哥本哈根峰會的失落與收獲

哥本哈根氣候峰會將無助于進一步促進環(huán)保技術的投資。

The Copenhagen climate summit will do little to spur further investment in environmental technologies.

鑒于該過程的核心部分存在根本性的缺陷，這點不足為奇：減少全球二氧化碳排放量的談判的前提是這些國家產(chǎn)生了多少二氧化碳，而非他們消費了什么。

That's hardly surprising given the fundamental flaw at the heart of the process: Negotiations to reduce global carbon dioxide emissions were premised on how much of the gas nations produce, rather than what they consume.

發(fā)展中國家擔心，要求它們減排可能是發(fā)達國家貿(mào)易保護主義的詭計。一個國家的減排如果是通過依靠進口減少了當?shù)氐亩趸寂欧帕繉崿F(xiàn)的，那么它意味著另一個國家的排放量的增加，世界氣候并沒有從中得益。

Industrializing countries feared the emissions curbs being demanded of them were a protectionist ruse by the developed world. One country's production cuts, if achieved by reducing local CO2 emissions by relying on imports, is another country's production increase, with no gain for the world's climate.

由世界上最大的工業(yè)國家炮制出來的不具約束力的協(xié)議看來是懷疑彼此動機和越來越不信任預測全球變暖科學的國家所能達成的最小公分母。

The non-binding accord cooked up by the world's biggest industrial nations looks like the lowest common denominator you would expect from countries skeptical of each others' motives and increasingly mistrustful of the science that predicts global warming.

對于投資者和商界領袖來說，可以幫助他們預測二氧化碳成本的國際監(jiān)管框架未能進一步明確。這種確定性對于評價環(huán)保項目的投資價值，以達到聯(lián)合國建議的減排目標至關重要。

For investors and business leaders, there is no extra clarity on an international regulatory framework that might help them predict the cost of CO2. Such certainty is critical for evaluating the investment merits of environmental projects to meet the emission reductions advised by the United Nations.

麥肯錫(McKinsey)曾預測，到2020年，這部分開支可能高達5,300億歐元（7597.6億美元），而2030年增加到8,100億歐元。

McKinsey has forecast such spending might amount to as much as 530 billion euros (9.76 billion) a year by 2020 and 810 billion euros by 2030.

歐盟擁有世界上最先進的排放交易體系，它的二氧化碳價格約為每噸14歐元，不到讓許多低排放項目具有經(jīng)濟可行性所需價格的一半。歐洲嚴重的經(jīng)濟衰退加之過于慷慨地發(fā)放交易許可證破壞了通過含稅碳定價削減碳排放的市場化做法所應該具有的優(yōu)勢，即帶來了更加可預測的結(jié)果。

The price of CO2 in the European Union, which has the world's most advanced emissions trading system, is around 14 euros a metric ton, less than half the level necessary to make many low-emission projects viable. The combination of the severe European recession, coupled with too generous issuance of trading permits, has undermined the perceived advantage of a market-based approach to carbon reduction over tax-based carbon pricing: that it leads to more predictable outcomes.

更重要的是，歐盟對二氧化碳交易制度的規(guī)劃只延續(xù)到2020年，而發(fā)電站等許多二氧化碳密集型項目的使用壽命遠遠超過這個年限，這就造成了另一個問題。

What's more, EU planning for the CO2 trading regime extends only to 2020, another problem when many CO2-intensive capital projects, like power stations, have far longer lives.

然而，各方都不是輸家。歐洲的好消息是，二氧化碳的底價正在通過新的碳稅得以建立。

Still, all isn't lost. The good news in Europe is that a floor price for CO2 is being established through new carbon taxes.

歐盟委員會正在尋求設立地區(qū)范圍內(nèi)的排放稅，以將目前游離在排放交易體系之外的二氧化碳排放者納入其中，但越來越多的歐洲國家都已開始單方面征稅。

The European Commission is seeking a region-wide tax to catch CO2 emitters currently exempt from the emissions trading system, but European states are increasingly putting levies in place unilaterally.

上述舉動的動機可能更多地是籌集資金來彌補捉襟見肘的政府預算，而不是減少全球變暖，但它對促進歐洲綠色投資的作用可能還要大過哥本哈根的緊張氣氛。

Raising money to pay for stretched government budgets may be the motivation rather than reducing global warming, but it may do more to spur green investment in Europe than all the hot air in Copenhagen.