放棄北約對(duì)美國無益
振作起來;唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)正是歐洲所需的一針提神劑;太長(zhǎng)時(shí)間享受美國庇護(hù)的歐洲人，應(yīng)該對(duì)這位當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)敦促歐洲人自力更生表示歡迎。震驚于此次美國大選結(jié)果的歐洲政策制定者為了尋找“烏云的金邊”可謂不遺余力。
There are none. Whatever Europe’s shortcomings as a partner to the US — and there have been plenty — Mr Trump promises to make the world, including Europe, a more unstable and dangerous place. That this approach may encourage Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own security is all to the good but it does not alter the essential prognosis.
這“金邊”是找不到的。無論作為美國合作伙伴的歐洲有什么缺點(diǎn)(肯定不少)，特朗普一定會(huì)讓包括歐洲在內(nèi)的整個(gè)世界變得更不穩(wěn)定、更危險(xiǎn)。他或許會(huì)激勵(lì)歐洲人為自身安全擔(dān)負(fù)起更大的責(zé)任，因而不失為一件好事，但這一點(diǎn)不改變上述基本論斷。
Mr Trump’s foreign policy is a work in progress. Measured by the public statements of the president-elect and his closest advisers, it is shot through with contradictions. America-first isolationism jostles with pledges to increase military spending. The recurring themes, though, are economic nationalism and withdrawal from the global responsibilities the US has assumed since 1945. Mr Trump, whose criticisms of Nato are longstanding, seems clear that allies — whether Japan, the Republic of Korea or Nato members such as Germany, Poland, France or Britain — should look after themselves.
特朗普的外交政策還在醞釀當(dāng)中。觀察這位當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)及其最親密顧問的公開聲明，可以看出其中充滿了矛盾。一邊宣揚(yáng)美國為先的孤立主義，一邊承諾增加軍費(fèi)開支。然而，反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的主題是經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義以及不再承擔(dān)美國自1945年以來一直承擔(dān)的全球責(zé)任。長(zhǎng)期對(duì)北約(Nato)持批評(píng)態(tài)度的特朗普似乎已經(jīng)清楚地表明，美國的盟友——無論是日本、韓國，還是德國、波蘭、法國、英國等北約成員國——都應(yīng)自食其力。
The disdain for globalism catches the public mood in the US. After costly wars of choice in Afghanistan and Iraq there is not much of a market in the midwest for overseas adventurism. The Iraq war was intended as a demonstration of American might. As things turned out, it illuminated national weakness. Superior military hardware takes you only so far unless you have political consent.
特朗普對(duì)全球主義的蔑視契合了美國的公眾情緒。經(jīng)過了阿富汗、伊拉克這兩場(chǎng)不是非打不可且代價(jià)高昂的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，海外冒險(xiǎn)主義在美國中西部地區(qū)已沒有多大市場(chǎng)。發(fā)動(dòng)伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)本是為了顯示美國的實(shí)力，結(jié)果卻暴露了美國的弱點(diǎn)。優(yōu)勢(shì)武器裝備的作用是有限的，除非能獲得政治上的同意。
The charge that Europe has been a free-rider on the US defence budget broadly speaking is a fair one. It has been acknowledged, if then ignored, by many European politicians. I never understood why newly democratic governments in eastern Europe — with most to fear from Russian revanchism — cut so deeply into defence budgets.
廣義來說，指責(zé)歐洲一直搭乘美國國防預(yù)算的便車也不為過。許多歐洲政治家都承認(rèn)了這一點(diǎn)——如果不是后來又忽視了這一點(diǎn)的話。我一直不明白東歐新成立的民主政府為何如此大規(guī)模地削減國防預(yù)算，它們最有理由憂懼俄羅斯復(fù)仇主義。
Some Europeans presented a philosophical justification for the unequal contribution to Nato. Europe’s role after the collapse of communism was that of a “normative” power, spreading liberal internationalism by example. As the sole superpower, the US could keep the peace. Seen from Washington this was never a good bargain. And, anyway, things have moved on from that glorious moment of innocence when it was possible, just, to imagine a world order recast in Europe’s postmodern image.
一些歐洲人為北約內(nèi)部這種不平均的費(fèi)用分?jǐn)偺岢隽苏軐W(xué)上的理由。共產(chǎn)主義垮臺(tái)后，歐洲扮演的角色是一個(gè)“標(biāo)桿”大國，通過樹立榜樣傳播自由國際主義。作為全球唯一的超級(jí)大國，美國可以維持這種和平。從華盛頓的角度來看，這從來都不是一筆合算的買賣。此外，無論如何，形勢(shì)已經(jīng)發(fā)生變化，不再是那個(gè)剛剛可以想象一種按照后現(xiàn)代歐洲形象塑造的世界秩序的光榮時(shí)刻。
All this said, American altruism has always been a myth. From the outset the US commitment to the alliance was rooted in self-interest. Roosevelt, Truman and the rest had weighed the cost of isolationism during the 1920s and 1930s. Nato was the first line of defence against the global, and anti-American, ambitions of Soviet communism.
話雖如此，美國的利他主義從始至終根本就不存在。美國對(duì)北約的承諾從一開始就根植于自身利益。羅斯福(Roosevelt)、杜魯門(Truman)等領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人權(quán)衡了上世紀(jì)二、三十年代實(shí)行孤立主義的代價(jià)。北約是抵御蘇聯(lián)共產(chǎn)主義全球(反美)野心的第一道防線。
Likewise, the postwar international economic architecture was drawn to American specifications. A secure and prosperous Europe provided a rich market for US multinationals. American business was the big winner from an open international order.
同樣，戰(zhàn)后的國際經(jīng)濟(jì)體系也是根據(jù)美國的意愿打造的。安全、繁榮的歐洲為美國跨國公司提供了廣闊的市場(chǎng)。美國企業(yè)是開放的國際秩序的大贏家。
The assumption was modified only slightly once the Berlin Wall came down. The Atlantic alliance would at once entrench democracy in the former communist states and spread the liberal “Washington consensus” to rising states in the south and east.
柏林墻倒塌后，這種設(shè)定僅稍有調(diào)整。這個(gè)跨大西洋聯(lián)盟立刻在前共產(chǎn)主義國家鞏固民主，并向南方和東方崛起的國家傳播信奉自由主義的“華盛頓共識(shí)”。
The economic calculus has changed during the past decade — mainly because China has been the biggest winner from the open trading system — but it is hard to find a significant US business that thinks America would benefit from a retreat into protectionism.
雖然過去十年全球經(jīng)濟(jì)格局已經(jīng)改變——主要因?yàn)橹袊殉蔀殚_放貿(mào)易體系的最大贏家——但很難找到一家認(rèn)為美國將從回歸貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義中受益的重要美國企業(yè)。
It would not take much to upend the alliance. Now, as during the cold war, Nato stands or falls on the credibility of the US commitment to defend its allies. If Mr Trump shares the view of his friend Newt Gingrich that Estonia is little more than a “suburb of St Petersburg” the game is lost. No manner of increase in European defence budgets will sustain Nato deterrence if Russia sees the US dumping the alliance’s Article 5 mutual defence arrangements.
拆散北約也不是很難。像冷戰(zhàn)期間那樣，如今北約的成敗依然系于美國保衛(wèi)盟友承諾的可信度上。如果特朗普贊同友人紐特•金里奇(Newt Gingrich)的觀點(diǎn)——愛沙尼亞不過是“圣彼得堡的郊區(qū)”——那這場(chǎng)博弈就輸了。如果俄羅斯看到美國放棄北大西洋公約第五條關(guān)于共同防御的安排，無論歐洲國家如何增加國防預(yù)算都無法維持北約的威懾作用。
A part of Mr Trump may say: who cares? He can certainly find “realists” in the US and European foreign policy establishments who would turn over parts of the former Soviet space to a Russian sphere of influence. But the true realist question is what does the US get from Moscow in return? Not much beyond a damaging reputation as an unreliable ally.
特朗普內(nèi)心有一個(gè)聲音或許會(huì)說：管他呢?他一定可以在美歐外交政策建制派中，找到會(huì)聽任俄羅斯把部分前蘇聯(lián)地區(qū)收入自己勢(shì)力范圍之內(nèi)的“現(xiàn)實(shí)主義者”。但真正現(xiàn)實(shí)的問題是，美國能從莫斯科得到什么回報(bào)?除了留下不可靠的盟友的壞名聲外，美國不會(huì)得到什么。
Beyond its economic interest in European stability — the EU may have its troubles but it is America’s richest overseas market — the US has much to lose from a break-up of the alliance. You do not restore American power and prestige by ditching old friends.
不僅是歐洲的穩(wěn)定關(guān)系到美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益(歐盟或許遭遇了麻煩，但仍是美國最富裕的海外市場(chǎng))，北約解體還將讓美國損失更多。拋棄了老朋友的美國是不會(huì)恢復(fù)實(shí)力和威望的。
Europe’s role during these past several decades has been to offer the US a stamp of international legitimacy in the pursuit of its national interests. Some would say it has sold itself too cheaply. As Wolfgang Ischinger, the chairman of the Munich Security Conference, wrote recently in The New York Times: “Wherever Mr Trump looks, he will not find better partners to work with to secure America’s strategic interests.”
歐洲過去幾十年一直扮演為美國追求國家利益提供國際合法性證明的角色。有人會(huì)說，歐洲要價(jià)太低了。慕尼黑安全會(huì)議(Munich Security Conference)主席沃爾夫?qū)?bull;伊申格爾(Wolfgang Ischinger)最近在《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》(The New York Times)上撰文稱：“無論在哪兒，特朗普都找不到(比歐洲)更好的、保護(hù)美國戰(zhàn)略利益的合作伙伴了。”
So yes, Europeans should spend more on defence. As importantly, they need a strategy to confront the threat from Moscow and the chaos on its southern borders. But no one should pretend that the US would be a winner were Mr Trump to rupture permanently one of the most successful alliances in history.
沒錯(cuò)，歐洲應(yīng)當(dāng)在國防上投入更多。同樣重要的是，他們需要一項(xiàng)應(yīng)對(duì)莫斯科的威脅以及南部邊境外混亂局面的戰(zhàn)略。但如果特朗普永久瓦解這個(gè)歷史上最成功的聯(lián)盟之一的話，誰都不應(yīng)假裝美國會(huì)成為贏家。
