人民幣曾撼動世界。在2015年8月中國允許人民幣急劇貶值之后,過去6年來最大規(guī)模的一場全球市場恐慌來臨。此后,人民幣成為美國選舉中的重大問題,即便這屆美國政府上臺后還一直沒有把它列為優(yōu)先政務。最新動向則有所不同。人民幣近來快速升值。但這次基本上沒引起什么評論,最直接涉及中國外匯市場者除外。
There are various reasons for this. The first is a result of the furore of two years ago. There is a strong tendency to view Chinese authorities as all-powerful villains from James Bond movies, calmly directing everything according to a central plan, as they plot world domination. Every contradictory move would be minutely analysed to work out how it fitted in the grand plan. After the dreadfully ham-fisted response in August 2015, outside analysts have begun to grasp that Chinese officials, like their counterparts elsewhere, are often just making things up as they go along, and reacting to events.
原因有很多。首先,這是兩年前那場群情激奮的結果。人們很容易將中國當局視為《007》(James Bond)系列影片中的強大惡棍,他們從容不迫地按照中央計劃指導一切,并密謀主宰世界。每個自相矛盾的舉措都將被仔細分析,以找出它如何服務于整體計劃。在2015年8月中國極為拙劣的回應之后,外部分析師開始明白,中國官員與其他國家的官員一樣,往往只是走一步算一步,見招拆招、隨機應變。
A second reason is that the Chinese response this time is transparently driven by the recent weakness of the dollar. Strengthening the Rmb against the dollar keeps it more stable against other currencies. The following chart compares the exchange rates with the dollar and the euro. China’s currency has weakened against the euro, until the past few weeks.
第二個原因是,中國這次的回應顯然是最近美元疲弱推動的。人民幣兌美元匯率升值讓它兌其他貨幣的匯率更加穩(wěn)定。下圖比較了人民幣兌美元和兌歐元的匯率。人民幣對歐元直至過去幾周一直是貶值的。
Viewed in terms of its real effective exchange rate (as calculated by Barclays), China’s currency is roughly back where it started the year, and still significantly lower than it was before the messy devaluation of August 2015:
從實際有效匯率來看(如巴克萊(Barclays)所計算),人民幣基本回到了今年年初的水平,但仍遠低于2015年8月那次無序貶值前的水平。
Then came the latest thrilling development. At the end of last week, the authorities announced that they were relaxing restrictions on selling short the currency. As Lex puts it, this appeared to be an invitation to press the currency down, even against the dollar. How should we interpret this? It is probably best to think in terms of officials reacting to events and making things up as they go along. But there may be more to it than that. NatWest Markets’ Mansoor Mohi-uddin said:
隨后就出現(xiàn)了最近的激動人心的動向。一周前,中國有關部門宣布,他們將放松對賣空人民幣的限制。正如英國《金融時報》的Lex專欄所言,這似乎是邀請人們壓低人民幣匯率,甚至是壓低人民幣兌美元匯率。對此我們應該如何解讀?也許最好把這看成官員們在見招拆招、隨機應變。但實際情況也可能并非如此簡單。以下為NatWest Markets的曼蘇爾•毛希丁(Mansoor Mohi-Uddin)所述:
This week we visited clients and officials in Beijing and Shanghai. Dollar-yuan has continued to fall through 6.50 to breach 6.45 on Friday. But news late yesterday the People’s Bank of China was removing its 20% reserve requirement on FX forward trading — imposed in 2015 to support the yuan — helped the pair end the week higher back near 6.50.
我們近來拜訪了北京和上海的客戶和官員。9月8日,美元兌人民幣匯率跌至6.50后繼續(xù)下探,擊穿6.45。但中國人民銀行(PBoC)將取消遠期賣匯業(yè)務20%外匯風險準備金要求的消息,幫助人民幣兌美元匯率重回6.50附近——中國人民銀行從2015年開始對遠期賣匯業(yè)務征收20%的外匯風險準備金、以支撐人民幣匯率。
We recommend staying short dollar-yuan. But we would not add to positions at current levels given the risks of further action by policymakers.
我們建議繼續(xù)做空美元兌人民幣匯率。但我們不會增加現(xiàn)有頭寸水平,因為政策制定者可能還會出臺進一步舉措。
First, domestic corporates still have greenbacks to sell. Local companies have been caught out this year by accumulating foreign exchange at the start of 2017 and then being forced to sell after the authorities engineered a stronger yuan from 6.90 against the dollar in May to encourage foreign participation in China’s and Hong Kong’s new Bond Connect. Local banks we met were divided on how much more dollars domestic corporates needed to sell. But some banks thought Chinese companies were only half way through cutting greenback longs.
首先,中國企業(yè)還會繼續(xù)拋售美元。中國企業(yè)在2017年年初積累外匯,隨后被迫拋售,因為今年5月政府讓人民幣兌美元匯率從6.90的水平一路升值,以鼓勵外資參與中國內地和香港新推出的“債券通”項目。我們拜訪的中國銀行對中國企業(yè)還需要拋售多少美元意見不一。但一些銀行認為,中國企業(yè)削減美元儲備的過程才進行到一半。
Second, the People’s Bank of China’s options for supporting dollar-yuan in the near term appear constrained by the upcoming Chinese Communist Party’s Congress starting on October 18. Ahead of the event, clients in Beijing and Shanghai felt the monetary authorities could not publicly call for the yuan’s surge to ease. If senior officials at the central bank were to verbally intervene and foreign countries responded adversely, the exchange rate would become a very inconvenient issue at a key time for China’s political leadership.
其次,中國人民銀行近期支撐美元兌人民幣匯率的可選手段,似乎受到10月18日召開的中共“十九大”的限制。在“十九大”前,北京和上海的客戶感到貨幣當局不能公開呼吁人民幣放緩升值。如果中國人民銀行的高級官員發(fā)聲干預,而外國做出負面的回應,匯率就會在中國政治領導層換屆這個節(jié)骨眼上成為極其棘手的問題。
Third, increased carry costs this year are also forcing onshore dollar longs to cut their positions. The short-term 1Y China government bond — US Treasury yield differential currently stands at 227bps compared with 140bps at the end of 2016.
第三,今年持有成本增加也迫使在岸美元多頭削減頭寸。中美的1年期政府債券收益率差目前是227個基點,而2016年年底是140個基點。
Fourth, alternative indicators signal continuing yuan strength. In the CSI 300 equity index, cyclical real estate developers have been underperforming defensive healthcare providers this year as China’s important property sector cools. This suggests Chinese demand for iron ore may ease in future to the benefit of the yuan.
第四,其他指標表明人民幣將會繼續(xù)升值。從滬深300(CSI 300)股指來看,隨著中國至關重要的房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)降溫,今年周期性的房地產(chǎn)板塊的表現(xiàn)一直不如防御性的醫(yī)療板塊。這表明中國對鐵礦石的需求可能在未來下降,這有利于人民幣升值。
Last, offshore demand has begun to rise. The total amount of yuan (CNH) deposits in Hong Kong, Seoul, Singapore and Taipei have picked up since March. This marks a reversal of the trend seen after the yuan’s devaluation in August 2015 when CNH deposits across Asia fell almost every month from CNY1.65trn to CNY950bn in Q1’17.
最后,離岸需求開始升溫。香港、首爾、新加坡和臺北的離岸人民幣(CNH)存款額自今年3月以來增長。這標志著自2015年8月那次人民幣貶值以來的趨勢開始逆轉——當時整個亞洲的離岸人民幣存款幾乎每月都在下降,從1.65萬億元人民幣下降至2017年一季度的9500億元人民幣。
Perhaps another way of summing this up is: Chinese authorities are making this up as they go along, and so should investors.
上面這段話或許可以總結為:因為中國當局正在見機行事,所以投資者也應如此。