尼日利亞為何流傳還我腐敗之說
在尼日利亞，有一個(gè)正在迅速流傳的話題標(biāo)簽：#還我腐敗#(#BringBack-Corruption)。這是對(duì)尼日利亞總統(tǒng)穆罕默杜•布哈里(Muhammadu Buhari)發(fā)起的反腐行動(dòng)的戲謔的批評(píng)，盡管如此，這一批評(píng)的確反映出他們對(duì)尼日利亞日益加劇的困境的真切憤怒。
Never mind that the main culprit of Nigeria’s woes is the price of oil: at $40 a barrel, a bigcomedown for a mono-commodity state whose cronies, schemers and skimmers have grownaccustomed to the $100-a-barrel lifestyle. Not a few Nigerians, even those too poor and tooremoved from power to leech off the petro-economy, are blaming Mr Buhari’s war on graft fortheir misfortune.
沒有人在意的是，造成尼日利亞困境的罪魁禍?zhǔn)灼鋵?shí)是油價(jià)：現(xiàn)在的油價(jià)是每桶40美元，這讓這個(gè)依賴單一大宗商品的國家非常落魄(這個(gè)國家的當(dāng)權(quán)者的親信、陰謀家和揩油者已經(jīng)習(xí)慣了油價(jià)處于每桶100美元時(shí)的生活方式)。相當(dāng)多的尼日利亞人，甚至是那些極度貧困、極度無權(quán)無勢(shì)以至于無法從石油經(jīng)濟(jì)中撈油水的人，都指責(zé)布哈里的反腐斗爭(zhēng)導(dǎo)致了他們的困境。
“With corruption a bag of pure water was N80. Without corruption a bag of pure water isN150 #BringBack-Corruption”, goes a typical refrain. Another highlights one company’s effortsto wring more profit from a shrivelling market. “Titus Sardine started with 4 fishes, it reducedto 3. Now it’s 2. In years to come, you’ll open Sardine and see ‘Try Again, No fish this time’ #BringBackCorruption.”
“有腐敗的時(shí)候一袋純凈水要80奈拉。沒有腐敗的時(shí)候一袋純凈水要150奈拉#還我腐敗#”，這是一條具有代表性的抱怨。另一條抱怨表明一家公司從萎縮的市場(chǎng)中擠出多一點(diǎn)利潤的嘗試。“Titus牌沙丁魚罐頭最開始一罐里頭有4條魚，然后減少到了3條?，F(xiàn)在有2條。未來幾年，你打開沙丁魚罐頭以后會(huì)看到‘再試一次，這次沒有魚’ #還我腐敗#”。
Mr Buhari has indeed made the pursuit of corruption, along with the fight against Boko Haramterrorists, his biggest priority, though the link with rising prices or diminishing fish portionsis not entirely obvious. Despite there being little if any direct correlation, many say that awhole system once lubricated by under-the-table money has simply seized up.
布哈里的確將打擊腐敗和博科哈拉姆(Boko Haram)恐怖分子放在了首位——盡管這和物價(jià)上升或者魚肉份量減少之間的聯(lián)系并不明顯。直接聯(lián)系即使有的話，也很微弱，但許多人說，整個(gè)曾經(jīng)靠臺(tái)面下資金的潤滑得以運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的體制如今已經(jīng)停止運(yùn)作。
Mr Buhari, a retired general, ran the country in the early 1980s after seizing power the old-fashioned way — in a military coup. He also railed against the endemic corruption thatmade Nigeria notorious, even in Africa. Whatever traction he gained during two years ofmilitary rule was quickly lost. Levels of state theft reached vertiginous heights undersubsequent leaders.
退役將軍布哈里曾在上世紀(jì)80年代初治理過這個(gè)國家，當(dāng)時(shí)他是通過一種老派的方式——軍事政變上臺(tái)的。那一次他也曾怒斥尼日利亞猖獗的腐敗，該國的腐敗即便在非洲也是臭名昭著的。布哈里在那為期兩年的軍事統(tǒng)治中取得的任何成果后來很快都消失了。在后來數(shù)任領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的統(tǒng)治下，盜竊國家財(cái)產(chǎn)的猖獗程度達(dá)到令人發(fā)指的水平。
Now, after his surprise win in last year’s election, Mr Buhari is having another go. Under hisdirection, state prosecutors have gone after several high-ranking members of the previousadministration of Goodluck Jonathan, though the former president, who had the grace to quitoffice when electors booted him out, is assumed to be safe from prosecution.
去年意外在選舉中獲勝的布哈里正在進(jìn)行又一次嘗試。在他的指令下，尼日利亞檢方已經(jīng)起訴了前總統(tǒng)古德勒克•喬納森(Goodluck Jonathan)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的上一屆政府中的多名高官，盡管喬納森本人應(yīng)該會(huì)被免于起訴(他在被選民投下臺(tái)時(shí)爽快地讓出了位置)。
Results have been mixed. The trial of Sambo Dasuki, a former national security adviser, hasrun into trouble over alleged procedural irregularities, blamed by some on Mr Buhari’s militaryinstincts and his impatience with the niceties of the law. Mr Dasuki is accused of helping to“divert” about $2.1bn meant to have been deployed in fighting Boko Haram.
結(jié)果好壞參半。對(duì)前國家安全顧問桑博•達(dá)蘇基(Sambo Dasuki)的審判因?yàn)樯嫦映绦蚴М?dāng)而遇到了麻煩，一些人將其歸咎于布哈里的軍人本能和他對(duì)法律細(xì)節(jié)的不耐煩。達(dá)蘇基被指控幫助他人“挪用”本應(yīng)用于打擊博科哈拉姆分子的約21億美元的撥款。
Recent attacks on power stations and oil and gas pipelines have been blamed on saboteursangered by Mr Buhari’s crackdown on nefarious activities. As lights flicker off and privategenerators cough into action, some Nigerians have taken to muttering: “When you fightcorruption, corruption fights back.”
最近針對(duì)發(fā)電廠和油氣管道的襲擊，被認(rèn)為是布哈里打擊犯罪活動(dòng)激起的蓄意破壞。一盞盞燈忽閃著熄滅，私人發(fā)電機(jī)轟隆隆地運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)起來，一些尼日利亞人禁不住嘟囔：“你打擊腐敗，腐敗也在還擊。”
Champagne importers and car dealers, too, are complaining that officials are not spending likethey used to. “There’s not enough money flowing around because everything was beingfinanced by corruption,” says Mohammed Garuba, head of asset management atCardinalStone, a Lagos-based financial institution.
香檳進(jìn)口商和汽車經(jīng)銷商也抱怨官員們出手不如過去闊綽了。“流轉(zhuǎn)的資金不足，因?yàn)橐磺卸际强扛瘮硖峁┵Y金的，”位于拉各斯(Lagos)的金融機(jī)構(gòu)CardinalStone的資產(chǎn)管理主管穆罕默德•加魯巴(MohammedGaruba)說。
Mr Buhari’s drive is laudable. It is, however, unlikely to work. He is right to end the culture ofimpunity by going after big offenders. But unless he can tackle the underlying causes ofcorruption, the victims of his campaign will be seen as arbitrary and his victories fleeting.
布哈里的反腐行動(dòng)值得贊譽(yù)，然而卻不太可能奏效。他為了終結(jié)犯罪者不受懲處的氛圍去追究重大犯罪者的責(zé)任，這樣做是正確的。但除非他能夠解決腐敗的病根，否則人們就會(huì)認(rèn)為他的反腐行動(dòng)是想針對(duì)誰就針對(duì)誰，他的勝利也將是曇花一現(xiàn)。
So what are the causes? Central are the opportunities presented to a parasitic coterie ofmiddlemen, gatekeepers, rationers, arbitrageurs, licensers and fixers. They trade in scarcity,much of it of their own devising. They can get you anything, from business permits to oil blocks— if the price is right. In such a rentier system, the disincentives to actually make anything arehuge. Mr Buhari has complained with only mild exaggeration that Nigeria cannot evenproduce toothpicks.
那么病根有哪些呢?核心問題是，由中間人、看門人、配給者、套利者、許可發(fā)放者和代人疏通者組成的寄生階層有空子可鉆。他們把“稀缺性”當(dāng)生意來做，這種稀缺性大部分又是他們自己設(shè)計(jì)出來的。他們能為你搞到任何東西，從經(jīng)營許可到石油區(qū)塊——只要你出合適的價(jià)錢。在這樣一個(gè)食利者體制中，做任何實(shí)業(yè)的障礙都是巨大的。布哈里曾經(jīng)抱怨尼日利亞連牙簽都造不出來——這話并不算十分夸張。
To tackle the root cause of corruption, Nigeria needs to purge rent-seeking opportunities.Nowhere are these more evident than in the oil industry. Nigeria is the largest petroleumproducer in Africa. Its output of 2m barrels a day is controlled by the Nigerian NationalPetroleum Corporation, a many-tentacled entity which — and you can almost see the flashingred warning sign — both regulates and participates in the oil business. The NNPC dabbles inexploration, distribution and refining, though the latter mostly consists of exporting rawcrude and importing refined products at scandalous prices.
要解決腐敗的病根，尼日利亞需要清除尋租的機(jī)會(huì)。這一點(diǎn)在石油行業(yè)再明顯不過。尼日利亞是非洲最大的石油生產(chǎn)國。該國200萬桶原油的日產(chǎn)量控制在尼日利亞國家石油公司(NNPC)的手中。該公司業(yè)務(wù)范圍很廣。它既是石油行業(yè)的監(jiān)管者，也是石油行業(yè)的參與者(你幾乎都能看見紅色的警示燈在閃爍)。尼日利亞國家石油公司涉足開采、分銷和精煉，盡管所謂的“精煉”基本就是出口原油，然后以令人發(fā)指的價(jià)格進(jìn)口精煉石油產(chǎn)品。
The NNPC is a case study in how to sacrifice national interest to personal gain. The auditor-general recently found that it had failed to remit $16bn to the Treasury in 2014 alone.Amazingly, in oil-abundant Nigeria, most people have no electricity. One does not have to be amarket fundamentalist to conclude that the NNPC needs shrinking to as small a size aspossible, where zero is the optimal number.
尼日利亞國家石油公司堪稱如何犧牲國家利益中飽私囊的典型案例。尼總審計(jì)長(zhǎng)最近發(fā)現(xiàn)，僅2014年一年，該公司沒有上交給財(cái)政部的資金就達(dá)到160億美元。驚人的是，在石油資源豐富的尼日利亞，大多人還用不上電。一個(gè)人不必是市場(chǎng)原教旨主義者就能得出結(jié)論，尼日利亞國家石油公司應(yīng)該盡可能削減規(guī)模，最好是徹底消失。
Few doubt Mr Buhari’s sincerity in taking on corruption. Yet punishing individual wrongdoerswill not be enough. Unless he can devise coherent strategies to squeeze graft from thesystem, it will return with a vengeance once he has gone. Then the advocates of#BringBackCorruption will have got their way. It will, though, be a cause for anything butcelebration.
很少有人質(zhì)疑布哈里打擊腐敗的誠意。然而，懲罰單個(gè)的違法分子是不夠的。除非他能夠設(shè)計(jì)出連貫的策略將腐敗從體制中徹底鏟除，否則一旦他離開，腐敗就會(huì)以變本加厲之勢(shì)卷土重來。那時(shí)候支持#還我腐敗#的人就如愿了。然而，這唯獨(dú)不值得慶祝。
