特朗普將辜負(fù)“憤怒的支持者”

Will Donald Trump benefit the enraged white working class that brought him into the White House? To answer this, one must examine his plans and the desires of congressional Republicans. One must also consider how these plans might affect the world economy. The conclusion is straightforward: some people will indeed benefit but the white working class will not be among them. Republicans have long stoked rage they do not assuage. Mr Trump has taken this approach in new directions.

唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)會(huì)造福將他送入白宮的憤怒的白人勞動(dòng)階層嗎?若要回答這個(gè)問題，必須考察一下他的計(jì)劃和共和黨國(guó)會(huì)議員的意愿。還必須考慮這些計(jì)劃可能如何影響世界經(jīng)濟(jì)。結(jié)論很簡(jiǎn)單：有些人確實(shí)會(huì)受益，但白人勞動(dòng)階層不在其列。長(zhǎng)期以來，共和黨人一直在煽動(dòng)憤怒，卻沒有做什么來平息他們煽動(dòng)起來的怒火。特朗普用新的方式延續(xù)了這一傳統(tǒng)。

Huge, permanent and regressive tax cuts seem the one certainty. It is something on which Mr Trump and congressional Republicans agree. The revised Trump plan would reduce the top individual income tax rate to 33 per cent and the corporate tax rate to 15 per cent. It would also eliminate the estate tax. The highest-income taxpayers — 0.1 per cent of the population, those with incomes over $3.7m in 2016 dollars — would receive an average cut of more than 14 per cent of after-tax income. The poorest fifth’s taxes would fall by an average of 0.8 per cent of taxed income. To those who hath, it shall be given.

大幅度、永久性和累退式的減稅似乎是確定要發(fā)生的。特朗普和共和黨國(guó)會(huì)議員在這方面達(dá)成了共識(shí)。特朗普修改后的計(jì)劃，將會(huì)把最高一檔個(gè)人所得稅率降至33%，將公司稅率降至15%。它也將廢除遺產(chǎn)稅。最高收入納稅人——占總?cè)丝诘?.1%、2016年收入超過370萬美元的那些人——所獲的平均減稅幅度將超過其稅后收入的14%。最貧窮的五分之一人口所獲平均減稅幅度，將為其稅后收入的0.8%。凡有的，還要加給他。

Mr Trump (much less so the congressional Republicans) plans to increase infrastructure spending. This is desirable, though it would have made even more sense if Republicans had supported such a programme in the midst of the Great Recession. But as noted by Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury secretary, the Trump plan relies mainly on private investment. Experience elsewhere suggests this often leads to exploitation of taxpayers and a failure to put into effect public investments that deliver high social benefits but have limited commercial returns.

特朗普計(jì)劃增加基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施支出(共和黨國(guó)會(huì)議員這樣做的意愿低得多)。這是可取的，不過，要是共和黨人在大衰退(Great Recession)期間曾支持這樣的計(jì)劃，那會(huì)更合理。但正如美國(guó)前財(cái)長(zhǎng)勞倫斯•薩默斯(Lawrence Summers)所說，特朗普的計(jì)劃主要依靠私人投資。其他地區(qū)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明，這往往導(dǎo)致對(duì)納稅人的剝削，并讓創(chuàng)造很高社會(huì)效益但商業(yè)回報(bào)有限的公共投資無法實(shí)現(xiàn)。

The net effect of these plans would be a large rise in fiscal deficits. Calculations by the Tax Policy Center at the Brookings think-tank suggest that by 2020 the deficit would increase by 3 per cent of gross domestic product. With current forecasts as the baseline and ignoring any additional spending, this would mean a deficit of around 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2020. Cumulatively, the increase in federal debt by 2026 might be 25 per cent of GDP. 這些計(jì)劃的最終后果將是財(cái)政赤字的大幅增加。智庫布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)(Brookings)稅收政策中心(Tax Policy Center)的測(cè)算表明，到2020年，赤字增幅將相當(dāng)于國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的3%。以目前預(yù)測(cè)為起點(diǎn)，并忽略任何額外支出，這意味著到2020年赤字將相當(dāng)于GDP的5.5%左右。累計(jì)下來，到2026年聯(lián)邦債務(wù)的增加額或許將相當(dāng)于GDP的25%。

Congressional Republicans such as Paul Ryan would surely demand matching cuts in spending. Annual federal outlays are close to 20 per cent of GDP. Spending on health, income support, social security, defence and net interest absorbed 88 per cent of this in 2015. Elimination of spending on all else (a catastrophic mistake) would merely halve the prospective deficit. In sum, the plan’s logic leads towards either big increases in federal debt relative to GDP or sharp cuts in spending on programmes on which Mr Trump’s supporters depend.

保羅•瑞安(Paul Ryan)等共和黨國(guó)會(huì)議員，肯定會(huì)要求以同等程度削減支出。年度聯(lián)邦支出接近GDP的20%。在2015年，醫(yī)療、收入補(bǔ)助、社會(huì)保障、國(guó)防和凈利息支出占到總支出的88%。取消所有其他支出(一個(gè)災(zāi)難性的錯(cuò)誤)僅僅將令預(yù)期赤字減半?？偠灾?，依照邏輯推斷，特朗普的計(jì)劃要么會(huì)導(dǎo)致聯(lián)邦債務(wù)相對(duì)于GDP的比例大幅增長(zhǎng)，要么會(huì)導(dǎo)致特朗普的支持者們所依賴的種種計(jì)劃的開支遭到大幅削減。

The envisaged rise in US fiscal deficits would however be expansionary, even though the concentration of the cuts on the wealthiest would limit this effect. Still, a jump in US fiscal deficits would accelerate rises in US short-term interest rates. Mr Trump could hardly complain since he has attacked the Federal Reserve’s low rates. Yet, as Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute notes, the world economy is fragile. A swift rise in US interest rates might destabilise it.

然而，美國(guó)財(cái)政赤字預(yù)計(jì)中的上升將有助于經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張，盡管減稅主要針對(duì)最富裕人群將削弱這一效果。然而，美國(guó)財(cái)政赤字猛增將加速美國(guó)短期利率的上升。特朗普很難抱怨什么，因?yàn)樗恢迸険裘缆?lián)儲(chǔ)的低利率。然而，正如美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的德斯蒙德•拉赫曼(Desmond Lachman)所說，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)是脆弱的。美國(guó)利率的迅速上升可能會(huì)破壞世界經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定。

Furthermore, the combination of fiscal loosening with monetary tightening would mean a stronger dollar and a rising current account deficit in the medium term. The US would re-emerge as the global buyer of last resort, so helping the world’s structural mercantilists: China, Germany and Japan. A strong dollar and rising external deficits would, as in the early 1980s, increase protectionist pressures — Ronald Reagan’s administration was quite protectionist in its first term. The decision to launch the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations to liberalise world trade was then the response. This time, however, a strong dollar would reinforce the bias towards protectionism of the Trump administration. But protection against imports would raise the currency’s value further, shifting the adjustment on to unprotected sectors — above all, on to competitive exporters. In all, a strong dollar must weaken the manufacturing Mr Trump seeks to help.

此外，寬財(cái)政與緊貨幣相結(jié)合意味著，中期內(nèi)美元會(huì)走強(qiáng)，經(jīng)常賬戶赤字會(huì)上升。美國(guó)將重新成為全球最后購(gòu)買人，從而有利于世界上的結(jié)構(gòu)性重商主義國(guó)家：中國(guó)、德國(guó)和日本。正如20世紀(jì)80年代初那樣，強(qiáng)勢(shì)的美元和不斷攀升的外部赤字會(huì)增加實(shí)行貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義的壓力——頭一屆羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)政府的保護(hù)主義傾向就相當(dāng)強(qiáng)烈。當(dāng)時(shí)的回應(yīng)是，決定啟動(dòng)烏拉圭回合多邊貿(mào)易談判、以推動(dòng)世界貿(mào)易自由化。然而，這一次，強(qiáng)勢(shì)美元將強(qiáng)化特朗普政府對(duì)保護(hù)主義的偏好。但不利于進(jìn)口的保護(hù)主義措施將進(jìn)一步推高美元匯率，將調(diào)整傳遞到不受保護(hù)的部門那里——尤其是有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的出口商那里?？偠灾?，強(qiáng)勢(shì)美元肯定會(huì)削弱特朗普試圖幫助的制造業(yè)。

A likely response would be to cajole the Fed into slowing monetary tightening. Janet Yellen’s term as Fed chair expires in 2018. Her successor could be told that the 4 per cent growth mentioned by Mr Trump has to be attained. The last time such growth was achieved over a five-year period was before the crash of 2000 — an ominous warning. If the Fed tried to achieve this goal, it might trigger inflation, financial instability or, more likely, both. In all this there seem to be few, if any, gains for Mr Trump’s working-class supporters.

一個(gè)可能的對(duì)策將是勸誘美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)放慢貨幣緊縮進(jìn)程。珍妮特•耶倫(Janet Yellen)的美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席任期將于2018年屆滿。她的繼任者可能被告知，特朗普提出的4%的增長(zhǎng)率必須實(shí)現(xiàn)。上一次持續(xù)五年實(shí)現(xiàn)這樣的增長(zhǎng)率，發(fā)生在2000年崩盤之前——這是一個(gè)不祥的警告。如果美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)試圖實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)，或許會(huì)引發(fā)通貨膨脹、金融不穩(wěn)定，或者更可能的是，同時(shí)引發(fā)這兩種情況。這一切，似乎都對(duì)特朗普的勞動(dòng)階層支持者們好處不大、甚至毫無好處。

The president-elect has also promised to eliminate Obamacare and most environmental and financial regulations. It is hard to believe any of this would succour the prospects of the working class. They are more likely to suffer from even worse health cover, a dirtier environment, more predatory behaviour by financial institutions and, at worst, even another financial crisis. Protectionism, too, will fail to help most of his supporters . Many depend on cheap imported goods. Many would be badly hurt by the dire results of a tit-for-tat global trade war. Meanwhile, rapidly rising productivity would still ensure a steady fall in the share of manufacturing in US employment, despite protection.

這位當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)還承諾廢除“奧巴馬醫(yī)改”(Obamacare)和大多數(shù)環(huán)保和金融法規(guī)。很難相信這些措施的任何一個(gè)會(huì)改善勞動(dòng)階層的前景。他們更有可能會(huì)面對(duì)更糟的健康保障、更臟的環(huán)境、行為更肆無忌憚的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，在最壞情況下，甚至是另一場(chǎng)金融危機(jī)。保護(hù)主義也將無法幫助特朗普的大多數(shù)支持者。他們中許多人依靠低價(jià)的進(jìn)口商品過活。一場(chǎng)相互報(bào)復(fù)的全球貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)將造成可怕后果，這些后果將對(duì)許多人造成嚴(yán)重傷害。同時(shí)，盡管有保護(hù)措施，但生產(chǎn)率的迅速提高仍將導(dǎo)致制造業(yè)就業(yè)人數(shù)在美國(guó)就業(yè)總?cè)丝谥械恼急确€(wěn)步下降。

Mr Trump promises a burst of infrastructure spending, regressive tax cuts, protectionism, cuts in federal spending and radical deregulation. A big rise in infrastructure spending would indeed help construction workers. But little else in these plans would help the working class. Overall, his plans might indeed generate a brief economic surge. But the longer-term consequences are likely to be grim, not least for his angry, but fooled, supporters. Next time, they might be even angrier. Where that might lead is terrifying.

特朗普承諾了如下東西：基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施支出大幅增加、累退式減稅、保護(hù)主義、聯(lián)邦支出削減、大幅去監(jiān)管?；A(chǔ)設(shè)施支出的大幅增加確實(shí)將有利于建筑工人。但是這些計(jì)劃中的其他部分對(duì)勞動(dòng)階層沒什么幫助?？偟膩碚f，他的計(jì)劃確實(shí)可能帶來短暫的經(jīng)濟(jì)爆發(fā)。但長(zhǎng)期后果可能是嚴(yán)峻的，尤其是對(duì)于他那些憤怒、但被愚弄的支持者而言。下一次，他們可能還會(huì)變得更加憤怒。那可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致什么后果，讓人不敢想象。