如何與中國(guó)爭(zhēng)奪未來(lái)？靠特朗普關(guān)稅可能沒(méi)用

WASHINGTON — Behind the White House’s plan to punish China with tariffs and other restrictions is a growing concern that Beijing is using industrial policy to dominate industries of the future, at the expense of the United States and other nations.

華盛頓——在白宮計(jì)劃用關(guān)稅和其他限制規(guī)定懲罰中國(guó)的背后，人們愈發(fā)擔(dān)心北京方面正在利用產(chǎn)業(yè)政策來(lái)主宰未來(lái)行業(yè)，而代價(jià)則是犧牲美國(guó)和其他國(guó)家的利益。

On Thursday, the Trump administration laid out its case in a 35-page report entitled “How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World.” It exhaustively details the steps Chinese officials take to protect and promote their domestic industries and disadvantage foreign competitors, including the use of government subsidies, cyberespionage and forced intellectual property transfers to Chinese companies from American and other foreign firms.

周四，特朗普政府在一份長(zhǎng)達(dá)35頁(yè)、題為《中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)侵略如何威脅美國(guó)及世界的技術(shù)和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)》(How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World)的報(bào)告中闡明了這一情況。該報(bào)告詳盡列舉了中國(guó)官員為保護(hù)和促進(jìn)國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)，并使競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手居于劣勢(shì)所采取的措施，包括利用政府補(bǔ)貼、網(wǎng)絡(luò)間諜活動(dòng)，以及強(qiáng)迫美國(guó)和其他外國(guó)公司向中國(guó)企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)讓知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)。

The United States is trying to derail China’s dominance by punishing Beijing. But it has yet to detail how it plans to build America’s dominance in industries that will power economic and job growth in the future, or cultivate what the administration officials call the “crown jewels of American technology and intellectual property.”

美國(guó)正試圖通過(guò)懲罰北京來(lái)破壞中國(guó)的優(yōu)勢(shì)，但尚未詳細(xì)說(shuō)明它將計(jì)劃如何在未來(lái)推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)和就業(yè)增長(zhǎng)的行業(yè)中建立美國(guó)的主導(dǎo)地位，或是如何培育出被政府官員稱(chēng)為“美國(guó)技術(shù)和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)皇冠上的明珠”。

Speaking with reporters on Tuesday, a senior administration official said Mr. Trump’s tariffs are designed to benefit American high-tech industries from the sort of “predation” China has used in the past.

周二，一名政府高級(jí)官員在接受記者采訪時(shí)表示，特朗普的關(guān)稅旨在通過(guò)中國(guó)曾使用過(guò)的“掠奪”行為來(lái)惠及美國(guó)的高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)。

Many economists say those steps are insufficient — and possibly counterproductive — to position American companies to compete in emerging, high-tech, globalized industries. They say the administration needs a proactive strategy to bolster American innovation and technology. That includes investing in federal research and development spending, worker skills and attracting more high-caliber foreign students to American graduate programs and fostering advanced industries such as biodefense and artificial intelligence.

許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，這些措施不足以讓美國(guó)公司在新興的全球化高科技行業(yè)中站得住腳，可能還會(huì)起反作用。他們表示，政府需要積極的戰(zhàn)略來(lái)支持美國(guó)的創(chuàng)新和技術(shù)，包括投資聯(lián)邦研發(fā)支出、工人技能，并吸引更多高素質(zhì)外國(guó)學(xué)生參與美國(guó)研究生項(xiàng)目，打造生物防衛(wèi)和人工智能等先進(jìn)行業(yè)。

Whether industries like semiconductors thrive going forward in the United States “will depend not on America’s success in curbing China’s progress, but rather on its ability to sustain and support innovation by U.S. companies,” Laura D’Andrea Tyson, a former top economic adviser to President Bill Clinton, wrote this week.

未來(lái)美國(guó)的半導(dǎo)體等行業(yè)能否茁壯成長(zhǎng)“并不取決于美國(guó)能否成功遏制中國(guó)的進(jìn)步，而在于美國(guó)維系和支持美國(guó)公司創(chuàng)新的能力”，曾任比爾·克林頓(Bill Clinton)總統(tǒng)高級(jí)經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問(wèn)的勞拉·丹德烈亞·泰森(Laura D'Andrea Tyson)本周寫(xiě)道。

Instead of targeting innovation, the administration’s policy efforts to date have focused largely on supporting legacy industries like coal mining and steel production, which have shed hundreds of thousands of jobs in recent decades, and which few economists expect to generate significant job growth in the years to come.

迄今為止，政府的政策措施主要集中支持煤炭開(kāi)采和鋼鐵制造等傳統(tǒng)行業(yè)，而非創(chuàng)新。這些行業(yè)在近幾十年內(nèi)已經(jīng)減少了數(shù)十萬(wàn)個(gè)工作崗位，也沒(méi)什么經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家預(yù)計(jì)這些行業(yè)會(huì)在未來(lái)幾年帶來(lái)顯著的就業(yè)增長(zhǎng)。

China, meanwhile, targets support to companies that demonstrate a winning strategy for growth. The government forces subsidized and protected firms to compete on the global marketplace, shutting down those that are unable to perform, said Ann Harrison, an economist who specializes in industrial policy at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School.

與此同時(shí)，中國(guó)的目標(biāo)則是支持表現(xiàn)出了成功增長(zhǎng)戰(zhàn)略的企業(yè)。賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)(University of Pennsylvania)沃頓商學(xué)院(Wharton School)專(zhuān)攻產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家安·哈里森(Ann Harrison)說(shuō)，中國(guó)政府強(qiáng)制受資助和受保護(hù)的企業(yè)參與全球市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，而那些沒(méi)有業(yè)績(jī)的企業(yè)則會(huì)被關(guān)閉。

“Firms are supported, but if it’s not working, they cut it out,” she said. “That’s really different from Trump’s industrial policy. What we’re really doing now is, we’re not supporting emerging industries. We’re bailing out failing industries.”

“公司會(huì)得到支持，但如果沒(méi)有績(jī)效，他們就會(huì)把它裁掉，”她說(shuō)。“這和特朗普的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策非常不同。我們現(xiàn)在在做的其實(shí)不是在支持新興行業(yè)，而是在救助衰退行業(yè)。”

Many experts worry the United States is not doing enough to help its own advanced industries compete — not just against China, but the rest of the world.

許多專(zhuān)家擔(dān)心美國(guó)所采取的行動(dòng)不足以幫助本國(guó)的先進(jìn)行業(yè)參與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)——不只是與中國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，而是與世界競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

Experts in artificial intelligence say the administration should push for more investment in academic and government research, instead of cutting back on scientific research across the government. They say administration immigration policies have spooked many foreign-born artificial intelligence researchers based in the United States.

人工智能領(lǐng)域的專(zhuān)家表示，政府應(yīng)增進(jìn)學(xué)術(shù)和政府研究的投資，而不是在政府內(nèi)削減科學(xué)研究。他們表示，政府的移民政策已經(jīng)嚇到了許多在外國(guó)出生但是在美國(guó)工作的人工智能研究人員。

Canada, South Korea, France and Britain have ramped up government spending in an effort to ensure that they retain and attract top talent and promote artificial intelligence research. China has unveiled a plan to become the world leader in the field and create a domestic industry worth $150 billion by 2030, committing billions of dollars to the effort.

加拿大、韓國(guó)、法國(guó)和英國(guó)為確保能留住并吸引頂尖人才、促進(jìn)人工智能研究，都已加大了政府開(kāi)支。中國(guó)也已經(jīng)公布了一項(xiàng)成為該領(lǐng)域世界領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的計(jì)劃，將在2030年前創(chuàng)造出價(jià)值1500億美元的國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)，并將為此投入數(shù)十億美元。

At the tail end of the Obama administration, the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the White House began to address the industry’s development. But after Mr. Trump took office, the office’s work in that area seemed to stagnate. The administration has yet to name a director for the office, which is currently run by its deputy chief technology officer, Michael Kratsios, who used to work with Silicon Valley venture capitalist Peter Thiel. It recently convened a meeting of companies working in artificial intelligence at the White House, in which Mr. Kratsios indicated the administration would take a hands-off approach to the industry’s development.

在奧巴馬政府的末期，白宮的科學(xué)和技術(shù)政策辦公室(Office of Science and Technology Policy)開(kāi)始關(guān)注科技行業(yè)的發(fā)展。但特朗普上臺(tái)后，該辦公室在這個(gè)領(lǐng)域的工作似乎停滯不前。特朗普尚未任命該辦公室的主管。目前，該辦公室由副首席技術(shù)官邁克爾·克拉齊奧斯(Michael Kratsios)管理，他曾與硅谷風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家彼得·蒂爾(Peter Thiel)共事。前不久，該辦公室召集人工智能公司在白宮舉行了一次會(huì)議，克拉齊奧斯在會(huì)上表示，政府將對(duì)該行業(yè)的發(fā)展采取不干涉的態(tài)度。

“If we don’t have the government setting big goals, then we will just see business as usual: The private sector will continue to optimize for its own problems, pulling people out of universities and not really giving back to government because that is not its priority,” said Jack Clark, who oversees policy for OpenAI, an independent artificial intelligence lab based in San Francisco. “Academia will get left behind and the government will have no clear mandate in this very important area.”

“如果政府不設(shè)立宏大的目標(biāo)，那么，該行業(yè)的情況會(huì)一如往常：私營(yíng)部門(mén)將繼續(xù)重點(diǎn)解決自己的問(wèn)題，把人才從大學(xué)吸引出來(lái)，不回饋政府，因?yàn)槟遣皇钦闹攸c(diǎn)考慮事項(xiàng)，”舊金山獨(dú)立人工智能實(shí)驗(yàn)室OpenAI的政策主管杰克·克拉克(Jack Clark)說(shuō)。“學(xué)術(shù)界將被拋在后面，政府在這個(gè)非常重要的領(lǐng)域?qū)](méi)有明確的授權(quán)。”

The United States has a long history of industrial policy, including the Obama administration’s bailout of the automotive industry during the financial crisis and its subsequent efforts to foster advanced manufacturing.

美國(guó)的工業(yè)政策歷史悠久，奧巴馬政府在金融危機(jī)期間對(duì)汽車(chē)行業(yè)進(jìn)行了救助，隨后又為培育先進(jìn)制造業(yè)做出了努力。

“We sought to have a strategic focus,” said Gene Sperling, who directed the National Economic Council for much of the Obama administration, “that did accept that there were strong positive impacts for innovation and jobs in not just protecting the manufacturing base — as was done with the auto rescue — but making the U.S. the attractive place to build what comes next in manufacturing as well.”

“我們希望有一個(gè)戰(zhàn)略重點(diǎn)，”在奧巴馬政府的大部分時(shí)間領(lǐng)導(dǎo)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)委員會(huì)(National Economic Council)的吉恩·斯珀林(Gene Sperling)說(shuō)。“它的確會(huì)對(duì)創(chuàng)新和工作機(jī)會(huì)產(chǎn)生強(qiáng)烈的積極影響，不僅能保護(hù)制造業(yè)根基——例如對(duì)汽車(chē)行業(yè)的救助——而且能使美國(guó)成為吸引未來(lái)制造業(yè)的地方。”

Policymakers in Washington have a large array of tools to tilt the economic playing field to help particular industries. Mr. Trump signed a tax law in December that reduced the corporate tax rate to 21 percent, a move that disproportionately helped banks and real estate companies. He has relaxed regulations for fossil fuel exploration and other industries. But he has not singled out emerging growth industries for support, as Mr. Obama did.

華盛頓的政策制定者擁有大量工具，可以改變經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境，幫助特定的行業(yè)。去年12月，特朗普簽署了一項(xiàng)稅法，將公司稅稅率降至21%，這項(xiàng)政策對(duì)銀行和房地產(chǎn)公司特別有利。他放松了對(duì)化石燃料勘探等行業(yè)的監(jiān)管。但他并沒(méi)有像奧巴馬那樣，挑出打算支持的新興增長(zhǎng)行業(yè)。

That is not China’s approach.

中國(guó)的做法不是這樣的。

Trump administration officials outlined 53 examples of China’s “economic aggression” that they contend have lifted the Chinese to domination of traditional manufacturing and positioned China to beat the world in industries like artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles and blockchain technology.

特朗普政府的官員們列舉了中國(guó)“經(jīng)濟(jì)侵略”的53個(gè)例子。他們認(rèn)為，這些侵略行為使中國(guó)在傳統(tǒng)制造業(yè)中占據(jù)了主導(dǎo)地位，并使中國(guó)在人工智能、自動(dòng)駕駛汽車(chē)和區(qū)塊鏈技術(shù)等行業(yè)立于不敗之地。

The administration is trying to counter that rise with tariffs, and it also supports a bipartisan bill moving through Congress that would give the federal government greater leeway to block Chinese investments in American companies, a practice that the administration official called “colonization by purchase.”

特朗普政府正試圖通過(guò)提高關(guān)稅來(lái)抵制中國(guó)的上升趨勢(shì)，并支持國(guó)會(huì)通過(guò)一項(xiàng)兩黨共同提出的法案，該法案將賦予聯(lián)邦政府更大的回旋余地，阻止中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)企業(yè)進(jìn)行投資。特朗普政府官員稱(chēng)，中國(guó)的投資是“通過(guò)收購(gòu)進(jìn)行殖民”。

Many economists and lawmakers applaud the administration’s efforts to crack down on Chinese intellectual property theft.

許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和議員贊賞特朗普政府打擊中國(guó)盜竊知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)行為的努力。

Fighting Chinese intellectual property theft is critical to supporting American industries. “It is something that is very real,” said Chang-Tai Hsieh, an economist who focuses on growth and development issues at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business. “It happens all the time. It is generally viewed by many of these firms as just the way you do business in China.”

打擊中國(guó)的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)盜竊行為對(duì)支持美國(guó)的產(chǎn)業(yè)至關(guān)重要。“這是非常真實(shí)的事，”芝加哥大學(xué)(University of Chicago)布思商學(xué)院(Booth School of Business)關(guān)注增長(zhǎng)和發(fā)展問(wèn)題的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家謝昌泰(Chang-Tai Hsieh)說(shuō)，“這種事一直在發(fā)生。這些公司中的很多人普遍認(rèn)為，這是在中國(guó)做生意的方式。”

But he said that fight may be best waged in American courtrooms, not trade negotiations, and that the administration may have missed a potential victory on that front by recently deciding to soften penalties on Chinese smartphone maker ZTE.

但他表示，這種斗爭(zhēng)最好在美國(guó)的法庭上進(jìn)行，而不是通過(guò)貿(mào)易談判，特朗普政府前不久決定減輕對(duì)中國(guó)智能手機(jī)制造商中興通訊的處罰，可能錯(cuò)失了在這條陣線上獲勝的機(jī)會(huì)。

The Commerce Department had previously barred the company from selling into the United States for seven years because of violations of American sanctions. That earlier decision, Mr. Hsieh said, had Chinese companies “terrified.”

此前，美國(guó)商務(wù)部曾因違反美國(guó)制裁規(guī)定，禁止該公司在七年內(nèi)向美國(guó)銷(xiāo)售產(chǎn)品。謝昌泰表示，早前的這項(xiàng)決定令中國(guó)企業(yè)“感到恐懼”。