朝韓歷史性峰會(huì)：金正恩踏上韓國控制領(lǐng)土
韓國首爾——周五，金正恩(Kim Jong-un)開啟了與韓國總統(tǒng)的歷史性峰會(huì)，成為首位踏足韓國控制領(lǐng)土的朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。這次峰會(huì)將考驗(yàn)金正恩用手中的核武器做交易的意愿。
Kim’s decision to cross into the world’s most heavily armed border zones, a prospect that seemed unthinkable just a few months ago, was broadcast live in South Korea, where all eyes and ears are focused on the intentions of the North’s 34-year-old leader.
金正恩進(jìn)入世界上戒備最為森嚴(yán)的邊界區(qū)的決定，在幾個(gè)月前似乎還難以想像，韓國對此做了現(xiàn)場直播，所有焦點(diǎn)都聚焦在這位34歲朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的意圖上。
For South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, who has placed himself at the center of diplomacy to end the nuclear standoff with the North, the meeting presents a formidable task: finding a middle ground between a cunning enemy to the North and an impulsive ally in the United States.
對于已經(jīng)將自己置于終結(jié)與朝鮮核對峙外交中心位置的韓國總統(tǒng)文在寅(Moon Jae-in)來說，這次會(huì)晤有一個(gè)艱巨的任務(wù)：在狡猾敵人朝鮮和沖動(dòng)盟友美國之間找到一個(gè)中間立場。
The historic encounter at the Peace House, a conference building on the South Korean side of the border village of Panmunjom, could set the tone for an even more critical meeting planned between Kim and President Donald Trump.
這個(gè)位于韓國一側(cè)板門店邊境村和平之家(Peace House)的歷史性會(huì)面，可能會(huì)為已經(jīng)計(jì)劃好的金正恩與特朗普之間更加重要的會(huì)面定下基調(diào)。
On Friday morning, Kim emerged from Panmungak, a North Korean administrative building inside Panmumjom. He walked down the steps toward the border line, where Moon was waiting. The two Korean leaders smiled and shook hands across a low, 20-inch-wide concrete slab that marks the border bisecting Panmunjom.
周五早間，金正恩從板門店朝鮮一側(cè)的行政大樓板門閣(Panmungak)走出。他走下臺(tái)階，步向邊界線，文在寅正在那里等候。朝韓兩位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人均面帶微笑，隔著低矮的、20英寸(約合50厘米)寬的混凝土板相互握手。這個(gè)混凝土板所在的邊界線將板門店一分為二。
Then, Mr. Kim stepped across the border.
然后，金正恩跨過了邊界。
After the two leaders posed for photos, they crossed briefly into the North’s territory. They then stepped backed into South Korean territory, holding hands. They walked down a red carpet, inspected a South Korean military honor guard and entered the Peace House.
在兩位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人擺好姿勢拍完照后，雙方短暫地跨入了朝鮮的領(lǐng)土。然后兩人又牽著手退后，回到韓國領(lǐng)土。他們走了紅毯、檢閱了韓國軍事儀仗隊(duì)，然后進(jìn)入和平之家。
“I came here to put an end to the history of confrontation,” Mr. Kim was quoted as saying during the meeting, according to Mr. Moon’s spokesman, Yoon Young-chan. Mr. Moon suggested they hold more meetings, and Mr. Kim said he would visit South Korea’s presidential Blue House “if the president invites me.”
“我來到這里，是為了結(jié)束這段對抗的歷史，”文在寅發(fā)言人尹永燦(Yoon Young-chan，音)引述金正恩在會(huì)面時(shí)的話說。文在寅提議兩人舉行更多會(huì)晤，金正恩表示“如果總統(tǒng)邀請我”，將訪問韓國總統(tǒng)府青瓦臺(tái)。
While Moon’s meeting with Kim on Friday — their first face-to-face talk — is rich with symbolism, Kim is not expected to capitulate on Trump’s key demand: total and immediate nuclear disarmament.
盡管周五與文在寅的會(huì)面富有象征意義——這也是兩人的首次面對面會(huì)談，但外界預(yù)計(jì)金正恩不會(huì)屈服于特朗普的關(guān)鍵要求：立即進(jìn)行徹底的核裁軍。
Moon’s other challenge, with Trump, turns on how best to deal with North Korea and its leader — who is expected to meet with Trump in the next few months.
文在寅的另一個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)和特朗普有關(guān)，涉及將如何最好地和朝鮮及其領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人打交道。金正恩預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)在接下來的幾個(gè)月里同特朗普會(huì)面。
The South Korean president favors an action-for-action strategy in which the North takes steps to dismantle its nuclear arsenal and is rewarded for each move with economic benefits and security guarantees. South Korean officials said that the entire process could take about two years.
文在寅支持采取行動(dòng)換行動(dòng)的策略。按照這種策略，朝鮮采取措施廢除核武庫，每一項(xiàng)舉措都會(huì)得到經(jīng)濟(jì)上的好處和安全上的保證作為獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。韓國官方稱，整個(gè)過程大約需要兩年時(shí)間。
Trump’s national security team, by contrast, has insisted that North Korea must scrap its weapons programs before any relief from the sanctions that isolate the nation can be granted. And they say that “substantial dismantlement” should be completed much more quickly, perhaps in six months.
相比之下，特朗普的國家安全團(tuán)隊(duì)堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為朝鮮必須先廢除核計(jì)劃，才能獲準(zhǔn)減輕導(dǎo)致其遭到孤立的制裁。他們還說，“實(shí)質(zhì)性拆除”應(yīng)該在更短的時(shí)間內(nèi)完成，也許是六個(gè)月。
Moon sees himself less as a negotiator with Kim and more as a mediator shuttling between two men who believe that keeping others guessing gives them an edge: a volatile U.S. president with no experience in nuclear negotiations, and a hotheaded young North Korean leader with no experience on a global stage.
文在寅更多地認(rèn)為自己是穿梭于美國總統(tǒng)和朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之間的調(diào)解人，而不是與金正恩談判的代表。美國總統(tǒng)變化無常，沒有核談判經(jīng)驗(yàn)，年紀(jì)尚輕的朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人則容易激動(dòng)，沒有全球舞臺(tái)上的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。兩人都認(rèn)為讓別人猜測會(huì)讓自己占據(jù)優(yōu)勢。
“What we can do is to try to help the North and the United States reach an agreement, helping them narrow their differences and seeking and presenting practical ideas both sides can accept,” Moon said recently, adding that he may have only one shot to get it right. “This is an opportunity that will not come again.”
“我們能做的是努力幫助朝鮮和美國達(dá)成協(xié)議，幫助他們縮小分歧，尋找和提出雙方都能接受的實(shí)際意見，”文在寅最近說，并接著表示他可能只有一次機(jī)會(huì)。“這是一個(gè)不會(huì)再有的機(jī)會(huì)。”
The challenge is stark. No nation that has openly tested a nuclear device has ever surrendered its arsenal, and North Korea has conducted six underground explosions, each more powerful than the last, and has test-fired missiles that can reach the mainland United States.
這項(xiàng)挑戰(zhàn)頗為嚴(yán)峻。沒有哪個(gè)公開試驗(yàn)核裝置的國家放棄自己的核武庫，并且朝鮮已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了六次地下爆炸，一次比一次的威力大，還試射了能夠抵達(dá)美國本土的導(dǎo)彈。
But Trump and Kim have both already defied conventional wisdom about what is possible. If they meet in June — most likely in Singapore, according to U.S. and South Korean officials — it would be the first direct encounter between the leaders of the two nations, as well as a chance to test the argument that making progress with North Korea in the nuclear standoff requires starting at the top.
但特朗普和金正恩都打破了有關(guān)可能性的傳統(tǒng)觀念。如果在6月會(huì)面——據(jù)美國和韓國官員稱，地點(diǎn)極有可能是新加坡——這將是兩國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人首次直接接觸，也是考驗(yàn)一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)的機(jī)會(huì)。這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，在核僵持中同朝鮮取得進(jìn)展要從上層開始。
The meeting between Kim and Moon is the third summit meeting between leaders of the two countries, but the first in which denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula tops the agenda.
金正恩與文在寅的會(huì)晤是兩國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之間的第三次會(huì)面，但以朝鮮半島無核化為首要議題，這是第一次。
Moon hopes to emerge from Friday’s summit meeting with a formal but vague denuclearization commitment from Kim and perhaps a path to negotiating a peace treaty or a plan to reduce military tensions. Some have suggested a pullback of troops from the Demilitarized Zone between the North and South is possible.
文在寅希望在周五的會(huì)談中得到金正恩正式但模糊的無核化承諾，或許還有通過談判達(dá)成和平協(xié)定或緩和軍事緊張局勢方案的途徑。一些人士表示，部隊(duì)可能會(huì)從朝韓之間的非軍事區(qū)撤軍。
“I find it impossible to believe that Kim is prepared to give up what his father and his grandfather bequeathed to him,” said Gary Samore, a veteran of negotiations with North Korea as the top arms control aide in the Clinton and Obama administrations, speaking at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.
“我很難相信金正恩準(zhǔn)備放棄他父親和祖父留給他的東西，”加里·薩莫爾(Gary Samore)在首爾的峨山政策研究院(Asan Institute for Policy Studies)說。他是對朝談判方面的老手，曾在克林頓和奧巴馬政府任最高軍控助手。
But he added that Kim “may now calculate he has enough of a nuclear arsenal” — and so can afford to put more on the table than in the past.
但他補(bǔ)充，金正恩“可能現(xiàn)在是估計(jì)自己的核武器足夠多了”——因此在談判桌上的籌碼也比過去多了。
One possibility that causes consternation in the region is that Trump will settle for dismantling North Korea’s small fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles, eliminating its ability to strike the United States — but leaving South Korea and Japan vulnerable. “It would be the ‘America First’ way,” Samore said, referring to Trump’s campaign slogan.
會(huì)在該地區(qū)引發(fā)恐慌的一種可能是，特朗普將接受朝鮮逐步廢除規(guī)模很小的洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈，從而消除其攻打美國的能力——但這讓韓國和日本還是易受攻擊。“這將是‘美國優(yōu)先’的方式，”薩莫爾說的是特朗普的競選口號(hào)。
If skepticism is rampant in Washington, the Moon administration is somewhat more optimistic. To South Korean policymakers, Kim’s recent decisions suggest that he is willing to trade his nuclear arsenal for economic growth, which the young leader may see as necessary to preserving his rule for decades. They also argue Trump’s threats of military action have proved more effective at changing Kim’s calculations than anticipated.
如果說華盛頓方面疑慮四起，那么文在寅政府則比較樂觀。對于韓國的決策者來說，金正恩最近的決策表明了他想以核武器換經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的意愿，這位年輕的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人或許認(rèn)為這是維持自己數(shù)十年統(tǒng)治的必要條件。他們還認(rèn)為，特朗普提出的軍事行動(dòng)威脅比預(yù)想的更能有效改變金正恩的考量。
South Korean officials say they have spent far more time and energy coordinating with the Trump administration before the Friday summit meeting than with the North Koreans, an effort complicated by the White House shake-up that included the departure of Lt. Gen H.R. McMaster as national security adviser and the firing of Rex W. Tillerson as secretary of state.
韓國官員表示，在周五的首腦會(huì)晤前，他們花在與特朗普政府周旋上的時(shí)間和精力比花在朝鮮人身上的還多，而且由于美國國家安全顧問H·R·麥克馬斯特中將(Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster)的離開和國務(wù)卿雷克斯·W·蒂勒森(Rex W. Tillerson)被解雇，事情變得更為復(fù)雜。
The focus on Washington also reflects concern about McMaster’s successor, John R. Bolton, who joined the administration after arguing for military strikes to destroy North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, ridiculing South Korean leaders as “putty in North Korea’s hands,” and calling North Koreans “the biggest con men in the world.”
華盛頓受到的關(guān)注反映出了人們對麥克馬斯特的繼任者約翰·R·博爾頓(John R. Bolton)的擔(dān)憂。在加入政府之前，他就主張用軍事打擊來摧毀朝鮮的核武庫，還嘲諷韓國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人“任由朝鮮擺布”，稱朝鮮人“是世界上最大的騙子”。
One area of consensus is an attempt to more clearly establish the talks’ desired outcome from the outset, giving all parties greater incentive to move forward. Previous negotiations were open-ended, without specific goals that everyone agreed on.
達(dá)成了共識(shí)的一點(diǎn)是，要從一開始便努力確立更為明確的預(yù)期會(huì)談結(jié)果，給各方以更大的動(dòng)力前進(jìn)。此前的談判均為開放式的，沒有各方都同意的具體目標(biāo)。
South Korea and the United States also want to push the North to accept a timetable that would move quickly from the suspension of weapons tests — which it announced last week — to the dismantlement of its nuclear program. Some in the Trump administration have argued for completion in six months, but that may be an opening negotiating position given the challenges involved.
韓國和美國也希望推動(dòng)朝鮮在上周宣布暫停了武器測試之后迅速行動(dòng)，將撤銷核計(jì)劃列入日程。特朗普政府中的一些人主張要在六個(gè)月內(nèi)完成，但考慮到其中的挑戰(zhàn)，這可能會(huì)是一個(gè)開放的談判立場。
Bolton has occasionally cited the example of Libya, which shipped most of its nuclear equipment to a U.S. weapons lab in Tennessee over the course of several weeks in late 2003. But much of that equipment was still in crates; there was little to dismantle.
博爾頓有時(shí)會(huì)援引利比亞為例。2003年末，利比亞曾在數(shù)周之內(nèi)將本國的大部分核設(shè)備運(yùn)往了美國田納西州的一個(gè)武器實(shí)驗(yàn)室。但其中大部分的設(shè)備仍在箱中，沒什么要銷毀的。
Iran took a bit more than six months to take apart much of its program and ship 97 percent of its nuclear material from the country. But, like Libya, it had not yet built nuclear weapons.
伊朗花了六個(gè)月多一點(diǎn)的時(shí)間來拆除其大部分工程，并運(yùn)出了國內(nèi)97%的核材料。但和利比亞一樣，它并未造出核武器。
North Korea is believed to have 20 to 60 such weapons — U.S. intelligence agencies cannot agree on the number — in addition to a vast infrastructure of fuel production and weapons manufacturing facilities, much of it hidden in the mountains or underground. Samore argued that the North should be asked to hand over an inventory that the United States and its allies could compare with intelligence reports and seek to verify. That process would offer a first sign of whether Kim is coming clean, but could take years to complete.
據(jù)信，朝鮮擁有20到60枚核武器——美國的情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)無法就此數(shù)字達(dá)成一致。此外，還有龐大的燃料生產(chǎn)設(shè)施和武器制造設(shè)施，其中大部分還隱藏在山區(qū)或地下。薩莫爾認(rèn)為，應(yīng)要求朝鮮交出一份可供美國及其盟友與情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)的報(bào)告進(jìn)行比較、核實(shí)的編目清單。這個(gè)過程可以作為金正恩是否毫無保留的第一個(gè)跡象，但它可能需要數(shù)年時(shí)間才能完成。
