特朗普當(dāng)選與英國(guó)退歐不再是同類

The Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump will forever be linked in history. The two events took place within a few months of each other. Both were populist revolts that appealed to similar constituencies.

英國(guó)退歐公投與唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)勝選將成為歷史上永遠(yuǎn)被聯(lián)系在一起的事件。兩件事在幾個(gè)月的時(shí)間內(nèi)相繼發(fā)生。兩者都代表了對(duì)于相似選民群體有感召力的民粹主義造反。

After Mr Trump’s election, Theresa May, Britain’s prime minister, was the first foreign leader to visit the new US president. A photograph of the two leaders walking hand in hand quickly became a symbol of the closeness of Trump’s America and Brexit Britain. For mainstream politicians in Europe, “Trump and Brexit” became shorthand for the forces that they were trying to combat.

特朗普當(dāng)選后，英國(guó)首相特里薩•梅(Theresa May)成為了首位拜訪這位美國(guó)新總統(tǒng)的外國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。兩位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人牽手而行的照片，迅速成為特朗普治下的美國(guó)和退歐后的英國(guó)關(guān)系親密的象征。在歐洲主流政治家看來(lái)，“特朗普和英國(guó)退歐”(Trump and Brexit)已經(jīng)成為他們一直試圖打擊的勢(shì)力的代名詞。

But, as the months have passed, it has become clear that Trump and Brexit are not, in fact, identical twins. They are more like distant relations who are growing further apart with the passage of time.

但是，隨著時(shí)間的推移，事實(shí)已經(jīng)變得很清楚，特朗普當(dāng)選和英國(guó)退歐實(shí)際上并非“同卵雙胞胎”。兩者更像是隨著時(shí)間流逝關(guān)系越來(lái)越疏遠(yuǎn)的遠(yuǎn)房親戚。

The differences between the Trump phenomenon and Brexit are a matter of both style and substance. Mr Trump violates the conventional expectations of how a US president should behave on a daily basis. Mrs May, by contrast, is scrupulously correct in her behaviour. She is about as likely to attend an EU summit in her pyjamas as to tweet that she is a “very stable genius”.

特朗普現(xiàn)象與英國(guó)退歐這兩件事不僅看上去不同，實(shí)質(zhì)上也不同。特朗普每日都在違背對(duì)一位美國(guó)總統(tǒng)應(yīng)如何行事的傳統(tǒng)預(yù)期。相比之下，梅的舉止沒有絲毫差錯(cuò)。她絕不可能在Twitter上稱自己是一個(gè)“精神狀態(tài)非常穩(wěn)定的天才”，就像她絕不可能穿件睡衣去參加歐盟(EU)峰會(huì)一樣。

Early in her period in office Mrs May suggested hopefully that she might get on with Mr Trump because “opposites attract”. But that pretence has now been dropped. When the president retweeted posts from a British far-right group, Mrs May was forced to condemn him. Predictably Mr Trump lashed back, although he initially directed his ire at the wrong Theresa May, lambasting a British housewife with just six Twitter followers.

在執(zhí)政初期，梅樂觀地提出，自己跟特朗普或許會(huì)合得來(lái)，因?yàn)?ldquo;兩極相吸”。但是現(xiàn)在她已經(jīng)放棄了這種幻想。當(dāng)特朗普轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)英國(guó)一個(gè)極右組織的帖子時(shí)，梅不得不對(duì)他進(jìn)行譴責(zé)。不出所料，特朗普回?fù)袅?，盡管他最初將怒火指向了一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤的特里薩•梅賬戶——痛斥了一名在Twitter上僅有6個(gè)粉絲的英國(guó)家庭主婦。

The slapstick comedy of this incident obscured a serious political difference. In office, Mr Trump has embraced anti-Muslim rhetoric that Mrs May has carefully avoided. That difference is part of a broader divide between the radical nationalism of Mr Trump and the cautious and conventional globalism of Mrs May.

這件事的滑稽性掩蓋了一個(gè)嚴(yán)肅的政治差異。作為總統(tǒng)的特朗普一直對(duì)反穆斯林言論來(lái)者不拒，而梅一直對(duì)這種言論避之不及。這種差異是特朗普激進(jìn)民族主義與梅謹(jǐn)慎傳統(tǒng)的全球主義之間更廣泛分歧的一部分。

For although many Europeans and Remainers are convinced that Brexit is a nationalist spasm, and little else, the May government is determined to present it in a different light. The prime minister’s argument is that leaving the EU is an opportunity to forge a new future as “Global Britain”. She has emphasised her support for the international, rules-based, liberal order. By contrast, Mr Trump remains a proud, “America First” nationalist who is deeply suspicious of all international institutions, from the UN to the World Trade Organization.

因?yàn)?，盡管許多歐洲人和留歐派英國(guó)人相信英國(guó)退歐只是一次民族主義“抽風(fēng)”，但梅政府決心賦予它一種不同的意義。梅認(rèn)為，脫離歐盟是打造一個(gè)新未來(lái)——“全球化的英國(guó)”——的機(jī)遇。她強(qiáng)調(diào)了自己對(duì)國(guó)際化、基于規(guī)則的自由秩序的支持。相比之下，特朗普仍是一個(gè)自以為是、信奉“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”的民族主義者，對(duì)所有國(guó)際機(jī)構(gòu)——從聯(lián)合國(guó)(UN)到世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)——都存在深深的質(zhì)疑。

These very different international visions have led to policy disputes between Brexit Britain and Trump’s America. Neither side has much interest in playing up these differences. But on a succession of issues, Britain has sided with the EU rather than the US. When the Trump administration repudiated the Paris climate accord, the UK stuck with the agreement and the European consensus. The same pattern repeated itself when the White House announced its intention to move the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. And while Mr Trump is itching to rip up the Iran nuclear deal, Britain has joined the rest of the EU in supporting it.

這些截然不同的世界觀，導(dǎo)致了決定退歐后的英國(guó)和特朗普治下美國(guó)之間的政策分歧。雙方都不愿強(qiáng)調(diào)這些分歧。但英國(guó)在一系列問題上都支持歐盟，而非美國(guó)。特朗普政府退出《巴黎氣候協(xié)定》時(shí)，英國(guó)堅(jiān)持遵守該協(xié)定和歐洲共識(shí)。當(dāng)白宮宣布計(jì)劃將美國(guó)駐以色列大使館遷至耶路撒冷時(shí)，同樣的一幕再次上演。此外，特朗普很想撕毀伊朗核協(xié)議，而英國(guó)則站在歐盟其他國(guó)家那邊支持該協(xié)議。

Perhaps the most consequential policy division is over the WTO. The Trump administration is quietly hobbling the world trade body by blocking appointments to its court. But a functioning WTO is critical to Mrs May’s plans to make Brexit work. The UK has stressed that, if it cannot strike a new trade deal with the EU, it will fall back on WTO rules. Mr Trump’s agenda could wreck the body that Britain is relying upon as its insurance policy.

或許影響最重大的政策分歧在于如何對(duì)待WTO。特朗普政府通過阻止WTO上訴機(jī)構(gòu)法官的任命，悄悄地給這一世界貿(mào)易機(jī)構(gòu)使絆子。但一個(gè)正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的WTO對(duì)梅的英國(guó)退歐計(jì)劃至關(guān)重要。英國(guó)強(qiáng)調(diào)，如果無(wú)法與歐盟達(dá)成新的貿(mào)易協(xié)議，它將轉(zhuǎn)而退守WTO規(guī)則。特朗普的議程可能會(huì)破壞這個(gè)英國(guó)賴以保底的機(jī)構(gòu)。

Some of the ideologues behind Brexit remain wedded to the idea that Britain is part of an “Anglosphere” of English-speaking nations, with the US and the UK at its heart. But Britain’s foreign policy choices since the Brexit vote suggest that the UK is actually more comfortable with the Franco-German worldview than the American one. The repeated low-key clashes between the May government and the Trump administration emphasise the extent to which Britain is now “in play” as a foreign policy actor. If the Brexit negotiations come to a reasonably amicable conclusion and Mr Trump remains in the White House, post-Brexit Britain could easily end up closer to the EU than the US.

支持英國(guó)退歐的一些理論家仍堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，英國(guó)是以美英兩國(guó)為核心的英語(yǔ)國(guó)家“盎格魯文化圈”的一部分。但退歐公投以來(lái)的英國(guó)外交政策選擇表明，英國(guó)實(shí)際上更愿意接受法德的世界觀，而非美國(guó)的世界觀。梅政府與特朗普政府之間的多次有節(jié)制的沖突，突顯出英國(guó)如今已在多大程度上推行獨(dú)立的外交政策。如果英國(guó)退歐談判達(dá)成一個(gè)算得上友好的結(jié)果而特朗普仍坐鎮(zhèn)白宮，退歐后的英國(guó)可能更容易向歐盟、而非美國(guó)靠攏。

The more ardent Brexiters would argue that this is simply because the British establishment has failed to understand the populist moment. But opinion polls suggest that Mrs May’s policy decisions reflect wider sentiment in Britain. A Globescan survey last year showed that only 33 per cent of Britons believe that the US has a “mainly positive” impact on world affairs; compared with 84 per cent positive ratings for Germany and 66 per cent for France. Some 79 per cent of Brits trusted President Barack Obama’s judgment, compared with 22 per cent who trust President Trump.

更堅(jiān)決的退歐派人士會(huì)辯稱，這只是因?yàn)橛?guó)建制派未能理解這股民粹主義勢(shì)頭。但民調(diào)顯示，梅的政策決定反映了英國(guó)民眾更普遍的情緒。去年GlobeScan所做的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查顯示，僅33%的英國(guó)人認(rèn)為美國(guó)對(duì)世界事務(wù)的影響“主要是積極的”;相比之下，德國(guó)在這方面獲得的認(rèn)可率為84%，法國(guó)為66%。約79%的英國(guó)人信任巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)總統(tǒng)的判斷，而信任特朗普總統(tǒng)的只有22%。

These numbers underline the differences between Brexit Britain and Trump’s America. British political debate since the Brexit vote has been bitter, but it has been conducted in largely conventional terms. By contrast, Mr Trump’s White House increasingly feels like a deranged episode from a reality TV show. The vote for Brexit and the election of Mr Trump may have sprung from similar instincts. But they have ended up in very different places.

這些數(shù)字突顯了退歐后的英國(guó)和特朗普治下美國(guó)之間的種種不同。自退歐公投以來(lái)，英國(guó)的政治辯論一直很激烈，但在很大程度上是按照傳統(tǒng)方式進(jìn)行的。相比之下，特朗普的白宮越來(lái)越像是一集瘋狂的真人秀節(jié)目。英國(guó)公投退歐和特朗普當(dāng)選可能源自相似的本能。但它們的后續(xù)發(fā)展截然不同。