特朗普的美國(guó)與新全球秩序

Donald Trump’s stunning electoral defeat of Hillary Clinton marks a watershed not just for American politics, but for the entire world order. We appear to be entering a new age of populist nationalism, in which the dominant liberal order that has been constructed since the 1950s has come under attack from angry and energised democratic majorities. The risk of sliding into a world of competitive and equally angry nationalisms is huge, and if this happens it would mark as momentous a juncture as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在選舉中意外擊敗希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)，不僅對(duì)美國(guó)政治而言標(biāo)志著一個(gè)分水嶺，對(duì)整個(gè)世界秩序也是如此。我們似乎正進(jìn)入一個(gè)新的民粹民族主義時(shí)代。在這個(gè)時(shí)代，自上世紀(jì)50年代構(gòu)建起的主導(dǎo)的自由秩序，受到了情緒激憤的民主多數(shù)的攻擊。世界陷入同樣憤怒的各種民族主義相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)巨大。如果這種情況發(fā)生，它將標(biāo)志著一個(gè)與1989年柏林墻倒塌同樣重大的關(guān)頭。

The manner of Trump’s victory lays bare the social basis of the movement he has mobilised. A look at the voting map shows Clinton’s support concentrated geographically in cities along the coasts, with swaths of rural and small-town America voting solidly for Trump. The most surprising shifts were his flipping of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, three northern industrial states that were so solidly Democratic in recent elections that Clinton didn’t even bother to campaign in the latter one. He won by being able to win over unionised workers who had been hit by deindustrialisation, promising to “make America great again” by restoring their lost manufacturing jobs.

特朗普獲勝的方式暴露了他動(dòng)員起的這場(chǎng)運(yùn)動(dòng)的社會(huì)基礎(chǔ)?？匆豢赐镀钡貓D，我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，希拉里的支持者集中于沿海城市，而農(nóng)村和小城鎮(zhèn)地區(qū)堅(jiān)定地投票支持特朗普。最令人意想不到的是他在賓夕法尼亞、密歇根和威斯康星的翻盤(pán)，這三個(gè)北部工業(yè)州在最近幾次選舉中曾是如此固若金湯的民主黨州，以至于希拉里甚至沒(méi)有去威斯康星造勢(shì)。特朗普獲勝是因?yàn)樗靡誀?zhēng)取到那些受到去工業(yè)化沖擊的工會(huì)工人的支持，他承諾通過(guò)恢復(fù)他們失去的制造業(yè)工作崗位，“讓美國(guó)再次變得偉大”。

We have seen this story before. This is the story of Brexit, where the pro-Leave vote was similarly concentrated in rural areas and small towns and cities outside London. It is also true in France, where working-class voters whose parents and grandparents used to vote for the Communist or Socialist parties are voting for Marine Le Pen’s National Front.

這一幕似曾相識(shí)。英國(guó)退歐就是這種情況——支持退歐的投票同樣集中于農(nóng)村地區(qū)、小城鎮(zhèn)以及倫敦以外的其他城市。在法國(guó)也是如此，父輩和祖父輩曾投票給共產(chǎn)黨或社會(huì)黨的工人階級(jí)選民，眼下正投票支持馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)的國(guó)民陣線(xiàn)(National Front)。

But populist nationalism is a far broader phenomenon than that. Vladimir Putin remains unpopular among more educated voters in big cities such as St Petersburg and Moscow, but has a huge support base in the rest of the country. The same is true of Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has an enthusiastic support base among the country’s conservative lower middle class, or Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban, who is popular everywhere but in Budapest.

但民粹民族主義是一個(gè)遠(yuǎn)比這更廣泛的現(xiàn)象。弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)在圣彼得堡、莫斯科等俄羅斯大城市受教育程度較高的選民中仍舊不受歡迎，但在該國(guó)其他地區(qū)卻擁有眾多支持者。對(duì)土耳其總統(tǒng)雷杰普•塔伊普•埃爾多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)或者匈牙利總理歐爾班•維克托(Viktor Orban)來(lái)說(shuō)也是如此，前者在土耳其保守的中產(chǎn)階級(jí)下層中受到狂熱的支持，而后者在除了布達(dá)佩斯的整個(gè)匈牙利都受到歡迎。

Social class, defined today by one’s level of education, appears to have become the single most important social fracture in countless industrialised and emerging-market countries. This, in turn, is driven directly by globalisation and the march of technology, which has been facilitated in turn by the liberal world order created largely by the US since 1945.

如今，由個(gè)人受教育程度界定的社會(huì)階層，似乎已經(jīng)成為很多工業(yè)化和新興市場(chǎng)國(guó)家中最重要的社會(huì)分割線(xiàn)。這種現(xiàn)象受到全球化和技術(shù)進(jìn)步的直接推動(dòng)，而促進(jìn)全球化和技術(shù)進(jìn)步的正是自1945年以來(lái)主要由美國(guó)創(chuàng)建的自由世界秩序。

When we talk about a liberal world order, we are speaking about the rules-based system of international trade and investment that has fuelled global growth in recent years. This is the system that allows iPhones to be assembled in China and shipped to customers in the US or Europe in the week before Christmas. It has also facilitated the movement of millions of people from poorer countries to richer ones, where they can find greater opportunities for themselves and their children. This system has worked as advertised: between 1970 and the US financial crisis of 2008, global output of goods and services quadrupled, bringing hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, not just in China and India but in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.

在我們談?wù)撟杂墒澜缰刃驎r(shí)，我們說(shuō)的是近年來(lái)推動(dòng)全球增長(zhǎng)的、基于規(guī)則的國(guó)際貿(mào)易和投資體系。正是這一體系使得蘋(píng)果手機(jī)能夠在中國(guó)組裝、并在圣誕節(jié)前一周運(yùn)至美國(guó)或歐洲的消費(fèi)者手中。這一體系還方便了數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)的人口從較貧困國(guó)家遷移至較富裕國(guó)家——在那里他們可以為自己和子女找到更好的發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)。這一體系如宣傳的那樣奏效：從1970年到2008年美國(guó)金融危機(jī)，全球商品和服務(wù)產(chǎn)出翻了兩番，讓數(shù)億人口擺脫了貧困——不僅包括生活在中國(guó)和印度的人，還包括生活在拉丁美洲和撒哈拉以南非洲地區(qū)的人。

But as everyone is painfully aware now, the benefits of this system did not filter down to the whole population. The working classes in the developed world saw their jobs disappear as companies outsourced and squeezed efficiencies in response to a ruthlessly competitive global market.

但正如現(xiàn)在大家都已痛苦地意識(shí)到的，該體系所帶來(lái)的好處并沒(méi)有層層惠及所有人群。隨著企業(yè)為應(yīng)對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)殘酷的全球市場(chǎng)而進(jìn)行外包并盡可能提高效率，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家工人階級(jí)失去了工作。

This long-term story was hugely exacerbated by the US subprime crisis of 2008, and the euro crisis that hit Europe a couple of years later. In both cases, systems designed by elites — liberalised financial markets in the US case, and European policies such as the euro and the Schengen system of internal migration — collapsed dramatically in the face of external shocks. The costs of these failures were again much more heavily borne by ordinary workers than by the elites themselves. Ever since, the real question should not have been why populism has emerged in 2016, but why it took so long to become manifest.

這一長(zhǎng)期問(wèn)題因2008年美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)以及幾年后歐洲遭遇的歐元危機(jī)而大大加劇。在這兩場(chǎng)危機(jī)中，精英們?cè)O(shè)計(jì)的體系——美國(guó)的自由金融市場(chǎng)以及歐洲的歐元和管理內(nèi)部人口流動(dòng)的申根(Schengen)體系等政策——在面對(duì)外部沖擊時(shí)都迅速崩潰。這些失敗的代價(jià)又一次更多地由普通工人、而非精英自身承擔(dān)。從此以后，真正的問(wèn)題不應(yīng)再是為什么民粹主義在2016年出現(xiàn)，而是為什么它過(guò)了這么久才顯現(xiàn)出來(lái)。

In the US, there was a political failure insofar as the system did not adequately represent the traditional working class. The Republican party was dominated by corporate America and its allies who had profited handsomely from globalisation, while the Democratic party had become the party of identity politics: a coalition of women, African-Americans, Hispanics, environmentalists, and the LGBT community, that lost its focus on economic issues.

在美國(guó)，政治上出現(xiàn)了這樣一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤：政治體制未充分代表傳統(tǒng)工人階級(jí)。從全球化中獲利頗豐的美國(guó)企業(yè)界及其盟友主導(dǎo)了共和黨;而民主黨已變成一個(gè)玩弄身份政治的政黨：一個(gè)由女性、非洲裔美國(guó)人、西裔美國(guó)人、環(huán)保主義者以及LGBT(女同性戀者、男同性戀者、雙性戀者與跨性別者)等群體組成的聯(lián)盟，不再關(guān)注經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題。

The failure of the American left to represent the working class is mirrored in similar failures across Europe. European social democracy had made its peace with globalisation a couple of decades ago, in the form of Blairite centrism or the kind of neoliberal reformism engineered by Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democrats in the 2000s.

美國(guó)左翼未能代表工人階級(jí)，歐洲各地的左翼也犯下同樣的錯(cuò)誤。二十年前，歐洲的社會(huì)民主主義就已經(jīng)同全球化和解了，和解的表現(xiàn)就是布萊爾中間路線(xiàn)，以及德國(guó)前總理格哈德•施羅德(Gerhard Schröder)的社會(huì)民主黨在本世紀(jì)頭十年設(shè)計(jì)的新自由主義改革。

But the broader failure of the left was the same one made in the lead-up to 1914 and the Great war, when, in the apt phrase of the British-Czech philosopher, Ernest Gellner, a letter sent to a mailbox marked “class” was mistakenly delivered to one marked “nation.” Nation almost always trumps class because it is able to tap into a powerful source of identity, the desire to connect with an organic cultural community. This longing for identity is now emerging in the form of the American alt-right, a formerly ostracised collection of groups espousing white nationalism in one form or another. But even short of these extremists, many ordinary American citizens began to wonder why their communities were filling up with immigrants, and who had authorised a system of politically correct language by which one could not even complain about the problem. This is why Donald Trump received a huge number of votes from better-educated and more well-off voters as well, who were not victims of globalisation but still felt their country was being taken from them. Needless to say, this dynamic underlay the Brexit vote as well.

但左翼的更大錯(cuò)誤跟一戰(zhàn)前的那個(gè)是同一個(gè)，當(dāng)時(shí)的情況——借用捷克裔英國(guó)哲學(xué)家埃內(nèi)斯特•格爾納(Ernest Gellner)形象的描述——是一封本應(yīng)投進(jìn)標(biāo)為“階級(jí)”(class)的郵箱的信件，被錯(cuò)誤地投進(jìn)了標(biāo)為“民族”(nation)的郵箱。民族幾乎總是壓倒階級(jí)，因?yàn)樗芾靡环N強(qiáng)烈的身份認(rèn)同感，那種與一個(gè)有機(jī)的文化共同體建立聯(lián)系的渴望。這種對(duì)身份認(rèn)同的渴望正以美國(guó)新右翼(alt-right)的形式顯現(xiàn)出來(lái)，新右翼包括各種以前受到排斥的形形色色的白人至上主義團(tuán)體。但即使沒(méi)有這些極端主義者，很多普通美國(guó)公民也開(kāi)始奇怪為什么他們的社區(qū)中出現(xiàn)越來(lái)越多的移民，又是誰(shuí)授權(quán)建立了一套講究語(yǔ)言的政治正確性的體制，在這個(gè)體制中人們甚至不能抱怨這一問(wèn)題。這就是為什么特朗普從受教育程度更高、更富裕的選民那里也得到了不少選票，這些人不是全球化的受害者，但仍感到有人正從他們手中奪走他們的國(guó)家。不用說(shuō)，英國(guó)投票退歐本質(zhì)上也是因?yàn)橥瑯拥脑颉?/p>

So what will be the concrete consequences of the Trump victory for the international system? Contrary to his critics, Trump does have a consistent and thought-through position: he is a nationalist on economic policy, and in relation to the global political system. He has clearly stated that he will seek to renegotiate existing trade agreements such as Nafta and presumably the WTO, and if he doesn’t get what he wants, he is willing to contemplate exiting from them. And he has expressed admiration for “strong” leaders such as Russia’s Putin who nonetheless get results through decisive action. He is correspondingly much less enamoured of traditional US allies such as those in Nato, or Japan and South Korea, whom he has accused of freeriding on American power. This suggests that support for them will also be conditional on a renegotiation of the cost-sharing arrangements now in place.

那么，特朗普獲勝對(duì)國(guó)際體系將帶來(lái)哪些實(shí)際影響?與他的批評(píng)者相反，特朗普確實(shí)擁有始終如一、經(jīng)過(guò)深思熟慮的立場(chǎng)：他在經(jīng)濟(jì)政策和全球政治體系方面是一個(gè)民族主義者。他明確表示，將尋求就現(xiàn)有貿(mào)易協(xié)議重新進(jìn)行談判，如北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定(NAFTA)，可能還有世貿(mào)組織(WTO)。如果他得不到自己想要的，他愿意考慮讓美國(guó)退出。他對(duì)普京等通過(guò)果斷行動(dòng)一樣辦成了事情的“強(qiáng)人”領(lǐng)袖表示了贊賞。相比之下，他對(duì)北約成員國(guó)或日本、韓國(guó)等美國(guó)的傳統(tǒng)盟國(guó)要冷淡得多，并指責(zé)這些國(guó)家搭美國(guó)力量的便車(chē)。這意味著，對(duì)這些盟友的支持將依據(jù)對(duì)現(xiàn)有費(fèi)用分擔(dān)安排的重新談判而定。

The dangers of these positions for both the global economy and for the global security system are impossible to overstate. The world today is brimming with economic nationalism. Traditionally, an open trade and investment regime has depended on the hegemonic power of the US to remain afloat. If the US begins acting unilaterally to change the terms of the contract, there are many powerful players around the world who would be happy to retaliate, and set off a downward economic spiral reminiscent of the 1930s.

這些立場(chǎng)對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)和全球安全體系的威脅，怎樣往嚴(yán)重了說(shuō)都不為過(guò)。當(dāng)今世界充滿(mǎn)經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義。一直以來(lái)，一個(gè)開(kāi)放的貿(mào)易和投資體系的正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，依靠的都是美國(guó)的霸權(quán)。如果美國(guó)開(kāi)始單方面采取行動(dòng)修改這一契約的條款，全世界范圍內(nèi)有很多強(qiáng)大的參與者都將樂(lè)于展開(kāi)報(bào)復(fù)，并引發(fā)一場(chǎng)上世紀(jì)30年代那樣的經(jīng)濟(jì)螺旋式下行。

The danger to the international security system is as great. Russia and China have emerged in the past decades as leading authoritarian great powers, both of whom have territorial ambitions. Trump’s position on Russia is particularly troubling: he has never uttered a critical word about Putin, and has suggested that his takeover of Crimea was perhaps justified. Given his general ignorance about most aspects of foreign policy, his consistent specificity with regard to Russia suggests that Putin has some hidden leverage over him, perhaps in the form of debts to Russian sources that keep his business empire afloat. The first victim of any Trumpist attempt to “get along better” with Russia will be Ukraine and Georgia, two countries that have relied on US support to retain their independence as struggling democracies.

這些立場(chǎng)對(duì)國(guó)際安全體系的威脅同樣巨大。過(guò)去幾十年間，俄羅斯、中國(guó)已崛起為重要的威權(quán)主義大國(guó)，且兩國(guó)都有領(lǐng)土野心。特朗普對(duì)俄羅斯的立場(chǎng)尤其令人擔(dān)憂(yōu)：他從未對(duì)普京有過(guò)半句批評(píng)，還暗示后者吞并克里米亞或許是合理的?？紤]到特朗普對(duì)外交政策大多數(shù)方面整體的無(wú)知，他對(duì)俄羅斯的始終如一的特殊態(tài)度暗示著，普京對(duì)特朗普擁有某種隱形的影響力，或許后者的商業(yè)帝國(guó)賴(lài)以維系的債務(wù)幕后的債主是俄羅斯人。特朗普與俄羅斯“改善關(guān)系”的任何嘗試，最先傷害的將是烏克蘭和格魯吉亞，這兩個(gè)身處困境的國(guó)家一直依靠美國(guó)的支持才得以保持獨(dú)立的民主國(guó)家地位。

More broadly, a Trump presidency will signal the end of an era in which America symbolised democracy itself to people living under corrupt authoritarian governments around the world. American influence has always depended more on its “soft power” rather than misguided projections of force such as the invasion of Iraq. America’s choice last Tuesday signifies a switching of sides from the liberal internationalist camp, to the populist nationalist one. It is no accident that Trump was strongly supported by Ukip’s Nigel Farage, and that one of the first people to congratulate him was the National Front’s Marine Le Pen.

更廣泛地說(shuō)，特朗普擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)將標(biāo)志著一個(gè)時(shí)代的終結(jié)，在那個(gè)時(shí)代，美國(guó)對(duì)世界各地生活在腐敗威權(quán)政府統(tǒng)治之下的人們而言就是民主的象征。美國(guó)的影響力一直更多地依賴(lài)于其“軟實(shí)力”，而非像入侵伊拉克那樣的不明智的武力使用。美國(guó)11月8日作出的選擇意味著，它脫離自由國(guó)際主義陣營(yíng)，改投了民粹民族主義陣營(yíng)。特朗普受到英國(guó)獨(dú)立黨(UKIP)領(lǐng)袖奈杰爾•法拉奇(Nigel Farage)如此強(qiáng)烈的支持并非偶然，國(guó)民陣線(xiàn)的馬琳•勒龐是最早對(duì)特朗普獲勝表示祝賀的人之一也非偶然。

Over the past year, a new populist-nationalist internationale has appeared, by which like-minded groups share information and support across borders. Putin’s Russia is one of the most enthusiastic contributors to this cause, not because it cares about other people’s national identity, but simply to be disruptive. The information war that Russia has waged through its hacking of Democratic National Committee emails has already had a hugely corrosive effect on American institutions, and we can expect this to continue.

過(guò)去一年，一個(gè)新的“民粹-民族主義國(guó)際”已經(jīng)浮現(xiàn)，想法相同的組織通過(guò)這個(gè)新的“國(guó)際”跨境共享信息和支持。普京領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的俄羅斯是這一事業(yè)最熱心的支持者之一，不是因?yàn)樗P(guān)心其他民族的民族認(rèn)同，而只是為了制造混亂。俄羅斯通過(guò)侵入民主黨全國(guó)委員會(huì)(Democratic National Committee)郵件系統(tǒng)發(fā)動(dòng)的信息戰(zhàn)，已然對(duì)美國(guó)的制度造成了巨大的侵蝕，我們可以預(yù)期這種狀況還將持續(xù)。

There remain a number of large uncertainties with regard to this new America. While Trump is a consistent nationalist at heart, he is also very transactional. What will he do when he discovers that other countries will not renegotiate existing trade pacts or alliance arrangements on his terms? Will he settle for the best deal he can get, or simply walk away? There has been a lot of talk about the dangers of his finger on the nuclear trigger, but my sense is that he is much more isolationist at heart than someone eager to use military force around the world. When he confronts the reality of dealing with the Syrian civil war, he may well end up taking a page from the Obama playbook and simply continue to sit this one out.

關(guān)于這個(gè)新美國(guó)，目前仍存在若干較大的不確定因素。雖然特朗普本質(zhì)上是一個(gè)一貫的民族主義者，但他也非常善做交易。當(dāng)特朗普發(fā)現(xiàn)其他國(guó)家不會(huì)按照他的條件，就現(xiàn)有貿(mào)易協(xié)定或同盟安排重新進(jìn)行談判時(shí)，他會(huì)怎么做?他會(huì)退而接受自己能得到的最好交易，還是會(huì)一走了之?對(duì)于由他來(lái)控制核按鈕的危險(xiǎn)性，人們已經(jīng)談?wù)摿撕芏?，但我的感覺(jué)是，他內(nèi)心深處更是一個(gè)孤立主義者，而非一個(gè)渴望在全世界使用武力的人。在他面對(duì)處理敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)這個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)時(shí)，他最后很可能會(huì)借鑒奧巴馬的劇本，繼續(xù)袖手旁觀。

This is the point at which the matter of character will come into play. Like many other Americans, I find it hard to conceive of a personality less suited to be the leader of the free world. This stems only in part from his substantive policy positions, as much from his extreme vanity and sensitivity to perceived slights. Last week, when on a stage with Medal of Honor winners, he blurted out that he too was brave, “financially brave”. He has asserted that he wants payback against all his enemies and critics. When faced with other world leaders who will slight him, will he react like a challenged Mafia boss, or like a transactional businessman?

在這一點(diǎn)上，性格特征將會(huì)發(fā)揮作用。像許多美國(guó)人一樣，我覺(jué)得很難想象有性格比特朗普更不適合擔(dān)當(dāng)自由世界領(lǐng)袖的人了。他實(shí)質(zhì)性的政策立場(chǎng)只是部分原因，其他原因還包括他極端的虛榮心以及敏感的自尊心。不久前，在與榮譽(yù)勛章(Medal of Honor)獲得者同臺(tái)時(shí)，他脫口而出，稱(chēng)自己也很勇敢——“在財(cái)務(wù)上很大膽”。他聲稱(chēng)要對(duì)自己所有的敵人和批評(píng)者進(jìn)行報(bào)復(fù)。當(dāng)面對(duì)輕視他的其他世界領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人時(shí)，他的反應(yīng)是會(huì)像一個(gè)受到挑戰(zhàn)的黑手黨老大，還是會(huì)像一個(gè)善做交易的商人?

Today, the greatest challenge to liberal democracy comes not so much from overtly authoritarian powers such as China, as from within. In the US, Britain, Europe, and a host of other countries, the democratic part of the political system is rising up against the liberal part, and threatening to use its apparent legitimacy to rip apart the rules that have heretofore constrained behaviour, anchoring an open and tolerant world. The liberal elites that have created the system need to listen to the angry voices outside the gates and think about social equality and identity as top-drawer issues they must address. One way or the other, we are going to be in for a rough ride over the next few years.

如今，對(duì)自由民主的最大挑戰(zhàn)，與其說(shuō)來(lái)自中國(guó)等公開(kāi)實(shí)行威權(quán)主義的國(guó)家，不如說(shuō)來(lái)自于自由民主世界內(nèi)部。在美國(guó)、英國(guó)、歐洲以及其他許多國(guó)家，政治體制中民主的部分正在反抗自由的部分，并有可能利用其表面上的合法性來(lái)撕毀現(xiàn)行的一些規(guī)則，正是那些規(guī)則一直以來(lái)約束了行為，支撐起一個(gè)開(kāi)放、包容的世界。創(chuàng)造了這一體系的自由主義精英們需要傾聽(tīng)門(mén)外憤怒的聲音，把社會(huì)平等和身份認(rèn)同作為他們必須解決的最重要問(wèn)題來(lái)思考。不管怎樣，我們?cè)谖磥?lái)幾年都免不了經(jīng)歷一段艱難旅程。

The writer is a senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute and author of ‘Political Order and Political Decay’

本文作者是斯坦福大學(xué)(Stanford)弗里曼•斯波利研究所(Freeman Spogli Institute)高級(jí)研究員，其最新著作是《政治秩序和政治衰敗》(Political Order and Political Decay)