關(guān)注成本，不要貪小便宜吃大虧

關(guān)注成本，不要貪小便宜吃大虧

Small differences in the rate at which you compound your money can dramatically influence the ultimate amount of wealth you acquire.

你在整合錢的比率上的細(xì)微差別會使你最終積攢的財富產(chǎn)生巨大差異。

Consider that an extra 3% return annually can result in 3x as much money over 50 years! The power of compound interest is truly astounding.

想想每年額外3%的回報率會使你的錢在50年內(nèi)翻三倍!復(fù)利的強大真是令人驚嘆。

The safest way to try and grab an extra few percentage points of return, as in the case of any good business, is cost control.

就所有良好商業(yè)模式而言，嘗試并把握住一點兒額外百分比的回報率最安全的方法就是控制成本。

If you are enrolled in a dividend reinvestment program or DRIP that charges $2 for each investment and you are putting away $50 per month, your costs are immediately eating 4% of your principal. This can make sense in certain circumstances.

如果你參與一項股息再投資計劃(或簡稱DRIP)，每次投資收費$2，你每月要支付$50，你的成本就是資本中馬上減少的4%，在某些情況下這樣做可行。

For example, my family gifted my younger sister shares of Coca-Cola stock over the years through a special type of account known as a UTMA and it served its purpose beautifully.

比如我家人前幾年通過一個被稱為UTMA的特殊類型的賬戶贈送給我妹妹可口可樂的股票，并且收益可觀。

It is also true that, given her life expectancy, that initial 4% cost, which was inconsequential in terms of actual dollars in the grand scheme of things, will end up being cheaper than the mutual fund expense ratio on a low-cost index fund over the coming decades because it was a one-time, upfront expense, never to be repeated.

而且考慮到她的壽命，最初4%的成本相對于這個長期計劃中所得收益已經(jīng)微不足道了，在未來幾十年最終將低于低成本指數(shù)基金中共同基金費用比率，因為那個成本只是一次性的前期費用，不會再出現(xiàn)。

The problem is that many investors don't know which expenses are reasonable and which expenses should be avoided.

問題在于許多投資者不知道哪些花銷是合理的，哪些應(yīng)該避免。

Adding to this problem is that there is a huge divide between the wealthy and the lower and middle classes that cause something that is a waste of money at one level to be a fantastic bargain at another.

更麻煩的是，導(dǎo)致在富人階層和較低階層及中產(chǎn)階級之間產(chǎn)生巨大差異的是，在一個階層看來是浪費錢的投資可能對另外一個階層來說就是妥妥的賺到了。

For example, it will often make sense for someone earning $50,000 a year without a large portfolio to forgo an investment advisor altogether, unless there are some behavioral advantages that lead to better outcomes or the convenience is simply worth it, as it is to many people, instead opting for a handful of well-selected, low-cost index funds.

比如，一個沒有大型證券投資組合，一年就能賺到$50,000的人，完全放棄投資顧問還能說得通，除非他有什么行為優(yōu)勢能讓他賺到更多的錢或者個人收益值得那樣做，否則許多人都會選擇一些精選出來的低成本指數(shù)基金。

This is true despite the severe methodology flaws that have been quietly introduced into things like S&P 500 index funds in recent decades.

事實就是如此，盡管近些年嚴(yán)重的方法論缺陷被悄悄引入了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)基金等投資組合。

(There is this illusion, often held by inexperienced investors, that the S&P 500 is passively managed. It is not. It is actively managed by a committee, only the committee has arranged the rules in a way that seeks to minimize turnover.)

(經(jīng)驗不足的投資者常有一種誤解，認(rèn)為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500是被動式管理。其實不是。它其實被一個委員會管理，只是這個委員會制定了促使交易量最小化的規(guī)則。)

This same approach is often idiotic for someone who is rich.

對有錢人來說，類似的方法通常顯得很蠢。

As people like John Bogle, founder of Vanguard, have pointed out, wealthy investors with a lot of taxable assets who wanted to take an indexing approach would be better off buying the individual stocks, reconstructing the index themselves in a custody account.

Vanguard 的創(chuàng)始人John Bogle等人已經(jīng)指出，有大量應(yīng)稅資產(chǎn)的有錢的投資者如果想采用指數(shù)方法，那么買入個股，在一個托管賬戶中自己重新設(shè)定指數(shù)，收益會更高。

A wealthy investor can often end up with more cash in his or her pocket, all things considered, paying between 0.25% and 0.75% for a directly owned passive portfolio than he or she would hold an index fund that appears to have a much lower expense ratio of, say, 0.05%.

從各方面考慮，一個有錢的投資者，為直接持有的被動投資組合支付0.25% -0.75%的費用比率通常會比持有貌似費用比率更低，比如說0.05%的指數(shù)基金最終賺得更多。

The rich are not dumb. They know this.

有錢人也不笨，他們都懂。

It's the non-rich constantly talking about it that are displaying their ignorance of things like the way tax strategies can be employed.

反倒是總在討論這個的沒錢人才暴露了他們對可以的采用的稅收策略等方式的無知。

One important note:

重要提示：

History has shown that it is generally not a good idea to sell because of your expectations for macroeconomic conditions, such as the national unemployment rate or the government's budget deficit, or because you expect the stock market to decline in the short-term. Analyzing businesses and calculating their intrinsic value is relatively simple.

歷史表明，基于對宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)因素的預(yù)期就售出通常不是明智之選，比如國家失業(yè)率或者政府的預(yù)算赤字，或者因為你預(yù)計股票市場短期內(nèi)會下跌。分析企業(yè)并計算他們的隱含價值才是相對簡單之舉。

You have no chance of accurately predicting with any consistency the buy and sell decisions of millions of other investors with different financial situations and analytical abilities.

你并不能對數(shù)百萬其他投資者任何買進(jìn)和賣出的決定做出準(zhǔn)確的一致性預(yù)測，他們有著不同的財務(wù)狀況和分析能力。

To learn more about this topic, read What Is Market Timing? and Market Timing, Valuation, and Systematic Purchases.

想要了解更多關(guān)于本話題的內(nèi)容，可以讀一下《什么是市場時機(jī)?》、《估值》和《系統(tǒng)購買》。