怎樣監(jiān)管科技平臺(tái)？

The US Senate Intelligence Committee’s grilling last week of Facebook, Google, and Twitter told us something we already knew: Russia manipulated the US election results. Only the scale of the effort, which reached roughly half the US population, was a surprise.

美國(guó)參議院情報(bào)委員會(huì)(Senate Intelligence Committee)上周對(duì)Facebook、谷歌(Google)和Twitter的質(zhì)詢(xún)，證實(shí)了一些我們已經(jīng)知道的事情：俄羅斯操縱了美國(guó)選舉結(jié)果。讓人意外的只是這一操縱努力的規(guī)模：它竟然觸及了美國(guó)大約一半人口。

It also told us something that we knew, but had forgotten: industry self-regulation rarely works. From turn-of- the-century railroads, through energy markets in the 1990s, to the financial industry circa 2007, there are many examples that bear this out. The tech industry is only the latest case in point.

這個(gè)聽(tīng)證會(huì)還證實(shí)了一些我們知道、但此前忘記的事情：行業(yè)自律很少奏效。從19世紀(jì)末/20世紀(jì)初的鐵路行業(yè)、20世紀(jì)90年代的能源市場(chǎng)、到2007年前后的金融行業(yè)，有很多例子證明了這一點(diǎn)。科技行業(yè)只是最新的例證。

The contrition and apologies of the executives who sat in front of the committee did not add up to any significant shift, either in business model or philosophy. Rather, their vague promises to “do better,” and claims that they simply can’t track the complexity of their own algorithms just underscores the need for a cohesive regulatory framework around companies that have become monopoly powers, and should ultimately be seen as public utilities.

坐在情報(bào)委員會(huì)面前的一眾高管的懊悔和道歉，并不意味著商業(yè)模式或者理念方面的任何重大改變。相反，他們作出的要“做得更好”的含糊承諾，以及有關(guān)他們無(wú)法追蹤自己公司算法的復(fù)雜性的說(shuō)法，恰恰說(shuō)明有必要針對(duì)這些科技公司制定一套連貫的監(jiān)管框架，這些公司已經(jīng)成為壟斷力量，因此歸根結(jié)底應(yīng)該被視為公用事業(yè)公司。

The problem, of course, is that smart regulation is very tough to craft. Finance is, again, the perfect example of this — the complexity and global fragmentation of the post-2008 regulatory landscape has introduced its own risks into the system.

當(dāng)然，問(wèn)題在于很難設(shè)計(jì)聰明的監(jiān)管。金融業(yè)再次成為絕佳例子——2008年之后監(jiān)管格局的復(fù)雜性和全球碎片化，本身將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)引入了系統(tǒng)。

So how do we create a framework for government oversight of Big Tech that protects consumer and societal interests, curbs growth-dampening monopoly power, and allows us to keep the internet services we depend on? I would argue for a focus on three core principles — transparency, simplicity and size.

那么，我們?cè)撊绾蝿?chuàng)建一個(gè)監(jiān)管框架，讓政府監(jiān)督大科技公司，以保護(hù)消費(fèi)者和社會(huì)利益、遏制不利于增長(zhǎng)的壟斷力量，同時(shí)保留我們依賴(lài)的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)服務(wù)?我主張把重點(diǎn)放在3條核心原則上——透明度、簡(jiǎn)潔性和規(guī)模。

Starting with transparency, the internet giants should be required not only to report politically related advertising as other media do (and as the proposed Honest Ads Act would require), but also to use both people and algorithms to track hate-driven search results. As the academic and tech-critic Jonathan Taplin put it to me, “the notion that it’s impossible for Facebook, Google and Twitter to police their platforms is a big lie. They currently do a very good job, using AI, of keeping all pornography off their sites.”

首先是透明度，不僅應(yīng)該要求互聯(lián)網(wǎng)巨頭像其他媒體那樣報(bào)告政治相關(guān)廣告(這也是擬議中的《誠(chéng)實(shí)廣告法案》(Honest Ads Act)的一項(xiàng)要求)，還應(yīng)該要求它們使用人工和算法兩種手段來(lái)追蹤仇恨驅(qū)動(dòng)的搜索結(jié)果。就如學(xué)者和科技評(píng)論家喬納森•塔普林(Jonathan Taplin)對(duì)我所說(shuō)的，“有關(guān)Facebook、谷歌和Twitter無(wú)法管控它們自己的平臺(tái)的說(shuō)法是個(gè)彌天大謊。在利用人工智能屏蔽色情內(nèi)容方面，它們現(xiàn)在做得非常好。”

This implicitly argues for a re-examination of the legal loopholes in the Communications Decency Act that allow platform companies to eschew responsibility for what is on their sites. And in fact, there has been a significant move in that direction; under pressure, the Internet Association finally announced support late last week for a bipartisan bill to eliminate federal liability protections for websites that knowingly assist, support, or facilitate online sex trafficking, something they had resisted since it would open the door to further tweaks to the act’s liability exemptions.

這暗示我們應(yīng)該重新審視《通信內(nèi)容端正法》(Communications Decency Act)中的法律漏洞，該法允許提供平臺(tái)服務(wù)的公司無(wú)需對(duì)平臺(tái)上的內(nèi)容承擔(dān)責(zé)任。事實(shí)上，在這個(gè)方向上已經(jīng)有了一個(gè)重大動(dòng)作;在壓力之下，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)協(xié)會(huì)(Internet Association)終于在上周宣布支持一項(xiàng)兩黨法案，對(duì)那些在知情的情況下協(xié)助、支持、或?yàn)樵诰€(xiàn)性販運(yùn)提供便利的網(wǎng)站，剝奪對(duì)它們的聯(lián)邦責(zé)任保護(hù)。此前互聯(lián)網(wǎng)協(xié)會(huì)一直抵制此事，因?yàn)檫@將為進(jìn)一步微調(diào)該法的責(zé)任豁免打開(kāi)大門(mén)。

Transparency for users would also be increased with “opt in” provisions that allow them more control over how their data are used (as is the case with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation). Ideally, this would be a first step towards a better understanding of how companies themselves value data. As one senior policymaker’s aide pointed out to me, the monetary value of data currently gets shoehorned into “goodwill” on financial statements or, more often, is left out entirely.

讓用戶(hù)在更大程度上控制自身數(shù)據(jù)如何被使用的“選擇加入”規(guī)定(就如歐盟的《一般數(shù)據(jù)保護(hù)條例》(General Data Protection Regulation))，還能提高用戶(hù)層面的透明度。理想情況下，這將是朝著更好地理解企業(yè)本身如何對(duì)數(shù)據(jù)估價(jià)邁出的第一步。就如一名資深政策制定者的助手對(duì)我指出的，數(shù)據(jù)的貨幣價(jià)值現(xiàn)在在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表上被硬塞在“商譽(yù)”項(xiàng)下，或者更多時(shí)候被完全排除在外。

Big tech companies should also be required to keep audit logs of the data they feed into their algorithms, and be prepared to explain their algorithms to the public. “A recurring pattern has developed,” says Frank Pasquale at the University of Maryland, “in which some entity complains about a major internet company’s practices, the company claims that its critics don’t understand how its algorithms sort and rank content, and befuddled onlookers are left to sift through rival stories in the press.”

還應(yīng)該要求大型科技公司保留他們輸入算法的數(shù)據(jù)的審計(jì)日志，并且準(zhǔn)備好向公眾解釋它們的算法。馬里蘭大學(xué)(University of Maryland)法學(xué)教授弗蘭克•帕斯奎爾(Frank Pasquale)表示：“目前出現(xiàn)了一種反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的情況：某個(gè)實(shí)體抱怨一家大型互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司的實(shí)踐，而該公司聲稱(chēng)，批評(píng)者不理解其算法是如何整理和排序內(nèi)容的，而一團(tuán)霧水的旁觀(guān)者只能在報(bào)上梳理相互對(duì)立的說(shuō)法。”

This relates to the point about simplicity. Complexity (or the illusion of it) is too often used to avoid legitimate public interest questions, such as how propagandists get their messages across, or how users are tracked and valued. Companies should help us understand all this by opening the black box of their algorithms. This needn’t be a competitive disadvantage; research has shown that it is the amount of data plugged into an algorithm, rather than the cleverness of the algorithm itself, that is the key here. To the extent that users trust what companies are doing, they may be more willing to part with precious data.

這與簡(jiǎn)潔性的原則有關(guān)。復(fù)雜性(或其假象)往往被用于躲避正當(dāng)?shù)墓怖鎲?wèn)題，比如宣傳者如何傳播他們的訊息，或者用戶(hù)是怎樣被跟蹤和估價(jià)的。公司應(yīng)該通過(guò)開(kāi)啟算法黑匣子來(lái)幫助我們理解這一切。這不一定是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)劣勢(shì);研究顯示，關(guān)鍵在于饋入算法的數(shù)據(jù)量，而不是算法本身的聰明程度。況且，如果用戶(hù)信任公司在做的事情，他們可能更愿意分享寶貴的數(shù)據(jù)。

Finally, regulators need to address the size issue. Yes, the services big tech companies offer are great, and mostly free, which allows them to avoid antitrust legislation in the US system, where consumer pricing is considered the measure of power. Yet there are myriad examples of the largest players using their size to steal smaller companies’ ideas and “lowball” them during dealmaking, or to reshape the regulatory framework to serve their own interests.

最后，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)需要解決規(guī)模問(wèn)題。沒(méi)錯(cuò)，大型科技公司提供的服務(wù)非常好，而且大多是免費(fèi)的，這讓它們能夠規(guī)避美國(guó)法律體系中的反壟斷法;在美國(guó)，消費(fèi)者定價(jià)被視為力量的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。然而，有大量實(shí)例表明，最大型企業(yè)利用自己的規(guī)模竊取小公司的創(chuàng)意，并通過(guò)交易占小公司的便宜，或者重塑監(jiān)管框架以服務(wù)于自己的利益。

It is all too reminiscent of the power held by 19th-century railroad barons. They, too, dominated their economy and society. And they, too, were able to price gouge, drive competitors out of business, and avoid taxation and regulation, largely by buying off politicians. 所有這一切都讓人想起19世紀(jì)鐵路巨頭所擁有的威力。當(dāng)年他們也主宰著經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)。他們也能夠哄抬價(jià)格，將競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手趕出市場(chǎng)，逃避稅收和監(jiān)管——主要通過(guò)收買(mǎi)政客來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)。

Yet eventually, they were curbed by the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It included some provisions that the industry favoured, as well as many it lobbied against. Rather than crush innovation, the ICC ushered in a period of prosperity by allowing technology benefits to be widely shared. It is time to think hard about whether we need another ICC — an Internet Commerce Commission — to do the same.

然而，他們最終因州際商務(wù)委員會(huì)(Interstate Commerce Commission)的創(chuàng)立而受到遏制。它包括一些行業(yè)青睞的規(guī)定，也有許多行業(yè)游說(shuō)反對(duì)的規(guī)定。州際商務(wù)委員會(huì)并未壓制創(chuàng)新，而是讓技術(shù)效益得到廣泛分享，從而開(kāi)啟了一段繁榮時(shí)期。是時(shí)候認(rèn)真思考我們是否需要又一個(gè)ICC，即互聯(lián)網(wǎng)商務(wù)委員會(huì)(Internet Commerce Commission)，來(lái)做同樣的事情。