美國(guó)政要第7課
The origin of RMA
--Interview with Dr. James R. Blaker, Senior advisor to Former Vice Chairman of Joint Chief of Staffs, Gen. (Re.) William A. Owens (March 26, 1998) 訪美國(guó)參聯(lián)會(huì)前副主席歐文斯上將(退役)的高級(jí)顧問詹姆斯•布萊克博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: It’s a pleasure to have this opportunity to gain your insightful ideas on military revolution, future warfare, and the U.S. national defense development. I would like to begin our interview with the concept of RMA. I noticed that the term of military technical revolution (MTR) was used in the beginning discussion. Then came the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). What is the defining concept or the exact meaning of RMA? Why was RMA used instead of MTR?
DR. BLAKER: I think the change in terminology1 occurred for two reasons. The first reason, which was not as important, was to distinguish what the United States was trying to do from the Russians. The term “military technical revolution”, MTR, was initially coined by some Soviet military writers. I think the term emerged as early as the late 1970s.
When it began to appear in Soviet military writings, some of the Americans who followed Soviet military writings closely picked up on it. Because it started to appear in the writings of a number of different authors, largely among the lower ranking authors in the Soviet military academies-the Fruenza Academy, among others, --analysts here became interested in trying to see what was behind the apparent prominence2 of this term, “MTR”.
We initially thought the term MTR had to do with some kind of a technical change, then the Soviets thought that would have some bearing on what they called the correlation3 of forces.
So for a period in the early 1970s, we Americans spent a lot of time trying to figure out what it was that the Soviets were talking about. Our initial conclusion was that the Soviets were announcing that they had achieved some kind of a technical advantage. There was a lot of speculation about what that could be, that centered on the possibility the Soviets had a way of combining a satellite space-based surveillance4 system with a missile delivery system that would jeopardize the American ballistic missiles submarines. That, of course, would have a significant effect on the strategic military balance as it was perceived to have been at that time.
So we spent a lot of effort trying to see if that was true, if the Soviets had somehow discovered a way of tracking ballistic missile submarines, with enough precision and enough timeliness, so that they could sue some of their land based nuclear missiles to attack the U.S. ballistic missile submarine force when it was deployed.
By the late 1970s, the people inside the United States planning community had decided that that was leading the Soviets to a fascination5 with this term; that there did not exist such a reconnaissance strike system, and that in fact, what the Soviets were writing about was a series of developments that the United States began to talk about in the 1970s, particularly, the concepts and some of the technology that was associated with what ultimately became the American air/land battle concept. Bill Perry, who was the director of defense research and engineering during the Carter administration, was talking in the late 1970s about the ability to have real-time tracking capabilities sufficient to enable long-range targeting of Soviet ground forces with precision weapons. Others, notably Donn Starry at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Center6, postulated that would allow the Americans to attack the Soviet second echelon7 forces. This suggested the Americans had solved the problem caused by the fact that the balance of conventional military power in Europe lay in the Soviet’s hands. The members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, after all, had a very large active duty force strength and the ability to choose the time and place of attack. Earlier western strategy had been based on attrition8; the basic concept was to confront an attack from the east with “a wall of steel”. But that strategy had always been suspected because the attacking force might be able to achieve a local superiority sufficient to break through the West’s defensive line. Western analysts had always worried about the East’s ability to choose where to attack and then do so with a series of echelons. But , by the mid-1970s, the American military theorists were claiming they had a means of defeating the echelon attack, because they were developing the capacity to strike deep into enemy territory and disrupt the flow forward of the second and follow-on echelons.
So by the early 1980s, certainly by the mid-1980s, the United States thinking about the term “military technical revolution” evolved to the point that there was a general consensus that what the Soviets were talking about were some of the things that the Americans were doing.
But what the Americans were doing was more than just a technological development, because they were starting to say that technology could lead to a very different type of strategy. They postulated a shift in ground force operations, from one of attrition, toward maneuver.
In other words, it was an argument that technology would allow a shift away from attrition warfare toward a new way of fighting. So it was more than technology. It was technology coupled with the idea of a change in the military doctrine.
I believe Andy Marshall was one of the first people to use the term “revolution in military affairs”, or “RMA”. He did so to dismiss the idea that technology by itself could bring about a major change, and to argue that what is really required for a major change was technology wedded to a different doctrine and perhaps different military organizations in order to better carry out this doctrine.
So, certainly by the late 1980s, the term became “revolution in military affairs” and it was a term that the Americans used to signal it was a more complex phenomenon than simply developing the technology.
When the Cold War ended in the late 1980’s it turned out to be quite a shock to American military thinking. Despite the view that containment ultimately would result in a change of the Soviet Union, nobody inside the Pentagon really believed that would be the case, and instead assumed a protracted conflict that would probably last for everybody’s lifetime.
So when the Soviet Union collapsed, it was quite a shock and quite a surprise to people inside the Pentagon. Over the years we had started to believe that the Cold War would never end.
When the shock occurred there was this scramble of intellects, trying to figure out what do you do now, because we had 40 years planning against a threat that no longer existed. We had optimized our military organizations and doctrine for a threat which no longer existed. It wasn’t clear whether or not these forces were applicable to the new era.
So Andy Marshall and a number of other people began to say, well, maybe we have to change things, and maybe we really are pushed into a rapid change, a revolutionary change of military affairs, and what is such a thing. So they spent a lot of time in the early 1990s looking at what historically seemed to have been similar changes of the past.
They looked at things like the blitzkrieg9 that the Germans developed in the 1930s. they looked at Peoples’ Wars concepts10, what the Chinese were developing in the 1930s and 1940s, to see how do you go about making these sorts of changes. And the ultimate conclusion was that revolutions in military affairs, as opposed to technological developments, are massive undertakings; very difficult and very unusual, because they result in changes in the institutions. They really are revolutions in the sense that they are not contained within a technological area. And as such, the Andy Marshall view was that they usually take periods of extended time in order to occur.
Owens, who came in believing that it was necessary to make changes, ended up on the other side of his debate. He became an opponent of the conventional wisdom, particularly the conventional wisdom that said, “these are big things that take a long time to occur. Don’t push them. Let us evolve carefully.”
Owens’ contribution was the counter argument that said that, “no, they don’t take as long as you’re complaining. The claim that says that they take a very long time is simply a means of trying to hang on to something that is no longer applicable to the type of military that we could have. And we should make a leap ahead, because the Americans are on the cutting edge of the technology which will allow it.”
WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 詞匯提示
1.terminology [] n. 術(shù)語(yǔ)
2.prominence [] n.突出
3.correlation [] n.相互關(guān)系
4.surveillance [] n.監(jiān)視
5.fascination [] n.著迷
6. the US Army Training and Doctrine Center 美軍訓(xùn)練與紀(jì)律中心
7.echelon [] n.梯隊(duì)
8.attrition [] n.磨損
9.blitzkrieg [] n.閃電戰(zhàn)
10.People’s War concept 人民戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)思想
QUESTIONS AFTER LISTENING 聽后答題:
1. When did the term “military technical revolution” emerge?
A.In the late 1980’s. B.In the late 1970’s.
C.In 1985. D.In 1979.
2. Where did the term “MTR” appear initially?
A.In Soviet military writings.
B.In U.S. military writings.
C.In German military writings.
D.In Chinese military writings.
3. When did the U.S. make sure that a reconnaissance strike system did not exist in Soviet Union?
A.In 1969. B.In 1980.
C.By the late 1970’s. D.By the late 1980’s.
4. When did the American military theorists claim that they had a means of defeating the echelon attack?
A.By the mid 1980’s. B.By the mid 1970’s.
C.Andy Marshall. D.By the late 1970’s.
5. Who was the first people to use the term “RMA”?
A.Bill Perry. B.Donn Starry.
C.In early 1990’s D.William Owens.
6. When did the term “RMA” replace the term “MTR”?
A.In 1995. B.In mid 1980’s.
C.In early 1990’s D.By the late 1980’s.
7. What did it turn out to be quite a shock to American military thinking?
A.The Gulf War broke out in 1991.
B.The Cold War ended in the late 1980’s.
C.The Cold War started after World War Ⅱ.
D. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
8. What kind of things did they look at which seemed to have b3en similar changes of the past in the early 1990’s?
A.They looked at things like the blitzkrieg.
B.They looked at things like Peoples’ War concepts.
C.They looked at things like guerrilla warfare.
D.They looked at things like the blitzkrieg and Peoples’ War concepts.
9. What was Andy Marshall’s view on the RMA?
A.It would take a long time to occur.
B.It would not take a very long time to occur.
C.It would occur in few years.
D.It would occur within the technological area.
10. What was Owens’ view on the RMA?
A.It would take a long time to occur.
B.It would not take a very long time to occur.
C.It would occur in few years.
D.It would occur within the technological area.
【參考譯文】
“軍事革命”一詞的來歷
陳伯江：很高興有機(jī)會(huì)請(qǐng)您談?wù)勀鷮?duì)軍事革命、未來戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和美國(guó)國(guó)防發(fā)展的看法．我注意到在開始進(jìn)行軍事革命討論時(shí)，使用的是軍事技術(shù)革命一詞，后來變?yōu)檐娛赂锩?qǐng)您首先介紹一下軍事革命討論的背景和發(fā)展過程。
布萊克：我認(rèn)為術(shù)語(yǔ)的變化有兩個(gè)原因。第一個(gè)原因不怎么重要，就是為了使美國(guó)的說法與蘇聯(lián)人的有所區(qū)別。“軍事技術(shù)革命”一詞最初是由蘇聯(lián)的軍事學(xué)者提出來的，我想它最早出現(xiàn)時(shí)，便引起了一些跟蹤研究蘇聯(lián)軍事情況的美國(guó)人的注意。因?yàn)樗_始出現(xiàn)在許多不同作者的文章中，大多數(shù)作者是弗隆恩扎軍事學(xué)院的級(jí)別較低的軍官。美國(guó)的分析家們對(duì)這個(gè)詞突然熱門的原因很感興趣。
我們最初認(rèn)為“軍事技術(shù)革命”一詞與某種技術(shù)上的變革有關(guān)。而蘇聯(lián)人認(rèn)為這種變革將會(huì)影響各種力量之間的相互關(guān)系。
因此，在70年代的一段時(shí)間里，我們美國(guó)人花費(fèi)了大量時(shí)間試圖弄清什么是蘇聯(lián)人所說的軍事技術(shù)革命。我們最初的結(jié)論是，蘇聯(lián)將要宣布他們已經(jīng)取得某種技術(shù)上的優(yōu)勢(shì)。當(dāng)時(shí)有許許多多有關(guān)這種優(yōu)勢(shì)可能是什么推測(cè)。主要的推測(cè)集中在認(rèn)為蘇聯(lián)可能發(fā)明了把空間衛(wèi)星偵察系統(tǒng)與導(dǎo)彈發(fā)射系統(tǒng)結(jié)合起來的辦法，這將會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)的彈道導(dǎo)彈潛艇帶來嚴(yán)重危害。當(dāng)然，這也將對(duì)那時(shí)的戰(zhàn)略軍事平衡帶來重大影響。于是，我們以大量精力進(jìn)行研究，以求發(fā)現(xiàn)情況是否真的如此，蘇聯(lián)是否已經(jīng)找到能非常精確而又及時(shí)地跟蹤彈道導(dǎo)彈潛艇的方法。則他們就可能使用陸基核導(dǎo)彈攻擊美國(guó)已部署的彈道潛艇力量。
特別值得注意的是，某些概念和技術(shù)與后來美提出的“空地一體戰(zhàn)”思想密切相關(guān)。后來成為美國(guó)國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)的威謙•佩里，曾在前70年代未卡特政府時(shí)期擔(dān)任防務(wù)研究與工程計(jì)劃主任，他當(dāng)時(shí)就談到過那種可使精確武器遠(yuǎn)距離攻擊蘇聯(lián)地面部隊(duì)成為可能的實(shí)時(shí)跟蹤能力。其他人，如美國(guó)陸軍訓(xùn)練與紀(jì)律中心的唐•斯塔里上將當(dāng)時(shí)也曾推測(cè)，這將使美國(guó)能夠攻擊蘇軍第二梯隊(duì)。這說明美國(guó)已經(jīng)解決了歐洲常規(guī)軍事力量對(duì)比中蘇聯(lián)人掌握了主動(dòng)權(quán)所引起的問題。當(dāng)時(shí)的華沙條約組織國(guó)家畢竟擁有非常強(qiáng)大的現(xiàn)役部隊(duì)以及選擇發(fā)起攻擊時(shí)間和地點(diǎn)的能力。在那之前，西方的戰(zhàn)略一直以消耗戰(zhàn)為基礎(chǔ)，基本的思想是以“鋼鐵之墻”擋住東方的進(jìn)攻。但這一戰(zhàn)略始終令人懷疑，因?yàn)檫M(jìn)攻一方完全有可能獲得局部?jī)?yōu)勢(shì)，從而突破西文的防線。對(duì)東方擁有進(jìn)攻地點(diǎn)的選擇權(quán)，并能隨后從一連串的梯隊(duì)發(fā)起進(jìn)攻的能力，西文分析家始終憂心忡忡。但到70年代中期，美國(guó)的軍事理論家宣稱他們有了擊敗梯隊(duì)式進(jìn)攻的方法，因?yàn)樗麄儼l(fā)展了能夠攻擊敵方領(lǐng)土縱深并阻擋敵第二及其后續(xù)梯隊(duì)前進(jìn)的能力。
所以到80年代初期，確切地說是到80年代中，美國(guó)對(duì)“軍事技術(shù)革命”這一術(shù)語(yǔ)有了基本一致的看法，即蘇聯(lián)人所談?wù)摰挠嘘P(guān)“軍事技術(shù)革命”的那些東西，實(shí)際上正是美國(guó)人所在做的。
但是，美國(guó)所正在做的卻遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了技術(shù)上的發(fā)展，因?yàn)樗麄円验_始意識(shí)到技術(shù)的發(fā)展將有可能導(dǎo)致極不相同的戰(zhàn)略。他們提出了在地面作戰(zhàn)中由消耗戰(zhàn)向機(jī)動(dòng)戰(zhàn)轉(zhuǎn)變的設(shè)想。
換句話說，它強(qiáng)調(diào)了技術(shù)將引起一場(chǎng)由消耗戰(zhàn)向新的作戰(zhàn)方式的轉(zhuǎn)變。這場(chǎng)變革遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了技術(shù)的范圍，它是技術(shù)與軍事理論變革的緊密結(jié)合。
我認(rèn)為安德魯•馬歇爾是最早使用軍事革命術(shù)語(yǔ)的人。他用“軍事革命”一詞代替“軍事技術(shù)革命”的目的，是要摒棄技術(shù)本身就能帶來重大變化的思想，強(qiáng)調(diào)重大的變革所要求的，是技術(shù)與新作戰(zhàn)理論以及為了實(shí)踐這一理論而產(chǎn)生的新軍事編制的結(jié)合。
因此，到90年代初，“軍事技術(shù)革命”一詞變成了“軍事革命”。美國(guó)人用“軍事革命”這個(gè)詞來表明軍事革命是一個(gè)比僅僅發(fā)展技術(shù)要復(fù)雜得多的概念。
80年代未冷戰(zhàn)的結(jié)束，給美國(guó)的軍事思想界帶來了相當(dāng)大的震動(dòng)。盡管人們說遏制政策最終會(huì)使蘇聯(lián)發(fā)生變化，但五角大樓沒有人相信情況真會(huì)如此，相反，人們認(rèn)為冷戰(zhàn)是一場(chǎng)長(zhǎng)期沖突，在每個(gè)人的有生之年都將持續(xù)進(jìn)行下去。
所以在蘇聯(lián)垮臺(tái)之時(shí)，五角大樓的人們感到相當(dāng)震驚。多少年來，我們都認(rèn)為冷戰(zhàn)絕無(wú)盡頭。
在震驚之余，思想界的一些人急忙開始尋求現(xiàn)在怎么辦的答案。因?yàn)槲覀?0年來一直計(jì)劃對(duì)付的威脅不復(fù)存在了。我們已經(jīng)發(fā)展完善起來的軍隊(duì)編成和軍事理論所要對(duì)付的威脅不復(fù)存在了。這些軍隊(duì)是否適合于新的時(shí)代當(dāng)時(shí)還不清楚。因此，安德魯•馬歇爾和其它一些人率先提出，我們可能必須進(jìn)行變革，并且我們可能真的被推進(jìn)到一場(chǎng)快速的變革之中，一場(chǎng)軍事領(lǐng)域里的革命性變化。所以，他們?cè)?0年代初花了大量的時(shí)間，從歷史上考察過去是否發(fā)生過類似的變化。
他們考察了３０年代德國(guó)人發(fā)明的閃擊戰(zhàn)；他們還考察了中國(guó)人在30至40年代發(fā)展的人民戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)思想，以求了解他們?nèi)绾芜M(jìn)行這類變革。最后提出的結(jié)論是，與技術(shù)上的發(fā)展所不同的是，軍事革命是規(guī)模宏大的深刻變化；非常困難而又極不尋常，因?yàn)樗鼈儗?dǎo)致體制上的變化。它們之所以稱得上是革命，在于它們的影響是無(wú)法限制在技術(shù)領(lǐng)域之內(nèi)的。有鑒于此，安德魯•馬歇爾認(rèn)為，軍事革命的發(fā)生通常需要經(jīng)歷較長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間。
參聯(lián)會(huì)副主席歐文斯上將一開始相信進(jìn)行變革是必要的，但后來成了普遍看法的對(duì)立派。他尤其反對(duì)這樣的普遍看法；“軍事革命是需要很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間才能完成的大事，不要急于求成，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)小心謹(jǐn)慎地前進(jìn)。”
歐文斯的貢獻(xiàn)在于他提出了相反看法。他指出：“不，軍事革命并不需要你們所說的那么長(zhǎng)時(shí)間。那種認(rèn)為軍事革命需要很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間才能完成的說法，只不過是想要堅(jiān)持老一套的做法而已。而老一套做法已不再與我們能夠擁有的新型軍隊(duì)相適應(yīng)。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)大步向前躍進(jìn)，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)擁有允許向前躍進(jìn)的先進(jìn)技術(shù)。”
KEYS TO THE QUESTIONS 參考答案：
1.b 2.a 3.c 4.b 5.c 6.c 7.b 8.d 9.a 10.b
