即使特朗普總統(tǒng)用發(fā)動(dòng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)來(lái)阻止,中國(guó)也將成功建起一個(gè)與美國(guó)相匹敵的強(qiáng)大技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)。其中的原因,可以在一個(gè)曾以廉價(jià)制造業(yè)和賣淫聞名的城市中一座普通工廠的四樓找到。
This factory floor, in the southern Chinese city of Dongguan, once employed what one employee called a “magnificent sea of people.” Rising labor costs and a new generation with little interest in toiling in factories forced a new tack. Now the sea of people is being replaced by a whirring array of boxy machines, each performing work it used to take 15 people 26 steps to finish.
在這個(gè)位于中國(guó)南方城市東莞的工廠車間里,用一位員工的話說(shuō),曾經(jīng)是“一片壯觀的人海”。勞動(dòng)力成本的上升、以及對(duì)在工廠里辛苦工作毫無(wú)興趣的新一代人,正在迫使工廠采取新策略。如今,人海正在被一排排方頭方腦的機(jī)器取代,每一臺(tái)機(jī)器干的活過(guò)去需要15個(gè)人用26個(gè)步驟才能完成。
The factory suggests that Beijing’s vision of Made in China 2025 — the ambitious state-driven plan to retool China’s industries to compete in areas like automation, microchips and self-driving cars — is not being pushed just by the Communist Party’s top leaders. Instead, the drive is also coming from the bottom up: from the businesses and cities across China that know they must modernize or perish.
這家工廠表明,北京的《中國(guó)制造2025》愿景的推動(dòng)者不只是中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人,這個(gè)雄心勃勃的政府計(jì)劃旨在更新如自動(dòng)化、微芯片和自動(dòng)駕駛汽車等工業(yè)領(lǐng)域,確立中國(guó)在其中的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。推動(dòng)這項(xiàng)計(jì)劃的力量也來(lái)自基層,來(lái)自中國(guó)各地那些知道不現(xiàn)代化就會(huì)滅亡的企業(yè)和城市。
The Trump administration is not wrong to confront Beijing over Made in China 2025. China’s top-down approach gives its companies unfair advantages and could continue to roil global trade relations long after Mr. Trump retires to Mar-a-Lago.
特朗普政府在《中國(guó)制造2025》問(wèn)題上與北京對(duì)峙并沒(méi)有錯(cuò)。中國(guó)自上而下的做法給予中國(guó)企業(yè)不公平的優(yōu)勢(shì),這種做法可能會(huì)在特朗普卸任后的很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間里繼續(xù)擾亂全球貿(mào)易關(guān)系。
But Made in China 2025 is also being propelled by businesses like Dongguan Mentech Optical & Magnetic Company, the owner of the factory, which are worried about labor costs and their own futures. It comes from local governments looking for ways to stay relevant. It comes from a growing network of private-sector entrepreneurs, academics and local politicians who are increasingly working together to overhaul China’s factories and its future. Other cities — Suzhou, Wenzhou, Xuzhou and the industrial areas around Shanghai are just a few examples — have also drummed up their own automation plans.
但是,《中國(guó)制造2025》的推動(dòng)力也來(lái)自東莞銘普光磁股份有限公司這樣的企業(yè),這些企業(yè)的老板擔(dān)心勞動(dòng)力成本上升和自己的未來(lái)。來(lái)自想方設(shè)法保住自己的價(jià)值的地方政府。來(lái)自私營(yíng)企業(yè)家、學(xué)者和地方政客越來(lái)越多的互動(dòng),他們正在為改革中國(guó)工廠和中國(guó)未來(lái)而日益加強(qiáng)合作。其他城市——比如蘇州、溫州、徐州和上海周邊的工業(yè)區(qū)——也在制定自己的自動(dòng)化方案。
The modernization may not happen in 2025. In fact, it may be long after that. But China will get there, mostly because it has to.
這些現(xiàn)代化可能不會(huì)在2025年實(shí)現(xiàn)。實(shí)際的實(shí)現(xiàn)可能需要2025年后的很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間。但中國(guó)將實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo),主要是因?yàn)樗仨氝@么做。
“If Made in China 2025 were a car, the engine has started and it’s definitely moving along,” said Zhang Guojun, director of Guangdong Intelligent Robotics Institute in Dongguan, one of several city-supported local research centers helping the factories upgrade. The city was automating well before Made in China 2025 came out in 2015, he said, “but the policy provided us a clear direction.”
“如果中國(guó)制造2025是一輛車,車子已經(jīng)發(fā)動(dòng)了,而且肯定是在移動(dòng),”張國(guó)軍說(shuō),他是位于東莞的廣東省智能機(jī)器人研究院的院長(zhǎng),該院是當(dāng)?shù)卣С值?、幫助工廠升級(jí)換代的地方研究所之一。他說(shuō),早在《中國(guó)制造2025》在2015年出臺(tái)之前,東莞就已經(jīng)在進(jìn)行自動(dòng)化改造,“但是這個(gè)政策給我們指出了明確的方向。”
A city of eight million people in the Pearl River Delta, Dongguan long relied on making and exporting shoes, toys and electronic parts to the United States and Europe. In many ways, it looks like the factory-dominated China of popular imagination, with whole parts of the city pervaded by rows of rectangular factory buildings, one after another.
東莞是位于珠江三角洲的一座擁有800萬(wàn)人口的城市,其經(jīng)濟(jì)過(guò)去一直依靠制造鞋、玩具和電子零部件等向美國(guó)和歐洲出口的商品。在許多方面,東莞看起來(lái)很像大眾想象中的、以制造業(yè)廠房為主的中國(guó),城市中有大片區(qū)域是由一排排長(zhǎng)方形廠房構(gòu)成的。
Then the 2008 financial crisis hit. Orders dried up. Dongguan became known as China’s capital of prostitution until a government crackdown cleaned it up.
后來(lái),2008年的金融危機(jī)襲來(lái)。訂單枯竭了。東莞成了中國(guó)著名的賣淫之都,直到政府發(fā)起一場(chǎng)打擊行動(dòng)進(jìn)行清理。
Beyond the financial crisis, China’s very prosperity threatened Dongguan’s future. The average worker’s income rose fourfold over the past decade. Fewer young people wanted to work on dull and stressful assembly lines, preferring service jobs — like waiting tables and delivering e-commerce packages — that let them interact with people or move around. Some factories moved to lower-cost countries or shut down for good.
除了金融危機(jī),中國(guó)本身的繁榮也在威脅著東莞的未來(lái)。在過(guò)去的十年里,工人的平均收入增加了四倍。愿意從事枯燥的、壓力很大的裝配線工作的年輕人越來(lái)越少,更多的人想從事服務(wù)業(yè)工作——比如在飯館當(dāng)服務(wù)員、配送電子商務(wù)包裹等,這類工作讓他們與人打交道,或能到處走動(dòng)。一些工廠遷往成本更低的國(guó)家,一些永久停業(yè)了。
Dongguan’s companies and government had to do something. They committed to modernizing.
東莞的企業(yè)和政府不得不做點(diǎn)什么。他們開始致力于現(xiàn)代化。
Before Made in China 2025 became policy, Dongguan kicked off a “replacing humans with machines initiative” and funded it with about $30 million a year. It later channeled more money into other automation initiatives. Companies that could prove they had a worthy research project or were willing to invest in industrial robots, software or advanced machinery could win subsidies and tax breaks. The government picked up 10 percent to 20 percent of the tab. Smartphone, furniture, machinery and even cake companies won support, official documents show.
在《中國(guó)制造2025》成為國(guó)家政策之前,東莞啟動(dòng)了一項(xiàng)“機(jī)器換人計(jì)劃”,并每年為該計(jì)劃提供約合3000萬(wàn)美元的資金。后來(lái),東莞還將更多的資金投入到其他自動(dòng)化項(xiàng)目上去。那些能夠證明自己的價(jià)值的研究項(xiàng)目,或愿意在工業(yè)機(jī)器人、軟件或先進(jìn)機(jī)械方面投資的企業(yè),可獲得補(bǔ)貼和減稅等政府優(yōu)惠。政府幫它們出了10%到20%的資金。官方文件顯示,智能手機(jī)、家具、機(jī)械甚至制作蛋糕的公司都獲得了這種支持。
Mentech, the telecom equipment supplier, once had hundreds of workers winding, packaging and testing magnetic wires that were thinner than hair, all by hand. Even today, the company is desperate for workers. On the side of one factory building it lists the on-the-job benefits it offers: monthly wages with overtime of up to about $1,100, air-conditioned dormitories, free Wi-Fi and even a birthday present.
電信設(shè)備供應(yīng)商銘普曾雇有數(shù)百名工人,他們纏繞、包裝和測(cè)試比頭發(fā)還細(xì)的磁線,全靠手工。即使在今天,這家公司仍然嚴(yán)重缺人手。公司在一棟廠房的外墻上列出了其提供的職工福利:每月最高可達(dá)約合1100美元的工資和加班費(fèi),宿舍有空調(diào),免費(fèi)Wi-Fi,甚至還有一份生日禮物。
“Love your employees,” reads a banner, “and they will love you back 100 times.”
“愛你的員工吧,他會(huì)百倍地愛你,”一條橫幅這樣寫道。
But labor costs and a lack of hands were holding it back. During the Lunar New Year holiday, when most of China shuts down and goes home, some 500 Mentech executives, engineers and administrative staff had to work three-hour shifts after their normal workday to keep the factory running, said Zhang Xiaodong, a research and development manager.
但是,勞動(dòng)力成本和缺乏人手正在阻礙著公司的發(fā)展。春節(jié)假期期間,中國(guó)大部分地區(qū)都放假回家了,但研發(fā)經(jīng)理張曉東(音)說(shuō),銘普的大約500名管理、研究和行政人員不得不在正常工作日之后多工作三個(gè)小時(shí),以維持工廠的運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。
Mentech asked Mr. Zhang and others to figure out how to automate the factory. They spent two years working late into the night. Machines needed tweaking. Components needed to be redesigned so that machines could make them. Several projects failed.
銘普讓張和其他人想辦法將工廠自動(dòng)化。他們花了兩年的時(shí)間,每天工作到深夜。機(jī)器需要調(diào)試。為了用機(jī)器制造零件,這些零件需要重新設(shè)計(jì)。幾次嘗試都失敗了。
“Not every problem has a solution,” Mr. Zhang said. “We know that smart manufacturing is the future. But getting there isn’t easy.”
“并不是每個(gè)問(wèn)題都有答案,”張說(shuō)。“我們知道智能制造是未來(lái)的方向,但達(dá)到那個(gè)目標(biāo)不容易。”
Today, a factory floor that once needed over 300 workers now needs 100. More than half of the factory has been automated. The workers clustered around the machines will probably be replaced by machines themselves in a year or two.
如今,一個(gè)曾經(jīng)需要300多名工人的廠房現(xiàn)在只需要100名工人。工廠的一半以上已經(jīng)自動(dòng)化。現(xiàn)在聚集在機(jī)器周圍的工人可能會(huì)在一兩年內(nèi)也被機(jī)器取代。
To help, the Dongguan government provided $1.5 million in subsidies. It is also luring start-ups and helping scientists open research centers to provide more know-how.
東莞政府為幫助公司自動(dòng)化提供了約合150萬(wàn)美元的補(bǔ)貼。政府也在吸引初創(chuàng)企業(yè),幫助科學(xué)家成立研究中心,從而為當(dāng)?shù)靥峁└嗟膶?shí)用知識(shí)。
One start-up aiding Mentech is Dongguan Precision Intelligent Technology, which will provide a good chunk of the machinery the company needs to automate fully. Because the equipment will be Chinese-made, it will be cheaper than purchases of automation systems from Japan or the United States.
其中一個(gè)在協(xié)助銘普的初創(chuàng)公司是東莞普萊信智能技術(shù)有限公司,這家公司將為銘普的全面自動(dòng)化提供大量的所需設(shè)備。因?yàn)檫@些設(shè)備將是中國(guó)制造的,所以比從日本或美國(guó)進(jìn)口自動(dòng)化系統(tǒng)要便宜。
“The biggest trend in manufacturing is that automation is irreversible,” said Forest Tian, a former venture capitalist who founded Precision Intelligent Technology. “There will be huge demand for these machines.”
“制造業(yè)的最大趨勢(shì)是不可逆轉(zhuǎn)的自動(dòng)化過(guò)程,”福里斯特·田(Forest Tian)說(shuō),他曾是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家,現(xiàn)在是普萊信智能技術(shù)的創(chuàng)始人。“將對(duì)這些機(jī)器有巨大的需求。”
The Dongguan government has taken other steps to ensure these centers of innovation help local manufacturers. For example, it formed about 30 research institutes in partnership with major Chinese universities. Once the initial money was given, Dongguan officials told the institutes they had to figure out how to make money on their own.
為確保這些創(chuàng)新中心能夠幫助當(dāng)?shù)刂圃焐?,東莞政府還采取了其他的措施。比如,政府與中國(guó)主要大學(xué)合作成立了大約30家研究機(jī)構(gòu)。東莞官員告訴這些機(jī)構(gòu),最初的資金到位之后,它們必須自己想辦法找錢。
The institutes teamed up with companies like Guangdong Janus Intelligent Group Corporation, a once-dowdy cellphone parts maker facing the familiar problem of high labor costs. Experts in the field became recurring visitors to its factory.
這些研究機(jī)構(gòu)與像廣東勁勝智能集團(tuán)股份有限公司這樣的企業(yè)合作,勁勝曾是一家不時(shí)髦的手機(jī)零部件制造商,如今面臨著勞動(dòng)力成本過(guò)高的問(wèn)題。領(lǐng)域的專家們已經(jīng)成了這些工廠的常客。
“We call it 18 Buddhas coming to Dongguan,” said Huang He, the head of Janus’s smart-factory business, alluding to the followers of the original Buddha.
“我們稱之為十八羅漢來(lái)東莞,”勁勝的智能工廠業(yè)務(wù)負(fù)責(zé)人黃鶴(音)說(shuō)。
At a Janus factory, rows of automated machine tools work with robotic arms and green conveyor belts in a space nearly the size of a football field. The robotic arms feed metal blocks to the machines, which then punch, grind and wash them. The housings for phones and tablets come out.
在一家與勁勝合作的工廠,幾乎一個(gè)足球場(chǎng)大小的廠房里,一排排自動(dòng)化機(jī)床的機(jī)械臂在綠色傳送帶上工作著。機(jī)器臂把未加工的金屬塊遞給機(jī)器,機(jī)器對(duì)其進(jìn)行沖壓、研磨和清洗。手機(jī)和平板電腦的外殼就這樣生產(chǎn)出來(lái)了。
The factory requires 16 workers on a shift, instead of 103 before it was automated. The robotic arms are made in China.
這家工廠需要16名工人、而不是103名工人輪班工作。機(jī)器臂是中國(guó)制造的。
No doubt many Chinese companies will fail in their effort to upgrade. Made in China 2025’s other goals, such as building up world-class microchip industries or self-driving cars, remain out of sight for now.
毫無(wú)疑問(wèn),許多中國(guó)企業(yè)的升級(jí)努力將會(huì)失敗?!吨袊?guó)制造2025》的其他目標(biāo),比如建立世界級(jí)的微芯片產(chǎn)業(yè)或自動(dòng)駕駛汽車產(chǎn)業(yè),目前仍遙不可及。
Yet when it comes to manufacturing, Dongguan suggests Made in China 2025 will succeed partly because the effort is bigger than Beijing. Chinese companies and local government officials are determined to climb the value chain so they will not fall into obsolescence. The best Washington can do is to make sure its policies help American companies stay ahead of the game.
但在制造業(yè)方面,東莞的例子表明,《中國(guó)制造2025》將取得成功,部分原因是中國(guó)的自動(dòng)化努力遠(yuǎn)不只是政府所希望的。中國(guó)的企業(yè)和地方政府官員們已下定決心,為了不被淘汰,他們要沿著制造業(yè)價(jià)值鏈往上爬。華盛頓能做的最多只是確保美國(guó)政府的政策能夠幫助美國(guó)公司保持領(lǐng)先地位。