金融英語(yǔ)第二十三講亞洲金融危機(jī) （一）

所屬教程:金融英語(yǔ)世界

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Lesson 23 金融世界第二十三講亞洲金融危機(jī) （一）

這一講我們要跟您談?wù)劧兰o(jì)末發(fā)生在亞洲的金融危機(jī)。

金融世界第二十三講
亞洲金融危機(jī) （一）
這一講我們要跟您談?wù)劧兰o(jì)末發(fā)生在亞洲的金融危機(jī)。

澳洲廣播電臺(tái)金融節(jié)目主持人巴里克拉克首先介紹了這場(chǎng)亞洲金融風(fēng)暴是如何爆發(fā)的。他在談話中使用了這樣一些詞匯：

1 overseas creditors 海外債權(quán)人
2 international capital flows 國(guó)際資本流動(dòng)
3 short-term capital 短期資本
4 herd behavior 群體恐慌行為

巴里克拉克說(shuō)：

The crisis became evident in July, 1997. Overseas creditors began withdrawing short-term capital from the region, placing intense pressure on the exchange rates for the currencies of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea.

These five countries had been heavily dependent on international capital flows. In 1996, there was an inflow of $US 93 billion. But a year later the flow was reversed. In 1997 there was an outflow of $12 billion.

As capital was withdrawn from the region and the exchange rates of the five countries depreciated, or fell, panic set in amongst foreign creditors.

The result was a deepening spiral. As capital was withdrawn, the exchange rate depreciated, leading to more capital outflows.

Economists call these panics 'herd behaviour'; where the creditors in a market all rush, or stampede, for the exit, trying to get out first.

Usually, their behaviour is not based on the real underlying economic conditions in the market (the fundamentals), but rather on the behaviour and expected behaviour of other creditors.

接下來(lái)我們把巴里克拉克的這段談話及中文翻譯分段聽(tīng)一遍：（英文略）

這場(chǎng)危機(jī)在一九九七年七月變得顯而易見(jiàn)。海外債權(quán)人開(kāi)始從這一地區(qū)撤出短期資本，使泰國(guó)、印尼、馬來(lái)西亞、菲律賓和韓國(guó)這五國(guó)貨幣的兌換率受到極大壓力。

這五國(guó)都嚴(yán)重依賴國(guó)際資本的注入。一九九六年，流入這些國(guó)家的資本是九百三十億美元，但一年之后資本的流向逆轉(zhuǎn)。一九九七年時(shí)有一百二十億美元的資本流出。

隨著資本撤出這一地區(qū)以及五國(guó)的貨幣匯率下調(diào)或跌落，外國(guó)債權(quán)人開(kāi)始感到恐慌。

其結(jié)果是惡性循環(huán)。隨著資本的撤出，匯率下跌，導(dǎo)致更多的資本流出。

經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家稱這種恐慌是群體恐慌行為，就是市場(chǎng)上的債權(quán)人全都蜂擁或驚慌地要搶先退出市場(chǎng)。

通常他們不是根據(jù)市場(chǎng)的基本經(jīng)濟(jì)條件（根本準(zhǔn)則）來(lái)采取行動(dòng)，而是根據(jù)其他債權(quán)人的行為或是預(yù)計(jì)的行為來(lái)采取行。

接下來(lái)我們把巴里克拉克的這段談話原文再完整聽(tīng)一遍。（略）

二十世紀(jì)末亞洲的這場(chǎng)金融風(fēng)暴爆發(fā)之迅速，破壞之嚴(yán)重，令經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家目瞪口呆。澳洲廣播電臺(tái)金融節(jié)目主持人巴里克拉克接下來(lái)分析了這場(chǎng)金融風(fēng)暴的部分起因：

If financial panics are not new, the Asian crisis came as a complete surprise to virtually all commentators. After all, the five Asian countries had shown remarkable growth in output, employment, productivity and exports over the past 20 years.

Warning signs became apparent from 1996, as these countries faced increased competition from China and Mexico in markets for manufacturing exports. Growth rates began to slow. But the real problem lay in their reliance on short-term capital flows from overseas. This capital can be moved quite quickly in and out of an economy. Economists call such flows 'indirect foreign investment' to distinguish them from longer term or 'direct foreign investment'.

While the five countries had deregulated their financial systems, increasing the number of banks and the ease of foreign borrowing, there was inadequate regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Indeed, in some cases, banks were allowed to break regulations on lending. The degree of risk in borrowing was seriously underestimated. Their exchange rates were also mildly overvalued as they targeted the US dollar.

These policy errors contributed to produce a fragile financial system - one which was vulnerable to a rapid reversal of capital flows. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the 1997 panic cannot be explained by the extent of the policy errors. Foreign creditors had a superficial understanding of the long-term prospects of the region, which meant that their behaviour was subject to wild swings.

下面我們分段聽(tīng)一遍巴里克拉克的談話和中文翻譯：（英文略）

如果說(shuō)金融恐慌并不新奇的話，這場(chǎng)亞洲金融危機(jī)卻大大出乎所有專家學(xué)者的意外。這五個(gè)亞洲國(guó)家過(guò)去二十年中畢竟在產(chǎn)量、就業(yè)、生產(chǎn)力和出口方面表現(xiàn)出了引人注目的增長(zhǎng)。

從一九九六年開(kāi)始，隨著這些國(guó)家在制造業(yè)出口市場(chǎng)上面臨著來(lái)自中國(guó)和墨西哥不斷增加的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，危險(xiǎn)信號(hào)變得清晰可見(jiàn)，增長(zhǎng)速度放緩。但是真正的麻煩在于這些國(guó)家對(duì)于海外短期資本的依賴。這種資本能夠非常迅速地流入或流出一個(gè)國(guó)家。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家稱這種資本是“間接外國(guó)投資”，以區(qū)別于長(zhǎng)期的或“直接外國(guó)投資”。

這五個(gè)國(guó)家解除了對(duì)金融系統(tǒng)的管制，增加了銀行的數(shù)目，放松了國(guó)際借貸，但同時(shí)卻缺乏對(duì)金融機(jī)構(gòu)恰當(dāng)?shù)墓芾砗捅O(jiān)督。實(shí)際上，它們有時(shí)允許銀行違反規(guī)定借出貸款。借貸中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)被嚴(yán)重低估。這些國(guó)家的貨幣與美元實(shí)行固定匯率也使它們的匯率梢許偏高。

這些政策上的錯(cuò)誤成為形成一個(gè)脆弱的金融體系的因素。這一體系難以防范資本流向的迅速逆轉(zhuǎn)。然而一九九七年亞洲金融恐慌的嚴(yán)重性卻無(wú)法用這些政策性錯(cuò)誤的程度來(lái)加以解釋。外國(guó)債權(quán)人對(duì)這一地區(qū)的長(zhǎng)期前景只有很膚淺的認(rèn)識(shí)，這意味著他們的行為會(huì)隨著市場(chǎng)盲目的動(dòng)蕩而變化。

接下來(lái)我們把巴里克拉克的這段談話再連起來(lái)聽(tīng)一遍。（略）

在這一講的最后，我們把巴里克拉克有關(guān)亞洲金融危機(jī)的第一段談話再聽(tīng)一遍。（略）

各位朋友，這一講由澳洲廣播電臺(tái)中文部為您制作的金融世界節(jié)目到這里就結(jié)束了。