歐洲可能出現(xiàn)更多加泰羅尼亞？

If the EU tries to stop its constituent economies going global, I surmise from working trips to Milan and Amsterdam that it is terrible at it. These cities gleam with graphic evidence that Brussels is not the dead hand of Eurosceptic lore. It is either an enabler of mercantile openness or, at worst, an irrelevance.

從我到米蘭和阿姆斯特丹的出差經(jīng)歷看，如果歐盟(EU)在試圖阻止其成員經(jīng)濟(jì)體走向全球，那么它做得很無(wú)能。這些城市里滿(mǎn)是活生生的證據(jù)，證明布魯塞爾并不是歐洲懷疑論渲染的那種“死亡之手”。從好的方向說(shuō)，歐盟是商業(yè)開(kāi)放的促進(jìn)力量;從最糟糕的方向說(shuō)，它是無(wú)關(guān)緊要的。

With all rich regions, the complicated relationship is (or should be) with their own countries. It is the nation state that taxes their output and sends the receipts to other areas. It is the nation state that can act against their interests through sheer weight of electoral numbers. Ask Londoners. Next to this, the EU, for all its supranational pretensions, asks nothing of them.

對(duì)于所有富裕地區(qū)而言，復(fù)雜關(guān)系是(或者應(yīng)當(dāng)是)它們與所在國(guó)家之間的關(guān)系。正是民族國(guó)家對(duì)它們的產(chǎn)出征稅，然后把這些財(cái)政收入轉(zhuǎn)移到其他地區(qū)。正是民族國(guó)家可以通過(guò)選票的絕對(duì)力量，采取不符合它們利益的行動(dòng)。問(wèn)問(wèn)倫敦人吧。相比之下，歐盟盡管擁有種種超國(guó)家主張，但沒(méi)有要求他們作出任何貢獻(xiàn)。

So why are there not more Catalonias? Or more Venetos and Lombardys, the two Italian regions that voted for more autonomy on Sunday? And might there be in future? Catalans have a stronger ethnic identity than most regional populations but the other raw materials of separatist feeling, which seem to include economic self-reliance and historic experience of self-rule, are there in city-regions across Europe and beyond.

那么為何沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)更多的加泰羅尼亞?或者是更多的威尼托和倫巴第(這是意大利的兩個(gè)地區(qū)，上周日投票要求更大自治權(quán))?未來(lái)會(huì)有更多嗎?加泰羅尼亞人具有比多數(shù)地區(qū)人口更強(qiáng)烈的民族認(rèn)同感，但是分離主義情緒的其他原料(似乎包括經(jīng)濟(jì)自立和歷史上的自治經(jīng)歷)存在于歐洲乃至其他地方的城市區(qū)域。

The material gap between cities and deindustrialised heartlands has grown over decades to become the most troublesome faultline in western democracies. Look at an electoral map of votes for Donald Trump in America, Marine Le Pen in France or EU exit in Britain. But the real trouble starts when we see this imbalance exclusively through the lens of the left-behind places, as something to be redressed through infrastructure projects, industrial protection and a new cultural sensitivity to conservative-minded provinces.

過(guò)去幾十年來(lái)，城市與去工業(yè)化的內(nèi)陸地帶之間的實(shí)質(zhì)性差距，已成為西方民主國(guó)家內(nèi)部最棘手的斷層線(xiàn)?？纯疵绹?guó)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)、法國(guó)馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)或者英國(guó)退歐的選民分布地圖吧。但是真正的麻煩始于我們只通過(guò)那些掉隊(duì)地區(qū)的視野來(lái)看待這種失衡，以為可以用基建工程、產(chǎn)業(yè)保護(hù)和以新的文化敏感對(duì)待保守傾向的鄉(xiāng)村地區(qū)來(lái)進(jìn)行補(bǔ)救。

As a moral proposition, this is right: the weakest first. As a reading of how politics will actually unfold over time, it could be the wrong way around. The anger that poor regions feel for the rampant metropolis — that Pas-de-Calais feels for Paris, that Indiana feels for New York — might turn out to weigh less than the grievances that flow in the opposite direction. In this version of the future, it is the city dwellers who feel wronged by regions that free ride on their productive surplus and vote against their heathen ways from a distance. (Call it representation without taxation.) National governments find it harder to raise revenue from the one to subsidise the other. Regionalist movements emerge, pressing for greater and greater autonomy if not formal secession.

作為一項(xiàng)道德命題，這是正確的：先照顧弱勢(shì)群體。作為對(duì)隨著時(shí)間推移政治將如何發(fā)展演變的解讀，這可能本末倒置了。貧窮的鄉(xiāng)村地區(qū)對(duì)快速發(fā)展的大都市感到的憤怒——加來(lái)海峽(Pas-de-Calais)地區(qū)對(duì)巴黎的憤怒，印第安納州對(duì)紐約的憤怒——最終在分量上可能不如反方向上的憤怒。根據(jù)后一版本，未來(lái)的局面將是城市居民感到不公，他們覺(jué)得自己的富余產(chǎn)出被鄉(xiāng)村地區(qū)搭便車(chē)，卻在投票時(shí)被那些地區(qū)的不開(kāi)化選民占上風(fēng)。(不妨稱(chēng)其為“不納稅卻享有代表權(quán)”。)民族國(guó)家的政府發(fā)現(xiàn)，要從一個(gè)地區(qū)收稅來(lái)補(bǔ)貼另一個(gè)地區(qū)變得更難了。地方主義運(yùn)動(dòng)興起了，要求獲得越來(lái)越大的自治權(quán)，即便不是要求正式獨(dú)立的話(huà)。

In the absence of ethnic homogeneity, it is automatic fiscal stabilisers that mark out a nation. Nationhood is the willingness of rich regions to pay for the rest as a matter of course. If that willingness goes away, the nation becomes form without substance.

如果不存在民族同質(zhì)性，界定一個(gè)國(guó)家的將是自動(dòng)財(cái)政穩(wěn)定機(jī)制。國(guó)家觀(guān)念無(wú)非是富裕地區(qū)理所當(dāng)然地愿意補(bǔ)貼其他地區(qū)。如果這種意愿消失了，國(guó)家也就變得有名無(wú)實(shí)了。

Might it? If anything characterises the present-day conservative, such as President Trump’s former adviser Steve Bannon or the people who brought you Brexit, it is a habit of talking about the nation state as though it were a non-negotiable constant of history rather than an improvisation of recent centuries. There is something of the arriviste about them, forever reading heritage into a mock Tudor mansion. The nation is too young to deserve this assumption of permanence. It emerged before the welfare state, when fiscal transfers between regions were too small to constitute a burden on anyone. It also predates a global economy whose returns are to knowledge and capital, which convene on cities rather than to land and industry. It is curiously untested by the modern world.

會(huì)這樣嗎?如果說(shuō)有任何東西可以表征當(dāng)今的保守派——比如特朗普總統(tǒng)的前顧問(wèn)史蒂夫•班農(nóng)(Steve Bannon)或者給你帶來(lái)英國(guó)退歐的那些人——那就是一種習(xí)慣：他們談起民族國(guó)家時(shí)，就仿佛那是歷史長(zhǎng)河中一個(gè)不可談判的常數(shù)、而非最近幾個(gè)世紀(jì)臨時(shí)湊合的產(chǎn)物。他們散發(fā)出暴發(fā)戶(hù)的氣息，永遠(yuǎn)對(duì)著一棟模擬的都鐸王府堡宣讀傳統(tǒng)。國(guó)家的歷史太短了，不配獲得這種永恒假設(shè)。國(guó)家出現(xiàn)在福利國(guó)家之前，那時(shí)地區(qū)之間的財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移太小，不會(huì)對(duì)任何人構(gòu)成負(fù)擔(dān)。國(guó)家也出現(xiàn)在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)之前，在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生回報(bào)的是在城市匯集的知識(shí)和資本，而不是土地和工業(yè)。國(guó)家這個(gè)概念尚未經(jīng)受過(guò)現(xiàn)代世界的考驗(yàn)是奇特的。

Some Londoners dream of a sovereign republic, with a moat dug around the M25 and passport checks at Watford, but it is an improbable candidate by European standards. England became a political unit a millennium ago. Even if the UK were to flake away around it, there is still a nation in which London is immemorially enmeshed. Being the capital also serves as compensation for all the wealth sent elsewhere. It is the continent that is worth watching. Some of the richest European cities governed themselves and their surrounds for longer than the countries they now find themselves in have existed. Most do not have capital status as a sop.

有些倫敦人夢(mèng)想著成立一個(gè)主權(quán)共和國(guó)，圍繞M25高速公路挖一條護(hù)城河，在沃特福特(Watford)設(shè)立護(hù)照檢查點(diǎn)，但以歐洲標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)看，倫敦是一個(gè)不太可能的獨(dú)立候選地區(qū)。英格蘭在1000年前已成為一個(gè)政治實(shí)體。即便聯(lián)合王國(guó)的其他部分分崩離析，倫敦自古以來(lái)就屬于的英格蘭仍會(huì)存在。充當(dāng)首都也是對(duì)倫敦輸送到其他地區(qū)的所有財(cái)富的補(bǔ)償。值得關(guān)注的是歐洲大陸。有些最富有的歐洲城市管理自己和周邊地區(qū)的時(shí)間，比它們?nèi)缃袼鶎俚膰?guó)家存在時(shí)間更長(zhǎng)。其中多數(shù)城市并未獲得首都地位作為安慰。

There will be no restoration of the city states, no undoing of the Risorgimento, no secessions in Hamburg and Bordeaux. But there is every prospect of cities demanding more self-rule as relations deteriorate with nations that seem to need and resent them all at once. If conservatives cherish the nation state, they cannot become a one-sided lobby for the angriest provinces. That is an abusive relationship, not a country. The long-run threat to nationhood comes from productive, outward-facing regions that look at their domestic stragglers and feel — to steal a phrase —

未來(lái)將不會(huì)出現(xiàn)城市國(guó)家的恢復(fù)、復(fù)興運(yùn)動(dòng)(Risorgimento，指意大利統(tǒng)一——譯者注)的逆轉(zhuǎn)，或者漢堡和波爾多地區(qū)分離。但是，隨著城市與似乎既需要又厭惡它們的國(guó)家之間關(guān)系惡化，城市很可能會(huì)要求更大的自治權(quán)。如果保守派人士珍視民族國(guó)家，他們不能一邊倒地為最憤怒的鄉(xiāng)村地區(qū)游說(shuō)。那是一種虐待關(guān)系，而非一個(gè)國(guó)家。國(guó)家面臨的長(zhǎng)期威脅來(lái)自那些繁榮昌盛、面向外部的地區(qū)。這些地區(qū)看著國(guó)內(nèi)的掉隊(duì)者，感覺(jué)自己——借用一個(gè)短語(yǔ)——被枷鎖銬在一具尸體上。

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