FT社評：特朗普的阿富汗新戰(zhàn)略難以奏效

There is no doubt President Donald Trump inherited a bad hand in Afghanistan. The longest war in US history is probably unwinnable. Russian, and before that British, military history said as much even before George W Bush invaded 16 years ago in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on US soil.

毫無疑問，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在阿富汗接手了一個爛攤子。這場美國歷史上持續(xù)時間最長的戰(zhàn)爭很可能是無法取勝的。即使是在16年前小布什(George W Bush)因美國本土遭遇“9•11”恐怖襲擊而入侵阿富汗之前，蘇聯(lián)以及之前英國的征戰(zhàn)史就已說明了這一點。

And yet, predictably from the vantage point of the Oval office, Mr Trump has found the consequences of turning tail too grave to contemplate. To do so, as he said in a speech outlining his approach to Afghanistan on Monday, would “create a vacuum that terrorists, including Isis and al-Qaeda, would instantly fill”. It would be to repeat the mistake that the Obama administration made when it withdrew from Iraq prematurely in 2011, allowing Isis to capture territory that US and Iraqi soldiers had lost much blood to gain. From a domestic political perspective that prospect would be as untenable as launching another wholehearted surge.

然而，可以預(yù)見的是，坐在橢圓形辦公室(Oval office)“制高點”上的特朗普已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)，從阿富汗撤軍的后果將嚴(yán)峻得難以想象。正如他在周一發(fā)表闡述對阿政策的演講時所言，從阿富汗撤軍將“制造一個真空，而包括伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯蘭國(ISIS)、基地組織(al-Qaeda)在內(nèi)的恐怖分子將立刻去填補(bǔ)”。這樣做將重蹈巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)政府2011年的覆轍，即過早從伊拉克撤軍，以至于讓ISIS占領(lǐng)了美國和伊拉克士兵浴血奮戰(zhàn)獲得的領(lǐng)土。從國內(nèi)政治角度來看，這一前景與再次大規(guī)模增兵一樣，在美國國內(nèi)都得不到支持。

So, having pledged on the campaign trail to end the war in Afghanistan and eschew such foreign entanglements in future, Mr Trump has heeded his generals’ advice and performed an about turn. He did so with harsh warnings for Pakistan, which he accused of harbouring terrorists, conditional love for Afghanistan’s embattled government, and a vague plan to reinforce the 10,000 or so mostly special forces now on active duty to train and assist the Afghan army.

因此，曾在競選活動中承諾結(jié)束阿富汗戰(zhàn)爭并在未來避免在海外陷入此類糾纏的特朗普，聽從了手下將軍們的建議，轉(zhuǎn)變了自己的立場。他對巴基斯坦發(fā)出了嚴(yán)厲警告，指責(zé)后者為恐怖分子提供庇護(hù)、有條件地援助處境艱難的阿富汗政府，還提出一項不明確的計劃——增兵阿富汗以訓(xùn)練和協(xié)助阿富汗軍隊。阿富汗目前駐有約1萬美軍士兵，大部分是特種部隊。

There is nothing in any of this that changes the terms or strategic circumstances of US involvement in Afghanistan in a significant way. These are all tactics that have been tried, tested and found wanting in the past. Mr Trump, however, framed his plans as undoing Barack Obama’s legacy. Unlike his predecessor he declined to set any timelines for the intervention. Nor would this be about nation building. It would be about killing and defeating terrorists, pure and simple.

增兵根本不可能大幅改善美國介入阿富汗的條件或戰(zhàn)略環(huán)境。這些策略過去都嘗試過，結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)不太管用。然而，特朗普把他的計劃界定為消除奧巴馬的遺產(chǎn)。與前任不同的是，特朗普拒絕為軍事干預(yù)設(shè)定任何時間表，而且這種干預(yù)也將不涉及國家重建。特朗普的目標(biāo)純粹而簡單：殲滅并擊敗恐怖分子。

He is right in one respect: previous deadlines for US withdrawal have only encouraged the Taliban to sit it out. As the generals like to say, “the US has the watches, the Taliban has the time”.

他在一個方面是正確的：美國以前列出的撤軍最后期限只起到了鼓勵塔利班堅持到底的作用。正如將軍們喜歡說的，“美國人有手表，塔利班有時間”。

Mr Trump’s commitment to the long haul, however, came in almost the same breath as an expression of American impatience with this costly, open-ended engagement — a contradiction unlikely to convince US enemies that this is much more than bluster.

然而，特朗普打持久戰(zhàn)的承諾差不多也是在表達(dá)美國對這一代價高昂、無止境的戰(zhàn)爭失去耐心——這種矛盾不大可能會讓美國的敵人相信這絕不僅僅是恫嚇。

Mr Trump calls his strategy “principled realism”. But it is neither realistic — exhortations do not win wars — nor principled. A few thousand extra troops — the figure of 4,000 has been bandied around — and harsh rhetoric about Pakistan will change little on the ground. Worse, an appeal for India to get more involved pours fuel on the very rivalry between South Asia’s nuclear neighbours which has encouraged Islamabad’s duplicitousness in the past. Mr Trump may also find that poking Pakistan in the eye can only push it closer to Beijing.

特朗普把其戰(zhàn)略稱為“有原則的現(xiàn)實主義”。但它既不現(xiàn)實——規(guī)勸不能贏得戰(zhàn)爭——也無原則。增派數(shù)千士兵——傳聞是4000人——并嚴(yán)辭指責(zé)巴基斯坦，基本改變不了當(dāng)?shù)氐木置?。更糟糕的是，呼吁印度更深介入會加劇南亞有核鄰國之間的對抗，這在過去已經(jīng)對巴基斯坦搞兩面派起到了鼓勵作用。特朗普也許會發(fā)現(xiàn)，觸怒巴基斯坦只會把它往中國那邊推。

The Afghan government controls barely more than half the country. The Taliban is resurgent, Isis has gained a foothold and recently Kabul has been victim to repeated suicide bombings. In the mix civilians are suffering more casualties now than at any point since Mr Obama launched his own shortlived surge in 2009.

阿富汗政府控制著勉強(qiáng)超過一半的國土。塔利班重新興起，ISIS已有了立足之地，喀布爾近來多次遭到自殺式爆炸襲擊。在這種復(fù)雜局面下，平民的傷亡數(shù)量比2009年奧巴馬啟動他自己短命的大舉增兵后的任何時點都多。

For there to have been any hope of a successful counter insurgency, the US would have had to commit to the long haul and put more boots on the ground to win hearts and minds. Mr Trump has settled for another halfway house, one that maintains US engagement in Afghanistan in a holding pattern that is barely holding.

要想讓人對反叛亂的斗爭取得成功抱有希望，美國必須致力于打持久戰(zhàn)，并派駐更多地面部隊去贏得民心。特朗普采取了一種折中做法，這種做法以一種只能勉強(qiáng)維持的維持模式保持美國對阿富汗的介入。