意大利選民已從挺歐變?yōu)橐蓺W

The election results in Italy are a lesson to Europe. Italians were once among the most enthusiastic supporters of the European project. This is true no longer. The combination of economic malaise with political impotence has discredited not only Italy’s political and policymaking elite, but even the country’s engagement with the EU.

意大利的大選結(jié)果給歐洲上了一課。意大利人曾經(jīng)是歐洲一體化最熱情的支持者群體之一。如今已不再是這樣。經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷加上政治無(wú)能，不僅使得意大利政治和決策精英名譽(yù)掃地，甚至還危及了該國(guó)與歐盟的關(guān)系。

This does not mean Italy will leave; the costs would be too great. It means instead that the threat of both friction between Italy and the European establishment and further financial and economic disruption is now far greater.

這并不意味著意大利會(huì)退歐;退出的成本太高了。但這意味著如今兩個(gè)大得多的威脅：一是意大利與歐洲建制派之間的摩擦，二是進(jìn)一步的金融和經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)蕩。

The election results are quite as shocking as the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Tump in the US: 55 per cent of the voters chose Eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties.

意大利大選結(jié)果令人震驚的程度與英國(guó)退歐公投和唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)當(dāng)選美國(guó)總統(tǒng)相仿：55%的選民選擇了持歐洲懷疑論和反體制的政黨。

The Five Star Movement — an amorphous party of protest — gained 32 per cent of the vote and the League — a rightwing nationalist party — gained 18 per cent. The share of the centre-left Democratic party, in which the European establishment had put its trust, tumbled from 41 per cent four years ago to 19 per cent. The share of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia fell to 14 per cent. The populist revolution devours its parent.

無(wú)組織的抗議派政黨五星運(yùn)動(dòng)(Five Star Movement)贏(yíng)得了32%的選票，而右翼民族主義政黨聯(lián)盟黨(League Party)贏(yíng)得了18%的選票。承載著歐洲建制派信任的中左翼政黨民主黨(Democratic Party)的得票率從4年前的41%驟降至19%。西爾維奧•貝盧斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)的意大利力量黨(Forza Italia)的支持率降至14%。在這場(chǎng)民粹主義革命中，青出于藍(lán)而勝于藍(lán)。

Why are Italian voters so disenchanted? The obvious answers are that economic performance has been so dismal, while established Italian policymakers appear so ineffective. This is certainly not only — probably not even mainly — due to Italy’s participation in the euro. But the eurozone has made things worse. Not least, it offers an external scapegoat, which unscrupulous politicians are happy to exploit. Blaming foreigners is always an attractive strategy. In a failing country with a frustrated population, it is irresistible.

意大利選民為何如此心灰意冷?顯而易見(jiàn)的答案是，近年經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)如此慘淡，而體制內(nèi)的意大利政策制定者顯得如此無(wú)能。這肯定不僅僅是因?yàn)?甚至可以說(shuō)主要不是因?yàn)?意大利加入歐洲單一貨幣。但歐元區(qū)確實(shí)使得情況更糟。尤其是，它提供了一個(gè)外部的替罪羊，而無(wú)底線(xiàn)的政客樂(lè)于利用這一點(diǎn)。責(zé)怪外國(guó)人永遠(yuǎn)是具有吸引力的戰(zhàn)略。在一個(gè)民眾沮喪的正在走下坡路的國(guó)家，責(zé)怪外國(guó)人簡(jiǎn)直是不可抗拒的沖動(dòng)。

One aspect of the eurozone has been the inadequacy of its overall macroeconomic policy. In January 2018, the consumer price index of the eurozone (excluding erratic items) was 7.2 per cent lower than it would have been had it risen at an annual rate of 1.9 per cent since January 2007 — a rate of inflation that is a reasonable interpretation of the European Central Bank’s objective of “inflation rates below, but close to, 2 per cent over the medium term”.

歐元區(qū)的一個(gè)方面是缺乏整體的宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)政策。2018年1月，歐元區(qū)核心消費(fèi)價(jià)格指數(shù)(CPI，剔除了不穩(wěn)定項(xiàng)目)相比自2007年1月以來(lái)每年上漲1.9%(這個(gè)通脹率是對(duì)歐洲央行“通脹率在中期低于但接近2%”這個(gè)目標(biāo)的合理解讀)將會(huì)達(dá)到的水平低了7.2%。

An alternative assessment of macroeconomic policy is in terms of the growth of nominal gross domestic product. By the third quarter of 2017, eurozone nominal GDP was 11 per cent lower than it would have been had it grown at an annual rate of 3 per cent since early 2007 — a rate that would have been consistent with annual real growth of around 1 per cent and inflation of 2 per cent. Under Mario Draghi, the ECB did act successfully in the end. Yet overall macroeconomic policy has clearly been inadequate. It failed to deliver adequate growth in overall aggregate demand (see charts).

對(duì)宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的另一種評(píng)估方法是看名義GDP增長(zhǎng)。截至2017年第三季度，歐元區(qū)名義GDP相比自2007年初以來(lái)每年增長(zhǎng)3%(這個(gè)增速將與實(shí)際GDP約1%的年度增長(zhǎng)和2%的年通脹率一致)將會(huì)達(dá)到的水平低了11%。在馬里奧•德拉吉(Mario Draghi)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，歐洲央行最終確實(shí)成功地采取行動(dòng)。然而整體宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)政策明顯不足。它未能帶來(lái)整體總需求的足夠增長(zhǎng)(見(jiàn)圖表)。

Within this weak macroeconomic environment, huge divergences also opened up among individual member countries. Germany’s nominal GDP rose by 34 per cent between the first quarter of 2007 and the last quarter of 2017 (a compound average annual rate of 2.7 per cent). Italy’s rose by a mere 9 per cent over the same period (a compound average annual rate of 0.8 per cent).

在這個(gè)疲弱的宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境內(nèi)部，成員國(guó)之間也形成了巨大差異。從2007年第一季度到2017年第四季度，德國(guó)名義GDP增長(zhǎng)了34%(平均年復(fù)合增長(zhǎng)率為2.7%)。同期意大利名義GDP僅增長(zhǎng)9%(平均年復(fù)合增長(zhǎng)率為0.8%)。

Not surprisingly, given modest overall growth of nominal GDP, even Germany’s core annual inflation averaged a little over 1 per cent. Such low inflation in the core creditor country made adjustments in competitiveness within the eurozone far more difficult. 并不令人意外的是，鑒于名義GDP整體增長(zhǎng)有限，就連德國(guó)的平均年核心通脹率也只是略高于1%。核心債權(quán)國(guó)通脹率如此之低，使得歐元區(qū)內(nèi)部的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力調(diào)整更加困難。

If the Italian government had been able to pursue its traditional policy of devaluation and inflation, it could have generated a far stronger rise in nominal GDP. That would surely also have delivered higher levels of real output. Italy’s real GDP in the last quarter of 2017 was, instead, 5 per cent below its level in the first quarter of 2007, while its real GDP per head was still some 9 per cent below the 2007 level a full decade later. No wonder Italians are disillusioned.

如果意大利政府可以實(shí)行貨幣貶值和通脹的傳統(tǒng)政策，它本可以實(shí)現(xiàn)名義GDP的更強(qiáng)勁增長(zhǎng)。那肯定也會(huì)帶來(lái)更高的實(shí)際產(chǎn)出增長(zhǎng)。相反，2017年第四季度意大利實(shí)際GDP比2007年第一季度的水平低了5%，而2017年人均實(shí)際GDP比2007年水平低了大約9%。難怪意大利人幻想破滅。

No doubt, Italy has huge structural economic problems, which tightly constrain growth, but potential output cannot have fallen this much since 2007. Italy also suffers from chronically deficient demand, a failing that the eurozone, as it is now run, is simply unable to remedy. This is partly because overall demand has been too weak and partly because, within the rules, demand cannot be directed to where it is weakest.

毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，意大利存在巨大的結(jié)構(gòu)性經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題，嚴(yán)重制約著經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，但自2007年以來(lái)潛在產(chǎn)出不可能下滑這么多。意大利還面臨需求長(zhǎng)期不振的問(wèn)題;按照目前運(yùn)行方式，歐元區(qū)根本無(wú)法解決該問(wèn)題。部分原因是整體需求太疲弱，還有部分原因是在目前規(guī)則下需求無(wú)法被導(dǎo)向最疲軟的地方。

A prolonged recession, with high unemployment and low employment has inescapable political consequences. But the biggest frustration may be that the people Italians vote for have next to no room for manoeuvre. The question has rather been whom to elect (or sometimes not even elect) to carry out the policies decided in Brussels and Berlin. 長(zhǎng)期衰退、外加失業(yè)率高企和就業(yè)率偏低，必然會(huì)帶來(lái)政治后果。但是最令人沮喪的事情也許是意大利人民選出的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人幾乎沒(méi)有回旋余地。迄今的問(wèn)題是，選舉誰(shuí)(有時(shí)甚至不用選)來(lái)執(zhí)行由布魯塞爾和柏林方面決定的政策。

Why not vote for a clown or a party created by a clown? It might not make much difference to what happens in Italy, but it might at least be more amusing.

何不選一個(gè)小丑或由一個(gè)小丑創(chuàng)建的政黨?這樣做也許不會(huì)怎么改變意大利的現(xiàn)實(shí)，但至少有可能更好玩。

Some Italian economists now argue that the country could obtain a degree of macroeconomic policy freedom by issuing what is known as “fiscal money” — a parallel currency that could be used to pay Italian taxes.

一些意大利經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家現(xiàn)在提出，通過(guò)發(fā)行所謂的“財(cái)政貨幣”(可以用來(lái)在意大利交稅的平行貨幣)，意大利可以獲得一定程度的宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)政策自由。

This is technically possible. It would surely create hysteria in northern Europe, since it would eliminate the monetary policy monopoly of the ECB. But the very fact that such a radical idea is being discussed demonstrates the scale of the disenchantment in so large and important a country.

這在技術(shù)上是可行的。此舉必然會(huì)造成北部歐洲歇斯底里的反應(yīng)，因?yàn)樗馕吨鴼W洲央行喪失對(duì)貨幣政策的專(zhuān)斷權(quán)。但是討論如此激進(jìn)的想法本身表明了這個(gè)重要大國(guó)的人們心灰意冷的程度。

Unless and until the eurozone is able to generate widely-shared prosperity, it remains vulnerable to political upheaval. Weaknesses of the system, plus the impotence of democratic politics at the only level that really counts (the national one) remains a recipe for populism and fragility.

除非——以及直到——歐元區(qū)能夠營(yíng)造廣泛共享的繁榮，否則它仍然容易受到政治動(dòng)蕩的影響。體制的弱點(diǎn)、外加民主政治在國(guó)家這個(gè)真正重要的層面上無(wú)能，仍然是民粹主義和脆弱性的根源。

Italy, as many remark, is too big to fail and too big to bail. But its voters have moved from europhilia to scepticism. Like it or not, the risks of further upheaval are big.

正如很多人所說(shuō)的那樣，意大利一方面太大而不能倒下，另一方面太大而無(wú)法紓困。但該國(guó)選民對(duì)歐元區(qū)的態(tài)度已經(jīng)從支持變?yōu)閼岩?。無(wú)論人們喜歡與否，意大利發(fā)生進(jìn)一步動(dòng)蕩的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)很大。