FT社評(píng)：化解貿(mào)易阻力需中西方共同努力

Chinese companies scouring the world to buy technology, brands and multinational corporations have sparked a significant trend this year. The scale is impressive.

中國(guó)企業(yè)踏遍世界各地收購(gòu)技術(shù)、品牌和跨國(guó)公司，在今年形成一個(gè)顯著趨勢(shì)。其規(guī)模令人印象深刻。

The value of Chinese overseas acquisitions announced in the first nine months totalled about $191bn, almost double the inflows of foreign investment into China over the same period.

今年頭九個(gè)月宣布的中國(guó)海外收購(gòu)的總價(jià)值約為1910億美元，幾乎是同期外商對(duì)華投資的兩倍。

The acquisitions are generally welcomed by recipient countries. They help create jobs and economic growth. Signs of resistance are mounting in the US, Australia and recently in Europe too. Nearly $40bn in planned Chinese deals have been scuppered since mid-2015, mostly because of tightened scrutiny over competition and national security concerns.

這些收購(gòu)一般受到目的地國(guó)家歡迎。它們幫助創(chuàng)造就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)和促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。在美國(guó)、澳大利亞以及最近在歐洲，也出現(xiàn)了一些抵觸跡象。自2015年年中以來(lái)，總計(jì)近400億美元的中資收購(gòu)計(jì)劃受挫，多數(shù)是因?yàn)槌鲇诟?jìng)爭(zhēng)和國(guó)家安全顧慮的更嚴(yán)格的審查。

The list of deals inviting examination is lengthening, with the proposed $44bn Chinese takeover of Swiss agribusiness Syngenta one of the latest to face delays. Amid signs of a protectionist backlash in Germany, Berlin has withdrawn approval for the €670m acquisition of chip equipment maker Aixtron by Chinese interests citing “previously unknown security-related information”.

招致審查的交易的名單越來(lái)越長(zhǎng)，擬議中的中資440億美元收購(gòu)瑞士農(nóng)業(yè)綜合企業(yè)先正達(dá)(Syngenta)是最新一筆面臨延誤的交易。在德國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)出現(xiàn)保護(hù)主義反彈跡象的背景下，柏林方面撤回了對(duì)中資6.7億歐元收購(gòu)芯片設(shè)備制造商愛思強(qiáng)(Aixtron)的批準(zhǔn)，理由是“先前未知的安全相關(guān)信息”。

Such repercussions were entirely predictable. The deal bonanza highlights stark asymmetries between China and the west, raising questions not only of corporate governance but also of whether there can be reciprocal treatment between a highly restrictive authoritarian state and open industrialised democracies.

這種沖擊波是完全可以預(yù)見的。這波交易熱潮突顯了中國(guó)和西方之間的鮮明不對(duì)稱，還引發(fā)了種種疑問(wèn)，不僅包括公司治理，還包括在高度限制性的威權(quán)國(guó)家和開放的工業(yè)化民主國(guó)家之間有沒有可能存在互惠對(duì)等待遇。

The plain fact is that western companies would stand little chance of securing Beijing’s approval to buy an important state-owned Chinese corporation — or even a privately owned one in a restricted industry.

明顯的事實(shí)是，西方公司如果要收購(gòu)一家重要的國(guó)有中國(guó)企業(yè)，或者哪怕是一家在限制性行業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)的私營(yíng)企業(yè)，都是幾乎沒有機(jī)會(huì)爭(zhēng)取到北京方面批準(zhǔn)的。

The OECD, a grouping of industrialised countries, places China last but one for restrictiveness towards foreign direct investment out of 59 countries ranked. The World Bank put the country in 84th place, behind Saudi Arabia and Ukraine, in a ranking for ease of doing business.

由工業(yè)化國(guó)家組成的經(jīng)合組織(OECD)在其編制的對(duì)外商直接投資的限制程度排名中，把中國(guó)列在59個(gè)國(guó)家中的倒數(shù)第二位。世界銀行(World Bank)在其營(yíng)商環(huán)境報(bào)告中把中國(guó)排在第84位，還不如沙特阿拉伯和烏克蘭。

At the sector level, the mismatch between China and the west becomes even clearer. Media, telecoms, legal and financial services are either completely closed to foreign investment in China or highly restricted, according to OECD data. By contrast, such industries are almost entirely open to acquisitions in the west.

在行業(yè)層面，中國(guó)與西方之間的不對(duì)稱變得更加鮮明。根據(jù)經(jīng)合組織的數(shù)據(jù)，中國(guó)的媒體、電信、法律和金融服務(wù)等行業(yè)要么完全不讓外資涉足，要么實(shí)行嚴(yán)格限制。與此形成反差的是，西方的這些行業(yè)對(duì)收購(gòu)幾乎完全開放。

This means that companies such as Dalian Wanda, a Chinese company with strong government connections, has been able to snap up iconic Hollywood film studios but foreigners are barred from buying equivalent Chinese firms. Similarly, Chinese company Midea has bought Kuka, a robotics maker and one of Germany’s most advanced companies. But when Carlyle, a US private equity firm, tried to buy XCMG, a Chinese machine tool maker, it was blocked by Beijing.

這意味著中國(guó)企業(yè)——比如大連萬(wàn)達(dá)這樣一家具有深厚政府人脈的企業(yè)——能夠買下標(biāo)志性的好萊塢電影制片公司，而外國(guó)人被禁止收購(gòu)相等的中國(guó)公司。同樣，中國(guó)公司美的(Midea)收購(gòu)了德國(guó)機(jī)器人制造商、德國(guó)最先進(jìn)的企業(yè)之一庫(kù)卡(Kuka)。但是，美國(guó)私募股權(quán)公司凱雷(Carlyle)收購(gòu)中國(guó)工程機(jī)械制造商徐工(XCMG)的企圖被北京方面封殺。

Such a lack of balance is neither sustainable nor desirable. If China wants to continue to benefit from virtually free access to the best technology and brands the west has to offer, it needs to take reciprocity more seriously.

這種不平衡的狀態(tài)既不可持續(xù)，也不可取。如果中國(guó)希望繼續(xù)獲益于能夠基本上自由地獲取西方最好的技術(shù)和品牌，它就需要更加認(rèn)真地對(duì)待互惠對(duì)等。

With Chinese gross domestic product growth slowing, Beijing should recognise that it needs the US and Europe as much as they need China. It should also redouble its energies to negotiate a bilateral investment agreement with the EU.

隨著中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)增長(zhǎng)放緩，北京方面應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到，它需要美國(guó)和歐洲，就像美歐也需要中國(guó)一樣。它還應(yīng)加倍努力，與歐盟談判達(dá)成雙邊投資協(xié)定。

The upsurge in foreign investment and engagement that would follow a liberalisation of China’s highly restrictive investment regime would provide impetus to flagging growth. It would also help neutralise the growing wave of protectionism in the west that is threatening to thwart some of corporate China’s biggest overseas deals.

在中國(guó)放開高度限制性的投資制度后，外商投資和參與的激增將提振中國(guó)正在放緩的增長(zhǎng)。這還將有助于化解西方日益高漲的保護(hù)主義浪潮，這股浪潮正在威脅一些最大的中資海外交易。