對(duì)抗中國(guó)的高科技野心，美國(guó)也需要“衛(wèi)星時(shí)刻”

At the heart of the trade war between the United States and China lies a profound and unsettling question: Who should control the key technologies that will rule tomorrow?

美中貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的核心存在著一個(gè)深刻而令人不安的問(wèn)題：由誰(shuí)來(lái)控制將在未來(lái)占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位的關(guān)鍵技術(shù)?

These advances could alter everything about how we live and work. Shouldn’t some other entity, like maybe a democratically elected government, have some input in their rollout?

這些進(jìn)步可能改變我們的全部生活與工作方式。其他一些實(shí)體，例如民主選舉出來(lái)的政府，是否應(yīng)該在它們的起始階段做一些投入?

Here is a crazy idea. The United States could outline a plan for and put money behind an alternative vision for the global technology industry. If executed carefully, such a plan could stimulate wider competition in tech, and allow for broader economic and social gains. Perhaps a whole set of new companies, rather than just the giants you are used to, could plan a role in the future.

我有個(gè)瘋狂的想法。美國(guó)可以為全球科技產(chǎn)業(yè)的另一個(gè)愿景制定計(jì)劃，并為其提供資金。如果這樣一個(gè)計(jì)劃被認(rèn)真執(zhí)行，它還可以刺激更廣泛的科技競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，得到更廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)收益。也許在未來(lái)扮演重要角色的是一整套新公司，而不僅僅是你熟悉的那些巨頭。

Does this sound un-American? It should not. Not long ago, when Americans faced the possibility of being left behind by other countries’ advancing tech, the federal government stepped in with nearly endless resources to stimulate the creation of vast new industries.

這聽(tīng)起來(lái)很不美國(guó)嗎?就應(yīng)該這樣。不久前，當(dāng)美國(guó)人在先進(jìn)科技領(lǐng)域面臨被其他國(guó)家超過(guò)的可能性時(shí)，聯(lián)邦政府介入其中，動(dòng)用了幾乎是無(wú)限的資源來(lái)刺激創(chuàng)造大量新興產(chǎn)業(yè)。

Thanks to government funding, we got the nuclear industry, the space program, the aviation industry and the internet, which was initially sponsored by the Defense Department. Just about every key component in a smartphone, from the battery to GPS, is based on research first done for the U.S. government. It is not an understatement to say that, for better or worse, the U.S. government invented the modern world.

由于政府資助，我們有了核工業(yè)、太空計(jì)劃、航空業(yè)和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)，它們最初是由國(guó)防部贊助的。從電池到GPS，智能手機(jī)中的幾乎每個(gè)關(guān)鍵部件都是基于最早由美國(guó)政府進(jìn)行的研究。毫不保守地說(shuō)，無(wú)論好壞，是美國(guó)政府發(fā)明了現(xiàn)代世界。

But today in the United States, venture capitalists and multinational corporations lead the development of — and will own — tomorrow’s technologies. Meanwhile, the Chinese government is playing the role the United States once did. Over the past decade, China has pushed an aggressive series of plans meant to gain dominance in technological areas it considers crucial to the global economy.

但在今天的美國(guó)，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家和跨國(guó)公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)著未來(lái)技術(shù)的發(fā)展，并且還將擁有這些技術(shù)。與此同時(shí)，中國(guó)政府正在扮演美國(guó)曾經(jīng)扮演的角色。在過(guò)去十年中，中國(guó)推出了一系列積極的計(jì)劃，希望在它認(rèn)為對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)至關(guān)重要的技術(shù)領(lǐng)域內(nèi)獲得主導(dǎo)地位。

One program, Made in China 2025, outlines a road map for China to become a world leader in advanced manufacturing (things like robotics, aircraft and machine tools). Another plan calls for China to achieve dominance in artificial intelligence. Based on similar initiatives, the Chinese have already seen big wins. Americans invented the modern solar power industry, but thanks to Chinese government intervention, China’s solar industry leads the world. So does its high-speed rail system.

其中一個(gè)項(xiàng)目《中國(guó)制造2025》繪制了中國(guó)成為先進(jìn)制造業(yè)(機(jī)器人、飛機(jī)和機(jī)床等)世界領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的藍(lán)圖。另一項(xiàng)計(jì)劃要求中國(guó)在人工智能方面取得優(yōu)勢(shì)。基于類(lèi)似的舉措，中國(guó)人已經(jīng)看到了巨大的勝利前景。美國(guó)人發(fā)明了現(xiàn)代太陽(yáng)能產(chǎn)業(yè)，但由于中國(guó)政府的干預(yù)，中國(guó)的太陽(yáng)能產(chǎn)業(yè)目前已在世界領(lǐng)先。它的高鐵系統(tǒng)也是如此。

The Trump administration objects to China’s tech visions. It has cited Chinese government support for tech as a primary reason for imposing tariffs on Chinese goods. But its objections only put the disconnect in stark relief. If the United States is worried that the Chinese will win the future because they are actually spending money to win the future, why aren’t we doing the same?

特朗普政府反對(duì)中國(guó)的技術(shù)愿景。它以中國(guó)政府對(duì)科技的支持為理由，對(duì)中國(guó)商品征收關(guān)稅。但它的反對(duì)只能令這種脫節(jié)更加顯而易見(jiàn)。如果美國(guó)擔(dān)心中國(guó)人會(huì)贏得未來(lái)，因?yàn)樗麄儗?shí)際上是靠花錢(qián)贏得未來(lái)，那么為什么我們不這樣做呢?

“It is a waste that we are not using the rise of China as a galvanizing cry to invest more in science and technology in America,” said Yasheng Huang, an economist who studies Chinese politics and business at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Sloan School of Management. He has argued that rather than imposing tariffs to respond to programs like Made in China 2025, Americans should respond as we did in 1957, when we sharply increased government spending on science after the Soviet Union launched the world’s first man-made satellite, Sputnik 1.

“我們并沒(méi)有把中國(guó)的崛起作為一種激勵(lì)的吶喊，要求美國(guó)對(duì)科技進(jìn)行更多投入，這是在浪費(fèi)機(jī)會(huì)，”麻省理工學(xué)院斯隆管理學(xué)院(Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Sloan School of Management)研究中國(guó)政治和商業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家黃亞生說(shuō)。他認(rèn)為，為了應(yīng)對(duì)《中國(guó)制造2025》這樣的計(jì)劃，美國(guó)應(yīng)該像1957年蘇聯(lián)發(fā)射世界上第一顆人造衛(wèi)星斯普特尼克一號(hào)的時(shí)候那樣，大量增加政府在科學(xué)方面的開(kāi)支，而不是通過(guò)征收關(guān)稅。

You might argue that the modern world bears little resemblance to the Sputnik era. Today, we have vibrant tech industry. Amazon, Apple, Google, Facebook, Microsoft and lots of venture capitalists are already investing heavily in the future. Why should the government step in?

你可能會(huì)說(shuō)現(xiàn)代世界與蘇聯(lián)人造衛(wèi)星的時(shí)代幾乎沒(méi)有相似之處。今天，我們有充滿(mǎn)活力的科技產(chǎn)業(yè)。亞馬遜、蘋(píng)果、谷歌、Facebook、微軟和許多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家已經(jīng)為未來(lái)投入巨資。政府為什么要介入?

But that is a shortsighted view. Huang points out that the established tech industry is mainly funding the most immediately applicable technologies. “Life science and software get a lot of money,” he said.

但這是一個(gè)短視的觀點(diǎn)。黃亞生指出，成熟的科技產(chǎn)業(yè)主要是為最能直接應(yīng)用的技術(shù)提供資金。“生命科學(xué)和軟件行業(yè)獲得了大量資金，”他說(shuō)。

More speculative technologies that don’t offer any obvious payoff are not as lucky. “Everything else is underfunded,” Huang said, noting that as a percentage of the overall economy, federal spending on research and development has fallen since the 1970s.

更多沒(méi)有任何明顯收益的投機(jī)性技術(shù)則不是那么走運(yùn)。“其他所有領(lǐng)域都資金不足，”黃亞生說(shuō)，他指出，自1970年代以來(lái)，聯(lián)邦政府在研發(fā)方面的支出占整體經(jīng)濟(jì)的百分比一直下降。

But beyond simply opening the spigot to more money, we should push the U.S. government to create an alternative to China’s vision for tech dominance for another reason: It would be a way to develop a more accessible tech industry.

但是除了簡(jiǎn)單地投入更多資金之外，我們應(yīng)該為了另一個(gè)理由，推動(dòng)美國(guó)政府創(chuàng)造一種中國(guó)主導(dǎo)科技領(lǐng)域之外的愿景：這種方式能夠發(fā)展更容易為人們所享用的科技產(chǎn)業(yè)。

One huge problem with today’s tech business is the unequal way it distributes its gains. Tech advances have created immense wealth, but much of the money has gone to just a small number of people clustered around two cities on the West Coast. Now — as we are suddenly realizing the power that tech giants can exercise over politics, news, our psyches and other basic aspects of democracy — there is a real question about whether they face any meaningful challenge to their rise.

如今，科技產(chǎn)業(yè)的一個(gè)巨大問(wèn)題是分配收益的方式不平等。技術(shù)進(jìn)步創(chuàng)造了巨大的財(cái)富，但是大部分資金只流向聚集在西海岸兩個(gè)城市里的少數(shù)人。現(xiàn)在，我們突然意識(shí)到科技巨頭對(duì)政治、新聞、我們的心理以及民主的其他基本方面擁有何其巨大的影響力，而這些人在崛起過(guò)程中能否得到真正意義上的挑戰(zhàn)，這成了一個(gè)真正的問(wèn)題。

Government spending can help there, too. When the government creates tech, its gains tend to be spread widely. The internet is the open system it is today because it was sponsored by the government, not private telecom giants like AT&T. The GPS satellite system is available to anyone who wants to use it because taxpayers paid for it. The same can be true of much of what we invent tomorrow. If the U.S. government decided to plan for the future, rather than sit on the sideline as it came to pass, it could spur the development of the same kind of decentralized, open tech infrastructure that fostered today’s miracles.

政府支出也可以在這個(gè)領(lǐng)域發(fā)揮作用。當(dāng)政府創(chuàng)造技術(shù)時(shí)，其收益往往會(huì)得到廣泛傳播?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)成為如今這樣的開(kāi)放系統(tǒng)，是因?yàn)樗怯烧Y助的，而不是像AT&T這樣的私人電信巨頭。任何人都可以使用GPS衛(wèi)星系統(tǒng)，這是由于納稅人為此付費(fèi)。我們未來(lái)發(fā)明的大部分東西也可以是這樣。如果美國(guó)政府決心為未來(lái)做好準(zhǔn)備，而不是坐在場(chǎng)外，任憑未來(lái)在眼前溜走，那么它應(yīng)該刺激一種去中心的、開(kāi)放的技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的發(fā)展，當(dāng)初正是這種做法促進(jìn)了今天的奇跡。

It is a matter not just of access but of agency, too. Many of the technologies that will dominate the future could change life in substantial ways. Artificial intelligence and robotics could reshape labor markets and much else about how Americans work. Energy technologies might transform your city. Yet we really have no good way to prepare for these changes.

這不僅關(guān)乎技術(shù)的享用，也關(guān)乎技術(shù)的作用。許多將主導(dǎo)未來(lái)的技術(shù)可以在很大程度上改變生活。人工智能和機(jī)器人技術(shù)可以重塑勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)以及美國(guó)人的工作方式。能源技術(shù)可能會(huì)改變你的城市。然而，我們目前真的沒(méi)有什么好的辦法為這些變化做好準(zhǔn)備。