美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)失望 轉(zhuǎn)而寄望俄羅斯對(duì)朝施壓

When Kim Yong-nam, North Korea’s ceremonial leader, attended the Iranian presidential inauguration this month, he flew via Moscow, even though a flight via Beijing would have been much more convenient.

朝鮮名義上的國(guó)家元首金永南(Kim Yong Nam)本月參加伊朗總統(tǒng)就職儀式時(shí)曾繞道莫斯科，盡管航班從北京中轉(zhuǎn)要方便得多。

To some observers, the choice of stop-over is emblematic of a North Korean regime that seems increasingly estranged from its Chinese ally over irs nuclear ambitions and more reliant on long-standing ties with Russia. Pyongyang’s shift of attention also creates a potential opening that US diplomats are keep to explore as they search for ways to curb North Korea’s fast-developing nuclear missile programme.

對(duì)于一些觀察人士而言，轉(zhuǎn)機(jī)地的選擇標(biāo)志著朝鮮政權(quán)似乎因其核野心越來(lái)越與中國(guó)盟友疏遠(yuǎn)，而更依賴與俄羅斯的長(zhǎng)期關(guān)系。朝鮮轉(zhuǎn)變注意力還創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)美國(guó)外交人士渴望利用的潛在機(jī)會(huì)，他們正尋找方法限制朝鮮快速發(fā)展的核導(dǎo)彈計(jì)劃。

“The North Koreans are offended with China, and many of their political contacts are either frozen or seriously narrowed,” said Valery Sukhinin, Russia’s former ambassador to Pyongyang and one of Moscow’s most seasoned Korea hands.

前俄羅斯駐朝鮮大使、俄羅斯經(jīng)驗(yàn)最豐富的朝鮮問(wèn)題專家之一瓦列里•蘇希寧(Valery Sukhinin)表示：“朝鮮對(duì)中國(guó)不滿，他們之間的很多政治聯(lián)系要么被凍結(jié)，要么被大幅收縮。”

North Korean government officials have made several visits to Russia over the past year and sometimes meet at events in Moscow. Some western observers believe that inside North Korea, contacts between Pyongyang officials and Russian diplomats now surpass those with China.

過(guò)去一年，朝鮮政府官員多次出訪俄羅斯，有時(shí)會(huì)在莫斯科的活動(dòng)上會(huì)面。一些西方觀察人士認(rèn)為，在朝鮮內(nèi)部，朝鮮官員與俄羅斯外交官的接觸現(xiàn)在超過(guò)了與中國(guó)的接觸。

The Trump administration has become frustrated with China’s reluctance to use its economic leverage — it accounts for 90 per cent of North Korea’s trade — to lean on Kim Jong-un even if it backed a new round of UN sanctions earlier this month.

盡管本月早些時(shí)候中國(guó)支持了聯(lián)合國(guó)(UN)對(duì)朝鮮的新一輪制裁，但特朗普(Trump)政府對(duì)中國(guó)不愿利用經(jīng)濟(jì)影響力向金正恩(Kim Jong-un)施壓感到失望。中國(guó)占朝鮮對(duì)外貿(mào)易的90%。

Even though relations between the US and Russia are poor, Washington has begun to look to Moscow to carry sway in Pyongyang.

雖然美國(guó)與俄羅斯之間的關(guān)系不好，但美國(guó)已開(kāi)始寄望于俄羅斯對(duì)朝鮮施加影響。

“You can see the US testing Russian access and influence in North Korea,” said a western diplomat. “In March and April [US secretary of state Rex] Tillerson was testing Chinese access and influence and that’s being tested now with Russia”.

“你可以看到，美國(guó)正在測(cè)試俄羅斯在朝鮮的渠道和影響力，”一位西方外交人士表示，“今年3月和4月，(美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)卿雷克斯•蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson))曾測(cè)試中國(guó)的渠道和影響力，現(xiàn)在是在測(cè)試俄羅斯。”

This month, Mr Tillerson spoke of China and Russia in the same breath when he said the pair have “very good, open channels of communication” with Pyongyang.

本月，蒂勒森同時(shí)談到了中國(guó)和俄羅斯，他表示，兩國(guó)與朝鮮有著“非常良好且暢通的溝通渠道”。

“I’m hopeful that they can use their influence — and I think they do have influence with the regime — to bring them to a point of dialogue,” he said.

他表示：“我希望他們可以利用自己的影響力(我認(rèn)為他們確實(shí)對(duì)朝鮮政權(quán)有影響力)，讓他們達(dá)到可以對(duì)話的水平。”

Moscow has in recent months tried to appear reasonably neutral as tensions rose, warning both sides of the perils of escalating rhetoric. Alongside China, it is pushing for talks based on a simultaneous suspension of North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing and of large joint military exercises by US and South Korean forces.

最近幾個(gè)月，隨著緊張關(guān)系升級(jí)，俄羅斯試圖表現(xiàn)出適度的中立，就言論升級(jí)的危險(xiǎn)向雙方發(fā)出警告。俄羅斯正與中國(guó)一道，促成以朝鮮暫停核試驗(yàn)和導(dǎo)彈試射、同時(shí)美國(guó)和韓國(guó)軍隊(duì)暫停大規(guī)模聯(lián)合軍演為基礎(chǔ)的對(duì)話。

“The US is waiting to see if there’s a positive response from Pyongyang or if it’s dismissive to see how much leverage Russia has in terms of bringing them to the table,” said the diplomat.

這位外交人士表示：“美國(guó)正觀望朝鮮是否會(huì)做出正面回應(yīng)，或者朝鮮是否會(huì)對(duì)俄在把朝鮮帶到談判桌旁來(lái)方面所具備的影響力表示不屑。”

But American expectations that Russia could become a key player in mediating the crisis are treated with scepticism in Moscow.

但美國(guó)這種對(duì)俄羅斯或?qū)⒃谖有@場(chǎng)危機(jī)中發(fā)揮重要作用的預(yù)期，在俄羅斯卻受到質(zhì)疑。

Russian experts warn that Moscow’s support, alongside China, for the latest UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea has undermined what little leverage it had left on its former ally.

俄羅斯專家警告稱，俄羅斯和中國(guó)一起支持聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)對(duì)朝鮮的最新制裁，進(jìn)一步削弱了俄羅斯對(duì)這個(gè)曾經(jīng)的盟友所剩無(wú)幾的影響力。

More than 17 years ago, Russia replaced the Soviet Union’s alliance treaty with North Korea, under which it was required to come to Pyongyang’s support in the event of a military attack, with a friendship treaty without this clause.

蘇聯(lián)曾與朝鮮簽訂同盟性質(zhì)的條約，根據(jù)條約規(guī)定，蘇聯(lián)必須在朝鮮遭受武裝攻擊的情況下為其提供支持。逾17年前，俄羅斯與朝鮮簽訂的友好條約去掉了這一條款。

“North Korea had therefore long lowered its expectations towards us. But at least they would not blame or target us in their angry rhetoric,” said Mr Sukhinin. “But in their most recent statements, Russia was criticised by name for the first time — for bowing to the US and supporting Washington.”

蘇希寧表示：“朝鮮因此早就降低了對(duì)我們的期望。但至少他們不會(huì)用憤怒的言辭責(zé)備或者針對(duì)我們。但在最近的聲明中，俄羅斯首次被點(diǎn)名指責(zé)，理由是俄羅斯屈從美國(guó)并支持華盛頓方面。”

He added that US president Donald Trump’s public expression of thanks to China and Russia for supporting the last UNSC resolution had been particularly unhelpful. “If this continues, they may distance themselves from us, too. They feel isolated, and their response to that is to ratchet up their nuclear programme.”

他補(bǔ)充稱，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)公開(kāi)表示感謝中國(guó)和俄羅斯支持最新的聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)決議，這尤其有消極作用。“如果這種狀況持續(xù)的話，他們可能也會(huì)疏遠(yuǎn)我們。他們感覺(jué)受到孤立，他們的回應(yīng)是加快核武器計(jì)劃。”

Perhaps most importantly, the Krermlin has a radically different assessment from the US of the stand-off over North Korea’s nuclear programme. “From the Russian government’s point of view, the disruptive power in this crisis is still the US,” said Alexander Gabuev, an Asia expert at the Carnegie Moscow Centre.

或許最重要的是，克里姆林宮對(duì)朝鮮核計(jì)劃僵局的評(píng)估與美國(guó)截然不同?？▋?nèi)基莫斯科中心(Carnegie Moscow Center)亞洲問(wèn)題專家亞歷山大•加布耶夫(Alexander Gabuev)表示：“從俄羅斯政府的角度來(lái)看，這場(chǎng)危機(jī)中的破壞性力量仍是美國(guó)。”

Russian officials see North Korea’s obsession with developing nuclear weapons as the understandable attempt of a weak, isolated country to protect itself against a vastly more powerful adversary.

俄羅斯官員認(rèn)為，朝鮮作為一個(gè)受到孤立的弱小國(guó)家，癡迷于發(fā)展核武器保護(hù)自己免受實(shí)力強(qiáng)得多的對(duì)手的傷害，是可以理解的。

Officially, Moscow refuses to recognise North Korea as a nuclear power, hence its support for UN sanctions. But most Russian foreign policy officials and analysts argue that the only realistic option for defusing the crisis would be a deal granting North Korea the status of a de-facto nuclear power similar to that of India and Pakistan — without formal recognition, but without attempts to disarm it either.

莫斯科的官方立場(chǎng)是拒絕承認(rèn)朝鮮的核國(guó)家地位，因此支持聯(lián)合國(guó)制裁。但大多數(shù)俄羅斯外交政策官員和分析人士指出，解除危機(jī)的唯一現(xiàn)實(shí)選項(xiàng)是簽署協(xié)議授予朝鮮事實(shí)上的核國(guó)家地位，與印度和巴基斯坦類似——不正式承認(rèn)，但也不試圖讓他們解除核武。

“Instead of chasing an impossible and unachievable goal of a non-nuclear North Korea, the U.S. and other interested parties should quietly switch to a less pleasant, but realistically achievable goal: North Korea with small and stable nuclear arsenal,” Andrei Lankov, a Russian professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, wrote in a commentary on the options for resolving the crisis.

韓國(guó)國(guó)民大學(xué)(Kookmin University)的俄羅斯教授安德烈•蘭科夫(Andrei Lankov)在一篇關(guān)于朝鮮危機(jī)解決選項(xiàng)的評(píng)論文章中寫道：“美國(guó)和其他相關(guān)各方應(yīng)該悄然轉(zhuǎn)向不那么令人愉快、但在現(xiàn)實(shí)中可行的目標(biāo)，即擁有小型、穩(wěn)定核武庫(kù)的朝鮮，而不是追逐讓朝鮮成為無(wú)核國(guó)家這個(gè)不可能且無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)的目標(biāo)。”

“North Korea’s goal is to make everyone accept, even if not officially, that it has nuclear weapons now – just like India, Pakistan and Israel. They want to achieve such a status,” said Mr Sukhinin. “We don’t believe that North Korea threatens us or China, but at the same time it is important for us to ensure that this process doesn’t broaden further, that there is no more proliferation.”

蘇希寧表示：“朝鮮的目標(biāo)是讓所有人承認(rèn)(即便不是正式地承認(rèn))它現(xiàn)在擁有核武器，就像印度、巴基斯坦和以色列一樣。他們想要獲得這樣的地位。我們認(rèn)為朝鮮不會(huì)威脅到我們或者中國(guó)，但同時(shí)重要的是，我們要確保這種過(guò)程不會(huì)進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大，而且也不再有核擴(kuò)散。”