巴菲特86歲高齡轉(zhuǎn)變投資方向

Warren Buffett once observed that, “When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.” So what happens when an investor with a holy reputation tackles an unholy task?

沃倫•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)有一次發(fā)表這樣的見解：“當(dāng)一個以優(yōu)秀著稱的管理層接手一個以基本面糟糕聞名的企業(yè)時，往往是后者的聲譽(yù)會保留下來。”那么，當(dāng)一位有著圣人美譽(yù)的投資者接手一項不神圣的任務(wù)時會怎樣呢?

One answer was given this week by Kraft Heinz, in which Mr Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway is a leading investor. It withdrew a $143bn attempt to take over Unilever amid hostility to its relentless approach to cutting costs and jobs. Mr Buffett, who sits on Kraft Heinz’s board, clearly wanted his reputation for saintliness to remain intact.

上周卡夫亨氏(Kraft Heinz)給出了一個答案，巴菲特旗下的伯克希爾哈撒韋(Berkshire Hathaway)是該公司的領(lǐng)先投資者?？ǚ蚝嗍戏艞壛艘?430億美元收購聯(lián)合利華(Unilever)的計劃，這件事的背景是卡夫亨氏無情削減成本和裁員的戰(zhàn)略引發(fā)敵意。在卡夫亨氏董事會擁有一席的巴菲特，顯然希望他的圣人名譽(yù)保留下來。

Paul Polman, Unilever’s Dutch chief executive, runs the multinational as an exemplar of sustainability and stakeholder capitalism rather than the pure shareholder variety, and the abortive bid pitched two of Mr Buffett’s instincts against each other. One is to invest in processed food and drink companies such as Coca-Cola and Kraft Heinz with reliable global brands; the other is to be liked.

聯(lián)合利華的荷蘭籍首席執(zhí)行官保羅•波爾曼(Paul Polman)執(zhí)掌這家跨國公司的方式，堪稱可持續(xù)性和利益相關(guān)者資本主義的典范(而非純粹的股東資本主義)，而這筆流產(chǎn)的收購讓巴菲特的兩種本能發(fā)生矛盾：一是投資于有著可靠全球品牌的加工食品和飲料公司，例如可口可樂(Coca-Cola)和卡夫亨氏;二是招人喜歡。

The latter does not bother Jorge Paulo Lemann, the Brazilian billionaire whose 3G Capital private equity firm is cutting through the food and drink industry. As growth has slowed nearly to a halt thanks to price deflation and competition from makers of healthier fare, 3G has reacted by rolling up consumer groups and slashing budgets.

后面一點(diǎn)不影響巴西億萬富翁若熱•保羅•雷曼(Jorge Paulo Lemann)，他的私人股本公司3G資本(3G Capital)正馳騁于食品和飲料行業(yè)。隨著價格通縮以及更健康食品生產(chǎn)商的競爭導(dǎo)致行業(yè)增速幾乎停滯，3G資本的反應(yīng)是收購消費(fèi)品集團(tuán)并大幅削減預(yù)算。

It troubles Mr Buffett and so it should, for it strikes at the heart of how he built his company, and his unique investment record. “At Berkshire, we only go where we are welcome,” he promised in his 2015 letter to shareholders in a defensive passage about how he works with 3G despite their conflicting methods. If nothing else, it displayed the tension in his own mind.

這讓巴菲特感到苦惱，他應(yīng)該如此，因為這直擊他打造企業(yè)的方式和他的獨(dú)特投資記錄。他曾在2015年的致股東信中承諾：“在伯克希爾，我們只投資于我們受歡迎的公司，”這段為自己辯護(hù)的文字講述他如何與3G合作，盡管雙方在方法上存在分歧。即使沒有別的意義，這至少顯示了他內(nèi)心的矛盾。

It was once easier to be nice. Although Berkshire Hathaway has made much of its money in insurance, Mr Buffett was happiest investing in consumer brands, particularly in the US, with a “moat” to protect them: they were less vulnerable to competition because people always needed to eat, drink and buy household products, and instinctively turned to familiar names.

曾幾何時，要做到彬彬有禮較為容易。盡管伯克希爾哈撒韋在保險業(yè)賺了大錢，但讓巴菲特最高興的是投資于消費(fèi)品牌，尤其是在美國，這些品牌簡直像是有一條“護(hù)城河”在守衛(wèi)它們：它們不那么容易遭遇競爭，因為人們總是需要吃喝和購買家用品，而且總是會本能地轉(zhuǎn)向熟悉的品牌。

A quarter century ago, his biggest non-financial investments — the “sainted seven” — were brands that included See’s Candies and Nebraska Furniture Mart. The sweet spot emerged in the 1980s as US companies started to go global. In his 1989 shareholder letter, he noted that overseas sales of Coca-Cola, in which he had just raised his stake, were “virtually exploding”.

25年前，他的最大幾筆非金融投資——被稱為“七圣徒”(sainted seven)——包括時思糖果(See’s Candies)和內(nèi)布拉斯加家具賣場(Nebraska Furniture Mart)等品牌。上世紀(jì)80年代出現(xiàn)了特別有利的時機(jī)，當(dāng)時美國企業(yè)開始走向全球。在巴菲特1989年的致股東信中，他指出可口可樂(他剛剛增持了該公司的股份)的海外銷售“幾乎是在爆炸性增長”。

Mr Buffett embodies his belief in food brands. He drinks several cans of Coke a day, often accompanied by potato sticks made by Utz, a Pennsylvania company he has discussed buying, and picks up breakfast from McDonald’s on his drive to work. He ingests as he invests.

巴菲特踐行著他對食品品牌的信念。他每天喝幾罐可口可樂，經(jīng)常搭配賓夕法尼亞州Utz公司生產(chǎn)的薯條(他曾討論收購那家公司)，在驅(qū)車上班時順路買一份麥當(dāng)勞(McDonald’s)的早餐。他投資于自己吃喝的品牌。

He used to enjoy another advantage: owning strong brands in growing markets meant that he could leave the executives who ran them alone, rather than ripping up their way of operating. “Our role is simply to create an environment in which these CEOs . . . can maximise both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from their jobs,” he wrote last year.

他曾經(jīng)擁有另一項優(yōu)勢：擁有增長型市場的強(qiáng)大品牌意味著，他可以讓公司高管們獨(dú)立經(jīng)營，而不去擾亂他們的經(jīng)營方式。他去年寫道：“我們的任務(wù)只是創(chuàng)建一個環(huán)境，讓這些首席執(zhí)行官們……能夠把他們的管理有效性和他們從工作中獲得的快樂最大化。”

But the food and drink business has developed in ways that makes such cosiness impossible to sustain. Companies such as Unilever and Nestlé are larger and more global — collections of billion-dollar brands rather than owners of one or two. They are run by a global cadre: the top two executives at Kraft Heinz hail from Brazil.

但食品和飲料行業(yè)的發(fā)展讓這種安樂變得不可能持續(xù)。聯(lián)合利華和雀巢(Nestlé)這樣的公司規(guī)模變得更大，也更全球化，它們旗下有一系列價值數(shù)十億美元的品牌，而不是僅僅擁有一兩個品牌。它們由一個全球管理團(tuán)隊經(jīng)營：卡夫亨氏的兩名級別最高的高管來自巴西。

The industry has also stopped growing. The international acceleration has given way to falling sales at some companies and lacklustre expansion at others. Nestlé last week announced a “time out” from annual organic sales growth target of between 5 and 6 per cent. Even before Kraft Heinz’s bid, Mr Polman had adopted 3G’s cost-cutting mantra at Unilever.

這個行業(yè)也停止了增長。加快國際化已經(jīng)讓位于一些公司銷售額下滑，還有一些公司擴(kuò)張乏力。雀巢最近宣布，5%到6%的年度有機(jī)銷售增長目標(biāo)“需要停一停”。甚至在卡夫亨氏出價之前，波爾曼就在聯(lián)合利華借鑒了3G資本削減成本的理念。

Hence Mr Buffett’s hesitation. His investments alongside 3G Capital first in Heinz and then Kraft have been highly profitable but sit uncomfortably with his preference for maximising happiness. Kraft Heinz has shed 13,000 jobs since the companies merged two years ago — as Mr Buffett says, 3G specialises in “eliminating many unnecessary costs . . . very promptly”.

這就是為什么巴菲特猶豫不決。他與3G資本先是在亨氏、后來在卡夫的投資獲利頗豐，但這與他最大化快樂的偏好相悖。自兩家公司在兩年前合并以來，卡夫亨氏已裁員1.3萬人，正如巴菲特所言，3G資本專長于“消除很多不必要的成本……而且非常神速”。

The Unilever bid has confronted him with a choice. He either has to behave with naked aggression in the industry he knows best or find other outlets for Berkshire’s capital. I doubt whether he could change personality at the age of 86 even if he wanted to, so he must amend his investment strategy.

收購聯(lián)合利華的計劃讓他面臨一個選擇。他要么不得不用赤裸裸的攻擊性在自己最了解的行業(yè)呼風(fēng)喚雨，要么為伯克希爾哈撒韋的資本找到其他投資對象。我懷疑86歲高齡的他能否改變性格(即便他想改)，因此他必須修改自己的投資戰(zhàn)略。

He is doing so. Berkshire holds 9 per cent of Coca-Cola but it has shed investments in Procter & Gamble and Walmart, and the “sainted seven” consumer companies have been overtaken in importance by a “powerhouse five” of industrial holdings. They include BNSF, the US railroad group that he acquired in 2009, and Lubrizol, which produces speciality chemicals.

他正在這么做。伯克希爾哈撒韋仍持有可口可樂9%股權(quán)，但它減持了寶潔(Procter & Gamble)和沃爾瑪(Walmart)的股權(quán)，如今工業(yè)企業(yè)“五大金剛”的重要性取代了“七圣徒”消費(fèi)品公司。這“五大金剛”包括巴菲特于2009年收購的美國鐵路運(yùn)營商北伯林頓鐵路公司(BNSF)和特種化學(xué)品制造商路博潤(Lubrizol)。

Neither makes tasty snacks but both meet his aim of investing in “large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires”. They are also growing profitably without the need to slash costs and jobs. The food and drink industry used to be like that but it is no longer sweet enough for Mr Buffett.

這兩家公司都不生產(chǎn)好吃的零食，但都符合他投資于“滿足基本需求和愿望的大企業(yè)”的目標(biāo)。此外，它們都在盈利狀態(tài)下增長，而無需削減成本和就業(yè)。食品和飲料行業(yè)曾經(jīng)如此，但該行業(yè)對巴菲特而言已經(jīng)不夠誘人了。

[email protected] 譯者/梁艷裳