美國(guó)新總統(tǒng)將要面臨的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)

In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man rules. The US economy shows significant flaws. But it is a king when compared with its peers. It has recovered from the Great Recession, with unemployment low and real incomes rising. It also possesses abiding supremacy in new technologies. Nevertheless, the next administration will take over a country with mediocre growth of productivity, high inequality, a growing retreat from work and a declining rate of creation of new businesses and jobs. At least the US fiscal position is not a really urgent threat. That is to the good, since nothing much is likely to be done about it.

盲人國(guó)度，獨(dú)眼為王。雖然美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)暴露出巨大缺陷，但與其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體相比，美國(guó)仍可稱王。美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)已從大衰退(Great Recession)中復(fù)蘇，失業(yè)率處于較低水平，實(shí)際收入不斷增長(zhǎng)。美國(guó)還在新技術(shù)領(lǐng)域擁有根深蒂固的優(yōu)勢(shì)。然而，新一屆美國(guó)政府將接管的是這樣一個(gè)國(guó)度：生產(chǎn)率增長(zhǎng)差強(qiáng)人意，社會(huì)不平等程度高，越來(lái)越多人放棄求職，新企業(yè)創(chuàng)立及就業(yè)新增的速度不斷下降。至少美國(guó)的財(cái)政狀況還并非真正緊迫的威脅。這是件好事，因?yàn)閷?duì)于財(cái)政問(wèn)題，反正也不太可能做什么。

The financial crisis of 2007-09 was a devastating event, economically and politically. But real gross domestic product per head had reached its trough by the second quarter of 2009 and recovered to pre-crisis levels by the final quarter of 2013. Similarly, the unemployment rate peaked at 10 per cent in October 2009 but is now back to 4.9 per cent. The financial sector is also in far better health than during the crisis.

2007-09年金融危機(jī)就經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治而言都是一場(chǎng)災(zāi)難。但實(shí)際人均國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)已在2009年第二季度見(jiàn)底，并于2013年第四季度恢復(fù)至危機(jī)前水平。類(lèi)似地，2009年10月，失業(yè)率升至10%的峰值，但現(xiàn)在已回落至4.9%。金融業(yè)的健康狀況也已比危機(jī)期間好得多。

Too many casual observers take this rapid turnround for granted. But the Great Recession could have been another Great Depression. It took bold action by the Federal Reserve, the administration of George W Bush and that of Barack Obama to turn the economy around so quickly. Everyone has benefited greatly from this success.

太多漫不經(jīng)心的觀察人士將這種快速的復(fù)蘇視為理所當(dāng)然。但此次大衰退本來(lái)有可能演變成另一場(chǎng)大蕭條(Great Depression)。得益于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)、小布什(George W Bush)及巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)政府采取的果敢行動(dòng)，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)才如此迅速地恢復(fù)了生機(jī)。所有人都極大地受益于此次成功。

Nevertheless, the crisis has left deep scars. In the second quarter of 2016, real GDP per head was still only 4 per cent above its pre-crisis peak, almost nine years before. Labour productivity has grown slowly since the crisis, by historical standards, largely as a result of weakened investment. One study estimates US potential output is 7 per cent below levels suggested by pre-crisis trends. Yet average growth of US labour productivity, albeit slowly subsiding, has exceeded that of other leading high-income economies over the past 15 years. This is probably due to its dominance of high-tech innovation: the aggregate capitalisation of the five largest US technology companies is now over $2.2tn.

然而，這場(chǎng)危機(jī)還是留下了嚴(yán)重的后遺癥。2016年第二季度的實(shí)際人均GDP仍只比危機(jī)前(將近9年前)的峰值水平高4%。以歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)衡量，勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率自上次危機(jī)發(fā)生以來(lái)一直增長(zhǎng)緩慢——主要是由投資減弱造成。一項(xiàng)研究估計(jì)，美國(guó)的潛在產(chǎn)出比危機(jī)前的趨勢(shì)水平低了7%。但盡管出現(xiàn)放緩，過(guò)去15年間，美國(guó)勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率的平均增速超過(guò)了其他主要高收入經(jīng)濟(jì)體。這多半得益于美國(guó)在高科技創(chuàng)新領(lǐng)域的主導(dǎo)地位：美國(guó)最大的5家科技公司現(xiàn)在的總市值已經(jīng)超過(guò)2.2萬(wàn)億美元。

Yet, the scars left by the crisis, which include diminished confidence in the probity and competence of the financial, intellectual and policymaking elites, also came on top of older ones.

然而，上次危機(jī)留下的后遺癥——其中包括對(duì)金融界、知識(shí)界及政策制定界精英的誠(chéng)信和能力的日漸不信任——也是緊隨著一些老問(wèn)題出現(xiàn)的。

Real median household income increased by 5.2 per cent between 2014 and 2015. But it remains below pre-crisis levels. Indeed, it is below levels reached in 2000 and has even fallen relative to real GDP per head consistently since the mid 1970s. This performance helps explain the tide of disillusionment, even despair, revealed so starkly by this grim election (see charts).

2014年至2015年間，美國(guó)家庭實(shí)際收入中值提高了5.2%，但仍低于危機(jī)前的水平。實(shí)際上，這一中值也低于2000年水平，甚至相對(duì)于自上世紀(jì)70年代中期以來(lái)的實(shí)際人均GDP都一直在下降。這一表現(xiàn)可以解釋普遍的幻滅感，甚至絕望感——在此次氣氛嚴(yán)肅的大選中顯露無(wú)遺(見(jiàn)圖表)。

Not surprisingly, inequality has worsened markedly. Between 1980 and the most recent period, the share of the top 1 per cent in pre-tax income jumped from 10 per cent to 18 per cent. Even after tax, it rose by a third, from 8 to 12 per cent. The rise in compensation of chief executives, relative to that of workers, has been huge. The US has the highest inequality of any high-income country and has seen the fastest rise in inequality among the seven leading high-income economies. The divergence among these countries suggests that rising inequality is far more a social choice than an economic imperative.

意料之中的是，美國(guó)的不平等已明顯惡化。從1980年直至最近時(shí)期，稅前收入前1%人口所占收入比例已從10%躍升至18%。即使是稅后，他們所占收入比例也增加了三分之一，從8%增至12%。相對(duì)于普通員工，首席執(zhí)行官們的薪酬漲幅一直很高。在所有高收入國(guó)家中，美國(guó)的不平等程度最高，而在7個(gè)收入最高的經(jīng)濟(jì)體中，美國(guó)不平等程度加劇的速度最快。這些國(guó)家之間的差異表明，不平等程度日益加劇更多的是一個(gè)社會(huì)選擇問(wèn)題，而非在經(jīng)濟(jì)上不可避免。

Closely related to the rising inequality has been a decline in the share of labour in GDP from 64.6 per cent in 2001 to 60.4 per cent in 2014. Workers have not only suffered from declining shares of the pie. Just as significant is the steady rise in the proportion of men aged 25 to 54 neither in work nor seeking it from about 3 per cent in the 1950s to 12 per cent now. Even France had a higher fraction of prime-age men in jobs than the US every year since 2001. Since 1990, the US has had the second-largest increase in male non-participation in the labour force of all members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. After 2000, the declining trend in non-participation of prime-age women also halted. The proportion of US women in this age category in employment is now among the lowest of all the members of the OECD.

與日益加劇的不平等密切相關(guān)的是，勞動(dòng)力在GDP中所占份額從2001年的64.6%下降到2014年的60.4%。勞動(dòng)者遭遇的不僅是分到的蛋糕越來(lái)越小。同樣顯著的遭遇還有，25歲至54歲男性中沒(méi)有工作且已放棄求職的比例穩(wěn)步上升，從20世紀(jì)50年代的3%上升到現(xiàn)在的12%。就連法國(guó)的壯年男性占就業(yè)人口比例自2001年以來(lái)都年年壓過(guò)美國(guó)。自1990年起，美國(guó)男性未參與勞動(dòng)的比率的增幅在經(jīng)合組織(OECD)所有成員國(guó)里排第二。2000年以后，壯年女性未參與勞動(dòng)的比率不斷下降的趨勢(shì)也停止了。美國(guó)女性在所有壯年就業(yè)人口中所占比例現(xiàn)在也屬經(jīng)合組織所有成員中最低之列。

No less disturbing is a decline in economic dynamism. The rate of creation of new jobs has slowed markedly, as have rates of internal migration. The rate of entry of new businesses into the marketplace has also been falling over an extended period, as has the share of ones less than five years old in both the total number of businesses and employment. Meanwhile, business fixed investment has been persistently weak. Evidence also suggests a rising variation in returns on capital. These are long-term trends, not just post-crisis events.

經(jīng)濟(jì)活力的下降也同樣令人不安。就業(yè)崗位新增速度顯著放緩，國(guó)內(nèi)人口遷移率也是一樣。新企業(yè)進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)的速度也已持續(xù)下降較長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)期，成立不足5年的企業(yè)在所有企業(yè)中所占比例以及在總就業(yè)中所占比例也是一樣。與此同時(shí)，企業(yè)固定投資持續(xù)疲軟。證據(jù)還顯示資本回報(bào)的差異日益加大。這些都是長(zhǎng)期趨勢(shì)，不僅僅是危機(jī)后事件。

This loss of dynamism may not only be related to declining productivity growth but also to the shifts in income distribution. If competitive pressure is falling, monopolistic and monopsonistic — sole-buyer — positions will either emerge or strengthen. The collapse of trade unionism and decline in relative minimum wages reinforce the asymmetric power of business and labour in the marketplace. Intellectual property rights can also be a big barrier to competition. The rise of new regulatory barriers is disturbing. Among the striking changes is the soaring share of workers with an occupational licence at state level. These licences must be a big obstacle to easy movement across state borders.

經(jīng)濟(jì)活力喪失可能不止與生產(chǎn)率增長(zhǎng)減弱有關(guān)，還與收入分配的變化有關(guān)。如果競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力在下降，壟斷和獨(dú)買(mǎi)(買(mǎi)方壟斷)的格局要么會(huì)出現(xiàn)、要么會(huì)鞏固。工會(huì)的崩潰，以及相對(duì)最低工資的下降加強(qiáng)了企業(yè)和勞動(dòng)力在市場(chǎng)中的力量不對(duì)稱。知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)也可能成為阻礙競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的一大因素。新監(jiān)管壁壘的興起令人不安。還有一個(gè)顯著變化是擁有州級(jí)職業(yè)許可證的勞動(dòng)者所占比例出現(xiàn)飆升。這些許可證肯定極大地阻礙勞動(dòng)者方便地跨州流動(dòng)。

For all its strengths, the US economy could do better. In addition to the trends identified above, deteriorating infrastructure, worsening relative educational performance and a terrible tax code are challenges. Halting immigrants and imports would be an act of self-harm. The US must build on its historic strengths of an open and dynamic economy, together with government provision of infrastructure, research, education, and balanced tax and regulatory policies. A new administration needs the right diagnosis and co-operation from Congress. Pigs may also fly.

盡管美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)擁有種種優(yōu)勢(shì)，它本還可以表現(xiàn)得更好。除上述趨勢(shì)以外，基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的退化，教育相對(duì)表現(xiàn)的惡化，以及糟糕的稅制都構(gòu)成挑戰(zhàn)。停止接納移民和進(jìn)口將是自損之舉。美國(guó)必須發(fā)揚(yáng)其一貫的優(yōu)勢(shì)，即一個(gè)開(kāi)放、有活力的經(jīng)濟(jì)，再加上政府提供的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、研究、教育，以及均衡的稅收和監(jiān)管政策。新政府需要正確的判斷以及國(guó)會(huì)的合作。豬或許也可以飛起來(lái)。