特朗普懲罰中國(guó)得不償失

Despite the seeming disarray of his first month in office, President Donald Trump has remarkably kept many of his campaign promises. However, one of his most frequent — naming China as a currency manipulator — is as yet mere words.

盡管上任第一個(gè)月似乎給世人帶來(lái)了混亂感，但美國(guó)總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)顯然信守了他的多項(xiàng)競(jìng)選承諾。然而，他最經(jīng)常提到的承諾——把中國(guó)列為貨幣操縱國(guó)——到現(xiàn)在還未付諸行動(dòng)。

The new administration is holding back America’s leadership in global governance, as shown by the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Mr Trump and his close advisers believe bilateral deals are a better way to achieve “America First” — so why are they not chasing China? I believe they have not yet worked out how to gain over China through such pacts.

美國(guó)新的行政當(dāng)局正在收縮美國(guó)在全球治理中的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位，美國(guó)退出《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP)證明了這一點(diǎn)。特朗普和他的親密顧問認(rèn)為，雙邊協(xié)定是實(shí)現(xiàn)“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”(America first)原則的更佳途徑——那么，他們?yōu)楹螞]有對(duì)中國(guó)采取行動(dòng)呢? 我相信，他們是還沒想出如何通過此類協(xié)定在中國(guó)問題上獲益的方法。

Many in the US hold that China has reaped disproportionate advantages through globalisation, and that millions of American jobs have been lost due to imports from the country. In academic circles, most economists believe this is an inevitable cost of globalisation and the only way out for the US is to shift the population from lost jobs to new jobs in high-end services and high-tech industries. Mr Trump and his advisers take a more hawkish view that Beijing has gained by manipulating its currency, suppressing wages, subsidising exporters and disregarding the environment. As a result, it should be punished.

許多美國(guó)人認(rèn)為，中國(guó)從全球化中獲得了過大的好處，從中國(guó)進(jìn)口商品導(dǎo)致數(shù)百萬(wàn)美國(guó)人失去了工作。在學(xué)術(shù)界，多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，這是全球化的一種不可避免的代價(jià)，美國(guó)的唯一出路是把人口從消失的崗位轉(zhuǎn)移配置到高端服務(wù)業(yè)和高技術(shù)行業(yè)的新增崗位上。特朗普和手下顧問持有一種更強(qiáng)硬的觀點(diǎn)：北京方面通過操縱匯率、壓低工資、補(bǔ)貼出口商和忽視環(huán)境，獲得了好處。所以，中國(guó)應(yīng)該受到懲罰。

Certainly, the US has ways to punish China. Naming it a currency manipulator alone would make Beijing lose face — which it cares about. Imposing punitive tariffs on Chinese exports and restricting mergers and acquisitions, particularly from state-owned enterprises, are other options. That is why many international observers believe a trade war between the two countries is inevitable.

當(dāng)然，美國(guó)擁有懲罰中國(guó)的手段。單單把中國(guó)列為匯率操縱國(guó)就會(huì)讓中國(guó)丟臉——中國(guó)很看重臉面。其他手段有：對(duì)中國(guó)出口征收懲罰性關(guān)稅;限制中國(guó)企業(yè)、尤其是中國(guó)的國(guó)企對(duì)美國(guó)企業(yè)發(fā)起并購(gòu)。這就是許多國(guó)際觀察人士認(rèn)定美中之間的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)在所難免的原因。

But what would the US gain by punishing China?

但是，懲罰中國(guó)會(huì)讓美國(guó)得到什么好處?

Punitive tariffs will hurt US consumers. One of the big advantages of being an American is being able to enjoy the lowest priced goods produced in virtually every corner of the world. Americans buy Chinese goods because they are often the cheapest; making them more expensive might force Americans to buy from other countries, but not necessarily the US.

懲罰性關(guān)稅將傷害美國(guó)消費(fèi)者。身為美國(guó)人的一大優(yōu)勢(shì)，是能夠享受到世界幾乎每個(gè)角落生產(chǎn)出來(lái)的最低價(jià)商品。美國(guó)人購(gòu)買中國(guó)商品，是因?yàn)楹笳叩膬r(jià)格經(jīng)常是最低的;讓中國(guó)商品變得更貴，也許會(huì)迫使美國(guó)人去購(gòu)買其他國(guó)家的產(chǎn)品，但未必是美國(guó)本國(guó)產(chǎn)品。

Such measures will not help American workers, either. The kind of jobs that would be targeted are not likely to return to the US. Apple’s iPhone causes several billion dollars of deficit for America’s trade with China. But, suppose Apple moves the iPhone factories to the US; will there be enough Americans willing to work on the assembly lines even in the jobs left by increased automation?

這類措施也幫不到美國(guó)工人。這類措施意欲奪回的工作崗位不太可能回到美國(guó)。蘋果(Apple)的iPhone給美國(guó)的對(duì)華貿(mào)易造成數(shù)十億美元的逆差。但是，假如蘋果把iPhone工廠搬到美國(guó)，會(huì)有足夠多的美國(guó)人愿意待在裝配線上，哪怕是從事自動(dòng)化仍未替代的工作嗎?

Finally, American companies will not gain — indeed, many will be hurt. Some 40 per cent of the Chinese trade surplus with the US is created by American companies operating in China (another 20 per cent is created by other foreign companies working in China). If Chinese exporters are penalised, those companies will also be punished. And, if China retaliates, companies on both sides will lose.

最后，美國(guó)公司不會(huì)得利——事實(shí)上，許多美國(guó)公司將受損。在中國(guó)對(duì)美貿(mào)易順差中，大約40%是由在華經(jīng)營(yíng)的美國(guó)公司創(chuàng)造出來(lái)的(另有20%是其他在華經(jīng)營(yíng)的外資公司創(chuàng)造的)。如果中國(guó)出口商受到懲罰，那么那些公司也將受到懲罰。如果中國(guó)發(fā)起報(bào)復(fù)，中美兩國(guó)企業(yè)都會(huì)蒙受損失。

That the Trump administration has not devised a strategy to deal with China is certainly due in part to those uncertainties. A rational person does not hurt others for the joy of it. Mr Trump has to find ways to make China yield to American interests — he has to come up with deals that advance mutual gains. Here are some of them.

特朗普政府尚未制定出與中國(guó)打交道的戰(zhàn)略，在一定程度上當(dāng)然是因?yàn)槟切┎淮_定性。理智的人不會(huì)為了傷害別人的快感而去做這件事。特朗普必須想方設(shè)法讓中國(guó)順從美國(guó)的利益——他必須拿出對(duì)雙方都有好處的交易。以下是一些這樣的交易。

First, the two countries can sit down and talk about the exchange rate. Mr Trump accuses China of manipulating the renminbi. In one and half years, Beijing has lost about $1tn in foreign reserves defending the value of the currency. The two countries have a common interest in preventing further devaluation of the renminbi, creating opportunities for monetary co-ordination such as a slower pace of US interest rate rises and tighter border control of Chinese capital outflows.

首先，兩國(guó)可以坐下來(lái)，談?wù)剠R率問題。特朗普指責(zé)中國(guó)操縱人民幣匯率。在一年半時(shí)間里，中國(guó)已經(jīng)為保衛(wèi)人民幣匯率損耗了約1萬(wàn)億美元的外匯儲(chǔ)備。兩國(guó)在防止人民幣進(jìn)一步貶值、創(chuàng)造機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)協(xié)調(diào)兩國(guó)的貨幣政策(比如美國(guó)放慢加息步伐、中國(guó)收緊對(duì)資本外流的邊境管控)方面擁有共同利益。

Second, talks on a bilateral investment treaty should be revived. The bottleneck is the “negative list” of sectors in which China would continue to restrict foreign investment. There are still many irrational regulations governing the Chinese economy, including those restricting foreign investment in high-end services. A short negative list would help American companies because high-end services are arguably one of the US’s strong points. In addition, the BIT will smooth the path of Chinese companies in the US and encourage them to invest more there.

其次，應(yīng)當(dāng)恢復(fù)關(guān)于《雙邊投資協(xié)定》(BIT)的談判。瓶頸在于一份“負(fù)面清單”，中國(guó)將繼續(xù)限制外資進(jìn)入這份清單上的行業(yè)。目前中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)仍然受制于很多不理性的監(jiān)管規(guī)定，包括那些限制外資進(jìn)入高端服務(wù)業(yè)的監(jiān)管規(guī)定?？s短負(fù)面清單會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)公司有所幫助，因?yàn)楦叨朔?wù)業(yè)可以說是美國(guó)的強(qiáng)項(xiàng)之一。此外，《雙邊投資協(xié)定》將為中國(guó)企業(yè)在美經(jīng)營(yíng)鋪平道路，并會(huì)鼓勵(lì)中國(guó)企業(yè)加大對(duì)美投資力度。

Third, the two should sign a free-trade agreement. Mr Trump may find this idea unappealing now but it would open China’s door to American exports. The US door has long been open to Chinese exports, first under the “most favoured nations” arrangement, then under the World Trade Organisation. But China maintains high tariffs on imported consumer goods. Its people are becoming richer and more able to buy foreign goods; the rebalancing of the economy is under way; and domestic consumption is increasing. The country is set to become a big consumer goods market and an FTA with the US would now benefit American companies more than Chinese ones.

最后，兩國(guó)應(yīng)當(dāng)簽訂一份自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定。眼下，特朗普也許會(huì)覺得這個(gè)主張沒有吸引力，但它將為美國(guó)對(duì)華出口打開大門。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，中國(guó)對(duì)美出口的大門一直敞開著——最早是通過“最惠國(guó)”安排，接著通過世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)。但是，中國(guó)仍對(duì)進(jìn)口消費(fèi)品征收高關(guān)稅。中國(guó)人開始變得更富有，也更有能力購(gòu)買外國(guó)商品;經(jīng)濟(jì)再平衡正在進(jìn)行中;國(guó)內(nèi)消費(fèi)在增加。中國(guó)定將成為一個(gè)很大的消費(fèi)品市場(chǎng)，如今簽署自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定將對(duì)美國(guó)企業(yè)、而不是中國(guó)企業(yè)更有利。

If, as he claims, President Trump is a dealmaker, such moves will appeal to him. And as the Chinese are also good dealmakers, with pragmatism an inherent part of their culture, Sino-US trade relations can be much brighter than has seemed likely.

如果特朗普如他聲稱的那樣，是一個(gè)善于做交易的人，那么上述舉措將對(duì)他產(chǎn)生吸引力。鑒于中國(guó)人也很善于做交易(實(shí)用主義是中國(guó)文化的固有組成部分)，中美貿(mào)易關(guān)系可以比看起來(lái)的更光明。

Yao Yang is dean of the National School of Development at Peking University and director of the China Center for Economic Research

本文作者是北京大學(xué)(Beijing University)國(guó)家發(fā)展研究院院長(zhǎng)、中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究中心主任