貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)會(huì)給中國(guó)帶來多大傷害？

當(dāng)前的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)有什么影響呢?有分析表明，盡管它給經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來的直接影響肯定是負(fù)面的，但實(shí)際上卻很小，還不到GDP的0.5%。然而，即使對(duì)中國(guó)來說直接的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響也許是可控的，但貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)本身卻有可能損害中美之間的長(zhǎng)期關(guān)系，包括影響涵蓋教育、旅游的服務(wù)貿(mào)易在未來的增長(zhǎng)速度。美國(guó)在服務(wù)領(lǐng)域一直擁有龐大的、不斷增長(zhǎng)的順差，中方估計(jì)這一順差在2017年達(dá)到540億美元，美方的估計(jì)是400億美元。貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)最大的影響，也許將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出眼下直接受到影響的貨物。

What is the impact of the current trade war on the Chinese economy? An analysis shows that while the immediate direct impact on the economy is certainly negative, it is small in real terms, affecting less than 0.5% of GDP. However, while the immediate economic impact may be manageable for China, the trade war itself may do damage to the longer-term relations between China and the United States, including by affecting the future rate of growth of trade in services, including education and tourism. The U.S. has a persistent, large and growing surplus in this area, which was estimated by China to be $54 billion, and by the U.S. to be $40 billion in 2017. The biggest impact from the trade war might go beyond the immediate goods that are affected now.

不過最先的直接影響是：對(duì)美國(guó)進(jìn)口商來說，由于不具備消化關(guān)稅成本的利潤(rùn)空間，因此，特朗普政府對(duì)中國(guó)產(chǎn)品的新征稅清單將導(dǎo)致從中國(guó)進(jìn)口的大部分商品變得過于昂貴。這些關(guān)稅如果全面實(shí)施的話，有可能使相關(guān)的中國(guó)對(duì)美出口完全停止，其金額也許達(dá)到2500億美元。

But first, the immediate impact: the Trump administration's new list of Chinese products to be subject to tariffs will make the import of most of these goods from China prohibitively expensive for U.S. importers, as they don't have the kind of profit margins that would enable them to absorb the cost of these tariffs. If fully implemented, these tariffs will effectively lead to a complete halt in affected Chinese exports to the U.S., potentially amounting to $250 billion.

這將對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生什么影響呢?首先，作為和美國(guó)一樣龐大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，一直以來中國(guó)相對(duì)不怎么受外部的干擾。過去40年中，雖然中國(guó)進(jìn)出口的增長(zhǎng)速度與其他所有經(jīng)濟(jì)體一樣有起有落，但中國(guó)實(shí)際GDP增長(zhǎng)率保持了相對(duì)穩(wěn)定，事實(shí)上一直在正增長(zhǎng)。

How would that affect the Chinese economy? First of all, China, as a large economy like the United States, has always been relatively immune to external disturbances. During the past four decades, while the rates of growth of Chinese exports and imports have fluctuated like those of all other economies, the rate of growth of Chinese real GDP has remained relatively stable, and in fact has always stayed positive.

此外，過去10年中國(guó)對(duì)出口的依賴已經(jīng)持續(xù)減弱。商品出口占中國(guó)GDP的份額從2006年高峰時(shí)的35.3%，降到了2017年的18.1%(見圖1)。特別是對(duì)美國(guó)的商品出口，已經(jīng)從2006年高峰時(shí)占中國(guó)GDP的7.2%降至2017年的3.4%，下降了一半以上。

Moreover, Chinese dependence on exports has continued to decline over the past decade. The share of exports of goods within total Chinese GDP has fallen from a peak of 35.3% in 2006 to 18.1% in 2017 (see Chart 1). Specifically regarding exports of goods to the U.S. alone, this share of Chinese GDP has also fallen by more than half, from a peak of 7.2% in 2006 to 3.4% in 2017.

出口不再是中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的主要引擎，相反，今天中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的主要驅(qū)動(dòng)力是國(guó)內(nèi)需求，是由家庭消費(fèi)、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資和公共產(chǎn)品消費(fèi)來拉動(dòng)的。

Exports are no longer the principal engine of Chinese economic growth. Instead, the major driver of Chinese economic growth today is its domestic demand, driven by household consumption, infrastructural investments, and public goods consumption.

中國(guó)受美國(guó)新關(guān)稅影響而減少的這部分出口會(huì)占到GDP的1.7%。這一下降程度雖絕非等閑，但總體上是可控的。即使受新關(guān)稅影響的所有中國(guó)對(duì)美出口都停止，并且這些商品不再出口到其他國(guó)家，中國(guó)GDP的減少也不會(huì)超過1.12%。在這種情況下，原先預(yù)期6.5%的年經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率會(huì)降到5.4%，但與IMF預(yù)測(cè)2018年全球3.9%的平均增長(zhǎng)率相比，這個(gè)增長(zhǎng)速度仍然相當(dāng)可觀。

The fall in Chinese exports as a result of the new U.S. tariffs would amount to 1.7% of GDP. A reduction of this magnitude is material, but quite manageable in the aggregate. Thus, even if all Chinese exports to the U.S. subject to the new tariffs were both halted and not re-directed elsewhere, the decline in Chinese GDP caused would not exceed 1.12%. Such a reduction from an expected annual growth rate of 6.5% would leave 5.4%, which is still a very respectable rate of growth compared to the world average of 3.9%, as projected by the International Monetary Fund for 2018.

長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展動(dòng)向

Longer-Term Developments

重要的是我們要意識(shí)到，有兩個(gè)重要的長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展動(dòng)向?qū)?huì)同時(shí)發(fā)揮作用。

It is important to realize that there are two important longer-term developments simultaneously in play.

首先，貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的主要原因之一其實(shí)并不在于貿(mào)易本身，而在于中美兩國(guó)之間的經(jīng)濟(jì)和技術(shù)優(yōu)勢(shì)之爭(zhēng)。這場(chǎng)競(jìng)賽無論是明是暗，都不是從唐納德·特朗普總統(tǒng)開始的，就算他離任也不會(huì)消失。“亞洲再平衡”和“跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系”(TPP)這兩項(xiàng)旨在遏制中國(guó)的政策都是在巴拉克·奧巴馬總統(tǒng)當(dāng)政時(shí)期提出的(但看來已經(jīng)被特朗普總統(tǒng)拋棄了)。

First, one of the principal causes of the trade war is actually not trade itself, but competition between China and the U.S. for economic and technological dominance. This competition, whether explicit or implicit, did not begin with President Donald Trump and will not go away even after he leaves office. The “pivot to Asia” and the “Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)”, both policies supposedly meant to contain China, were initiated under President Barack Obama (but seemingly abandoned by President Trump).

這場(chǎng)競(jìng)賽有可能帶來富有建設(shè)性的成果。例如，制造最快超級(jí)計(jì)算機(jī)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)讓兩個(gè)國(guó)家生產(chǎn)出了更好、更快的超級(jí)計(jì)算機(jī)。美國(guó)的超級(jí)計(jì)算機(jī)IBM Summit目前是世界冠軍，而中國(guó)的神威·太湖之光是2016年和2017年的冠軍，而且全部采用了中國(guó)自己設(shè)計(jì)的芯片。不過，科技戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)也可能使市場(chǎng)日益孤立，從而扼殺創(chuàng)新。

This competition could potentially lead to constructive outcomes. For example, the competition to create the fastest super-computer has already resulted in both countries producing better and faster super-computers – the IBM Summit, an American super-computer, is the current world champion, and China's Sunway TaihuLight, that was built entirely with indigenously designed chips, was the champion in 2016 and 2017. However, the tech war might also stifle innovation through increasingly isolated markets.

第二個(gè)長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展動(dòng)向，是美國(guó)和世界其他地方的民粹主義、孤立主義及保護(hù)主義情緒上升，這也會(huì)對(duì)國(guó)際貿(mào)易和投資產(chǎn)生重大影響。唐納德·特朗普總統(tǒng)并不是這種情緒的始作俑者，但他能極其有效地挖掘和利用它們。

The second longer term development is the growth of populist, isolationist, and protectionist sentiment in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world, which will also have significant impact on international trade and investment. President Donald Trump did not create these sentiments, but has been able to tap into and exploit them very effectively.

貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的最大問題是沒有真正的贏家。由于雙方面臨的可能選擇都減少了，因此是雙輸。兩國(guó)出口商都將受到傷害，因?yàn)樗鼈兊某隹谙陆盗耍鴥蓢?guó)進(jìn)口商的業(yè)務(wù)也會(huì)下滑。兩個(gè)國(guó)家依賴進(jìn)口商品和原材料的消費(fèi)者和生產(chǎn)者，也將不得不支付更高的價(jià)格。一場(chǎng)大貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)即使持續(xù)時(shí)間不長(zhǎng)，也深具破壞力，因?yàn)樗鼤?huì)給未來的貿(mào)易與投資決策帶來大量的不確定性。何況，如果協(xié)議能輕易被推翻，條約能隨便被撕毀，那么長(zhǎng)期協(xié)議也就毫無可信度或用處可言了。

The biggest problem with a trade war is that there are no real winners — both countries lose because the feasible choices open to each of them are reduced. Exporters in both countries will be hurt because of the reduction in their exports, while importers in both countries will see their businesses decline. Consumers and producers who rely on imported goods and inputs in both countries will have to pay higher prices. A serious trade war, however short in duration, is disruptive as it introduces a great deal of uncertainty in future trade and investment decisions. Moreover, if agreements can be easily overturned and treaties readily broken, long-term arrangements will have little credibility or usefulness.

縮小美國(guó)對(duì)華貿(mào)易逆差更好的方法，是美國(guó)增加對(duì)中國(guó)的商品和服務(wù)出口，特別是新開發(fā)的商品及服務(wù)，如食品、能源等。中國(guó)對(duì)食品和能源的需求會(huì)持續(xù)保持旺盛，并且會(huì)在很多年里呈現(xiàn)增長(zhǎng)的勢(shì)頭。這些交易將導(dǎo)致美國(guó)的GDP和就業(yè)、導(dǎo)致兩國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)福祉出現(xiàn)真正的增長(zhǎng)。

A better way to narrow the U.S. trade deficit with China would be for the U.S. to increase its exports of goods and services to China, especially newly created goods and services, such as food and energy. Chinese demand for food and energy will continue to be high and rising for many years. These transactions would lead to genuine increases in GDP and employment in the U.S. and economic well-being in both countries.

美國(guó)對(duì)華服務(wù)出口的另一個(gè)快速增長(zhǎng)點(diǎn)是教育和旅游業(yè)。中國(guó)留學(xué)生(目前共35萬人)和赴美游客的支出一直在快速增長(zhǎng)。而且，他們來到美國(guó)可以增進(jìn)中美兩國(guó)人民之間的了解，促進(jìn)長(zhǎng)期關(guān)系的改善。美國(guó)在華學(xué)生和游客也可以發(fā)揮同樣的作用。

Another fast-growing component of U.S. exports of services to China is education and tourism. The expenditures of Chinese students (currently totaling 350,000) and tourists in the U.S. have been rising rapidly. Moreover, their presence in the U.S. can enhance understanding between the Chinese and American people and improve long-term ties. U.S. students and tourists in China can also play the same role.

貿(mào)易以及文化、教育交流，有可能進(jìn)一步促進(jìn)兩國(guó)之間的經(jīng)濟(jì)依存。中國(guó)會(huì)成為美國(guó)能源、食品和教育服務(wù)出口的最大客戶，美國(guó)在這些領(lǐng)域則可能成為中國(guó)最重要的供應(yīng)商。兩國(guó)都是贏家。

Through trade and cultural and educational exchanges, it is possible to promote further economic interdependence between the two countries. China could become the largest customer of U.S. energy, food, and educational services exports and the U.S. could become China's most important supplier in these areas. Both countries can win.

貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)什么時(shí)候結(jié)束?

When Will the Trade War End?

由于貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)實(shí)乃雙輸，所以盡快結(jié)束貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)符合中美兩國(guó)的利益。然而，在美國(guó)11月6日中期選舉之前結(jié)束，這種可能性不大，因?yàn)樘乩势湛偨y(tǒng)需要能夠宣布他已經(jīng)在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中獲勝。同樣，習(xí)近平也要堅(jiān)持讓中國(guó)不屈服于美國(guó)的壓力。

Since the trade war is lose-lose, it is in the interests of both China and the U.S. to try to end it soon. However, it is not likely to end before the upcoming U.S. mid-term elections on November 6, as President Trump needs to be able to declare a victory in the trade war, and likewise, for President Xi to maintain that China has not capitulated to U.S. pressure.

中美關(guān)系中還有某些長(zhǎng)期的潛在力量在發(fā)揮作用。我們可以假設(shè)中美之間正在進(jìn)行的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，無論友好還是不友好，會(huì)長(zhǎng)期存在下去，而預(yù)測(cè)它最終會(huì)如何了結(jié)很難。大概除了美國(guó)以外，中國(guó)和世界其他國(guó)家都會(huì)繼續(xù)維護(hù)WTO框架下的現(xiàn)存多邊貿(mào)易體系，因?yàn)檫@些國(guó)家都曾經(jīng)并且將繼續(xù)從中受益。

There are also longer-term underlying forces at work in China-U.S. relations. We can assume that the ongoing competition between China and the U.S. – whether friendly or unfriendly – will persist for the long-term. It is difficult to predict how things will end up. China and the rest of the world, except possibly the U.S., will likely continue to uphold the current multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as they have all benefited and will continue to benefit from it.

盡管存在著不確定性和緊張，但進(jìn)一步加大中國(guó)和美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)上的相互依存是符合中美兩國(guó)人民利益的。

In spite of uncertainties and tension, it is in the interest of both Americans and Chinese to promote greater mutual economic interdependence between our two countries.