美國保護(hù)主義可能引發(fā)數(shù)字貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)

National security is the new cover for US protectionism. President Donald Trump signed his steel and aluminium tariffs under that false guise. But metal bending is not the most worrisome new area for protectionism. Trade in physical goods and services has been flat for years, but digital flows of commerce and information have risen by 45-fold in the past decade, according to the McKinsey Global Institute. The trade war to fear is not in physical commodities, but in technology, which economic nationalists hope to ringfence in order to stave off competitive threats from countries such as China.

國家安全是美國保護(hù)主義的新幌子。美國總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在這種虛偽的幌子下簽署了命令，對美國進(jìn)口的鋼鐵和鋁征收高額關(guān)稅。但金屬并不是保護(hù)主義最令人擔(dān)憂的新領(lǐng)域。據(jù)麥肯錫全球研究院(McKinsey Global Institute)稱，實物商品與服務(wù)的貿(mào)易多年來一直持平，但過去10年商業(yè)和信息的數(shù)字流動增長了45倍。真正該擔(dān)心的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)并不在實體商品領(lǐng)域，而在技術(shù)領(lǐng)域，經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義者希望將技術(shù)圈護(hù)起來，以避免來自中國等國家的競爭威脅。

The US has already launched a so-called Section 301 investigation. The results are due this summer, but it will probably result in stricter barriers on Chinese investment in American data and IT. That could shut out companies such as, say, Tencent, or result in new tariffs on a wider variety of Chinese products — or even usher in new visa rules for Chinese immigrants.

美國已經(jīng)啟動了所謂的“301條款”(Section 301)調(diào)查。調(diào)查結(jié)果將于今年夏天公布，很可能會給中國對美國數(shù)據(jù)及信息產(chǎn)業(yè)的投資帶來更嚴(yán)苛的壁壘。這可能會將騰訊(Tencent)等企業(yè)拒之門外，或者導(dǎo)致美國對更廣泛的中國產(chǎn)品征收新的關(guān)稅——甚至針對中國移民引入新的簽證規(guī)則。

Last week, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US announced it had launched a review into Singapore-domiciled chipmaker Broadcom’s bid to purchase Qualcomm, a leading US semiconductor business. The move followed pressure from Texas senator John Cornyn and California representative Duncan Hunter, who have each received more than $15,000 in donations from Qualcomm’s political action committee, according to Federal Election Commission records. Treasury secretary Steve Mnunchin, who chairs Cfius, said last week that the US was “fully prepared” to use its powers to prevent the deal should it threaten national security.

美國外國投資委員會(Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 簡稱CFIUS)上周宣布，他們已對新加坡芯片制造商博通(Broadcom)收購美國領(lǐng)先的半導(dǎo)體企業(yè)高通(Qualcomm)的交易展開審查。(美國總統(tǒng)特朗普已經(jīng)封殺了博通敵意收購高通的交易，稱他這么做是為了保護(hù)美國的國家安全。——編者注)此前，德克薩斯州參議員約翰•科寧(John Cornyn)和加州眾議員鄧肯•亨特(Duncan Hunter)向CFIUS施加了壓力，聯(lián)邦選舉委員會(Federal Election Commission)的記錄顯示，他們兩人都收到了高通政治行動委員會超過15000美元的捐款。美國財長、CFIUS主席史蒂文•姆努欽(Steven Mnuchin)上周表示，美國“已做好充分準(zhǔn)備”，如果這筆交易威脅到國家安全，將動用權(quán)力阻止。

The arguments being made against the deal range from worries that Broadcom would shrink Qualcomm’s investment in crucial areas such as 5G, to fears that the US cannot remain digitally competitive and secure if a Singaporean company owns Qualcomm. But that fails to take into account the way in which both the US tech industry and the administration itself currently operate.

反對這筆交易的理由包括，擔(dān)心博通會縮減高通在5G等關(guān)鍵領(lǐng)域的投資，以及若高通被一家新加坡公司所有，美國將無法在數(shù)字領(lǐng)域保持競爭力與安全性。但這個理由沒有考慮到美國科技產(chǎn)業(yè)及政府自身目前的運作方式。

Cfius frets that Broadcom, which has lined up $106bn in debt financing from private equity groups Silver Lake, KKR and CVC for the deal, will take a short-term profit approach and cut Qualcomm’s rich research and development budget, which is 20 per cent of revenues. That is a legitimate worry: private equity has a history of reducing R&D when the debt loads are high. Cfius’s theory is that if Qualcomm is starved of investment, the US will lose a “national champion” in the tech race against China.

CFIUS擔(dān)憂的是，已從私人股本集團(tuán)銀湖資本(Silver Lake)、KKR與CVC獲得1060億美元債務(wù)融資的博通，會采取短期獲利策略并削減高通的巨額研發(fā)預(yù)算，這部分預(yù)算占高通營收的20%。CFIUS的擔(dān)憂是合理的：當(dāng)債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)很高時，私人股本向來會縮減研發(fā)開支。CFIUS的理論是，如果高通缺乏投資，美國將在與中國的科技競賽中與“冠軍頭銜”失之交臂。

Yet this ignores the fact that Qualcomm has “strategic collaborations and interests in China that dwarf those of Broadcom”, according to Stacy Rasgon, a Bernstein semiconductor analyst. Many big US tech companies have substantial interests in China, even though some of them have been privately jumping on the nationalisticbandwagon in recent months. They have been using the “better us than China” argument when lobbying against the groundswell of enthusiasm for additional regulation of the technology sector on a variety of fronts, from antitrust to privacy.

然而，據(jù)伯恩斯坦公司(Bernstein)的半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)分析師斯泰西•拉斯岡(Stacy Rasgon)稱，這種擔(dān)憂忽略了一個事實，即高通“在中國擁有的戰(zhàn)略合作關(guān)系與利益遠(yuǎn)超博通”。美國許多大型科技公司在中國擁有可觀的利益，盡管近幾個月其中一些公司私下里一直在追趕民族主義的浪潮。在反對對技術(shù)行業(yè)實行從反壟斷到隱私權(quán)等多方面的額外監(jiān)管時，“我們總比中國企業(yè)強(qiáng)”一直是這些企業(yè)慣用的理由。

The problem is that neither the US tech industry nor the government can have it both ways. In the 1980s, under the Ronald Reagan administration, there was briefly a push for a more cohesive industrial policy around technology, but it was ditched as soon as George H W Bush took office. Then, in the late 1990s, the Department of Defense worried that the Japanese were making 92 per cent of the flat panel displays used in military equipment. It launched an effort to create a homegrown industry for this technology. Billions of dollars and several years later, Japanese firms had a 96 per cent market share. Today’s worry, of course, is that we start with tariffs on aluminium and steel and end up in a digital trade war that cannot be won.

問題是，無論是美國的科技行業(yè)還是美國政府，都無法兩者兼得。上世紀(jì)80年代，在羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)執(zhí)政時期，曾短暫推行更具凝聚力的科技產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，但老布什(George H W Bush)一上臺就拋棄了這種政策。后來，在90年代末，美國國防部(Department of Defense)擔(dān)心日本正在制造92%的用于軍事設(shè)備的平板顯示器，于是努力為這項技術(shù)創(chuàng)造了一個本土產(chǎn)業(yè)。幾年過去了，美國花了幾十億美元，日本企業(yè)卻占據(jù)了96%的市場份額。當(dāng)然，如今我們擔(dān)憂的是，從對鋁和鋼鐵征收關(guān)稅開始，我們最終將陷入一場無法取勝的數(shù)字貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。

The government is right to want to look out for national security interests and to have a hand in how strategically important sectors are managed. But protectionism is not the way to do it.

政府希望維護(hù)國家安全利益，并參與管理戰(zhàn)略意義重大的行業(yè)是正確的。但保護(hù)主義并不是實現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)的途徑。

The US government has a terrific record in terms of funding blue sky research that results in huge economic value for the private sector — touchscreen technology, GPS and the internet itself came out of the Pentagon. We should be bolstering rather than cutting funding for such research, and perhaps even allowing the public sector to take a greater cut of the profits if the research is commercialised, as Nordic countries and Israel do. That would help offset popular criticism that results when companies such as Apple or Google or Qualcomm, after benefiting greatly from publicly funded basic research, end up stashing much of their profits offshore.

美國政府在資助藍(lán)天研究方面有著了不起的記錄，為私營部門帶來了巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)價值——觸摸屏技術(shù)、GPS以及本身即誕生于五角大樓的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)。我們應(yīng)增加而非削減這類研究的資金，甚至在這類研究商業(yè)化的情況下，允許公共部門獲取更多的利潤，就像北歐諸國與以色列所做的那樣。這將有助于減輕輿論的批評——蘋果(Apple)、谷歌(Google)或高通等公司在從公共資助的基礎(chǔ)研究中獲得巨大利益后，最終卻把大部分利潤藏在海外。

It is true that China protects its own tech sector. But it is also true that America has homegrown tech troubles. Rather than slapping tariffs on foreign goods or swallowing the claim that companies doing business with economic adversaries are somehow national champions that will ensure state security, we should take a closer look at our own digital ecosystem. Large US incumbents are crushing innovation. Educational reform is desperately need to train workers for jobs where they will not be displaced by robots.

的確，中國也在保護(hù)自己的科技產(chǎn)業(yè)。但美國也確實存在著本土的科技問題。與其對國外商品征收關(guān)稅，或拒絕承認(rèn)與經(jīng)濟(jì)對手做生意的公司在某種程度上其實是能夠確保國家安全的領(lǐng)袖企業(yè)，不如讓我們好好反觀一下自己的數(shù)字生態(tài)系統(tǒng)。美國的大企業(yè)正在破壞創(chuàng)新。美國迫切需要教育改革，以培訓(xùn)勞動者從事那些不會被機(jī)器人取代的工作。

We can best bolster growth not by protecting US companies from overseas buyers, but by investing in infrastructure. Addressing those issues is the right way to protect national security.

促進(jìn)增長的最好辦法不是保護(hù)美國企業(yè)不被海外買家收購，而是投資于基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。解決這些問題才是保護(hù)國家安全的正確途徑。