一名美軍預(yù)備役軍人被控為中國充當(dāng)間諜
華盛頓——美國執(zhí)法官員稱，一名來自中國的美國陸軍預(yù)備役軍人星期二被捕，他被控秘密向一名中國情報官員提供美國國防承包商雇員的信息。美國官員還表示，中國政府試圖招募他們作為線人。
The suspect, Ji Chaoqun, 27, was arrested in Chicago, where he attended graduate school before joining the Army Reserves, and charged with violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act, or FARA.
這名27歲的嫌疑人季超群(音)在芝加哥被捕。他曾在芝加哥讀研究生，后來加入了美國陸軍預(yù)備役部隊。他被控違反《外國特工登記法》(Foreign Agents Registration Act，簡稱FARA)。
Mr. Ji’s handler at a regional arm of China’s Ministry of State Security, which collects domestic and foreign intelligence, was also arrested, according to an F.B.I. affidavit. The officer, identified only as Intelligence Officer A, was arrested sometime before April. It is not clear where he was arrested or by whom.
季超群的上線在中國國家安全部一個地方分支機(jī)構(gòu)，他們搜集國內(nèi)國外情報。根據(jù)美國聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局(FBI)的一份證詞，這名上線也被捕了。這名官員只被指認(rèn)為“情報官員A”，在4月份之前被捕。目前還不清楚他是在哪里、被誰逮捕的。
An F.B.I. arrest of a Chinese intelligence officer would send a strong signal to China that American counterintelligence agents are keenly focused on its activities in the United States. Such an arrest would also be an embarrassment to Chinese intelligence, revealing sloppy tradecraft and exposing operations in the United States.
美國聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局逮捕一名中國情報官員，等于是向它發(fā)出強(qiáng)烈信號，即美國的反間諜機(jī)構(gòu)正密切關(guān)注中方在美國的活動。對中國情報機(jī)構(gòu)來說，這樣的逮捕也是一件尷尬的事，揭示出中國不佳的諜報技術(shù)，并暴露了它在美國的行動。
“By collecting this information for an arm of the Chinese government while in the United States, Ji knowingly and unlawfully acted as an agent of a foreign power,” Andrew K. McKay, an F.B.I. special agent, wrote in the affidavit.
“在美國期間，通過為中國一個政府部門收集這些信息，季在知情的情況下非法充當(dāng)了外國勢力的代理人，”聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局特工安德魯·K·麥凱(Andrew K. McKay)在證詞中寫道。
No lawyer was listed for Mr. Ji in court papers.
法庭文件中沒有列出季超群的律師。
Chinese espionage has been one of the top concerns for the Justice Department’s national security division and the F.B.I.’s counterintelligence division. The Justice Department has also cracked down on FARA violations, most prominently the convictions of Paul Manafort, President Trump’s former campaign chairman, for his work consulting for the pro-Russia former president of Ukraine.
中國的間諜活動一直是美國司法部的國家安全部門以及美國聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局反間諜部門最關(guān)心的問題之一。美國司法部也一直在打擊違反《外國特工登記法》的行為，其中最引人注目的是特朗普總統(tǒng)前競選主席保羅·馬納福特(Paul Manafort)由于為親俄羅斯的烏克蘭前總統(tǒng)提供咨詢而被定罪。
Mr. Ji, who was born in Beijing, met three Chinese intelligence officers while he was still a student in China. Using an alias, his primary handler posed as a professor, and the men said they were members of a confidential unit and made oblique references to spycraft, according to court papers.
季超群出生在北京，他在中國讀書時遇到了三名中國情報官員。法庭文件顯示，他的主要上線用化名冒充成一名教授。這些人說他們來自一個保密單位，并拐彎抹角地提到了間諜活動。
The Ministry of State Security has maintained a large network of intelligence gatherers inside and outside China. Some harvest information overtly through their positions as attachés and academics, and others secretly as spies.
中國國家安全部在國內(nèi)外維持著一個龐大的情報收集網(wǎng)絡(luò)。有些人通過他們使館隨員和學(xué)者的職位公開獲取信息，另一些人則秘密地充當(dāng)間諜。
It is unusual for the regional department of the M.S.S., Jiangsu Province Ministry of State Security, to run an operative in the United States, former officials said.
一些前官員表示，對于江蘇省國家安全廳——國家安全部的地方分支來說，在美國運作一名特工是不尋常的。
Mr. Ji arrived in the United States on a student visa in August 2013 to earn his master’s degree in electrical engineering at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago. During his time in school, he traveled to China three times and met with his M.S.S. contact. Once they met at a hotel and another time at the local State Security office.
2013年8月，季超群持學(xué)生簽證來到美國，在芝加哥的伊利諾伊理工學(xué)院(Illinois Institute of Technology)攻讀電子工程碩士學(xué)位。在學(xué)校期間，他曾三次前往中國，并與他的聯(lián)系人見面。一次，他們在酒店見面，還有一次在當(dāng)?shù)匕踩块T的辦公室見面。
Before Mr. Ji graduated in 2015, his contact asked him to buy background check data on eight naturalized American citizens who were born in Taiwan or China. They all worked in, or had recently retired from, jobs in the science and technology industry. Several specialized in the aerospace industry, and seven had worked for defense contractors, law enforcement officials said.
在季超群于2015年畢業(yè)前，他的聯(lián)系人讓他購買八名歸化美國公民的背景調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)，這八人都在臺灣或中國出生。他們都在科技行業(yè)工作，或者剛剛從這些行業(yè)退休。執(zhí)法官員說，有幾人專門從事航空航天工業(yè)，七人曾為國防承包商工作。
“They just wanted me to purchase some documents on their behalf,” Mr. Ji told the F.B.I. of his handlers, adding that they had told him that making the payments for the reports from China would be too onerous.
“他們只是想讓我代表他們?nèi)ベ徺I一些文件，”季超群將他的上線信息告訴聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局，并補(bǔ)充說，他們告訴他，從中國支付這些報告的費用太麻煩。
The F.B.I. contends that the M.S.S. was “testing Ji’s skills as a potential asset by tasking him to purchase these background check reports.”
聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局表示，中國的安全部門“讓他購買這些背景調(diào)查報告，以測試季超群作為潛在資產(chǎn)的技能”。
Mr. Ji emailed the files to his handler and called them “midterm test questions.”
季超群將這些文件通過電子郵件發(fā)給了自己的上線，并將它們命名為“期中考試題”。
He also asked an engineer to provide him with technical information from an unnamed aircraft engine supplier, a defense contractor that does aviation research for the military. He then provided the information to the Chinese government.
他還要求一名工程師向他提供一個未具名的飛機(jī)發(fā)動機(jī)供應(yīng)商的技術(shù)信息，該供應(yīng)商是一家為軍方從事航空研究的國防承包商。隨后，季超群把這些信息提供給了中國政府。
After graduating in 2015, Mr. Ji enlisted in the Army Reserves in the spring of 2016 under a program that allows immigrants to qualify for American citizenship in exchange for serving in the military.
2015年畢業(yè)后，季超群在2016年春天加入了陸軍預(yù)備役，這個項目允許移民在軍隊服役換取美國公民身份。
As part of his application, Mr. Ji lied about his contacts with Chinese intelligence officials, according to court documents.
法庭文件顯示，在申請中，季超群對自己與中國情報官員的接觸撒了謊。
The Army began discharging such recruits this year before they could qualify for citizenship, lawyers said. It has recently halted the discharges.
律師們說，陸軍今年開始在這些新兵有資格獲得公民身份之前就解除他們的軍籍。他們最近停止了這樣的做法。
