印度借閱兵拉攏東盟抗衡中國(guó)

India’s Republic Day parade is a popular public spectacle: a display of military hardware, leavened by cheesy floats and folk-dancing troupes. It is also the annual highlight of India’s diplomatic calendar, given New Delhi’s decades-old tradition of inviting a strategically important foreign leader as the parade’s “chief guest”.

印度共和國(guó)日(Republic Day)閱兵是一種展示軍事裝備的、受歡迎的公共景觀，漂亮的花車和載歌載舞的人群也為其增色不少。這也是印度的年度外交日程亮點(diǎn)，因?yàn)閹资陙?lái)，該國(guó)保持著邀請(qǐng)具有戰(zhàn)略重要性的外國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人擔(dān)任閱兵“主賓”的傳統(tǒng)。

When India’s missiles and tanks roll down New Delhi’s Rajpath for this year’s parade tomorrow morning, the VIP dais — graced in recent years by Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, Barack Obama, the former US president, and François Hollande, the former French president — will be heavier than usual.

當(dāng)印度的導(dǎo)彈和坦克明日上午進(jìn)入新德里國(guó)王大道(Rajpath)參加閱兵時(shí)，貴賓觀禮臺(tái)上的陣容將比以往更龐大。近年來(lái)出現(xiàn)在這個(gè)觀禮臺(tái)上的有日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)、美國(guó)前總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)和法國(guó)前總統(tǒng)弗朗索瓦•奧朗德(François Hollande)。

Rather than a single high-profile foreign dignitary, New Delhi is hosting 10 leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a strategically important region with which India is seeking to deepen ties to counter China’s increasing sway. “India does not want an Asia that is dominated by China,” says Dhruva Jaishankar, a fellow at Brookings India, a think-tank. “And a big part of where that will be determined is Southeast Asia.”

這次，印度并非僅邀請(qǐng)一位引人注目的外國(guó)要人，而是要招待來(lái)自東盟(Asean)的10位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。東盟是一個(gè)具有重要戰(zhàn)略意義的地區(qū)，印度正尋求與其加深關(guān)系，以抗衡中國(guó)日益增強(qiáng)的影響力。“印度不希望亞洲被中國(guó)主宰，”智庫(kù)布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)(Brookings Institution)印度中心研究員德魯瓦•賈伊尚卡爾(Dhruva Jaishankar)說(shuō)，“亞洲的很大一部分將由東南亞決定。”

India’s feelings are not unreciprocated. While China is Southeast Asia’s biggest trading partner, it is also a hegemon that many regional elites privately fear or loathe for its heavy-handed military and economic clout.

印度的感受并非單方面的。盡管中國(guó)是東南亞最大的貿(mào)易伙伴，但它也是一個(gè)霸主，許多地區(qū)精英私下里對(duì)中國(guó)強(qiáng)大的軍事和經(jīng)濟(jì)影響力感到害怕或厭惡。

The South China Sea is a particular flashpoint, given Beijing’s build-up of artificial islands for potential military use. India has openly sided with Southeast Asia in the dispute, with Narendra Modi, the prime minister, criticising China’s military build-up as evidence of an “18th-century expansionist mindset”.

鑒于中國(guó)政府為潛在軍事用途建設(shè)更多人工島，南中國(guó)海(South China Sea)是一個(gè)特別的引爆點(diǎn)。印度在這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)端中公開(kāi)支持東南亞，印度總理納倫德拉•莫迪(Narendra Modi)批評(píng)了中國(guó)的軍事擴(kuò)張，稱之為“18世紀(jì)擴(kuò)張主義思維”的證據(jù)。

It is that sense of India’s growing resolve in the face of Chinese assertiveness that has caught Asean’s attention.

印度在中國(guó)的強(qiáng)硬面前變得日益堅(jiān)決，引起了東盟的注意。

“What [Southeast Asian countries] are seeking — and have — in India is a partner that stands up for a rules-based international order, and that’s particularly important in the maritime space,” says Alyssa Ayres, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations. “In India, they see a global giant — a huge country that is not as big a behemoth as China on trade, but one that is willing to say to Vietnam and the Philippines, ‘We are with you on this question’. They are ready to stand up to China.”

“(東南亞國(guó)家)在印度這里尋求(并擁有)的是一個(gè)合作伙伴，這個(gè)伙伴支持以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的國(guó)際秩序，這在海洋領(lǐng)域尤為重要，”位于華盛頓的美國(guó)外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)(Council on Foreign Relations)的高級(jí)研究員阿莉薩•艾爾斯(Alyssa Ayres)說(shuō)，“在印度身上，他們看到的是一個(gè)全球大國(guó)——并非一個(gè)在貿(mào)易方面像中國(guó)那樣大的大國(guó)，但是一個(gè)愿意對(duì)越南和菲律賓說(shuō)‘我們?cè)谶@個(gè)問(wèn)題上與你們站在一起’的大國(guó)。他們準(zhǔn)備勇敢地面對(duì)中國(guó)。”

The idea of an “Indo-Pacific” region with India playing a more active strategic role has also been endorsed by Japan, Australia and Donald Trump, the US president, who spoke of a “new chapter for the Indo-Pacific” at a recent Pacific Rim summit.

由印度在其中扮演更積極戰(zhàn)略角色的“印度-太平洋”地區(qū)的構(gòu)想，也得到了日本、澳大利亞和美國(guó)總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的支持。特朗普在不久前的一次太平洋周邊國(guó)家峰會(huì)上談起了“印太新篇章”。

“We are talking about a new paradigm for what used to be called the Asia-Pacific,” says Thitinan Pongsudhirak, associate professor of political science at Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University. “When India is included, Southeast Asian countries see it as a potential giant that could counterbalance China. They are looking for some hedging as well.”

“我們討論的是替代過(guò)去亞太說(shuō)法的新模式，”泰國(guó)朱拉隆功大學(xué)(Chulalongkorn University)政治學(xué)副教授提塔南•蓬蘇迪拉克(Thitinan Pongsudhirak)表示，“當(dāng)納入印度后，東南亞國(guó)家把它視為可以抗衡中國(guó)的潛在巨人。他們也在尋找某種對(duì)沖。”

When it comes to commercial and economic ties, New Delhi’s hesitant engagement with Asean over the past 25 years has been underwhelming. Bilateral trade was just $58bn a year in 2015, substantially less than Asean’s trade with Hong Kong or Taiwan. In contrast, Asean is bound to China by vast networks of integrated supply chains, with bilateral trade forecast to reach $1tn in 2020.

在商業(yè)和經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系方面，過(guò)去25年印度與東盟猶豫不決的往來(lái)，并未給人留下深刻印象。2015年，雙邊貿(mào)易額僅為580億美元，大大低于東盟與中國(guó)香港或臺(tái)灣的貿(mào)易額。相比之下，東盟通過(guò)龐大的集成供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)與中國(guó)綁定在一起，2020年雙邊貿(mào)易額預(yù)計(jì)將達(dá)到1萬(wàn)億美元。

India lacks the financial depth to match China for infrastructure funding, or underwriting bonds. But even New Delhi’s more modest goals to boost connectivity — such as a trilateral highway between India, Myanmar and Thailand agreed 15 years ago — remain unrealised.

在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資或債券承銷方面，印度不具備與中國(guó)較量的金融深度。但就連新德里方面有關(guān)提高連通性的溫和目標(biāo)——比如15年前達(dá)成協(xié)議的印度、緬甸和泰國(guó)三邊公路——仍然尚未實(shí)現(xiàn)。

“There is a bit of angst about the gap between promises and delivery,” says Vishnu Prakash, a retired Indian diplomat. “We do not have the resources China has and we cannot or should not try to compete there. But whatever we promise, at least we should be able to deliver on that.”

“人們對(duì)于承諾和兌現(xiàn)之間的差距有點(diǎn)擔(dān)心，”已經(jīng)退休的印度外交官白加尉(Vishnu Prakash)表示，“我們不具備中國(guó)所擁有的資源，我們無(wú)法也不應(yīng)該試圖在這一點(diǎn)上競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。但無(wú)論我們承諾什么，至少我們應(yīng)該能夠兌現(xiàn)。”

But India is stepping up security co-operation with Southeast Asian countries, albeit in small but symbolically important steps. These include training combat pilots and submariners from several Asean countries, a new naval agreement with Singapore, growing technical co-operation and patrolling east of Malacca by the Indian navy.

但是印度正在加強(qiáng)與東南亞國(guó)家的安全合作，規(guī)模雖小但卻是具有象征意義的重要舉措。其中包括培訓(xùn)幾個(gè)東盟國(guó)家的戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)飛行員和潛艇人員，與新加坡簽署新的海軍協(xié)議，增進(jìn)技術(shù)合作，以及印度海軍在馬六甲海峽東部巡航。

Many are expecting India to pursue stronger defence partnerships with Asean countries in the coming years, possibly in conjunction with other like-minded Pacific powers, such as Australia and Japan. “On the security front there have been more developments than is often appreciated,” says Mr Jaishankar. “There is no expectation that India should match China one for one. But if you can provide even part of an alternative, that is helpful.”

很多人預(yù)計(jì)，未來(lái)幾年印度將尋求加強(qiáng)與東盟國(guó)家的防務(wù)合作關(guān)系，可能與其他志同道合的太平洋大國(guó)(如澳大利亞和日本)一起協(xié)力推進(jìn)。“在安全方面，進(jìn)展比人們通常意識(shí)到的多，”賈伊尚卡爾表示，“沒(méi)人指望印度會(huì)與中國(guó)一對(duì)一地競(jìng)賽。但哪怕你能提供部分替代，那也是有幫助的。”