在中印之間左右逢源的毛里求斯

Border flare-ups in the Himalayas between India and China have long been a feature of international politics, yet, curiously, the two countries now find themselves rubbing shoulders in the less hostile terrain of distant Mauritius. Is the tiny Indian Ocean island big enough for both Asian giants?

長期以來，印度和中國在喜馬拉雅地區(qū)的邊境摩擦一直是國際政治的一部分，然而令人好奇的是，這兩個國家如今在不那么敵對的、遙遠(yuǎn)的毛里求斯和諧相處。這個微小的印度洋島國，是否大到足以容納兩個亞洲巨人?

Mauritian ambitions as a financial centre involve both India and China playing big parts in its future. As it reinvents itself as an active launch pad for investors in Africa — from being, in the past, primarily a place to store offshore wealth — Mauritius wants to deepen its existing ties to India while cultivating new ones with China.

毛里求斯把自己打造成金融中心的抱負(fù)，涉及印度和中國都在其未來扮演重要角色。隨著毛里求斯尋求把自己從過去的離岸財富中心轉(zhuǎn)型成對非洲投資者的活躍跳板，該國想在加深與印度現(xiàn)有關(guān)系的同時，培育同中國的新關(guān)系。

“We don’t have to make choices — we want to be friends,” says Rama Sithanen, the chair of local financial services group IFS and a former minister of finance. “We’ve never been asked to make those choices.”

“我們并非不得不做出選擇……我們想要交朋友，”當(dāng)?shù)亟鹑诜?wù)集團(tuán)IFS的董事長、毛里求斯前財長希達(dá)南(Rama Sithanen)說，“我們從未被要求做出這樣的選擇。”

On the other hand, relations with New Delhi and Beijing appear to be pulling Mauritius in different directions. The island aims to maintain political and security links with India, and to have China play a very important part in plans to re-orient Mauritius’s role as a financial centre towards Africa.

另一方面，與印度和中國的關(guān)系看來要把毛里求斯拉向不同的方向。這個島國打算維持與印度的政治與安全關(guān)系，同時讓中國在其把自身重新定位為面向非洲的金融中心的過程中扮演非常重要的角色。

India has dominated investment flows to Mauritius since it opened up as an offshore centre 30 years ago. A recent change to capital gains taxation in the two countries’ tax treaty may somewhat diminish these flows in future. At the same time, a so-called “grandfathering” clause in the treaty means that Indian capital is still able to have a substantial interest in the island.

自毛里求斯在30年前作為一個離岸中心對外開放以來，印度便主宰了通向該國的投資流。最近，兩國稅務(wù)條約中的資本利得稅規(guī)定發(fā)生變化，未來也許會在一定程度上減少這些投資流。與此同時，條約中的一條所謂“祖父條款”意味著，印度資本仍然有能力在島上享有重大權(quán)益。

The Mauritian political elite has powerful historical ties to India. Many are girmitya, descendants of Indian indentured labourers who came to work on sugarcane plantations under British rule on the island. So close are relations that Narendra Modi, the Indian prime minister, has been known to call Mauritius “Little India”.

毛里求斯的政治精英們跟印度之間有著強(qiáng)大的歷史紐帶。很多人是girmitya，即在英國統(tǒng)治該島時期來這里的甘蔗種植園干活的印度契約勞工的后代。兩者關(guān)系如此緊密，以至于印度總理納倫德拉•莫迪(Narendra Modi)據(jù)悉把毛里求斯稱為“小印度”。

New Delhi’s influence on the island has not always been so discreet. In the 1980s, the government of Indira Gandhi briefly contemplated invading Mauritius when it appeared an India-friendly government was in danger of being overthrown.

印度對這個島國的影響力并非一直這么謹(jǐn)慎。1980年代，當(dāng)毛里求斯的親印度政府似乎處于被推翻的危險時，英迪拉•甘地(Indira Gandhi)政府短暫考慮過入侵該國。

In May, Pravind Jugnauth, the Mauritian prime minister, and Mr Modi signed an agreement on maritime security that came only two weeks after a Chinese summit meeting in Beijing, involving such national leaders as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif, on China’s so-termed “belt and road initiative” — the large-scale effort by China to boost its trade through infrastructure building programmes abroad.

5月，毛里求斯總理普拉溫德•賈格納特(Pravind Jugnauth)和莫迪簽訂了一份海上安全協(xié)議，而就在兩周前，他在北京出席了中國主持的“一帶一路項目”峰會，與會的國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人還有俄羅斯的弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)和巴基斯坦總理納瓦茲•謝里夫(Nawaz Sharif)等人。該項目是中國發(fā)起的大規(guī)模努力，目的是通過海外基建計劃來提振貿(mào)易。

The Mauritius/India agreement was sweetened by a $500m line of credit from the Indian government. This underlined how New Delhi can, similarly to Beijing, flex its financial muscles to back infrastructure projects and defend a sphere of influence.

印度政府提供的5億美元信貸額度，使毛里求斯和印度達(dá)成的協(xié)議更具誘惑力。這凸顯出，新德里能夠像北京一樣，依托雄厚財力來支持基建項目，并捍衛(wèi)自己的勢力范圍。

Metro Express, a planned light-rail network to relieve road congestion on the island, is being built by an Indian multinational and funded with nearly $300m in grants from New Delhi.

旨在緩解該島國道路堵塞的輕軌網(wǎng)絡(luò)Metro Express，正由印度的一家跨國公司承建，還得到了印度政府近3億美元的撥款。

If India’s political influence in the Mauritian capital, Port Louis, seems secure — not least through historical ties — China’s is looming large. Recently, for example, Mauritius has signed deals with governments in Senegal, Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Madagascar in order to help set up business parks and special economic zones. This is the kind of infrastructure that might soon be important to Chinese investors seeking to tap local markets.

如果說印度在毛里求斯首都路易港(Port Louis)的政治影響力看來很穩(wěn)固的話(尤其是借助歷史紐帶)，那么中國的影響也令人難以忽視。比如，毛里求斯不久前跟塞內(nèi)加爾、加納、科特迪瓦和馬達(dá)加斯加簽訂了協(xié)議，以幫助設(shè)立商業(yè)園區(qū)和特別經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)。這正是在不久后也許會令尋求進(jìn)入當(dāng)?shù)厥袌龅闹袊顿Y者感覺重要的那類基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。

Indeed, as Mr Jugnauth himself says, “Mauritius has invited the Chinese government to establish partnerships to invest in these ventures.” He adds: “Both countries recognise the huge potential that exists for deeper co-operation in future.”

的確，正如賈格納特本人所說，“毛里求斯邀請中國政府建立合作伙伴關(guān)系，以便對這些項目進(jìn)行投資。”他接著說：“兩國都意識到深化未來合作的巨大潛力。”

At the same time, this may not amount to Chinese companies setting up in Mauritius itself over the next few years and driving up demand for financial and legal services.

與此同時，這也許不會導(dǎo)致中國企業(yè)在未來幾年落戶毛里求斯，提振對金融與法律服務(wù)的需求。

“I don’t think that there will be a big flow of Chinese investment [into Mauritius] for the next two to three years,” says Alain Law Min, chief executive of MCB, Mauritius’s biggest bank. Although, as he adds: “I’m optimistic that we should get some of [the] bigger boys coming through.”

“我認(rèn)為，未來兩、三年，(流入毛里求斯)的中國投資不會很大，”毛里求斯最大銀行MCB的首席執(zhí)行官阿蘭•勞•敏(Alain Law Min)說。不過，他接著說：“我樂觀地認(rèn)為，我們應(yīng)該會看到其中一些巨頭落地經(jīng)營。”

Bank of China secured a licence in Mauritius last year, meanwhile, and Huawei, China’s biggest smartphone maker, is expanding its local presence.

去年，中國銀行(BoC)在毛里求斯取得了執(zhí)照，而中國最大智能手機(jī)制造商華為(Huawei)正在擴(kuò)大在該國的業(yè)務(wù)地盤。

In the long run, “the Chinese would like to find a base where they can access expertise,” Mr Law Min notes, especially to understand how to exploit demographic changes on the continent. Rising wages and an ageing population at home will push Chinese companies “to want to come to Africa to access that cheaper, and younger labour”, he says.

從長遠(yuǎn)看，“中國企業(yè)希望找到一個可以獲得專長的基地，”勞•敏指出，尤其是為了弄明白如何利用非洲大陸的人口結(jié)構(gòu)變化。他表示，國內(nèi)工資升高以及人口日益老化，將導(dǎo)致中國企業(yè)“希望進(jìn)軍非洲，獲得更廉價、更年輕的勞動力”。

“We think that the corridor between China and Africa, in terms of trade and investment, will increase significantly,” Mr Sithanen says. “Equally, we have space for Indian companies to come and invest in Mauritius,” he adds.

“我們認(rèn)為，在貿(mào)易與投資方面，中非之間的走廊將顯著拓寬，”希達(dá)南說。“同樣地，我們也有讓印度公司來毛里求斯投資的空間，”他接著說。

“China will win, India will gain.”

“中國會贏，印度也會贏。”