美國(guó)與沙特同盟為何出現(xiàn)裂痕
1945年2月，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)富蘭克林•羅斯福(Franklin Roosevelt)與溫斯頓•丘吉爾(Winston Churchill)和約瑟夫•斯大林(Joseph Stalin)在雅爾塔舉行峰會(huì)后的回國(guó)途中，在停泊在蘇伊士運(yùn)河大苦湖的美國(guó)海軍“昆西號(hào)”(USS Quincy)戰(zhàn)艦上會(huì)晤了沙特阿拉伯國(guó)王阿卜杜勒•阿齊茲•伊本•沙特(Abdul Aziz ibn Saud)。已經(jīng)解決戰(zhàn)后歐洲安排問題的羅斯福，為戰(zhàn)后的中東格局奠定了一塊基石。大體來說，美國(guó)將保證伊本•沙特統(tǒng)治的這個(gè)阿拉伯王國(guó)(用了30年、歷經(jīng)52場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)才用武力統(tǒng)一)的安全和完整，而沙特將保證以合理價(jià)格輸出石油。
As US President Barack Obama arrives on a valedictory visit to Saudi Arabia this week, that70-year-old bargain looks frayed by fractious relations with a ruling House of Saud that iscoming under unpredictable new management. The shale-based energy revolutionmeanwhile shows the potential to liberate the US from dependence on Saudi and Gulf oil. MrObama’s main foreign policy achievement, the nuclear deal struck last year betweeninternational powers and Iran, is abhorrent to Saudi Arabia, whose virulently sectarian Wahhabiinterpretation of Sunni Islam abominates the Shia Islam of Iran and its Arab network of co-religionists from Baghdad to Beirut.
在美國(guó)總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)對(duì)沙特阿拉伯展開卸任前的最后一次訪問之際，美國(guó)與如今由不可預(yù)測(cè)的新掌門人執(zhí)掌的沙特王室的緊張關(guān)系，讓這一持續(xù)70年的協(xié)議出現(xiàn)裂痕。與此同時(shí)，基于頁巖的能源革命顯示出美國(guó)有能力擺脫對(duì)沙特和海灣國(guó)家石油的依賴。奧巴馬的主要外交政策成就是國(guó)際大國(guó)與伊朗去年達(dá)成的核協(xié)議，而這為沙特阿拉伯所憎恨，該國(guó)瓦哈比(Wahhabi)教派對(duì)遜尼派伊斯蘭教作出排他的宗派解釋，對(duì)伊朗的什葉派伊斯蘭以及遍布阿拉伯世界(從伊拉克到黎巴嫩)的什葉派網(wǎng)絡(luò)充滿憎恨。
Even when the Iran deal was only at an interim and fragile stage in 2013, the Saudis were soaffronted they rejected a seat for which they had vigorously lobbied on the UN SecurityCouncil. But differences between Washington and Riyadh had been steadily accumulating —starting with the fact that it was mainly Saudi terrorists, on orders of the Saudi Osama binLaden, who struck America on 9/11.
甚至在2013年伊朗核協(xié)議僅僅處于脆弱的臨時(shí)階段時(shí)，沙特阿拉伯就感覺深受冒犯，拒絕了該國(guó)此前大力爭(zhēng)取的聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)(UN Security Council)非常任理事國(guó)席位。但美國(guó)與沙特的分歧早就在逐步積累，這始于下列事實(shí)：2001年9月11日襲擊美國(guó)的恐怖分子主要是沙特人，他們的頭目奧薩馬•本•拉登(Osama binLaden)也是沙特人。
The Saudis could never reconcile themselves to the US-led invasion of Iraq, not because ittoppled Saddam Hussein but because it led to Shia majority rule in an Arab country. WhenHosni Mubarak was toppled by Egypt’s popular revolt in 2011, Riyadh accused Mr Obama ofbetraying a US ally. Saudi perceptions of US complacency in the face of Iran’s advances inIraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen are a grievance far outweighing western perceptions of Isisjihadism as the main threat in and from the Middle East. After the Iraqi city of Mosul fell to alightning Isis offensive in 2014, even the late Prince Saud al-Faisal, the respected Saudiforeign minister, remonstrated with John Kerry, US secretary of state, that “Daesh [Isis] is our[Sunni] response to your support for the Da’wa” — the Tehran-aligned Shia Islamist rulingparty of Iraq.
沙特阿拉伯永遠(yuǎn)不能忍受以美國(guó)為首的多國(guó)部隊(duì)對(duì)伊拉克的入侵，不是因?yàn)檫@場(chǎng)入侵推翻了薩達(dá)姆•侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)，而是因?yàn)樗鼘?dǎo)致占人口大多數(shù)的什葉派統(tǒng)治了一個(gè)阿拉伯國(guó)家。2011年，當(dāng)埃及的民眾抗議推翻胡斯尼•穆巴拉克(Hosni Mubarak)政權(quán)時(shí)，沙特阿拉伯譴責(zé)奧巴馬背叛了美國(guó)的一個(gè)盟友。沙特阿拉伯認(rèn)為美國(guó)在面對(duì)伊朗在伊拉克、敘利亞、黎巴嫩和也門的步步緊逼時(shí)無動(dòng)于衷，由此產(chǎn)生的怨恨遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過西方將“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯蘭國(guó)”(ISIS)的圣戰(zhàn)主義視為中東內(nèi)部以及來自中東的主要威脅。在2014年ISIS的閃電攻勢(shì)導(dǎo)致伊拉克城市摩蘇爾淪陷后，就連備受尊敬的沙特外長(zhǎng)、已故的沙特•費(fèi)薩爾親王(PrinceSaud Al-Faisal)也對(duì)美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)卿約翰•克里(John Kerry)抱怨說：“ISIS是我們(遜尼派)對(duì)你們支持Da’wa(與德黑蘭一鼻孔出氣的伊拉克什葉派伊斯蘭主義執(zhí)政黨)的回應(yīng)”。
Mr Obama’s never-enthusiastic sentiments about the US-Saudi alliance, meanwhile, havebecome clearer after The Atlantic magazine published his candid thoughts last month.Obviously he sees Wahhabism as an ideology that fuels Islamist extremism worldwide and as abarrier blocking the Arab rendezvous with modernity.
與此同時(shí)，奧巴馬從未對(duì)美國(guó)沙特同盟表現(xiàn)出熱情，在《大西洋》雜志(The Atlantic)上月發(fā)表他的坦率看法后，這一點(diǎn)變得更為清楚了。顯然，他把瓦哈比主義視為一種助燃全球伊斯蘭極端主義的意識(shí)形態(tài)，以及一個(gè)阻礙阿拉伯世界現(xiàn)代化的障礙。
Alongside the international rapprochement with Iran, Mr Obama has long argued for aregional thaw and self-regulating balance of power between the Saudi and Iranian rivals. “Thecompetition between the Saudis and the Iranians — which has helped to feed proxy wars andchaos in Syria and Iraq and Yemen — requires us to say to our friends as well as to theIranians that they need to find an effective way to share the neighbourhood and institutesome sort of cold peace,” he told The Atlantic.
在國(guó)際社會(huì)與伊朗關(guān)系和解的同時(shí)，奧巴馬長(zhǎng)期主張地區(qū)關(guān)系走向緩和，在沙特阿拉伯和伊朗的對(duì)手之間實(shí)現(xiàn)自我調(diào)整的實(shí)力平衡。他告訴《大西洋》雜志：“沙特阿拉伯與伊朗的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)(這幫助造成了敘利亞、伊拉克和也門的代理人戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和混亂)要求我們對(duì)我們的朋友以及伊朗人說，他們需要找到一種有效方式共享這個(gè)地區(qū)，建立起某種冷和平。”
But any such regional détente remains anathema to Saudi Arabia, in which real power is nowwielded by Mohammed bin Salman, deputy crown prince and 30-year-old son of the ageingKing Salman — the first time the reins have passed from the sons of Ibn Saud to the thirdgeneration.
但任何地區(qū)關(guān)系的緩和都是沙特阿拉伯所憎恨的，如今沙特的實(shí)權(quán)由該國(guó)副王儲(chǔ)、年邁的沙特國(guó)王薩勒曼(King Salman)的30歲兒子穆罕默德•本•薩勒曼(Mohammed bin Salman，見上圖)掌握，這是大權(quán)首次由伊本•沙特的兒子們傳到第三代。
The fiasco at last weekend’s oil summit in Qatar, when on Mohammed bin Salman’sinstructions the Saudis tore up a production freeze deal they had largely devised because anIran emerging from sanctions refused to be part of it, demonstrated beyond doubt that thekingdom’s visceral animosity towards its Shia rival trumps economic self-interest.
在上周末的卡塔爾石油峰會(huì)上，遵照穆罕默德•本•薩勒曼的命令，沙特阿拉伯撕毀了本已基本定稿的產(chǎn)量?jī)鼋Y(jié)協(xié)議，就因?yàn)閯倓偨獬撇玫囊晾示芙^參與。這一尷尬結(jié)局清楚地表明，沙特阿拉伯對(duì)什葉派對(duì)手的刻骨仇恨高于經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。
However fulsome and emollient Mr Obama manages to be on this visit, and however much hesummons up the bonds uniting the US and the Wahhabi kingdom, all the way back to Rooseveltand Ibn Saud, the Saudis are simply waiting for him to leave office — albeit as anxious asanyone about the bewildering contest to replace him.
不管奧巴馬在訪問期間表現(xiàn)出多么恭維和圓滑，不管他在多大程度上重提美國(guó)與這個(gè)瓦哈比王國(guó)之間源遠(yuǎn)流長(zhǎng)、可一路追溯到羅斯福與伊本•沙特的傳統(tǒng)紐帶，沙特方面只是在等著他下臺(tái)。當(dāng)然，他們對(duì)于這場(chǎng)令人困惑的美國(guó)總統(tǒng)大選與所有人一樣焦慮。
“I don’t think there can be any confusion about who is our partner in the region and who isnot,” said Rob Malley, the president’s adviser on the Gulf. “It’s clear who our allies and who ourpartners are.” Not to the Saudis, it isn’t, and perhaps not so much to the Americans either.
“我認(rèn)為，我們不可能混淆誰是我們?cè)谶@個(gè)地區(qū)的合作伙伴，誰不是，”奧巴馬的海灣事務(wù)顧問羅布•馬利(RobMalley)表示，“很清楚，誰是我們的盟友，誰是我們的合作伙伴。”對(duì)沙特阿拉伯來說，這一點(diǎn)并不清楚，或許對(duì)美國(guó)也沒那么清楚。
