朝鮮：中國的“麻煩盟友”
在朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭中與美國作戰(zhàn)的中國人民“志愿”軍的那首戰(zhàn)歌，除了在幾部愛國主義影片中唱起以外，如今已很少聽到。但在那場未簽署和平條約的戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束63年后，這首歌依然描繪了中國在北亞的基本戰(zhàn)略定位：“中國好兒女，齊心團(tuán)結(jié)緊?？姑涝驍∶赖垡靶睦恰?rdquo;
The wolf metaphors have been dropped, but Beijing is still “resisting the US, protecting (North) Korea” as if the strategy was trapped in amber.
雖然野心狼的比喻已不再提及，但北京方面仍在“抗美援朝”，這一戰(zhàn)略仿佛被牢牢地困在了琥珀之中。
Economically, things have changed utterly. The deep and symbiotic commercial relationship that has grown between the US and China drove more than half a trillion dollars in bilateral trade last year. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese students — including offspring of the ruling Communist elite — studied at US colleges. Chinese companies spent $51bn acquiring US counterparts, a three-fold jump on the previous year.
在經(jīng)濟方面，形勢已經(jīng)發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化。美中之間建立起的深入、共生的商貿(mào)關(guān)系，促使去年的雙邊貿(mào)易額超過了5000億美元。數(shù)十萬中國留學(xué)生(包括執(zhí)政的共產(chǎn)黨精英的后代)在美國的大學(xué)深造。中國企業(yè)斥資510億美元收購美國企業(yè)，是前一年的3倍。
So why, then, has China stuck by Pyongyang, even as the impoverished state terrorises its neighbours by developing a nuclear arsenal that is probably only a few years away from being able to strike US territory? How is Beijing served by prioritising loyalty to an isolated, volatile dictatorship over ties with the world’s superpower?
既然如此，那中國為什么還會被平壤困住，即便這個貧困的國家通過發(fā)展核武器——可能距離能夠打擊美國本土只差幾年時間——來恫嚇其鄰國?將扶持一個孤立、反復(fù)無常的獨裁政權(quán)置于其與世界超級大國的關(guān)系之上，對中國有何好處?
Such questions have acquired added urgency since Donald Trump warned this month that “if China is not going to solve North Korea, we will”. This signal was backed up by orders for an aircraft carrier group to be deployed in waters near the Korean peninsula. This week Lieutenant General HR McMaster, the US national security adviser, threatened “other actions” if Pyongyang conducts further nuclear tests.
自唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)本月警告“如果中國不打算解決朝鮮，我們會出手解決”以來，這些問題的緊迫性已進(jìn)一步加劇。特朗普將一個航母戰(zhàn)斗群部署在朝鮮半島附近海域的命令有力地支持了這一信號。本周，美國國家安全顧問、陸軍中將赫伯特•雷蒙德•麥克馬斯特(HR McMaster)威脅稱，如果朝鮮再進(jìn)行核試驗的話，美國將采取“其他行動”。
Such US brinkmanship is aimed at coercing Pyongyang to drop its nuclear weapons programme. But it throws China into a highly conflicted position; Beijing’s alliance with North Korea derives from a founding narrative that asserts that China has struggled against the west to make its way in the world. This creates common cause with the hermit kingdom. Even though a nuclear-armed North Korea led by the mercurial, 33-year-old Kim Jong Un is deeply unpalatable to Beijing, it has been seen as preferable to a regime collapse and the entire Korean peninsula falling under a US security umbrella.
美國這種戰(zhàn)爭邊緣政策(brinkmanship)旨在迫使朝鮮放棄其核武計劃。但這把中國逼到了一個高度矛盾的位置;中朝聯(lián)盟源于中國在建國方面的敘事，即中國通過反抗西方的斗爭才在世界立足。這為中國與這個隱士王國創(chuàng)造了共同的事業(yè)。即便由33歲、反復(fù)無常的金正恩(Kim Jong Un)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的擁有核武器的朝鮮會讓北京深感不快，但北京方面認(rèn)為，這比其政權(quán)崩潰、整個朝鮮半島落入美國保護(hù)傘之下要好。
“North Korea is a public-relations nightmare for China every time it does something bad,” says Victor Cha of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “But Beijing is wedded to the strategic stability that a junior communist client state on its border provides in a region filled with US military allies.” He argues that Mr Trump is trying to force a change: “It takes a crisis to pry this loose.”
“朝鮮每次干壞事對中國來說都是一場公關(guān)夢魘，”華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國際問題研究中心(CSIS)的維克托•查(Victor Cha)說，“但北京一向極為重視這個邊境上的共產(chǎn)主義附庸國在一個到處是美國軍事盟友的地區(qū)提供的戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定。”他表示，特朗普正試圖強行改變這一現(xiàn)狀：“這需要一場危機才能撬動。”
But when Lt Gen McMaster insisted this week that Washington was “going to have to rely on Chinese leadership” to apply economic pressure on Pyongyang, he asked for something that Beijing has obdurately refused to furnish in any real sense.
但當(dāng)本周麥克馬斯特堅稱華盛頓“將不得不依賴中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人”對平壤施加經(jīng)濟壓力時，他提出的要求是北京方面一直以來都拒絕在任何真正意義上滿足的。
There is no doubt that China has the ability to bring North Korea’s economy to its knees. It can cut trade links and oil supplies, shut down the internet, banking services and tourism. “These things would devastate the North Korean economy,” says Minxin Pei of Claremont McKenna College. “But the reality is that Beijing is far from this point.”
毫無疑問，中國有能力讓朝鮮在經(jīng)濟上屈服。中國可以切斷貿(mào)易聯(lián)系和石油供應(yīng)，關(guān)閉互聯(lián)網(wǎng)、銀行服務(wù)和旅游。“這些措施將摧毀朝鮮經(jīng)濟，”克萊蒙特-麥肯納學(xué)院(Claremont McKenna College)的裴敏欣(Minxin Pei)說，“但現(xiàn)實是，北京絕不會這樣做。”
The uncomfortable truth for the US is that Beijing remains inclined to tolerate its exasperating client state for as long as Washington looms as China’s chief strategic competitor. This orientation is so entrenched that anything less than a genuine — and potentially terrifying — crisis may fail to shift it.
令美國不安的事實是，只要華盛頓還是中國主要的戰(zhàn)略競爭對手，北京方面就仍會傾向于容忍這個令人氣惱的附庸國。這種傾向如此根深蒂固，除了一場真正(且可能可怕的)危機，沒什么能使之發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)變。
As US-China rivalries escalate in the South China Sea and several other theatres, the idea that Beijing may jettison a longstanding ally to please its biggest rival may prove to be wishful thinking.
隨著美中之間的較量在南中國海及其他幾個地區(qū)不斷升級，認(rèn)為北京有可能拋棄一個長期盟友以取悅其最大競爭對手的想法，可能只不過是一廂情愿。
It is possible that China may apply judicious pressure on Pyongyang to de-escalate tension, but according to analysts, these would fall well short of the merciless intimidation required to force Mr Kim to scrap his nuclear ambitions — which bestow legitimacy upon his bellicose regime.
中國有可能對平壤施加審慎的壓力以緩和局勢緊張，但分析人士表示，這與迫使金正恩放棄核野心所必需的嚴(yán)酷威懾相去甚遠(yuǎn)——擁有核武器才能給他好戰(zhàn)的政權(quán)帶來合法性。
For Beijing, the priority remains keeping North Korea viable enough to forestall the feared spectre of US troops pressed up against the Yalu river border between China and North Korea.
對北京而言，首要任務(wù)仍是保持朝鮮足夠的生存能力，以預(yù)防美軍可怕的幽靈向中朝之間的鴨綠江邊境壓來。
“There are 35,000 American GIs just over North Korea’s southern border,” says Paul French, author of North Korea: State of Paranoia. “I think what is lost in all the chatter about Kim’s weirdness and murderous tendencies is that North Korea is still primarily for China a buffer state.”
“有3.5萬名美國大兵就駐扎在朝鮮南部邊界另一側(cè)，”《朝鮮：偏執(zhí)之國》(North Korea: State of Paranoia)一書作者保羅•弗倫奇(Paul French)說，“我認(rèn)為，人們喋喋不休地談?wù)摻鹫鞴殴?、兇殘的性情時遺忘的是，朝鮮對中國而言首先仍是一個緩沖國。”
