TED演講：我們對慈善的理解大錯特錯

　　I want to talk about social innovation and social entrepreneurship. I happen to have triplets. They're little. They're five years old. Sometimes I tell people I have triplets. They say, "Really? How many?" Here's a picture of the kids. That's Sage and Annalisa and Rider. Now, I also happen to be gay. Being gay and fathering triplets is by far the most socially innovative, socially entrepreneurial thing I have ever done.

　　我想跟大家聊聊“社會公益創(chuàng)新”(social innovation) 和“社會公益事業(yè)”(social entrepreneurship)。 我有三個孩子，他們是三胞胎。 他們現(xiàn)在5歲，還很小。 當(dāng)我告訴人們我有三胞胎的時候 他們說，“真的，多少個?” 這是這些小家伙的照片 分別叫Sage、Annalisa和Rider 現(xiàn)在，我也是一個同性戀。 身為一個同性戀父親養(yǎng)育三胞胎孩子 是我目前做過的最具有社會創(chuàng)新、最具有 社會事業(yè)精神的事情。

　　(Laughter) (Applause)

　　(笑聲)(掌聲)

　　The real social innovation I want to talk about involves charity. I want to talk about how the things we've been taught to think about giving and about charity and about the nonprofit sector are actually undermining the causes we love and our profound yearning to change the world.

　　我真正想要說的社會創(chuàng)新 是關(guān)于慈善事業(yè)的。 我要說的是我們一直以來被灌輸?shù)挠嘘P(guān)慈善、 奉獻(xiàn)和非營利部門的概念 正在破壞我們熱愛的 慈善事業(yè)的根基，而我們強(qiáng)烈的 呼吁各位改變這樣的現(xiàn)狀。

　　But before I do that, I want to ask if we even believe that the nonprofit sector has any serious role to play in changing the world. A lot of people say now that business will lift up the developing economies, and social business will take care of the rest. And I do believe that business will move the great mass of humanity forward. But it always leaves behind that 10 percent or more that is most disadvantaged or unlucky. And social business needs markets, and there are some issues for which you just can't develop the kind of money measures that you need for a market.

　　但是在我開始之前，我想要問問大家， 是否真的相信非營利組織是改變世界的 重要力量。 很多人都說營利性部門負(fù)責(zé)促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展， 而社會公益將會搞定剩下的事情。 我相信商業(yè)活動能夠極大的 促進(jìn)人類的進(jìn)步。 但是總是會有百分之十或更多的人 無法從中獲益。 社會事業(yè)也需要一個市場， 當(dāng)你需要的東西無法用金錢來衡量的時候， 創(chuàng)建這樣的市場有一些問題需要處理。

　　I sit on the board of a center for the developmentally disabled, and these people want laughter and compassion and they want love. How do you monetize that? And that's where the nonprofit sector and philanthropy come in. Philanthropy is the market for love. It is the market for all those people for whom there is no other market coming. And so if we really want, like Buckminster Fuller said, a world that works for everyone, with no one and nothing left out, then the nonprofit sector has to be a serious part of the conversation.

　　我曾經(jīng)在一個發(fā)展障礙關(guān)懷中心呆過 那里的人想要獲得的是 快樂、熱情和愛。 這些如何貨幣化? 這就是非營利組織和慈善機(jī)構(gòu)的 作用所在。 慈善為關(guān)愛提供了市場。 這個市場是為那些不被其它任何市場 接受的人準(zhǔn)備的。 如果我們真的想要做到巴克明斯特·富勒說的那樣， 不拋棄不放棄任何一個人， 那么非營利組織 就必須在社會中承擔(dān)起 一個舉足輕重的角色。

　　But it doesn't seem to be working. Why have our breast cancer charities not come close to finding a cure for breast cancer, or our homeless charities not come close to ending homelessness in any major city? Why has poverty remained stuck at 12 percent of the U.S. population for 40 years?

　　但是好像不是這樣子的。 為什么我們的乳腺癌慈善組織 無法找到治療乳腺癌的醫(yī)療方法? 為什么關(guān)心無家可歸者的慈善機(jī)構(gòu) 至今沒有在任何一個大城市做到居者有其屋? 為什么在過去四十年中美國貧困率 始終不低于總?cè)丝诘?2%?

　　And the answer is, these social problems are massive in scale, our organizations are tiny up against them, and we have a belief system that keeps them tiny. We have two rulebooks. We have one for the nonprofit sector and one for the rest of the economic world. It's an apartheid, and it discriminates against the [nonprofit] sector in five different areas, the first being compensation.

　　答案是，這些社會問題 都太大了， 公益組織相比起來太渺小了， 而我們的某些信念壓制了這些組織的壯大。 我們有兩套不同的游戲規(guī)則， 一套是限定非營利組織的， 另一套是限定營利性組織的。 這是“種族隔離”， 在五個方面歧視非營利組織， 首當(dāng)其沖的就是人員薪酬。

　　So in the for-profit sector, the more value you produce, the more money you can make. But we don't like nonprofits to use money to incentivize people to produce more in social service. We have a visceral reaction to the idea that anyone would make very much money helping other people. Interesting that we don't have a visceral reaction to the notion that people would make a lot of money not helping other people. You know, you want to make 50 million dollars selling violent video games to kids, go for it. We'll put you on the cover of Wired magazine. But you want to make half a million dollars trying to cure kids of malaria, and you're considered a parasite yourself. (Applause)

　　在營利性部門，你的產(chǎn)出越多， 你的收入就越多。 但是在非營利部門，我們不喜歡 用高報(bào)酬來激勵社會服務(wù)人員提高產(chǎn)出。 我們對于那些在幫助他人的過程中 為自己賺錢的行為有種本能的厭惡。 有意思的是我們對那些在賺錢的過程中 沒有幫助他人的人卻沒有這樣的厭惡。 比如，你想通過向孩子們兜售暴力游戲 來賺5千萬美元，沒問題， 我們會讓你上《連線》雜志封面。 但是如果你想通過為得了瘧疾的孩子們 提供醫(yī)療服務(wù)，并只想賺50萬美元時， 你會被人看成是貪婪的吸血鬼。(掌聲

　　And we think of this as our system of ethics, but what we don't realize is that this system has a powerful side effect, which is, it gives a really stark, mutually exclusive choice between doing very well for yourself and your family or doing good for the world to the brightest minds coming out of our best universities, and sends tens of thousands of people who could make a huge difference in the nonprofit sector marching every year directly into the for-profit sector because they're not willing to make that kind of lifelong economic sacrifice.

　　但是在我開始之前，我想要問問大家， 是否真的相信非營利組織是改變世界的 重要力量。 很多人都說營利性部門負(fù)責(zé)促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展， 而社會公益將會搞定剩下的事情。 我相信商業(yè)活動能夠極大的 促進(jìn)人類的進(jìn)步。 但是總是會有百分之十或更多的人 無法從中獲益。 社會事業(yè)也需要一個市場， 當(dāng)你需要的東西無法用金錢來衡量的時候， 創(chuàng)建這樣的市場有一些問題需要處理。

　　Businessweek did a survey, looked at the compensation packages for MBAs 10 years of business school, and the median compensation for a Stanford MBA, with bonus, at the age of 38, was 400,000 dollars. Meanwhile, for the same year, the average salary for the CEO of a $5 million-plus medical charity in the U.S. was 232,000 dollars, and for a hunger charity, 84,000 dollars. Now, there's no way you're going to get a lot of people with $400,000 talent to make a $316,000 sacrifice every year to become the CEO of a hunger charity.

　　《商業(yè)周刊》做過一個調(diào)查，他們調(diào)查了 商學(xué)院MBA畢業(yè)生十年來的收入水平。 其中斯坦福大學(xué)MBA的畢業(yè)生，在38歲時， 各種福利薪資加起來，平均能拿到40萬美元。 與此同時，美國規(guī)模在5百萬美元以上的 醫(yī)療慈善團(tuán)體的CEO平均薪酬只有23.2萬美元， 食品援助團(tuán)體的CEO更少，只有8.4萬美元。 你看，你根本沒有辦法讓那些能夠拿到 40萬美金的人才，放棄31.6萬美金的收入， 去一個食品援助團(tuán)體做CEO。

　　Some people say, "Well, that's just because those MBA types are greedy." Not necessarily. They might be smart. It's cheaper for that person to donate 100,000 dollars every year to the hunger charity, save 50,000 dollars on their taxes, so still be roughly 270,000 dollars a year ahead of the game, now be called a philanthropist because they donated 100,000 dollars to charity, probably sit on the board of the hunger charity, indeed, probably supervise the poor SOB who decided to become the CEO of the hunger charity, and have a lifetime of this kind of power and influence and popular praise still ahead of them.

　　有人會說，“那是因?yàn)镸BA畢業(yè)生都很貪婪。” 這不一定，可能是因?yàn)樗麄兏斆?對他們來說每年捐出去10萬美元 給食品援助團(tuán)體， 能省下來5萬美元的個人稅， 他們的收入還多出來將近27萬美元， 而且由于他們向慈善團(tuán)體捐贈了10萬美元的善款， 他們成了慈善家， 而且有可能坐進(jìn)食品援助團(tuán)體的董事會， 有可能監(jiān)管著當(dāng)初決定成為 食品援助團(tuán)體CEO的可憐的倒霉蛋， 并且在余生中他們的權(quán)力、影響力和社會贊許程度 都始終高于慈善團(tuán)體的CEO。

　　The second area of discrimination is advertising and marketing. So we tell the for-profit sector, "Spend, spend, spend on advertising until the last dollar no longer produces a penny of value." But we don't like to see our donations spent on advertising in charity. Our attitude is, "Well, look, if you can get the advertising donated, you know, at four o'clock in the morning, I'm okay with that. But I don't want my donations spent on advertising. I want it go to the needy." As if the money invested in advertising could not bring in dramatically greater sums of money to serve the needy.

　　第二個歧視的地方是廣告和營銷手段。 我們認(rèn)為營利性部門砸錢營銷是必然的，“砸錢，砸錢， 直到廣告投入無法讓你轉(zhuǎn)到更多的錢為止。” 但是我們不希望看到我們捐贈給慈善團(tuán)體的錢被用在廣告上。 我們的態(tài)度是，“如果你們能夠拿到電視臺捐贈的廣告時間， 比如，凌晨四點(diǎn)沒人看的時間段，我沒意見。 但是我不希望我的錢拿去買廣告時間。 我希望我的錢用在需要的人身上。” 他們覺得投入在廣告中的錢 不能夠帶來更多的善款去幫助 需要它們的人。

　　In the 1990s, my company created the long distance AIDSRide bicycle journeys and the 60-mile-long breast cancer three-day walks, and over the course of nine years, we had 182,000 ordinary heroes participate, and they raised a total of 581 million dollars. They raised more money more quickly for these causes than any events in history, all based on the idea that people are weary of being asked to do the least they can possibly do.

　　在1990年代，我的企業(yè)發(fā)起了 長距離“AIDS騎行”自行車騎行活動 和為乳腺癌籌款的60公里三日行走活動， 經(jīng)過這九年的努力， 有18.2萬平民英雄參與進(jìn)來， 共募集到了5.81億美元善款。 這是歷史上為艾滋病和乳腺癌籌款的 最快記錄。 這一切基于的觀點(diǎn)就是 人們已經(jīng)厭倦被動的去做力所能及的慈善。

　　People are yearning to measure the full distance of their potential on behalf of the causes that they care about deeply. But they have to be asked. We got that many people to participate by buying full-page ads in The New York Times, in The Boston Globe, in primetime radio and TV advertising. Do you know how many people we would have gotten if we put up flyers in the laundromat?

　　在自己深深關(guān)心的問題上， 人們總是會投入 自己所有力所能及的所有資源。 但是你要提出要求。 我們通過在《紐約時報(bào)》、《波士頓全球》上打廣告， 通過在電臺和電視臺的黃金時段打廣告 吸引到了如此多的朋友。 如果我們只是在洗衣店附近發(fā)發(fā)傳單， 你覺得還會有這么多人參與么?

　　Charitable giving has remained stuck, in the U.S., at two percent of GDP ever since we started measuring it in the 1970s. That's an important fact, because it tells us that in 40 years, the nonprofit sector has not been able to wrestle any market share away from the for-profit sector. And if you think about it, how could one sector possibly take market share away from another sector if it isn't really allowed to market?

　　美國的慈善捐贈數(shù)額一直固定在GDP的2%附近， 從我們開始統(tǒng)計(jì)的1970年代開始便是如此。 這是一個很重要的事實(shí)， 這告訴我們在過去40年中， 非營利部門沒能從營利性部門那里 搶到任何市場份額。 但是你反過來想想 一個不允許進(jìn)行市場營銷的非營利部門怎么可能 從營利性部門搶奪到市場?

　　And if we tell the consumer brands, "You may advertise all the benefits of your product," but we tell charities, "You cannot advertise all the good that you do," where do we think the consumer dollars are going to flow?

　　如果我們對消費(fèi)品牌的態(tài)度是， “你可以把產(chǎn)品的所有優(yōu)點(diǎn)都廣告出來”， 但是我們告訴慈善組織，“你不能為你所做的任何好事打廣告，” 你覺得消費(fèi)者的錢會流向哪里?

　　The third area of discrimination is the taking of risk in pursuit of new ideas for generating revenue. So Disney can make a new $200 million movie that flops, and nobody calls the attorney general. But you do a little $1 million community fundraiser for the poor, and it doesn't produce a 75 percent profit to the cause in the first 12 months, and your character is called into question.

　　第三個歧視的地方是通過新方式 募集資金的風(fēng)險問題。 迪斯尼能夠砸2億美元拍電影，打了水漂的話 也不會有人打電話給司法部長。 但是如果你是一個救濟(jì)組織的籌款人， 籌集了不到一百萬美元，而你在頭12個月中 沒有將善款的75%發(fā)到救濟(jì)人手中， 你的人品就會受到質(zhì)疑。

　　So nonprofits are really reluctant to attempt any brave, daring, giant-scale new fundraising endeavors for fear that if the thing fails, their reputations will be dragged through the mud. Well, you and I know when you prohibit failure, you kill innovation. If you kill innovation in fundraising, you can't raise more revenue. If you can't raise more revenue, you can't grow. And if you can't grow, you can't possibly solve large social problems.

　　所以非營利組織非常不情愿嘗試任何冒險的、 大規(guī)模的籌款行動， 他們擔(dān)心一旦失敗了， 他們的聲譽(yù)也會隨之一敗涂地。 我們都知道，不允許失敗 等于扼殺創(chuàng)新。 如果你扼殺了籌款創(chuàng)新，你就沒有辦法獲得更多的收入。 如果你不能獲得更多收入，你的組織就無法壯大。 如果你的組織無法壯大，你就無法解決社會面臨的那些大問題。

　　The fourth area is time. So Amazon went for six years without returning any profit to investors, and people had patience. They knew that there was a long-term objective down the line of building market dominance. But if a nonprofit organization ever had a dream of building magnificent scale that required that for six years, no money was going to go to the needy, it was all going to be invested in building this scale, we would expect a crucifixion.

　　第四個歧視的地方就是時間。 亞馬遜可以在六年時間中不給股東分紅， 而股東們都有這個耐心。 他們知道亞馬遜目標(biāo)很大， 它要花時間占領(lǐng)市場。 但是如果一個非營利組織 想要籌劃一個時間長達(dá)六年的籌款活動， 在此期間募集的錢沒有分給受捐贈人， 而是用來擴(kuò)大籌款規(guī)模， 他們肯定會被釘死在十字架上。

　　And the last area is profit itself. So the for-profit sector can pay people profits in order to attract their capital for their new ideas, but you can't pay profits in a nonprofit sector, so the for-profit sector has a lock on the multi-trillion-dollar capital markets, and the nonprofit sector is starved for growth and risk and idea capital.

　　最后一個領(lǐng)域就是利潤本身。 營利性部門可以通過向股東分紅來吸引投資者， 支持實(shí)現(xiàn)自己的新想法， 但是在非營利部門你不能分紅， 所以營利性部門獨(dú)占了規(guī)模龐大的資本市場， 而非營利部門就只能艱難中求生存， 渴望資本的投入。

　　Well, you put those five things together -- you can't use money to lure talent away from the for-profit sector, you can't advertise on anywhere near the scale the for-profit sector does for new customers, you can't take the kinds of risks in pursuit of those customers that the for-profit sector takes, you don't have the same amount of time to find them as the for-profit sector, and you don't have a stock market with which to fund any of this, even if you could do it in the first place, and you've just put the nonprofit sector at an extreme disadvantage to the for-profit sector on every level.

　　第三個歧視的地方是通過新方式 募集資金的風(fēng)險問題。 迪斯尼能夠砸2億美元拍電影，打了水漂的話 也不會有人打電話給司法部長。 但是如果你是一個救濟(jì)組織的籌款人， 籌集了不到一百萬美元，而你在頭12個月中 沒有將善款的75%發(fā)到救濟(jì)人手中， 你的人品就會受到質(zhì)疑。

　　If we have any doubts about the effects of this separate rule book, this statistic is sobering: From 1970 to 2009, the number of nonprofits that really grew, that crossed the $50 million annual revenue barrier, is 144. In the same time, the number of for-profits that crossed it is 46,136. So we're dealing with social problems that are massive in scale, and our organizations can't generate any scale. All of the scale goes to Coca-Cola and Burger King.

　　如果我們對這兩套游戲規(guī)則帶來的問題持懷疑態(tài)度， 下面的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)字會讓你震驚： 從1970年到2009年， 規(guī)模壯大的非營利組織數(shù)量， 超過5千萬美元門檻的， 只有144家。 與此同時，營利性機(jī)構(gòu)的數(shù)量 是46136家。 現(xiàn)狀是我們需要處理的社會問題規(guī)模非常龐大， 而我們的組織卻沒有辦法壯大到那樣的規(guī)模。 只有像可口可樂公司或漢堡王連鎖可以達(dá)到那樣的規(guī)模。

　　So why do we think this way? Well, like most fanatical dogma in America, these ideas come from old Puritan beliefs. The Puritans came here for religious reasons, or so they said, but they also came here because they wanted to make a lot of money. They were pious people but they were also really aggressive capitalists, and they were accused of extreme forms of profit-making tendencies compared to the other colonists.

　　那么我們的這些觀念是怎么來的? 跟美國的許多狂熱信條一樣， 這些觀念都來自于以前的清教徒。 清教徒由于宗教原因來到美洲，他們這么說的， 但是他們來這里也是為了賺錢。 他們是虔誠的人，但是也賺起錢來 也非常的不擇手段， 而相比其他的殖民者他們的賺錢方式更加激進(jìn)， 也因此受到了很多譴責(zé)。

　　But at the same time, the Puritans were Calvinists, so they were taught literally to hate themselves. They were taught that self-interest was a raging sea that was a sure path to eternal damnation. Well, this created a real problem for these people, right? Here they've come all the way across the Atlantic to make all this money. Making all this money will get you sent directly to Hell. What were they to do about this?

　　但是與此同時，這些清教徒也信奉加爾文教派， 這個教派的觀念讓他們也厭惡自己。 他們被告知自私自利只會讓自己 墮入地域，永不得救。 這給這些人出了一個大難題，對吧? 他們漂過大西洋來到這里就是為了賺錢， 賺錢讓你坐上下地獄的直通車。 他們該怎么辦?

　　Well, charity became their answer. It became this economic sanctuary where they could do penance for their profit-making tendencies at five cents on the dollar. So of course, how could you make money in charity if charity was your penance for making money? Financial incentive was exiled from the realm of helping others so that it could thrive in the area of making money for yourself, and in 400 years, nothing has intervened to say, "That's counterproductive and that's unfair."

　　慈善事業(yè)成了答案。 他們每追逐到1美元的利潤， 就捐出5美分作為救贖的手段，慈善成了一個 經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)惠的避難所。 理所當(dāng)然的，用來化解賺錢帶來的罪惡的組織， 怎么能又自己跑去賺錢呢? 經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激被排除在慈善助人事業(yè)之外， 這樣他們就可以放心大膽的去賺錢了。 400年來，沒有人質(zhì)疑這一點(diǎn)， 站出來說，“這不公平，也不科學(xué)。

　　Now this ideology gets policed by this one very dangerous question, which is, "What percentage of my donation goes to the cause versus overhead?" There are a lot of problems with this question. I'm going to just focus on two. First, it makes us think that overhead is a negative, that it is somehow not part of the cause. But it absolutely is, especially if it's being used for growth. Now, this idea that overhead is somehow an enemy of the cause creates this second, much larger problem, which is, it forces organizations to go without the overhead things they really need to grow in the interest of keeping overhead low.

　　這種觀念引出來一個很危險的問題， 就是：“我的善款有多大比例給了受捐贈人，多大比例成了管理費(fèi)?” 這帶來了很多問題。 我就挑其中兩個說。 第一，這讓我們覺得管理費(fèi)是很不好的東西， 對受捐贈人沒有任何好處。 恰恰相反，尤其是這些費(fèi)用被用來擴(kuò)大籌款規(guī)模時。 而“管理費(fèi)是慈善事業(yè)的敵人” 這種觀念 引發(fā)了第二個，也是更大的問題， 就是這種觀念迫使非營利組織放棄自己 真正應(yīng)該處理的大問題， 而把精力放在控制管理費(fèi)上。

　　So we've all been taught that charities should spend as little as possible on overhead things like fundraising under the theory that, well, the less money you spend on fundraising, the more money there is available for the cause. Well, that's true if it's a depressing world in which this pie cannot be made any bigger. But if it's a logical world in which investment in fundraising actually raises more funds and makes the pie bigger, then we have it precisely backwards, and we should be investing more money, not less, in fundraising, because fundraising is the one thing that has the potential to multiply the amount of money available for the cause that we care about so deeply.

　　我們都被灌輸了這樣的觀念， 慈善團(tuán)體的籌款等管理費(fèi)用應(yīng)該盡可能的低， 因?yàn)楣芾碣M(fèi)比例越少， 受捐贈人能夠拿到的錢就越多。 這種結(jié)論的前提是無論你怎么籌款， 這個冷漠的世界也不會給你更多的錢。 但是如果在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界中籌款活動 能夠增加善款收入并且將規(guī)模擴(kuò)大， 那么控制管理費(fèi)這個觀念就不合時宜， 而我們應(yīng)該更多， 而不是更少的投錢到籌款活動中， 因?yàn)楦笠?guī)模的籌款活動有可能籌到很多倍的善款， 可以幫助更多我們想要幫助的人。

　　I'll give you two examples. We launched the AIDSRides with an initial investment of 50,000 dollars in risk capital. Within nine years, we had multiplied that 1,982 times into 108 million dollars after all expenses for AIDS services. We launched the breast cancer three-days with an initial investment of 350,000 dollars in risk capital.

　　我講兩個例子。我們從風(fēng)投那里 拿到了5萬美元作為“AIDS騎行”的啟動資金。 9年之后我們將這筆錢翻了1982倍，達(dá)到了1.08億美元， 這是扣除了所有AIDS服務(wù)之后的盈余。 我們從風(fēng)投那里拿到了35萬美元 作為“關(guān)愛乳腺癌三日行走”活動的啟動資金。

　　Within just five years, we had multiplied that 554 times into 194 million dollars after all expenses for breast cancer research. Now, if you were a philanthropist really interested in breast cancer, what would make more sense: go out and find the most innovative researcher in the world and give her 350,000 dollars for research, or give her fundraising department the 350,000 dollars to multiply it into 194 million dollars for breast cancer research?

　　不到5年時間我們就將善款翻了554倍， 扣除了乳腺癌研究費(fèi)用之后 還剩下1.94億美元。 如果你是一個慈善家，想要資助乳腺癌研究， 你覺得哪個更有意義： 找到一個世界上最有創(chuàng)造力的研究人員， 給她35萬美元用于研究， 還是給籌款部門35萬美元 讓他們把乳腺癌研究的資金規(guī)模擴(kuò)大到1.94億?

　　2002 was our most successful year ever. We netted for breast cancer alone, that year alone, 71 million dollars after all expenses. And then we went out of business, suddenly and traumatically.

　　2002年是我們最成功的一年， 僅在乳腺癌項(xiàng)目一項(xiàng)上，扣除所有開支， 我們得到了7100萬美元的盈余。 然后我們就被解散了， 以非常突然和不愉快的方式。

　　Why? Well, the short story is, our sponsor split on us. They wanted to distance themselves from us because we were being crucified in the media for investing 40 percent of the gross in recruitment and customer service and the magic of the experience and there is no accounting terminology to describe that kind of investment in growth and in the future, other than this demonic label of overhead. So on one day, all 350 of our great employees lost their jobs because they were labeled overhead. Our sponsor went and tried the events on their own. The overhead went up. Net income for breast cancer research went down by 84 percent, or 60 million dollars in one year.

　　為什么?簡單的說，我們的贊助人背叛了我們。 他們希望和我們保持距離， 因?yàn)槲覀儽幻襟w報(bào)道妖魔化了， 因?yàn)槲覀儗⒖偸杖氲?0%投入到 人員培訓(xùn)、客戶服務(wù)、提高用戶體驗(yàn)上， 而這些為了組織自身發(fā)展和籌款規(guī)模擴(kuò)大的投資 并沒有辦法在我們的財(cái)報(bào)中體現(xiàn)， 只能用被妖魔化的詞“管理費(fèi)”籠統(tǒng)概括。 于是有一天，所有350名雇員， 都被裁掉了， 因?yàn)樗麄兌急淮蛏狭?ldquo;額外開支”的標(biāo)簽。 我們的贊助人用自己的方式管理。 他們的管理費(fèi)用更高， 乳腺癌研究基金的收入縮減了84%， 年收入只剩下了600萬美元。

　　This is what happens when we confuse morality with frugality. We've all been taught that the bake sale with five percent overhead is morally superior to the professional fundraising enterprise with 40 percent overhead, but we're missing the most important piece of information, which is, what is the actual size of these pies? Who cares if the bake sale only has five percent overhead if it's tiny? What if the bake sale only netted 71 dollars for charity because it made no investment in its scale and the professional fundraising enterprise netted 71 million dollars because it did? Now which pie would we prefer, and which pie do we think people who are hungry would prefer?

　　發(fā)生這樣的事情，是因?yàn)槲覀兏慊炝?“道德”和“節(jié)儉”這兩個概念。 我們都被灌輸了這樣的觀念，管理費(fèi)只有5%的愛心面包義賣 要比專業(yè)的籌款企業(yè)更加高尚，因?yàn)楹笳叩墓芾碣M(fèi)高達(dá)40%， 但是我們忽略了最重要的信息，就是， 這張大餅(善款的規(guī)模)到底有多大? 如果這張大餅很小，誰會在意它的管理費(fèi)只有5%? 如果愛心面包義賣只能夠籌集71美元， 而專業(yè)籌款企業(yè)籌集了7100萬美元， 差別就在于前者沒有任何投資用于擴(kuò)大規(guī)模 而后者做到了? 讓你選你會選哪張大餅， 饑餓的受捐贈人去選他們會選擇哪張?

　　Here's how all of this impacts the big picture. I said that charitable giving is two percent of GDP in the United States. That's about 300 billion dollars a year. But only about 20 percent of that, or 60 billion dollars, goes to health and human services causes. The rest goes to religion and higher education and hospitals and that 60 billion dollars is not nearly enough to tackle these problems.

　　這些加起來對總體的影響就是這樣的。 我說過慈善捐贈只占美國GDP的2%。 也就是3000億美元一年。 但是其中只有20%，也就是600億美元， 被用于醫(yī)療和人道救助服務(wù)。 別的錢被用在宗教、高等教育、醫(yī)院等地方。 而600億美元根本不足以 處理這些問題。

　　But if we could move charitable giving from two percent of GDP up just one step to three percent of GDP, by investing in that growth, that would be an extra 150 billion dollars a year in contributions, and if that money could go disproportionately to health and human services charities, because those were the ones we encouraged to invest in their growth, that would represent a tripling of contributions to that sector.

　　但是如果我們能夠通過籌款投資， 將我們的慈善捐贈比例從GDP的2%， 就提高一點(diǎn)，從2%提高到3%， 那就多出來1500億美元用于慈善。 而如果這些錢更多的流向 醫(yī)療和人道援助服務(wù)項(xiàng)目， 這些都是我們鼓勵進(jìn)行籌款投資的組織， 這將使這些部門的收入翻3倍。

　　Now we're talking scale. Now we're talking the potential for real change. But it's never going to happen by forcing these organizations to lower their horizons to the demoralizing objective of keeping their overhead low.

　　這是我們想要的規(guī)模， 這是我們想要的真正的變革。 但是如果我們繼續(xù)要求非營利組織 控制他們的管理費(fèi)比例， 限制他們的視野，這一切都不可能發(fā)生。

　　Our generation does not want its epitaph to read, "We kept charity overhead low." (Laughter) (Applause) We want it to read that we changed the world, and that part of the way we did that was by changing the way we think about these things. So the next time you're looking at a charity, don't ask about the rate of their overhead. Ask about the scale of their dreams, their Apple-, Google-, Amazon-scale dreams, how they measure their progress toward those dreams, and what resources they need to make them come true regardless of what the overhead is.

　　我們這一代人沒有人希望自己的墓碑上刻著 “我們把慈善管理費(fèi)控制的很低。” (笑聲)(掌聲) 我們希望上面寫著我們改變了世界， 而改變世界的途徑之一就是 我們改變了我們對這些事情的思考方式。 所以下一次你遇到一個慈善組織， 不要問他們的管理費(fèi)比例。 問他們有多大的夢想， 像蘋果、谷歌、亞馬遜那么大的夢想， 他們?nèi)绾魏饬克麄兣c夢想的接近程度， 為了這個夢想他們需要什么幫助， 不要問管理費(fèi)比例。

　　Who cares what the overhead is if these problems are actually getting solved? If we can have that kind of generosity, a generosity of thought, then the non-profit sector can play a massive role in changing the world for all those citizens most desperately in need of it to change. And if that can be our generation's enduring legacy, that we took responsibility for the thinking that had been handed down to us, that we revisited it, we revised it, and we reinvented the whole way humanity thinks about changing things, forever, for everyone, well, I thought I would let the kids sum up what that would be. Annalisa Smith-Pallotta: That would be -- Sage Smith-Pallotta: -- a real social -- Rider Smith-Pallotta: -- innovation.

　　如果真能夠解決問題，誰還會去關(guān)心管理費(fèi)比例? 如果我們能夠有這樣的一種寬容， 一種思想上的慷慨，那么我們的非營利部門就有可能 在扮演很重要的角色來改變世界， 幫助所有那些最需要幫助的人去改變。 而這種改變可能是我們這一代最寶貴的遺產(chǎn)之一， 我們有義務(wù) 去思考已經(jīng)傳遞給我們的這一切， 我們重新審視它，修訂完善它， 最終重新定義人類思考慈善事業(yè)的方式， 永遠(yuǎn)的，并且不漏掉任何人。 最后我想讓我的孩子們做個總結(jié)。 Annalisa Smith-Pallotta: 那將是—— Sage Smith-Pallotta: 真正的 Rider Smith-Pallotta: 社會創(chuàng)新。

　　Dan Pallotta: Thank you very much. Thank you.

　　Dan Pallotta: 非常感謝，謝謝大家。

　　(Applause) Thank you. (Applause)

　　(掌聲) 謝謝。(掌聲)