演講MP3+雙語文稿:“在線經(jīng)濟”如何幫助當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟？

聽力課堂TED音頻欄目主要包括TED演講的音頻MP3及中英雙語文稿，供各位英語愛好者學(xué)習(xí)使用。本文主要內(nèi)容為演講MP3+雙語文稿:“在線經(jīng)濟”如何幫助當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟？，希望你會喜歡！

【演講者及介紹】Amane Dannouni

數(shù)字市場專家，BCG的Amane Dannouni探討了技術(shù)如何影響既定的商業(yè)模式，以及數(shù)字賦能器如何釋放更大的經(jīng)濟和社會價值。

【演講主題】“在線市場”如何幫助當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟，而不是傷害當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟？

How online marketplaces can help local economies, not hurt them

【中英文字幕】

翻譯者Joyce He 校對者Wanting Zhong

00:14

In February 2013, my wife and I moved to Singapore. Exactly at the same time, Uber has announced it started operations in the country. Now, my wife and I agree on a lot of things, but using Uber was definitely not one of them. While I was excited about the technology and how maybe we don't need to own cars anymore, she felt that every Uber car is here to steal jobs from taxi drivers. And Sarah was not the only one.

2013 年 2 月， 我和妻子搬去了新加坡。 與此同時， Uber（優(yōu)步）宣布 在新加坡開始運營。 我和我妻子在很多事情上 都保持一致的態(tài)度， 但使用 Uber 絕不是其中之一。 我對這項科技感到興奮不已， 認(rèn)為它可能意味著 我們以后再也不用養(yǎng)私家車了， 她卻認(rèn)為每一輛在這兒的 Uber 都在從當(dāng)?shù)爻鲎廛囁緳C手里搶工作。 莎拉（我妻子） 并不是唯一 一個這么想的人。

00:48

As the Ubers, Airbnbs and Amazons of the world -- what we call "online marketplaces" -- as they started expanding their presence, we have heard, all of us, countless policymakers worried about how to deal with these new risks of job destruction, lower wages and tax leakage. We've also heard company leaders worried about aggressive competition from global platforms eating up their local businesses. And on the rational level, of course I understand. After all, this is basic supply and demand economics. If, in any market, you dramatically increase supply, you should expect prices, profitability and growth to go down for existing players.

當(dāng)全世界的“在線市場” —— Uber (優(yōu)步)，Airbnb (愛彼迎)， Amazon (亞馬遜) 等 開始拓展業(yè)務(wù)時， 我們所有人也能聽到 無數(shù)的政策制定者 都在擔(dān)憂如何應(yīng)對 它們帶來的新風(fēng)險： 對就業(yè)市場的打擊， 工資縮水，和稅收下降。 我們也聽說過公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人 擔(dān)心這些環(huán)球平臺帶來的激烈競爭 會蠶食他們的當(dāng)?shù)仄髽I(yè)。 從理性的角度講，我當(dāng)然能理解， 畢竟，這是經(jīng)濟學(xué)基本的 供需關(guān)系模型。 如果你在任何一個市場 大幅增加供給量， 那么市場價格、收益率 和經(jīng)濟增長對于現(xiàn)有參與者來說 就會相應(yīng)下降。

01:32

But in my personal experience, I've also seen the other side of the story. Where online marketplaces, like Gojek in Indonesia or Jumia in Africa, have helped their business ecosystems and the communities around them. The positive side I have seen demonstrated itself in a woman, a taxi driver in Egypt, that now had the opportunity to work without the harassment she faced in the taxi business. It demonstrated itself through a village in Kenya that got an economic boost, because the nearby beautiful but completely unknown lake is now becoming a national ecotourism spot.

但以我個人的經(jīng)驗來看， 我也見過與之截然相反的情況。 像印度尼西亞的 Gojek， 非洲的 Jumia 等在線市場， 實際上反而能幫助當(dāng)?shù)氐?商業(yè)生態(tài)系統(tǒng)和周圍的社區(qū)。 我所見到的積極一面 在一位女士身上體現(xiàn)了出來。 她是埃及的一位出租車司機。 她現(xiàn)在可以有機會 在一個不會受到出租車行業(yè) 那樣騷擾的環(huán)境下工作。 這種好的方面同時也在肯尼亞 一個取得經(jīng)濟增長的村莊中 得以體現(xiàn)， 因為當(dāng)?shù)馗浇囊粋€美麗 而又完全與世隔絕的湖泊 現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)成為了一個 國家級生態(tài)旅游景點。

02:13

Online marketplaces will continue to grow. And they will transform the way we shop, the way we travel and the way we transact with each other. So we really need to understand where is the truth between those two stories. Should we expect more of the bright side or more of the dark and worrying side? And is there a way to get the first without getting the second? I believe there is.

在線市場未來還會持續(xù)發(fā)展。 并且它們將會變革我們購物、 旅行 和與他人交往的模式。 所以我們現(xiàn)在需要弄清楚， 這兩種故事，到底誰是真相。 我們應(yīng)該期待好的一面會發(fā)生， 還是覺得不好的、 引人憂慮的一面會發(fā)生？ 有沒有可能只有好的一面會發(fā)生？ 我相信這種可能是存在的。

02:39

As a strategy consultant, I study businesses for a living. And as a mathematician at heart, I couldn't live with something and its opposite being equally true. So, I went back to fundamentals, and I asked the question: What do online marketplaces really do? What do they do?

作為一名戰(zhàn)略顧問， 我以研究商業(yè)模式謀生。 并且作為一名數(shù)學(xué)愛好者， 我無法忍受兩個完全相反的事物 被認(rèn)定為同樣正確。 所以，我問了一個比較基本的問題： 在線市場究竟在做什么？ 它們在做什么？

02:58

Well, at their core, they're doing something very simple. They match sellers and buyers. That's it. For drivers and passengers, you get Uber, Grab in Southeast Asia or DiDi in China. For matching merchants and consumers, you get Amazon, Alibaba or Jumia in Africa. And for housing, you get Airbnb; for fundraising, you get Kickstarter -- the list goes on. What all these examples have in common is that they transition this basic functionality of matching sellers and buyers from the physical world to the digital world. And by doing so, they can find better matches, do it faster and ultimately, unlock more value for everyone. In fact, online marketplaces' core benefit is that they get us more from the same amount of effort.

它們的核心原理 其實非常簡單， 就是將賣家與買家進行配對。 就這么簡單。 對于配對司機和乘客， 我們有 Uber、東南亞的 Grab, 還有中國的滴滴。 對于配對商家和消費者， 我們有Amazon (亞馬遜)， 阿里巴巴，和非洲的 Jumia。 對于租房，我們有 Airbnb (愛彼迎)； 對于籌款，我們有 Kickstarter—— 諸如此類。 而這些例子的共同點就是 他們將配對買賣雙方 的基本功能 從實體世界轉(zhuǎn)移到了電子世界。 通過這種方式， 他們能更好、更快地 配對買賣雙方， 并且最終能讓每個人 都得到更多價值。 事實上，在線市場的核心價值 就在于我們付出同等努力， 能從中獲得更多回報。

03:52

For example, if you're a taxi driver in San Francisco and you decide to work 10 hours per day, then you're actually having a paying passenger in your car for four hours out of the 10. If you take the same car and put it on a platform like Uber, you can have paying passengers for an additional one and a half hours. This is the same car becoming 40 percent more productive. And the same has been proven true for other online marketplaces. By design, they create more value for the economy.

比方說， 如果你是舊金山的一名出租車司機， 你打算每天工作十個小時， 那么你每天十個小時里 將有四個小時 在服務(wù)顧客。 但如果你把同樣的這輛車放到 像 Uber 這樣的平臺上， 那么你每天就可以有 額外一個半小時在服務(wù)顧客。 同樣一輛車就 比以前多了 40% 的收益。 同樣的道理在 其他在線市場也適用。 它們的設(shè)計就決定了 能為經(jīng)濟發(fā)展創(chuàng)造更多價值。

04:29

Now, we need to figure out who gets this additional value. You can give it to the drivers -- more passengers, more income. You can give it to consumers, if you reduce prices. Or you can decide that the platform gets to keep all of it. What usually happens is that all three of them would somehow split it. But what about the rest of us?

我們現(xiàn)在需要弄清楚， 究竟是誰得到了這些額外的價值。 你可以把這些多余的利潤給司機， 更多的乘客意味著更多的收入。 你也可以通過降低乘車價格， 把這些利潤分給乘客。 或者你也可以決定 由平臺保留全部利潤。 通常的情況是這三方 都會分得利潤的一部分。 但這對于其他人意味著什么？

04:52

We can also be impacted without being on either sides of this business. If my neighbor decides to rent his apartment on Airbnb, and we have more people coming in and out of the building, more noise than usual, then I'm getting an unpleasant side effect of this productivity magic. This is what economists would call a "negative externality." The negative externality of Uber cars becoming more productive is taxi drivers seeing the value of their licenses drop by as much as 30 percent in New York, for example. This is the dark side. And this is what sparks street demonstrations and sometimes, sometimes, even violence.

盡管并不處于 這種商業(yè)模式的任何一側(cè)， 我們也可能受到影響。 如果我的鄰居決定 在 Airbnb上出租他的公寓， 我們居住的這棟樓 就會有更多人員出入， 帶來比以往更多的噪音， 那么這種提高效率的商業(yè)魔法 就會帶來令我不快的副作用。 經(jīng)濟學(xué)家通常將其稱為 “負(fù)面的外部效應(yīng)”。 以紐約為例，Uber 車 變得更有效率 所帶來的“負(fù)面的外部效應(yīng)” 是讓出租車司機的牌照 貶值高達百分之三十。 這就是其黑暗的一面。 而這也是引起街頭示威的導(dǎo)火索， 有時甚至?xí)?dǎo)致暴力沖突。

05:34

I profoundly believe this is avoidable. And it became clearer to me the more I have spent time in emerging markets. In fact, during my time in Singapore, I spent half of any given week traveling in the region, between Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and I became a user -- actually, more of a fan -- of online marketplaces that were not that well-known back then.

我深切地認(rèn)為這是可避免的。 我在新興市場待的時間越長， 就越覺得如此。 事實上，在新加坡的那段時間里， 我每周都會花一半的時間 在馬來西亞、泰國、 印度尼西亞之間往返， 于是我成為了一名 使用當(dāng)時還不太普及 的在線市場的用戶—— 更確切地說，是一名粉絲。

05:56

But some of them made interesting strategic trade-offs that dramatically reduced their side effects, their externalities. Take Gojek, for example. They're basically Uber for motor bikes. They are one of the most liked online marketplaces in Indonesia, and this has a lot to do with the role they chose to play. Instead of picking a fight with every other transportation option out there, they choose to gradually integrate them within their own platform, so that without leaving the Gojek app, you can check the public transportation schedule and choose to take a bus for a long distance. Then, maybe, a motorbike or a traditional taxi that you can order and pay for from within the same app. If you look at Gojek today, nine out of 10 previous motor taxi drivers believe their quality of life has improved after joining the platform. And nine out of 10 consumers -- nine out of 10 -- believe that Gojek has a positive impact on society in general.

其中一些在線市場 做出了有趣的策略性取舍， 從而大幅減輕了它們的副作用， 也就是那些“外部影響”。 以 Gojek 為例， 他們本質(zhì)上是摩托車界的 Uber， 也是印度尼西亞 最受歡迎的在線市場之一， 而其中很大一部分原因 在于他們選擇扮演的角色。 他們選擇 將其他交通方式逐漸整合到 自己的平臺中，而不是與其進行競爭。 所以用戶不需要切換出 Gojek 的應(yīng)用， 就能查看公共交通時間表， 選擇公交車作為長途出行的工具， 或選擇摩托車，傳統(tǒng)的出租車， 這些預(yù)約和付款都可以 在同一個應(yīng)用中進行操作。 根據(jù) Gojek 現(xiàn)在的數(shù)據(jù)， 十個前摩的司機中就有九個 認(rèn)為在加入這個平臺之后 生活質(zhì)量得到了改善。 十個用戶中有九個， 90% 的用戶—— 認(rèn)為，總體而言，Gojek 對社會產(chǎn)生了積極的影響。

07:05

Now, this level of trust is what allowed Gojek to grow into what is today a super online marketplace for everything from food to grocery even massages and laundry pickups. It all came from a deliberate trade-off to be an orchestrator of a bigger ecosystem where others also have their role to play, instead of a single winner, a hero, that takes for himself what would, at the end, be a smaller pie.

正是這種程度的信任 使得 Gojek 成長為 現(xiàn)在這樣一個從食品雜貨， 甚至是按摩，洗衣店衣物提取等服務(wù) 都涵蓋到的一個超級在線市場。 而這一切都源于一個 經(jīng)過深思熟慮的取舍決定： 成為更大的生態(tài)系統(tǒng)中的協(xié)調(diào)者， 讓其他人也能參與進來， 而不是成為單一的贏家，“英雄”， 到最后只能分到一個 更小的“蛋糕”（利潤）。

07:35

Another interesting example is Jumia. Jumia is the equivalent of Amazon in Africa. But they don't generate the same level of fear in the small-business community. And one of the reasons for that is because they have decided to actively invest in African entrepreneurs, to grow them into the digital age. Now keep in mind, Jumia is operating in countries with some of the lowest digital literacy and digital connectivity scores in the world. Now they could have dealt with that the usual way, through lobbying for reforms -- and they probably do that -- but they have also built Jumia University, an e-learning platform where merchants can come and learn basic digital and business skills.

另一個有趣的例子是 Jumia， Jumia 相當(dāng)于非洲的亞馬遜。 但他們不會讓小企業(yè)圈 產(chǎn)生對 Amazon 那種程度的擔(dān)憂。 其中的一個原因是 它們決定積極投資 非洲的創(chuàng)業(yè)者， 幫助他們成長， 以融入到數(shù)字時代中。 請大家考慮到一點， Jumia 是在世界上數(shù)字素養(yǎng) (運用電腦及網(wǎng)絡(luò)資源的能力) 和數(shù)字連接得分最低的 幾個國家進行經(jīng)營。 他們可以通過使用傳統(tǒng)方法—— 為普及計算機進行游說， 他們可能也正在這么做， 但同時，他們還建造了 Jumia 大學(xué)， 一個在線學(xué)習(xí)平臺， 通過它，商家能學(xué)到 基本的電子和商業(yè)知識。

08:21

We have studied online marketplaces in Africa last year. And during that study, we have met one of Jumia's merchants. His name is Jomo. He was fired from his job in 2014, and at that time, he decided he wanted to become his own boss. He wanted to be independent. He also wanted to never be fired again. So at that time, Jomo had no clue what a business is. So he needed to go through a series of trainings to learn how to select products, how to price them and how to promote them online. Today, Jomo has a 10-employee online business. And as of a few months ago, he just opened his very first brick-and-mortar shop in the suburbs of Nairobi. Now, through its university, Jumia has the potential of helping a huge number of Jomos. And we have estimated that together with other online marketplaces on the continent, they can generate three million additional jobs by 2025. And they would do that either directly, or through their impact on the wider community.

去年，我們研究了 非洲的在線市場。 在研究過程中，我們認(rèn)識了 一名使用 Jumia 的商戶。 他叫 Jomo。 他在 2014 年被解雇， 在那時，他決定要當(dāng)自己的老板。 他想變得獨立， 再也不想被解雇了。 但在那時， Jomo 對做生意一竅不通。 他需要接受一系列培訓(xùn)， 來學(xué)習(xí)該如何選擇商品， 如何為它們定價， 以及如何在網(wǎng)上推銷這些產(chǎn)品。 現(xiàn)在，Jomo 的在線生意 已經(jīng)擁有了十名員工。 就在幾個月之前， 他剛在內(nèi)羅畢 (肯尼亞首都) 郊區(qū) 開了自己的第一家實體店。 通過這所大學(xué)， Jumia 將有潛力幫助到 更多像 Jomo 一樣的人。 根據(jù)我們的估計，到 2025 年， Jumia 和其他在非洲 的在線市場 將能創(chuàng)造約三百萬個 額外的工作崗位。 他們可以直接提供工作， 或通過對更廣大社區(qū) 的影響，幫助就業(yè)。

09:29

And sometimes, taking that wider impact into consideration or forgetting about it can make or break a platform. To illustrate that, let's go back to Singapore. So, when we decided with my wife to leave the country last year, Uber decided to do the same. At the same time, again, we started to see that pattern, but maybe it's a coincidence. In reality, Uber lost the ride-hailing battle to a Malaysian-born start-up called Grab.

有時， 是否有考慮到對更廣大群體 造成的影響 將決定一個平臺的成敗。 為了說明這一點， 讓我們回到新加坡。 去年，我和妻子決定離開新加坡， 與此同時， Uber 也做出了同樣的決定。 在那時， 我們又開始看到那個規(guī)律。 但也許那只是一個巧合。 事實上，Uber 在 即時用車領(lǐng)域輸給了 始創(chuàng)于馬來西亞 的初創(chuàng)公司 Grab。

10:05

Now, interestingly, my wife didn't have the same level of concerns with Grab, because when Grab started, it had a different name. It was called MyTeksi, and as the name suggests, it started as a platform for taxis. So when Grab started expanding the driver pool beyond taxis, it was seen as gradual and reasonable. They were also very careful while doing so. They thought of what kind of social safety net they should bring to all drivers. So they put in place special insurance packages and even financial education programs.

有趣的是， 我妻子對 Grab 并沒有 和對 Uber 同樣程度的擔(dān)憂。 因為 Grab 最開始有另一個名字， MyTeksi（“我的出租車”）， 顧名思義，它剛開始 是一個針對出租車的平臺。 所以當(dāng) Grab 后來開始 把業(yè)務(wù)拓展到其他出行工具時， 大眾都將其視為一個 漸進而合理的過程。 他們在拓展業(yè)務(wù)的時候 也非常小心謹(jǐn)慎。 他們考慮到了該帶給所有司機 什么樣的社會安全網(wǎng)絡(luò)。 他們?yōu)樗緳C落實了 特殊的保險計劃， 甚至還有理財教育的項目。

10:44

Now, compare that with what happened in London, in New York, in Paris, where taxi drivers didn't feel that the platforms understood they had to pay 200,000 euros for their license -- and mostly in loans. When you don't take that kind of social environmental information into account, you get strong reactions.

與之相比，倫敦、紐約、巴黎 的出租車司機們 覺得那些平臺并沒有認(rèn)識到 他們還要為自己的牌照 付二十萬歐元， 而且通常是以貸款的方式。 當(dāng)你不考慮到這些 社會環(huán)境信息時， 你就會得到一些激烈的反應(yīng)。

11:09

I'm not trying to argue that the trade-offs by either Grab or Jumia or Gojek are risk-free. Did they slow down growth at some point, temporarily? Maybe. But look at them today. Gojek is worth 10 billion dollars. Jumia is one of only three unicorns in the whole of Africa. And Grab, well, they pushed out Uber out of the whole region of Southeast Asia. And I also think these trade-offs have nothing specific to emerging markets. Amazon or Uber or others can learn from them and adapt them to their own realities.

我并不是說 Grab， Jumia，Gojek 所采取的取舍就是無風(fēng)險的。 他們在某段時間 有暫時減緩發(fā)展的步伐嗎？ 也許有。 但看看現(xiàn)在。 Gojek 現(xiàn)在價值一百億美元。 Jumia 是整個非洲僅有的 三家獨角獸公司之一。 Grab 將 Uber 擠出了 整個東南亞地區(qū)。 我也認(rèn)為這些取舍 并不只適用于新興市場。 亞馬遜，優(yōu)步等大企業(yè) 也可以從中學(xué)習(xí)， 并運用到自己的實際情況中。

11:51

In the long run, this doesn't need to be a zero-sum game. In the long run -- and this is maybe the Asian side of me speaking -- it pays to be patient. It pays to reconsider your goal and your priorities in the light of a much bigger equation that includes you and your users, of course, but also it includes regulators, policymakers, your communities. And I would argue, above all, it includes the very businesses you are meant to disrupt.

從長遠(yuǎn)的角度看， 這不需要是一場零和博弈 （一方得益一方受損的局面）。 從長遠(yuǎn)的角度看—— 這個觀點可能是 我的亞洲思維使然—— 耐心點是有好處的。 根據(jù)一個更大的等式來重新考慮 你的目標(biāo)和優(yōu)先級是值得的， 這個等式包括你和你的用戶， 當(dāng)然也包括監(jiān)管者、 政策制定者和社會共同體。 而且我認(rèn)為，這個等式 首先應(yīng)包括那些會被你 （的平臺）顛覆的企業(yè)。

12:22

Thank you.

謝謝大家。

12:23

(Applause)

（掌聲）