德國能否避免孤立命運(yùn)？

Angela Merkel has described the idea that she is now the de facto leader of the western world as “grotesque” and “absurd”. The German chancellor’s angst is understandable. Modern Germany has no desire to lead the west and is not powerful enough to bear that burden.

安格拉•默克爾(Angela Merkel)稱，認(rèn)為她眼下是西方世界事實(shí)上的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的想法是“怪誕的”和“荒唐的”。這位德國總理的焦慮可以理解。現(xiàn)代德國沒有領(lǐng)導(dǎo)西方的愿望，也沒有足夠大的實(shí)力來承擔(dān)這一負(fù)擔(dān)。

But unrealistic expectations are not the only reason for German anxiety. If Ms Merkel looks out from the glass box of the chancellor’s office in Berlin there is trouble on every horizon. To the east are the ever more authoritarian and Germanophobic governments of Poland and Hungary. And further east a hostile Russia. To the west, is the US of Donald Trump; to the north the UK of Brexit. And to the south lie Italy and Greece, two troubled countries that increasingly blame Germany for their economic woes.

但不切實(shí)際的期望并非導(dǎo)致德國產(chǎn)生焦慮的唯一原因。如果默克爾從柏林的玻璃盒子般的總理辦公室向外看去，每個方向都有麻煩。東面是越來越專制和反德的波蘭和匈牙利政府。再往東是敵對的俄羅斯。西面是唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)主政下的美國;北面是退歐的英國。南面是意大利和希臘，這兩個陷入困境的國家日益把自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)麻煩怪到德國頭上。

Collectively, the situation threatens to revive an old German nightmare: the fear of being a large, isolated power at the centre of Europe. The situation must feel even more grotesque because — unlike in the 20th century — Germany’s current loneliness has very little to do with the country’s own malign behaviour. On the contrary, it is the world around Germany that is changing fast, as populism and nationalism surge across Europe and in the US.

綜合來看，這種局面可能喚醒德國一個古老的噩夢：成為歐洲中央一個孤立大國的可怕情形?，F(xiàn)在的局面肯定感覺比那個噩夢更怪誕，因?yàn)楦?0世紀(jì)不同的是，德國目前的孤獨(dú)狀態(tài)，基本上不是它自己行為不端導(dǎo)致的。相反，是德國周圍的世界在快速變化，民粹主義和民族主義席卷整個歐洲和美國。

Of course, there are criticisms that can be made of the Merkel government’s handling of the euro and refugee crises. Those criticisms are made with great ferocity in Warsaw, Athens and other EU capitals. But nobody seriously doubts modern Germany’s commitment to liberal values at home, and internationalism abroad.

當(dāng)然，我們可以批評默克爾政府對歐元和難民危機(jī)的處置方式。在波蘭、希臘和其他歐盟成員國，德國政府在這些問題上遭到了猛烈批評。但是，沒有人真正質(zhì)疑現(xiàn)代德國在國內(nèi)對于自由價值觀、在國外對于國際主義的堅(jiān)守。

The problem is that Germany’s unwavering commitment to these values feels like the exception in the west, not the rule. One American delegate, returning from the recent Munich Security Conference, remarked to me that “it felt good to be in a normal country, again”. But German normality is now abnormal.

問題是，德國對這些價值觀的堅(jiān)守像是西方的例外，而不是慣例。參加了最近的慕尼黑安全政策會議(Munich Security Conference)的一位美國代表，回來后對我說，“再次身處一個正常國家的感覺真好”。但現(xiàn)在，德國的正常反而是反常的。

The danger and peculiarity of Germany’s position is underlined when compared with the international situation that faced the country in mid-2008, just before the outbreak of the financial crisis. That summer, a charismatic and idealistic US presidential candidate named Barack Obama came to Berlin and spoke before a huge and enthusiastic crowd.

與德國在2008年年中金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)前所面臨的國際形勢相比時，眼下局面的危險和特殊性顯得更突出。那年夏天，魅力十足、心懷理想主義的美國總統(tǒng)候選人巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)來到了柏林，在龐大、狂熱的人群面前發(fā)表了講話。

In Moscow, a more pro-western president, Dmitry Medvedev, took over from Vladimir Putin. With the eastward enlargement of the EU recently completed, Germany was now surrounded by friendly democracies that were fellow members of the bloc. The euro seemed to be operating well and the countries of southern Europe were prosperous and shared Germany’s enthusiasm for the EU. Both Britain and France were governed by pro-EU centrist governments.

在莫斯科，一個更親西方的總統(tǒng)德米特里•梅德韋杰夫(Dmitry Medvedev)從弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)手中接掌了權(quán)力。歐盟東擴(kuò)剛剛完成，當(dāng)時的德國周圍都是同屬歐盟的友好民主國家。歐元似乎運(yùn)行良好，南歐國家繁榮發(fā)展，跟德國一樣對歐盟充滿熱情。英國和法國都在親歐盟的中間派政府治理下。

Less than a decade on and all of that has changed utterly. For Germany, the most troubling developments are probably those closest to home. The EU is meant to be the ultimate guarantee against the return of German isolation on the European continent. But Britain has voted to leave. Brexit means that the EU is losing a country that has always been crucial to the European balance of power. It also sets a precedent for possible future defections. It is now clear that the EU can indeed break up.

不到十年過去，所有這一切都徹底改變了。對德國來說，最令人不安的事態(tài)很可能是發(fā)生在家門口的那些。歐盟本應(yīng)成為防止德國再次孤獨(dú)地立于歐洲大陸的終極保障。但英國已投票決定離開。英國退歐意味著歐盟將失去一個始終對歐洲格局的平衡至關(guān)重要的國家。英國退歐也為未來其他國家可能退歐創(chuàng)下了先例。目前很明顯的是，歐盟確實(shí)有可能解體。

Almost as alarming for Germany is the prospect that countries will stay within the EU, but then fail to respect its fundamental values and economic rules. The erosion of democracy in Poland and Hungary — amid a resurgent nationalism — is profoundly worrying for the Merkel government because there is no clear remedy. The EU was meant to be the insurance policy against this sort of thing but it has failed to deliver.

幾乎同樣令德國擔(dān)憂的是這種情況：各成員國將留在歐盟，但隨后又不遵守歐盟的基本價值觀和經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)則。在民族主義復(fù)興的背景下，波蘭和匈牙利的民主受到侵蝕，引起了默克爾政府的深度擔(dān)心，因?yàn)閷Υ瞬o顯而易見的補(bǔ)救措施。創(chuàng)立歐盟本是為了防止此類事情發(fā)生，但它辱沒了這一使命。

In the coming weeks and months, populist and nationalist parties will also perform strongly in the Dutch and French elections. If Marine Le Pen wins the French presidency in May, many in Berlin fear that the EU could collapse.

在接下來的數(shù)周和數(shù)月里，民粹主義和民族主義政黨也將在荷蘭和法國的選舉中表現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勁。如果馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)在5月的法國總統(tǒng)選舉中獲勝，德國政府中很多人擔(dān)心歐盟可能崩潰。

Meanwhile in Italy, the pro-EU centre is shrinking under the impact of the euro crisis. The populist and Eurosceptic Five Star movement is the country’s main opposition and could come to power in the next 12 months. The Greek debt crisis may soon revive.

與此同時，在意大利，親歐盟的中間力量在歐元危機(jī)的沖擊下在退縮。民粹主義、持疑歐立場的五星運(yùn)動黨(Five Star movement)是該國的主要反對派，該黨有可能在未來12個月內(nèi)掌權(quán)。希臘債務(wù)危機(jī)或許很快就會卷土重來。

Developments in Moscow and Washington are also profoundly worrying for the German government. Germany led the European response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. But the price of that has been a sharp rise in hostility between Ms Merkel’s Germany and Mr Putin’s Russia. Given the gruesome history of the 20th century, a hostile relationship with Moscow puts a special psychological pressure on Berlin.

莫斯科和華盛頓的事態(tài)也令德國政府深感憂慮。德國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)歐盟對俄羅斯非法吞并克里米亞做出了回應(yīng)。但是，代價是默克爾的德國和普京的俄羅斯之間的敵意急劇上升。鑒于20世紀(jì)的可怕歷史，與莫斯科交惡讓柏林感到一種特別的心理壓力。

Throughout the cold war, West Germany could at least look to the US for steadfast support. But in the Trump era that can no longer be relied upon. On the contrary, Mr Trump has been openly contemptuous of Ms Merkel and has raised serious questions about his commitment to the wider western alliance.

在整個冷戰(zhàn)期間，西德至少可以仰賴美國的堅(jiān)定支持。但在特朗普時代，德國已不再能仰賴這個。相反，特朗普公開蔑視默克爾，并引起人們嚴(yán)重懷疑他對整個西方聯(lián)盟的承諾。

With so much going wrong for Germany, a huge amount hangs on the French election. If the pro-EU, pro-German Emmanuel Macron wins the presidency, there will be delight in Berlin. His election would break Germany’s growing sense of isolation, and offer renewed hope that a Franco-German partnership can revive the EU. By contrast, if Ms Le Pen wins, the German nightmare will be complete.

考慮到出現(xiàn)這么多不利于德國的情況，法國大選事關(guān)重大。如果親歐盟、親德國的埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)贏得法國總統(tǒng)選舉，德國會感到高興。他的當(dāng)選將打破德國日益濃厚的孤立感，并讓人看到法德伙伴關(guān)系可以重振歐盟的新希望。相比之下，如果勒龐獲勝，德國的噩夢就將成為現(xiàn)實(shí)。