債轉(zhuǎn)股：中國解決債務(wù)問題的可喜動向

It was not a good omen. In March, Chinese premier Li Keqiang confirmed that his government would authorise debt-for-equity swaps to reduce corporate indebtedness. A few weeks later, Huarong Energy announced that a dozen banks had agreed to swap loans totalling Rmb12.9bn ($1.9bn) for shares in the distressed shipbuilder-turned-oil exploration company.

當(dāng)時(shí)那不是個(gè)好兆頭：3月，中國總理李克強(qiáng)證實(shí)，中國政府將允許通過債轉(zhuǎn)股來降低企業(yè)的負(fù)債率。幾周后，經(jīng)營困難的石油勘探企業(yè)華榮能源(Huarong Energy)宣布，12家銀行債主已同意該公司以股份抵償總計(jì)129億元人民幣(合19億美元)的貸款。華榮能源的前身是一家造船企業(yè)。

To many analysts, that debt-for-equity swap outlined by Huarong in a statement to the Hong Kong stock exchange seemed like a pointless exercise in delaying the inevitable. Surely it was better for banks to cut their losses rather than help a zombie shipbuilder reincarnate itself as a Central Asian petroleum play by acquiring oilfields in Kyrgyzstan’s Fergana valley.

對很多分析師而言，華榮能源在港交所(HKEx)公告中概述的債轉(zhuǎn)股方案看上去像是一種沒有意義的嘗試，只是為了拖延時(shí)間，而無法改變不可避免的結(jié)局。對于銀行來說，比起幫助一家垂死的造船企業(yè)通過收購位于吉爾吉斯斯坦費(fèi)爾干納盆地的油田重生為一家中亞石油企業(yè)，能夠減少損失無疑更好。

Six months later, two state-owned enterprises have unveiled the first state council sanctioned debt-for-equity swaps: Yunnan Tin Group and Wuhan Iron & Steel (Wisco). But neither Yunnan Tin nor Wisco’s swaps bear much resemblance to that outlined by Huarong in its transaction, which is still pending.

六個(gè)月后，兩家國有企業(yè)宣布了頭兩個(gè)獲得國務(wù)院批準(zhǔn)的債轉(zhuǎn)股項(xiàng)目：云南錫業(yè)集團(tuán)(Yunnan Tin Group)和武漢鋼鐵集團(tuán)(Wisco，簡稱：武鋼)。但是云南錫業(yè)和武鋼的債轉(zhuǎn)股項(xiàng)目與華榮此前在公告中概述的計(jì)劃(目前事情仍未確定)沒有太多相似之處。

The key difference is the introduction of middle men — in the form of a fund — that stand between Yunnan Tin and Wisco and bank creditors.

關(guān)鍵區(qū)別在于，在云南錫業(yè)和武鋼與銀行債權(quán)人之間，引入了中間機(jī)構(gòu)——一支基金。

In the case of Yunnan Tin, investors will be invited to purchase equity stakes in the company through the fund, and the proceeds will be used to pay down Rmb10bn worth of the company’s loans.

就云南錫業(yè)而言，投資者將受邀通過該基金購買云南錫業(yè)的股份，所籌資金將用于償還該公司總值100億元人民幣的貸款。

This will help to reduce the group’s leverage by about 15 per cent, according to NSBO Beijing, a research house. That in turn would help avoid the downside of the Huarong scenario, whereby banks that had lent billions of renminbi to a shipbuilder could end up as majority shareholders in an oil company with assets in one of Central Asia’s most volatile regions.

研究機(jī)構(gòu)藍(lán)橡資本中國(NSBO China)表示，這將有助于將該集團(tuán)的杠桿降低約15%。這反過來有助于避免華榮方案的壞處——向一家造船企業(yè)發(fā)放了數(shù)十億元貸款的那些銀行，到頭來可能會成為一家在中亞最動蕩的地區(qū)之一擁有資產(chǎn)的石油公司的大股東。

This attempt to create third-party demand for equity stakes in indebted companies is one of the main differences between the state council’s current debt-for-equity swap programme and its Rmb1.4tn bailout of the banking sector in the late-1990s. Back then, asset management companies paid banks full-face value for non-performing loans that were worth much less.

試圖為負(fù)債企業(yè)的股份創(chuàng)造第三方需求，是國務(wù)院當(dāng)前債轉(zhuǎn)股項(xiàng)目與上世紀(jì)90年代末總值1.4萬億元人民幣的銀行業(yè)紓困計(jì)劃之間的主要區(qū)別之一。當(dāng)時(shí)，幾家資產(chǎn)管理公司(AMC)按面值全額支付了遠(yuǎn)不值那個(gè)價(jià)格的不良貸款。

Another key difference is that the swaps involve standard rather than non-performing or special-mention loans, which is consistent with the government’s pledge that the programme will not be another “free lunch” for zombie companies. Yingchao Zhang, financial analyst at NSBO, observed in a recent report: “The scheme is not designed to tackle China’s NPL problem but to assist companies in reducing leverage levels.”

另一個(gè)關(guān)鍵區(qū)別在于此次債轉(zhuǎn)股涉及的是正常貸款、而不是不良貸款或關(guān)注貸款(special-mention loan)，這與政府承諾該項(xiàng)目不會成為僵尸企業(yè)的“免費(fèi)午餐”的說法一致。藍(lán)橡資本金融分析師張穎超(音譯)在最近一份報(bào)告中指出：“該項(xiàng)目并不是為了解決中國的不良貸款問題，而是為了幫助企業(yè)降低杠桿水平。”

If such swaps help companies such Yunnan Tin reduce leverage and revive their fortunes, the investors who bet on successful turnrounds will be rewarded.

如果此類債轉(zhuǎn)股項(xiàng)目幫助云南錫業(yè)這樣的企業(yè)降低了杠桿水平并恢復(fù)了生機(jī)，押注企業(yè)出現(xiàn)轉(zhuǎn)機(jī)的投資者將得到回報(bào)。

They will also bear the risk if the companies fail. Despite provisions that would force Yunnan Tin to buy back investors’ shares if its return targets are not met, the government has said it will not come to investors’ rescue if the group is not able to meet its obligations.

假如企業(yè)失敗，投資者也將承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。盡管按照規(guī)定，如果未能達(dá)到盈利目標(biāo)，云南錫業(yè)將必須回購?fù)顿Y者持有的股票，但是政府稱，如果該集團(tuán)無法履行義務(wù)，政府不會出手搭救投資者。

The scheme is too small to be a panacea for China’s larger debt problem. In its initial phase, it is expected to involve no more than Rmb3tn in debt — compared with the country’s outstanding corporate debt stock of Rmb120tn. In that regard, the debt-for-equity swap programme is just one of many tools in the Chinese government’s regulatory toolbox as it attempts to stabilise overall debt levels.

債轉(zhuǎn)股計(jì)劃規(guī)模太小，不足以成為解決中國龐大債務(wù)問題的靈丹妙藥。在初始階段，該計(jì)劃預(yù)計(jì)將涉及至多3萬億元人民幣的債務(wù)——而中國目前未償還的公司債務(wù)總計(jì)120萬億元人民幣。在這方面，債轉(zhuǎn)股項(xiàng)目只是中國政府在試圖穩(wěn)定整體債務(wù)水平時(shí)使用的眾多監(jiān)管工具之一。

But it is a useful reminder that when investors and analysts worry about problems in China, chances are the government is even more worried about the same issue.

但它有效地提醒了人們，當(dāng)投資者和分析師為中國的問題擔(dān)憂時(shí)，中國政府可能更是在為同樣的問題心急如焚。

Earlier this year, investor relief that the country’s economic growth had stabilised in the first quarter gave way to concerns that the better than expected performance was simply the product of a reckless surge in credit.

今年早些時(shí)候，投資者對第一季度中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長保持穩(wěn)定的寬慰，被這樣一種擔(dān)憂所取代，即強(qiáng)于預(yù)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)只是不計(jì)后果的信貸激增的產(chǎn)物。

While the Chinese government has always prioritised economic growth and urban job creation over debt reduction, the complex debt-for-equity swap mechanism revealed in October makes it clear that regulators devoted a lot of time to the problem this summer.

盡管中國政府總是把經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和城市就業(yè)放在比削減債務(wù)優(yōu)先考慮的位置上，但是10月公布的復(fù)雜的債轉(zhuǎn)股機(jī)制明確表明，監(jiān)管部門在今年夏天花了大量時(shí)間來研究這個(gè)問題。

For all the limitations of such swaps, they at least constitute an official recognition that Chinese corporate debt levels need to be stabilised, if not reduced. Coming on the heels of an unprecedented credit bubble, that in itself is a welcome development.

盡管此類債轉(zhuǎn)股項(xiàng)目存在種種局限性，但是它們至少體現(xiàn)出官方承認(rèn)了這一點(diǎn)，即需要采取措施穩(wěn)定、乃至削減中國的公司債水平。在一場前所未有的信貸泡沫之后，這本身就是一種可喜的動向。