21世紀(jì)的中印競爭

China has spent the past decade notching up firsts — world’s largest manufacturer, world’s largest exporter, world’s largest foreign reserves, world’s largest market for vehicles. In 2014, the International Monetary Fund even reported that, ranked by purchasing power, China is the world’s largest economy.

過去十年，中國一直在收集各種“第一”——全球最大制造業(yè)國家、全球最大出口國、全球最大外匯儲(chǔ)備、全球最大汽車市場。2014年，國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)甚至曾報(bào)告稱，以購買力計(jì)算，中國是全球最大經(jīng)濟(jì)體。

But there is one “world’s largest” title that China may have lost. New demographic research suggests that India, not China, could be the most populous country in the world — with unofficial estimates of China’s population revised down to just under 1.3bn, compared with India’s population of 1.33bn. That news could feed the growing sense in India, that while the rise of China has been the global story of the past 30 years, the next 30 will be India’s time to shine.

不過，中國也許已經(jīng)喪失了一個(gè)“全球最大”頭銜。新的人口研究顯示，全球人口最多國家可能是印度而非中國——中國人口的非官方估計(jì)向下修正至略低于13億，而印度人口為13.3億。這一新聞可能會(huì)助長印度一種日益攀升的感受，即盡管過去30年中國的崛起一直是個(gè)全球話題，下一個(gè)30年將成為印度閃耀之時(shí)。

Population trends in India certainly look more favourable for long-term economic growth than those in China. It is not just that India’s population may have surpassed that of China and will grow faster in future. More important, the Indian population is significantly younger than that of China, which means that it will have a larger working-age population than China, and fewer retired people to support. The recent history of Japan demonstrates that an ageing and shrinking population has a powerful negative effect on economic growth.

與中國相比，印度的人口趨勢看起來對長期經(jīng)濟(jì)增長當(dāng)然更有利一些。這并不僅僅因?yàn)橛《热丝诨蛞殉^中國，并將在未來以更快速度增長。更重要的是，印度人口比中國顯著年輕，這意味著印度將擁有比中國更龐大的勞動(dòng)年齡人口，需要供養(yǎng)的退休人口更少。日本近期的歷史證明，老齡化并處于收縮中的人口，對經(jīng)濟(jì)增長會(huì)產(chǎn)生巨大的負(fù)面影響。

These demographic forces may already be feeding through into growth rates. After decades in which India had to put up with jibes about the “Hindu rate of growth”, India is growing faster than China, with growth projected to exceed 7 per cent this year, compared with China’s official figure of 6.5 per cent.

這種人口因素也許已經(jīng)在向經(jīng)濟(jì)增長速度反饋了。在不得不忍受了數(shù)十年“印度增速”的嘲笑之后，印度的增長速度正在超過中國，預(yù)計(jì)今年的增速會(huì)超過7%，相比之下中國官方增長數(shù)據(jù)為6.5%。

But there are also some powerful qualifications to the idea that India is poised to catch up and then outstrip China. First, the Chinese economy is already five times larger, in real terms, than that of India. That means that even though India is currently growing slightly faster than China in percentage terms, the gap in the sizes of the two economies is growing, not shrinking.

不過，對于印度就要趕上和超過中國的觀點(diǎn)，存在一些強(qiáng)有力的限定條件。首先，中國實(shí)際經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模已經(jīng)是印度的5倍。這意味著即便印度目前的增速百分比比中國略高一些，中印兩個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體規(guī)模上的差距仍在增大，而不是在縮小。

Second, while demography favours India, in other important respects, China is better placed. Thirty per cent of the Indian population is illiterate, compared with under 5 per cent of the Chinese population. China’s infrastructure is also far superior to that of India, reflected in roads, railways and basic sanitation. Half of Indians still lack access to basic toilet facilities.

其次，盡管人口因素有利于印度，在其他重要方面，中國則更有利一些。印度30%的人口是文盲，而中國文盲比例則低于5%。中國的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施也遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)優(yōu)于印度，這表現(xiàn)在公路、鐵路和基本衛(wèi)生系統(tǒng)上。半數(shù)印度人仍然缺乏基本的廁所設(shè)施。

These kinds of comparisons are more than a mere parlour game. They matter because China and India are the two emerging superpowers of the 21st century. The nations are already engaged in a low-key geopolitical and ideological struggle.

這種比較不僅僅是文字游戲。它們的重要性在于，中國和印度是21世紀(jì)兩個(gè)新興超級大國。兩個(gè)國家已卷入了一輪低調(diào)的地緣政治和意識(shí)形態(tài)斗爭。

India has reacted with alarm to China’s ambitious plans to build infrastructure links across Asia, fearing that they will create a Chinese sphere of influence that will encircle India. When China hosted its “Belt and Road” forum in Beijing last month to promote plans to spend billions on infrastructure links across Eurasia, more than 100 countries sent official delegations — but India stayed away. The Indians fear that China is re-creating a tributary system in which Asian economies are bound into an economic system in which “all roads lead to Beijing”.

對于中國建立橫跨亞洲的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施網(wǎng)絡(luò)的大膽計(jì)劃，印度的反應(yīng)十分警覺，它擔(dān)心這些計(jì)劃將打造包圍印度的中國勢力范圍。上個(gè)月，中國在北京召開了“一帶一路”國際合作高峰論壇，推廣其斥巨資建設(shè)連接歐亞的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的計(jì)劃。當(dāng)時(shí)，逾100個(gè)國家派出了官方代表——印度卻置身事外。印度人擔(dān)心，中國正在重新建立一種朝貢體系。在這個(gè)體系中，亞洲各經(jīng)濟(jì)體被捆綁到一個(gè)“條條大路通北京”的經(jīng)濟(jì)系統(tǒng)中。

The implications of these infrastructure developments are strategic and economic. At a time when China’s navy is growing fast, Chinese-funded ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan are regarded with particular suspicion in Delhi. Growing ties between Pakistan and China create anxiety in India, which has fought four wars with Pakistan. Beijing and Delhi have their own unresolved territorial dispute, dating back to the war they fought in 1962, and the Indians worry that China is increasing pressure over its claims on the Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh.

這些基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施開發(fā)的影響既有戰(zhàn)略上的，也有經(jīng)濟(jì)上的。在這個(gè)中國海軍正在迅速擴(kuò)大的時(shí)期，新德里方面正以尤為懷疑的眼光看待中國出資在斯里蘭卡和巴基斯坦建設(shè)的港口。中國和巴基斯坦之間日益增長的往來，在與巴基斯坦有過四場戰(zhàn)爭的印度產(chǎn)生了焦慮。北京和新德里之間自身還存在沒有解決的領(lǐng)土爭端，這些領(lǐng)土爭端要回溯至1962年它們之間爆發(fā)的戰(zhàn)爭。印度人還擔(dān)心，中國正在加大其對印度阿魯納恰爾邦(Arunachal Pradesh)聲索主權(quán)的力度。

Military budgets in China and India have been rising sharply. China has launched its second aircraft carrier and is working on a third. And India has become the world’s largest importer of weaponry, after Saudi Arabia. The Indians have also stepped up military exercises with the US and Japan — two countries regarded as strategic adversaries by China. Shashank Joshi of the Royal United Services Institute in London argues that, as strategic tension rises, Indian-Chinese relations are “in their worst state for over a decade”.

中印兩國軍事預(yù)算一直在急劇增長。中國第二艘航母已經(jīng)下水，并已開工建造第三艘航母。印度則已成為僅次于沙特阿拉伯的全球第二大武器進(jìn)口國。此外，印度人還加大了與美國和日本的軍演力度——美日被中國視為戰(zhàn)略對手。倫敦英國皇家聯(lián)合軍種研究院(Royal United Services Institute)的沙善•喬希(Shashank Joshi)認(rèn)為，由于戰(zhàn)略緊張升級，印中關(guān)系“正處于十多年來的最差狀態(tài)”。

One particular Chinese gripe is the fact that the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, detested by Beijing, continues to be based in India. His presence points to the ideological element in the rivalry between India and China. Chinese analysts have often contrasted the success of their development model with the slower growth produced by India’s “chaotic” democracy. Indians like to respond that their democratic system will ultimately prove more stable than China’s one-party state. There is also a moral aspect to this argument. Indians boast of freedom of speech and independent courts. The Chinese respond that the ordinary citizen in China lives a more comfortable and dignified life than the average Indian.

中國人尤其感到不滿的，是北京方面憎惡的西藏精神領(lǐng)袖達(dá)賴?yán)?Dalai Lama)一直居住在印度的事實(shí)。達(dá)賴?yán)锏拇嬖?，顯示了印中對抗的意識(shí)形態(tài)元素。中國分析人士時(shí)常將中國發(fā)展模式的成功與印度“混亂”民主制度產(chǎn)生的較慢增長速度作對比。印度人則喜歡回應(yīng)稱，他們的民主體制最終會(huì)被證明比中國的一黨制政府更穩(wěn)定。這一辯論還涉及道德方面。印度人對他們的言論自由和獨(dú)立法庭夸耀不已。中國人則回應(yīng)稱，比起印度的普通人，中國普通公民過得更舒適、更有尊嚴(yán)。

These arguments reflect the fact that China and India represent not just rival powers but also rival political systems, ideologies, even civilisations. Western political analysts are preoccupied by the emerging power struggle between the US and China. But as economic and political power shifts to Asia, it is the contest between China and India that may ultimately shape the 21st century.

這些辯論反映出這樣一個(gè)事實(shí)：中國和印度不僅僅代表兩個(gè)相互競爭的國家，還代表兩個(gè)相互競爭的政治體制、意識(shí)形態(tài)、甚至文明。西方政治分析人士頭腦里想的都是美中之間的新興強(qiáng)國斗爭。然而，隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治影響力向亞洲轉(zhuǎn)移，最終決定21世紀(jì)格局的，也許會(huì)是中印之間的競爭。