強(qiáng)勢美元：特朗普和耶倫的相同難題
哪里有不和諧之處，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)便引人注目地帶來了和諧。他讓市場和珍妮特•耶倫(Janet Yellen)之間實(shí)現(xiàn)了和平，交易員們最終似乎相信了她對明年利率動(dòng)作的預(yù)測。
The Federal Reserve says it intends to raise rates three times next year, and the market implicitly, through Fed Funds futures, puts the chance of this happening at almost exactly 50 per cent. This follows five years of the Fed’s current attempt at transparency in which markets have persistently and successfully bet that rates will stay stuck near zero, whatever Ms Yellen may tell them.
美聯(lián)儲(Fed)表示其明年將加息三次，而市場通過聯(lián)邦基金利率期貨暗示，其發(fā)生幾率幾乎正好是50%。此前5年里，美聯(lián)儲一直試圖增加透明度，而市場一直、而且正確地押注利率將維持在接近零的水平，無論耶倫可能怎么表態(tài)。
It is the sharp change in psychology that came with Mr Trump’s election victory that has at last brought the rate markets and the central bank in tune with each other.
特朗普在選舉中獲勝帶來的心理巨變，最終導(dǎo)致利率市場和美聯(lián)儲達(dá)成了一致。
The problem is that the newfound belief in a hawkish Fed scares the bond and foreign exchange markets rigid. Ms Yellen perhaps inadvertently fed this in her press conference by commenting that fiscal policy was not really needed now — a very direct contradiction to the stance of the new administration. The strong language she used about the strength of the US economy and labour market also gave the impression that she was prepared to be even more hawkish in future.
問題在于，這種新萌發(fā)的對于美聯(lián)儲保持鷹派立場的信心，嚇壞了債市和匯市。在新聞發(fā)布會上，耶倫也許在無意中助長了這一情緒，她評論道，目前并不真的需要財(cái)政政策——這與新政府的立場直接抵觸。她使用強(qiáng)烈措辭表述美國經(jīng)濟(jì)和勞動(dòng)力市場的強(qiáng)勁程度，也給人留下了她準(zhǔn)備在未來表現(xiàn)得更加鷹派的印象。
The reaction to Ms Yellen’s press conference was almost certainly exaggerated and greater than she wanted, and some attempt by the Fed to talk traders back from the precipice over the next few days is likely. But the market reaction does indicate that the fixed income market is indeed prone to an overdramatic sell-off. Fears of this were not overdone, and this is unwelcome news.
耶倫新聞發(fā)布會引起的反應(yīng)幾乎肯定比她希望的更夸張、更巨大，未來幾天里，美聯(lián)儲很可能嘗試通過調(diào)整表態(tài)把交易員從懸崖邊上拉回來。但市場反應(yīng)的確預(yù)示著，固定收益市場真的可能遭遇過分戲劇化的拋售。對此局面的擔(dān)心并不過分，而這不是個(gè)好消息。
For the time being, Ms Yellen’s undiplomatic efforts will render her unpopular with Mr Trump. The consolation may be that they now find themselves facing the same serious and urgent problem; dollar strength. By the end of Wednesday’s hectic trading, the dollar had hit its highest on a trade-weighted basis since early 2003, before the invasion of Iraq.
就目前而言，耶倫的不圓滑做法將令她不受特朗普待見?；蛟S讓她感到安慰的是，他們兩人如今面臨同一個(gè)嚴(yán)峻、緊迫的問題：強(qiáng)勢美元。到周三繁忙的交易結(jié)束時(shí)，美元貿(mào)易加權(quán)匯率沖上自2003年初——即入侵伊拉克之前——以來的最高點(diǎn)。
The economic and financial logic is ineffable. If the US is genuinely going to reflate, then interest rates will need to rise. That will attract funds to the dollar, particularly from economies like Japan and Germany where rates are still on the floor. Yield differentials are now extreme. The spread of 10-year Treasury yields over equivalent German Bunds is now its widest since the spring of 1989, before German reunification.
其中的經(jīng)濟(jì)與金融邏輯是難以形容的。如果美國真的打算再通脹，那么利息將需要調(diào)高。那將吸引資金、尤其是來自日本和德國等利率仍非常低的經(jīng)濟(jì)體的資金買入美元。目前，利率差已達(dá)到極端水平。美國10年期國債收益率與德國10年期國債的差距如今達(dá)到自1989年春天——當(dāng)時(shí)德國尚未統(tǒng)一——以來的最大水平。
This should be helpful for Japan and Germany, export-oriented economies. It is extremely unhelpful for China, still tied to the dollar, and for many emerging markets, where dollar strength — as shown during 2013’s “taper tantrum” — can easily translate into crisis conditions. It is unhelpful for Ms Yellen, as a strong dollar tamps down inflation, through its effect on import prices, as well as growth.
對于出口導(dǎo)向經(jīng)濟(jì)體日本和德國而言，這應(yīng)是有益的。但對于仍與美元掛鉤的中國以及許多新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體，這是極其無益的;正如2013年的“縮減恐慌”(taper tantrum)所顯示的那樣，強(qiáng)勢美元在這些經(jīng)濟(jì)體可能很容易引發(fā)危機(jī)。這對耶倫是無益的，因?yàn)閺?qiáng)勢美元會通過其對進(jìn)口價(jià)格的影響而抑制通脹，并削弱增長。
It is also deeply unhelpful to Mr Trump. His signature aim is to restore US manufacturing and to defend the country’s trade position. A dollar this strong has much the same effect as an array of protective tariffs against US goods.
這對特朗普也是極其無益的。他的標(biāo)志性目標(biāo)是恢復(fù)美國制造業(yè)元?dú)?，并捍衛(wèi)美國的貿(mào)易地位。如此強(qiáng)勢的美元，在很大程度上跟對美國產(chǎn)品征收大量保護(hù)性關(guān)稅具有相同的效果。
Further, the Fed’s intended rate trajectory is based on GDP growth that will barely exceed 2 per cent over the next four years. Mr Trump’s clear commitment is to try to get growth up to 3.5 per cent. Fiscal policy generous enough to propel growth that strong would likely entail higher rates, and an even stronger dollar. The alternative would be an irresponsible Fed that was prepared to run the risk of allowing inflation to take off once more.
此外，美聯(lián)儲希望實(shí)現(xiàn)的利率軌跡的假設(shè)是，未來4年國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)增長勉強(qiáng)超過2%。特朗普的明確承諾是努力使GDP增速達(dá)到3.5%。如果財(cái)政政策足夠慷慨、能把增長率推高至那種水平，那將意味著更高的利率，以及更強(qiáng)勢的美元。替代選擇將是美聯(lián)儲不負(fù)責(zé)任，準(zhǔn)備承擔(dān)讓通脹再度飆升的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
Ultimately, the quandary for Mr Trump and Ms Yellen is identical and uncomfortable. There are limits to how much globalisation can be peeled back. Financial markets in a global setting put limits on how far the US can restimulate its own economy.
歸根結(jié)底，特朗普和耶倫的困境是相同的、令人不安的。全球化的倒退程度是存在極限的。全球背景的金融市場，為美國能在何種程度上重新刺激本國經(jīng)濟(jì)設(shè)定了極限。
