致了問題。但至少，最糟糕的可能結(jié)果不再是必然的了。